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Introduction

I
This book treats the history of the English criminal trial jury from its
origins to the eve of the Victorian reforms in the criminal law. It consists
of eight free-standing essays on important aspects of that history and a
conclusion. Each chapter addresses the phenomenon that has come to be
known as "jury nullification," the exercise of jury discretion in favor of
a defendant whom the jury nonetheless believes to have committed the
act with which he is charged. Historically, some instances of nullification
reflect the jury's view that the act in question is not unlawful, while in
other cases the jury does not quarrel with the law but believes that the
prescribed sanction is too severe. Order is imposed on the book not by
time but by a unity of concern. This approach trades the continuity of a
comprehensive narrative for a more detailed treatment of issues and
events of particular significance.
With one exception, these essays are not concerned with establishing
the fact of nullification. No one who has studied the history of criminal
law doubts that on occasion this practice occurs. (Indeed, the practice is
a central topic in many of the important studies of the social history of
crime that have appeared in recent years.) What interests me most is not
the persistence of nullification but its imp_act through time on the
substantive law, on the administration of the law, and on the ways in
which Englishmen-officials, jurists, and laymen-thought about both the
jury and the law. It is on these aspects that I focus, and it is that focus that
makes the book (at least in the author's mind) a general social and
intellectual history of an important element of English criminal law.
In writing this book I have been aided by scholarship on the history of
criminal law, and at times I draw heavily on such work. Some of my most
important intellectual debts are to those with whom I disagree. This will
be clear at a number of points where I state how my own view of the
criminal law-of its administration and place in English culture-differs
from that of those who have gone before. I hope that the reader will be
stimulated by these disagreements and will find my citations to the recent
scholarship that relates to each chapter useful. More generally, I am
aware that the story I am telling cannot be told fully without a great deal
xiii
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more attention to many matters that, given the particular focus of each
chapter, I barely touch. If this book provides a framework within which
broader discussion of the subjects I treat can be placed, or if it stimulates
scholars interested in those subjects to test the plausibility of the
framework I advance, it will have served its purpose.
The separate chapters in this volume represent different styles of
historical writing. The problem I examine is best approached through the
study of official and lay commentary on the jury specifically, and on the
criminal law in general. That literature is, of course, very sparse before
the sixteenth century. Thus, early chapters draw upon medieval trial
records, in the traditional mode of legal history, whereas the later
chapters depend on texts of a kind familiar to readers of political and
intellectual history. Moreover, parts of both early and late chapters are
best described as historical sociology of the kind that characterizes much
recent writing on the history of crime. By and large, I have not sought to
minimize these differences in approach and tone.
Some readers may find the transitions both in subject matter and
approach more than a little jarring. We are used to such differences
between books, not between chapters in one book by a single author. My
own view is that the analysis of most historical problems requires a
variety of approaches and that historians may fail to exploit their subjects
fully if they insist on a single approach or a satisfyingly consistent voice.
This is particularly true with regard to legal history; for the development
of legal doctrines and institutions is in part a matter of internal logic, in
part a matter of the relationship between institutions and society, and in
part a matter of pervasive cultural attitudes. But there is, I concede,
another, more personal point. Simply put, I enjoy trying my hand at
different kinds of historical scholarship. The justification I have given
stands, but it is a fair criticism that, where there may be conflict between
my readers' sensibilities and my own, I have consistently erred on the
side of self-indulgence.
The essentially hybrid nature of this book is revealed in yet another
way. I have tried to present a unified (if tentative and partial) account of
the history of the criminal trial jury that will profit specialists and lay
readers alike. The former will find some of the bridge material unnecessary; the latter will not wish to pursue some specific subjects quite
so far as the text and copious footnotes pursue them. It is hoped that
readers will make the use of this book that their personal interests dictate
without feeling it necessary to focus on material presented for the
convenience of other readers.
A final note: The history of the criminal law, long (and I sometimes
think, mercifully) neglected, now boasts nearly as many scholars as there
ever have been justices of the peace. Even criminals undetected in their
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own day, long since dead and resting peacefully, are hunted down,
classified, quantified, and correlated-treated less respectfully, all in all,
than those caught, convicted, hanged, and dissected. In the next several
years, scores of articles and upward of a dozen books will be published
dealing with the English criminal law before 1850. The present study
makes reference to many recent and forthcoming works, but it attempts
no definitive listing of the literature in this rapidly changing field. Instead,
I have been guided throughout by an effort to make use of, and to cite,
those very recent works that bear most importantly on the episodes in the
history of the criminal trial jury that I treat in greatest detail.

II
Most of the chapters in this volume are self-contained and can be read on
their own. To aid the reader whose interests are selective I have tried to
place each essay within the context of the unfolding story that the book
relates. This necessarily entails some repetition for those who read the
story straight through.
A brief summary of contents may serve to guide those whose concerns
lie in a specific period or aspect of legal history, or whose curiosity about
the jury, though more general, falls short of an obsession. Chapter 1 is an
introduction to the institutional setting of the medieval criminal trial jury.
Resting almost exclusively on secondary writings, it offers an interpretation of how changing institutional arrangements paved the way for the
jury to play an active, albeit de facto, discretionary role. Jury discretion
was most common in cases of sudden, unplanned homicides and in thefts
that did not involve physical violence or housebreaking. In these cases,
which had been settled by "composition" in pre-Angevin times, juries
frequently manipulated the fact-finding process to prevent the imposition
of capital punishment. They thus blunted the impact of the Angevin
reforms, accommodating those reforms to long-held social concepts of
liability and just deserts. Chapter 2 further explores this subject through
an extensive empirical analysis of jury behavior in homicide cases. The
law of homicide is the focus partly because of the relative richness of the
extant evidence and partly because in homicide cases, unlike theft, jury
discretion reflected opposition not merely to the level of sanction but also
to the rules of the substantive law itself. Although homicides decreased
over the centuries covered in this study, in the medieval period they were
common and made up a very large percentage of the court agenda. As I
shall show, the jury's role in homicide cases shaped the way people
thought about what the jury was supposed to do. The influence of the
jury's role in homicide long outlived the period of frequent homicide
prosecutions and was felt in other areas of the law.

xvi
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The impact of jury behavior on the evolution of the substantive law in
the medieval period is the subject of Chapter 3. This important aspect of
the relationship between law and society is one to which historians have
seldom attended and one which readers not trained in law understandably
find very difficult. I have tried to minimize the difficulties while giving the
history of homicide doctrine its due. My hypothesis is that the relationship between law and society was one of constant interaction: the
evolution of jury discretion reflected the influence of legal institutions and
ideas that were themselves at least in part the by-product of jury-based
discretion. Moreover, one of the few indices of the societal reaction to
jury behavior in the medieval period is the approach that officials who
were aware of that behavior took in the elaboration and application of the
law. Although the central subject matter of Chapters 2 and 3 is the law of
homicide, I have drawn inferences from developments in that sphere to
elucidate similar developments in theft, the other common felony where
jury discretion was frequent. I also discuss the relationship between the
particular kind of jury behavior that I am describing in Part I and the
administration of the medieval criminal law generally. Jury nullification of
the law of sanctions, I suggest, was accommodated by authorities who did
not foresee the long-run implications of their acquiescence in this relatively benign form of jury-based intervention.
Chapter 4 deals with changes both in procedure and in substantive law
in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. These changes involved
the decline of the self-informing jury, the rise of the prosecution, and the
development, for the first time in English history, of effective means for
controlling the criminal trial jury. The question I am concerned with is
how these developments affected the role and impact of jury-based
discretion. The chapter argues that authorities used their new powers
selectively and, having to some extent tamed the jury, continued to
acquiesce in a substantial amount of jury discretion which the bench saw
as harmless. The result was that while authorities provoked a reaction to
their attempts at jury control in some kinds of cases, for the most part
they further sanctified the ancient tradition of jury "law-finding." This
argument requires me to establish the relationships among many early
modern developments in the administration of the criminal law. Thus,
Chapter 4, like Chapter l, may be read as an interpretive overview and
introduction to the two chapters that follow it.
Those chapters (5 and 6) deal with the emergence and maturation of the
claim that the jury has the right to "find law." These matters require an
understanding of how seventeenth-century writers viewed both the history of the jury and the place of the criminal trial jury in the English
constitution. Chapter 5 focuses on Interregnum (mainly Leveller) ideas
concerning law-finding. I discuss those ideas against the background of
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the 1649 and 1653 trials of John Lilburne, and in the light of the tracts that
those trials provoked. Although some pamphleteers argued against the
legitimacy of the judiciary and for comprehensive jury law-finding, by the
mid-1650s the dominant pro-jury position accepted the judiciary as the
ordinary interpreters of the law. The jury's law-finding role was to nullify
judicial instructions in those (presumably rare) cases where the instructions, in the eyes of the jury, clashed with the "true" English common
law. Chapter 6 deals with Restoration thought regarding the right of the
jury to be free from judicial coercion. The centerpiece of the chapter's
lengthy narrative is Chief Justice Vaughan's famous opinion in Bushel's
Case (1670-71), in which Vaughan held such coercion to be unlawful. I
attempt to establish the relationship between the law-finding tradition and
Vaughan's opinion. To put it simply, Vaughan steered clear of that
tradition, but his opinion was subsequently glossed and appropriated by
late-Restoration proponents of the law-finding jury. These two chapters
introduce a major focus of the second half of the book, the ideological
relationship between the jury's "merciful" role in routine felonies, where
the community's quarrel was rather more with the capital sanction than
with the definition of crimes, and the jury's more dramatic nullifying role
in some political cases, where elements in the community viewed the law
itself as an aspect of governmental tyranny.
The last part of this book carries the story down to the early nineteenth
century. Chapter 7 begins with another overview, a brief discussion of
changes in the administration of the criminal law in the century following
the Glorious Revolution. There is now a substantial literature dealing with
the criminal trial and the administration of the criminal law in the
eighteenth century, and my own work ought to be read in conjunction
with that literature. The emphasis in Chapter 7 is on the way in which
some contemporaries viewed the role of the jury in routine felonies. As is
well known, many English jurists and lay writers who were influenced by
the Continental movement for law reform became critics of jury-based
mitigation. Yet, if I am correct, these critics, reflecting certain distinctively English ideas about the criminal law, lent some support to jurybased mitigation even as they argued for a criminal justice system in
which such jury behavior would be unnecessary.
In Chapter 8, the last of the essay chapters, I address the political and
legal struggle in the eighteenth century surrounding the law of seditious
libel. The celebrated criminal libel trials of this period became the
occasion for a wide-ranging debate over the jury's right to find law as well
as fact. Passions ran high, and both official and lay commentators were
involved. I pay particular attention to the impact on this debate of the jury
nullification in more routine cases that authorities countenanced with
relative equanimity. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the
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manner in which the centuries-long tradition of jury nullification influenced the development of what might be called the constitutional role of
the criminal trial jury. I attempt to bring together two problems that are
too often kept separate in historical scholarship: the daily administration
of the law in routine cases, and the more episodic, and epiphenomenal,
"political" trials that generated far-reaching claims about the rights of
Englishmen.
Chapter 9 concludes this history with a brief commentary on the
relationship between the role of the jury and the partial reform of the law
of sanctions in mid-nineteenth-century England. I link this commentary to
my concluding discussion and summary of the main themes of this book
on the relationship between social attitudes, legal institutions, and legal
doctrine. Here, as at earlier points, I assess the influence of the history of
the jury on contemporary views regarding criminal justice and discuss the
unity implicit in the centuries-long dialectic that I have traced.

III
Jury nullification, the concept that lies at the heart of the various essays
in this book, may take on a variety of meanings or shades of meaning. In
some of its senses, the jury's war with the law and the judges who
represent the law is a strong conflict, and in other senses it is much less
so. Although I try to keep the different meanings clear as I write, I believe
the reader will find that a general discussion of the term is a helpful
prelude to the substantive chapters.
Jury nullification in its strongest sense occurs when the jury recognizes
that a defendant's act is proscribed by the law but acquits because it does
not believe the act should be proscribed. The behavior, in other words, is
not criminal in the eyes of the jury, and the jury is willing to assert its view
in the face of what it is told by the judge. An intermediate form of
nullification reflects the jury's view that although the act proved is
properly classified as criminal, it is within a class of acts that do not
deserve the punishment prescribed for them. Such nullification serves to
protect defendants from punishments that are regarded as excessive. A
relatively weak form of nullification reflects the jury's view that although
the act proved is criminal and falls in a class of acts that may well deserve
the prescribed punishment, such punishment is inappropriate in the case
at hand. When nullification is in this way ad hoc, a defendant, because of
personal characteristics or the particular features of the case at hand, will
escape the generally fair sanctions that a concededly just law prescribes.
Nullification begins in the medieval period with jury mitigation in
routine felonies. It appears that the jury was in part disagreeing with
substantive legal rules and in part merely mitigating the sanction provided
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by law. Because of the available data, I pay most attention to the subset
of legally nonpardonable homicides that juries characterized as pardonable self defense. The cases in which jurors so characterized killings, and
thereby preserved defendants from death, fall primarily into the intermediate category of systemic nullification of the law of sanctions but also,
no doubt, contain instances of the other two types. It appears that the
typical situation was one in which death was thought too severe a penalty
for a wrongful, but victim-provoked, killing. In other cases of victim
provocation the act was probably viewed as blameless in the first
instance, and in still other cases there was an ad hoc quality since the
defendant apparently benefited from his good reputation. Nullification in
the case of theft, the other common capital felony, appears almost always
to be systemic rejection of the capital sanction or an ad hoc merciful
acquittal. The jurors had no quarrel with the laws protecting property, but
they apparently believed that some kinds of theft should not be punished
capitally and that specific defendants or those thieving in certain, special
circumstances did not deserve to die. While the data permit us to identify
such law-evading leniency, they do not always allow us to be certain of
the jurors' motives. It is also probably the case that in some instances in
which the jury appears to have been conforming, despite their sentiments,
to the law, they were in fact engaging in ad hoc harshness. Thus, the
refusal to return a life-sparing verdict for the kind of crime that usually
elicited one may reflect disapproval of the defendant rather than the
fortuitous assembly of twelve men who approved of the law or who, while
disapproving, believed they should defer to it.
Later chapters of the book analyze jury nullification in political cases,
and so engage true, or "strong" nullification. The state's problem is not
that the jury disbelieves the proof offered in support of an indictment;
rather, it is that the jury does not believe that the behavior the indictment
alleges should be a crime. One major theme of these later chapters is the
interrelationship between, on the one hand, systemic and ad hoc nullification of capital sanctions (merciful acquittals) in common-run felonies and,
on the other, strong nullification (repudiation of the law) in political
offenses.
The judicial perspective on the jury's behavior is significant, because
our characterization of the jury's behavior must be made in the light of the
bench's stance toward the law. Strong nullification, as I am using the
term, assumes that the judge adheres to the legal rule and believes the jury
ought to adhere to it. Thus the strongest form of jury nullification
represents a repudiation of the rules set forth by the bench, and it is not
surprising that it led to official attempts to restrain or redefine the role of
the jury. This contrasts with the systemic or ad hoc nullification in
common felonies, which frequently met with the acquiescence or en-
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couragement of the bench. Indeed, where judges encouraged or acquiesced in merciful verdicts, we might wonder whether there was nullification at all. From one perspective, we might say that the bench was, in
effect, suspending the law, or interpreting the law in such a way that the
jury's action was consistent with it. Where the bench disagreed with the
jury, it might have viewed what was for the jury an ad hoc nullification as
an instance of systemic nullification, or it might have appreciated the ad
hoc nature of the verdict but believed it inappropriate in the given case.
In either instance, the jury's leniency might be regarded as a serious
abuse of the jury's de facto power. Political conflict has never been
essential to judicial criticism of what juries do.
It must also be noted that juries nullified the law in many instances not
out of mercy but out of fear of the defendant's friends or relatives, or for
political favor, or even, perhaps, for monetary gain. The bench could not
always be certain whether the jury's motives were mercenary or merciful,
and such doubts must have influenced their response to life-sparing
verdicts. Although this book concerns the phenomenon of "conscientious" verdicts, it will be necessary to keep in mind that some verdicts
were corrupt and that the bench had to guard against them.
Verdicts that reflect systemic and ad hoc mercy have, once we take
account of the bench's perspective, two histories: as quasi-legitimate
responses permitted by the bench and as illegitimate, law-flouting responses. As we shall see, some lay writers extrapolated from judicial
acquiescence in cases involving quasi-legitimate "nullification" to a right
of juries to nullify even when the bench objected. The bench, on the other
hand, sometimes viewed what were in fact ad hoc nullifications of the
weakest form as true repudiations of substantive legal standards. The
several strands of nullificatory behavior that I have tried to separate in
theory were in practice intimately intertwined, and, as we shall see, were
often confounded by those in the thick of the debates concerning the
jury's role.

Note.-Unless otherwise indicated, quotations from antiquarian English sources have
been modernized throughout this volume. Titles of antiquarian English sources have been
left in their original form. Original foreign language quotations have been extended;
punctuation and capitalization remain as in the original. All unpublished archival material
not otherwise identified in the footnotes is from the Public Record Office, London, England.

Part I

Origins

1

The Criminal Trial Jury:
Origins and Early Developmentan Interpretive Ove!"view

From about 1220, trial by jury has been the primary means for determining guilt or innocence in prosecutions for felony. Trial by jury, as is well
known, replaced trial by ordeal after the Church in 1215 proscribed
clerical participation in that "barbaric" practice. 1 Although regular use of
the jury represented a significant transformation in the administration of
the criminal law, juries had from time to time been employed in this
particular setting for at least a generation. The historian has more reason
to ask why it took so long for trial by jury to become the general rule than
why it ultimately replaced the ordeal, for by the third decade of the
thirteenth century juries were in common use in a variety of other closely
related settings. Trial by something other than a jury had become virtually
an anomaly.
It may be that as long as the ordeal was thought to reflect God's will it
was thought necessary to invoke its powers before putting to death an
alleged felon. Men might on oath make determinations that affected the
disposal of property or the payment of fines, but God alone could mandate
the taking of a human life. And even if belief in the divine nature of proof
by ordeal had begun to wane long before the decree of 1215 brought its
use to an abrupt end, tradition may have sustained its use in the late
twelfth and early thirteenth centuries-tradition and the lack of a divinely
endowed alternative. Even after 1215, recourse to the verdict of men
sworn to say the truth could not be had without the suspect's consent.2
The decision to employ a trial jury in criminal cases appears to have
been an act of administrative expediency. The justices in eyre in 1218 had
raised the issue of an appropriate substitute for the ordeal; they were
ordered (in the absence of a formal trial mechanism) to imprison or to
banish those accused by a jury of presentment of having committed a serious
1. Lateran IV (1215) c. 18, in J. Alberigo et al., eds., Conciliorum oecumenicorum
decreta (3rd ed., Bologna, 1972), p. 220. See e.g. R. C. van Caenegem, "La Preuve dans le
droit du moyen age occidental: rapport de synthese," La Preuve, Receuils de la Societe Jean
Bodin, vol. 17 (Brussels, 1965), pp. 715-18; John Baldwin, "The Intellectual Preparation for
the Canon of 1215 against Ordeals," Speculum, vol. 36 (1961), p. 613.
2. See generally P.R . Hyams, "Trial by Ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common
Law," in Morris S. Arnold et al., eds., On the Laws and Customs of England (Chapel Hill,
N.C., 1981), pp. 90-126.
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offense. 3 It seems more than a little odd that the question had not been
settled before the justices reached the provinces. The solution seems only
slightly less so. It is likely that the order to imprison or banish confirmed
an existing plan and that the decision to punish mere suspects hardly
imposed upon the presenters a new responsibility. Having named all
those suspected of having committed a felony, the presenters probably
indicated which suspects they considered guilty. This may not have been
a departure from earlier practice: it does not seem plausible that before
1215 all whom the presenters had named had gone forward to the ordeal.
The presenters had probably always determined who the "true" suspects
were; the ordeal may well have been managed to confirm the presenters'
determinations. From the 1218 procedure to the trial jury was, according
to this theory, a relatively short step: a number of the original presenters,
afforced perhaps by others, were sworn to give a verdict on those whom
they and the other presenters had named as suspects. It was not so much
that the trial jury was adopted as that the ordeal was dispensed with. 4
The resort to a trial jury in criminal cases was the final stage of a
century-long evolution in the administration of the criminal law. Because
that evolution involved the steady increase of royal control over the
criminal process, it might seem paradoxical that this almost final stage
placed the defendant in the hands of the local community. But, as we shall
see, this was a natural development, one that at once expanded and
defined the limits of royal power. It was a development that allowed the
new form of criminal process to work. The interpretive overview
presented here can hardly do justice to the complex legal and social
origins of the criminal trial jury, a subject that has only recently received
the attention it deserves. I shall piece together a story that, in its details,
is both partial and tentative. Subsequent chapters shed further light, at
least by way of inference, on the question of early jury behavior. The
present discussion is intended to introduce an institution, its early
institutional setting, and the problems involved in assessing its behavior
and influence in the resolution of felony cases.

I
The roots of a royal system of criminal justice run deep into the English
past. Long before the Conquest, perhaps even from the outset of the
3. F.W. Maitland, ed., Pleas of the Crown for the County of Gloucester, 1221 (London,
1884), pp. xxxviii-xxxix; T. F. T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (5th
ed., Boston, 1956), p. 119.
4. See generally Roger D. Groot, "The Jury of Presentment before 1215," American
Journal ofLegal History, vol. 26 (1982), pp. 1-24. I shall at several points draw upon Groot's
important conclusions. See also Catherine Hamilton Kappauf, "The Early Development of
the Petty Jury in England: 1194-1221," doctoral dissertation (University of Illinois, 1973),
passim. For Kappauf's discussion of the procedure followed in 1218 see pp. 169-74.
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Anglo-Saxon period, some offenses were prosecuted on behalf of the
Crown, and those persons found to have perpetrated the most heinous of
them were at the Crown's mercy. Unless the king chose to commute their
sentence, they were executed at the king's hand. 5 These offenses-pleas
of the Crown-may be contrasted to all other pleas, which were prosecuted by the aggrieved or his kin, though typically in a public court, and
which usually led to composition or monetary compensation by the
convicted wrongdoer. 6 At the core of the theory of royal pleas lay those
enormities perpetrated against the Crown that amounted to treason. From
very early the king also exercised sole jurisdiction over the most heinous
offenses, such as murder-that is, homicide by stealth, in circumstances
where the offender not only took his victim offguard but also concealed
his identity from third parties. 7 During the several centuries between the
reigns of Alfred (871-99) and Henry II (1154-89), the list of royal pleas
gradually lengthened so that the number of "private" criminal prosecutions leading to composition between private parties was steadily reduced. 8 Nonetheless, until the twelfth century most prosecutions remained private; simple homicide and larceny, the two most common
offenses, were still both privately prosecuted and emendable.
The expansion of the scope of royal pleas left its mark on even those
offenses over which the Crown did not take sole jurisdiction. Offenders
were required to pay a fine to the king in addition to the composition they
rendered to the injured party. 9 Yet there were limits at this stage to the
practical effects ofthe growth of the theory of Crown law. Even where the
king took sole jurisdiction, prosecution was commenced privately, either
in the traditional Anglo-Saxon manner, wherein proof was achieved by
compurgation or by ordeal, or through the Norman institution of the
appeal, which led to trial by battle .10 Because punishment in Crown pleas

5. Naomi D. Hurnard, The King's Pardon for Homicide before A.D. 1307 (Oxford, 1969),
pp. 1-3. On Crown pleas generally see Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland,
The History of English Law, 2 vols. (2nd ed., reissued with an introduction by S. F. C.
Milsom, Cambridge, 1968), vol. 2, pp. 453-56; Frederick Pollock, "The King's Peace in the
Middle Ages," Harvard Law Review, vol. 13 (1900), pp. 177 et seq., reprinted in Select
Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, 3 vols. (Boston, 1907-9), vol. 2 (1908), pp. 403 et
seq.
6. See e.g. Dorothy Whitelock, The Beginnings of English Society (2nd ed., Middlesex,
1965), pp. 137-46.
7. Thomas A. Green, "Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability for Homicide in Mediaeval
England," Speculum, vol. 47 (1972), pp. 686, 689; Thomas A. Green, "The Jury and the
English Law of Homicide, 1200-1600," Michigan Law Review, vol. 74 (1976), p. 416.
8. See generally Pollock, "The King's Peace in the Middle Ages."
9. On this fine, the wite, see e.g. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2:458-60.
10. On early modes of trial see James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on
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was at the hands of the Crown, society may have viewed prosecution and
trial in such cases as in the name of the Crown. Procedure, however, with
its heavy dependence upon private initiative, remained largely the same
as before.
The Crown's interest in prosecutions for crime was represented by the
sheriff and the hundred official, who presided, respectively, in the courts
of the county and of the hundred, a division of the county or "shire,"
where trials were traditionally held. 11 Central justices at times joined or
replaced these county-based officials, although how often they had come
to do so by the early decades of the twelfth century remains unknown.l 2
Yet even the sporadic appearance of royal justices must have reinforced
the increasingly royal aspect of the administration of the criminal law and
eroded the once firm distinction between Crown pleas and private
prosecutions. Possibly a significant percentage of simple homicides and
larcenies led to execution rather than composition as early as the reign of
Henry I (1100-1135). Even so, the reforms effected in the later twelfth
century by Henry II were hardly less dramatic than historians have
commonly assumed them to be. 13
The Angevin reforms, whether they amounted to the creation of new
procedures or the regularizing of preexisting ones, were embodied in the
famous Assize of Clarendon of 1166. 14 The Assize is a complex document
registering the Crown's concern not only with felony but also with the
Evidence at the Common Law (New York, 1969), ch. 1; Whitelock, Beginnings of English
Society, pp. 137-46.
II. W. A. Morris, The Medieval English Sheriff to 1300 (Manchester, 1927), esp. ch. 7.
See also Hyams, "Trial by Ordeal," p. 93; A. Harding, The Law Courts of Medieval
England (London, 1973), pp. 18, 28-29.
12. See H. G. Richardson and G. 0. Sayles, The Governance of Mediaeval England from
the Conquest to Magna Carta (Edinburgh, 1963), ch. 9.
13. Hurnard (King's Pardon For Homicide, pp. 8--9) suggests that many felonies had
become unemendable as early as the reign of Henry I (1100--35). The king's peace was
extended to cover slayings that occurred at specified places or on certain occasions. Thus,
in Hurnard' s view, the reforms effected by Henry II (1154--89) represented a coalescence of
earlier, piecemeal extensions of the king's peace. On the impact of Henry II's legal reforms
see generally Julius Goebel, Felony and Misdemeanor (1937; reprinted, Philadelphia, 1976),
pp. 423-40; Richardson and Sayles, Governance of Mediaeval England, 173-215; Doris M.
Stenton, English Justice between the Norman Conquest and the Great Charter, 1066-1215
(London, 1965), pp. 65-82; Naomi D. Hurnard, "The Jury of Presentment and the Assize of
Clarendon," English Historical Review, vol. 56 (1941), pp. 374 et seq.; Harding, Law Courts
of Medieval England, pp. 49-57; W. L. Warren, Henry II (London, 1973), pp. 317--61.
14. Assize of Clarendon, in C. Stephenson and F. Marcham, trans. and eds., Sources of
English Constitutional History (New York, 1937), pp. 76-80. The Assize of Northampton
(1176) developed the program set in motion by the earlier assize, increasing the range of
felonies to be prosecuted. The presentment procedure was not altered. For the Assize of
Northampton, see ibid., pp. 80-83, esp. c. 1.
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political, religious, and social matters that interfered with effective
policing of the realm. 15 Henry II's government was moving decisively to
assert its jurisdiction over trial and execution for all felony at the expense
of existing, competing jurisdictions 16 and to ensure that local officials
were actively associated with the royal program of law enforcement. The
key to the new program was the procedure of presentment, or lay
accusation made on oath in the presence of royal officials. The presenters
were bound by their oath to report all those suspected of the commission
of felony; all those thus accused were ipso facto within the Crown's
jurisdiction. No interference with the prosecution of the accused would
be brooked, whether that interference stemmed from lawfully held
liberties or the exercise by the Church of legitimate privileges.
According to the terms of the Assize, twelve lawful men of each
hundred were to be chosen to take the oath. No doubt these were to be
men of substantial stature, men whose word would not be doubted and
whose role in the process would strengthen the royal position. Although
their accusations were supposed to be made before the royal justices, it
appears that more often than not they testified before the sheriff in county
court. The presentments and the process those presentments set in
motion were monitored, mostly after the fact, by royal justices, whose
regular circuits commenced as a result of the Assize. 17 The sheriff or
justices ordered the accused persons to be taken and held for trial; those
already in hand were tried immediately. Trial was typically by the ordeal
of cold water. In this second stage of the transformation of criminal
process the procedure of accusation was radically altered; the method of
proof, however, remained unchanged. 18
15. Ibid., c. 7 (pp. 77-78): mandates construction of gaols; c. 8 (p. 78): requires holders
of liberties to participate in presentment procedure; c. 9 (p. 78): states that no one may
forbid the sheriff to enter land for view of frankpledge; c. 15 (p. 78): forbids giving lodging
to strangers; c. 20 (p. 79): requires religious orders to examine reputation of prospective
entrants.
16. The royal program was not so comprehensive as this suggests. For an excellent
account of competing jurisdictions that lasted in some cases down to the fifteenth century
see J. B. Post, "Local Jurisdictions and Judgment of Death in Later Medieval England,"
Criminal Justice History, vol. 4 (1983), pp. 1-22.
17. See Richardson and Sayles, Governance of Mediaeval England, pp. 198-202. The
authors conjecture that the presentment jurors were to make their oath before local justices
and sheriffs; they state that royal justices were deployed to "oversee the activities of the
sheriffs and local justices" (p. 200). The account I give in the text should be taken as a model
for succeeding accusations and visitations; the procedure under the Assize of Clarendon
may have been almost entirely local. For discussion of the mechanics oflate-twelfth-century
presentment, see Kappauf, "Early Development of the Petty Jury," pp. 77 et seq. Kappauf
concludes that presentments were often made in written form as well as recited orally.
18. Assize of Clarendon, c. 2 (p. 77). I use "proof' in the technical sense; in fact, the
accusation process seems to have included a weighing of evidence that must be considered
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The new, public procedure of accusation was mandated by the Assize,
but it is by no means clear exactly what the presenting juries were
supposed to do-or did. The Assize bound the lawful men to present all
persons who had been accused of having committed theft, homicide, or
another serious offense. 19 The words seem very inclusive; there is little in
them to suggest that the presenting jury was supposed to employ a
significant degree of discretion. Nonetheless, we have good reasons for
inferring that they did employ some discretion. At the very least, the
presenting jury was to determine which persons had been "accused" or
were "publicly known" to be felons. If the presenters were indeed
required to pass along the names of all those who had been accused, no
matter how casually, we cannot imagine that all those named were
supposed in fact to undergo the ordeal. The most recent scholarship
argues that the presenters were not merely conduits for private accusations but that they also played an adjudicatory or a screening role.
Presentment by the twelve lawful men leading to the ordeal involved a
broader-based accusation, one that carried greater force-a greater
presumption of truthfulness-than the bare accusation of an aggrieved
party. 20
Not everyone named by the hundredmen on oath could "make his law"
by oath and ordeal. Not only those who had been caught red-handed or
had confessed but also those of very low reputation were to be treated
summarily. 2 I It appears even on the face of the Assize, therefore, that the
presenting jury was in some cases to make a finding of its own regarding
the character of the accused. There is one other point worth making.
Although we have very little evidence regarding the manner in which the
ordeal itself was administered, there are reasons for supposing it was not
part of the method of proof. See below, nn. 20, 26, 35, and accompanying text. The ordeal
of cold water involved submerging the suspect in water to determine whether God accepted
him (in which case the suspect sank) or rejected him (in which case the suspect bobbed to
the surface). The other common ordeal, reserved typically for freemen, involved carrying a
bar of hot iron for a certain distance. If after several days one's hands were still deeply
scarred, one was adjudged guilty.
19. Ibid., c. l (p. 77): the "lawful men" were put on oath "to tell the truth, whether in
their hundred or in their vill there is any man accused or publicly known as a robber or
murderer or thief."
20. See Groot, "Jury of Presentment." Groot argues convincingly (pp. 5 et seq.) that the
presenters were first to name all who were suspected but then to specify whom they truly
suspected; only the latter were forced to undergo the ordeal. Groot's evidence does not
allow the conclusion that the presentment jury's true suspicion always amounted to the kind
of certainty later trial juries were expectea to have before they convicted, or, for that matter,
to the certainty the presenters would have insisted upon if their unfavorable "verdicts"
were final ones. In this sense, the presenting jury was not a trial jury but was closer to our
grand jury. I use the phrase "screening role" to signal this.
21. Assize of Clarendon, cc. 12-13 (p. 78).
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imposed upon everyone who was, in theory, liable to undergo it.
Moreover, many who were subjected to the ordeal must have experienced
only a very mitigated version of it. It is, then, reasonable to suppose that
the presenting juries were instrumental in the sorting out of the accused.
So long as the method of proof remained brutal and blunt, the process of
accusation was probably sensitive and subtle. 22
The Assize and subsequent commissions to justices to hear and
determine hundred-jury presentments constituted a significant advance
where the Crown took control over the law of felony. All homicide and all
theft were subject to presentment by the hundredmen. Private accusations leading to private composition, in the Anglo-Saxon manner, had
come virtually to an end. Only the appeal remained, and, as we shall see,
even this private suit was about to be turned into a means of generating
accusations for presenting juries to consider.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Henry II's reforms, by
substantially widening the reach of monarchical power, created new
tensions in the criminal process. Private parties were stripped of their
traditional remedy; royal jurisdiction and royal remedies dominated. The
injured or his kin sometimes attempted settlement out of court, using the
threat of appeal or public accusation leading to presentment for leverage.23 The Crown, seeking to vindicate its jurisdiction, imposed fines
upon defaulting appellors and upon presenting juries that concealed
felonies, thereby limiting their discretionary role. 24 Although in some
cases the king or his justices allowed concords between the defendant and
the aggrieved,2s most convicted defendants now faced mutilation or death
rather than payment of monetary compensation. Inevitably, the presenting jury was being employed to undermine the interests of private parties
in obtaining compensation for themselves. Perhaps more significantly~ the
22. See generally Hyams, "Trial by Ordeal," pp. 93-94 and passim. I am treating very
briskly a complex subject that has recently received excellent scholarly attention. Groot
("Jury of Presentment") and Hyams have revolutionized scholarship on accusation and
proof before the Lateran Council of 1215. See also Peter Brown, "Society and the
Supernatural: A Medieval Change," Daedalus, vol. 104 (1975), pp. 133-51. For an
interesting discussion of the implications of some of the new anthropological and historical
scholarship on the ordeal see Lawrence Rosen, "Intentionality and the Concept of the
Person," in The Theory of Criminal Justice, NOMOS, vol. 27 (1984).
23. Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 8-12.
24. Ibid., pp. 10, 24-25. Hurnard is concerned mainly with royal efforts to prevent
concealment of felony by those seeking extrajudicial settlement. See also Pollock and
Maitland, History of English Law, 2:648.
25. Ibid., p. 22. See also Roger Groot, "The Jury in Private Criminal Prosecutions before
1215," American Journal of Legal History, vol. 27 (1983), pp. 132--40, for an extensive
discussion of judicially allowed concords where appellors retracted their appeals in return
for reparations by the appellees.
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hundred jurors were constrained to set in motion a procedure that led to
the mutilation or execution of many who, under the traditional system of
dispute settlement, had been allowed a chance to make peace, to restore
harmony through payment of fines.
We are not in a position to say how the presenting jury functioned in
these straits. Our best guess is that the hundredmen made presentmentsthus avoiding being fined for concealment of pleas-and then exercised
discretionary power in the subsequent task of stating whom they truly
suspected. If suspects of particularly bad reputation were not allowed to
exculpate themselves entirely by making their law, it seems likely that the
same discretion might be exercised to spare persons of particularly good
reputation the pain and ignominy that accompanied the ordeal. 26
The Angevin transformation of the criminal law was largely a jurisdictional revolution. By harnessing the prestige and knowledge of the most
respected members of local communities, the Crown was able to assert its
sole jurisdiction over virtually all those suspected of felony. Surely the
Crown's first priority was to shore up the enforcement of law against
those over whom the Crown already had sole power of punishmenttraitors, murderers, and robbers-but who escaped all punishment unless
a private accusation were made and sustained through the traditional
Anglo-Saxon trial procedure. Prudence may have suggested that the
Crown hear presentments of all felons; otherwise, injured parties seeking
compensation might pass off the most heinous offenses as lesser felonies
that were still emendable.27 The extension of mutilation or (as soon came
to be the general sanction) capital punishment to lesser felonies was a
clear result of Angevin policy; it was probably not its raison d'etre. Why
lesser punishments for simple homicide and larceny were not established
is difficult to explain unless we assume that the Crown either believed
such offenses merited execution or, realizing the nature of the presenting
and ordeal practice, expected such offenders would not in fact be
subjected to capital punishment. As we shall see, the little evidence that
sheds light on this problem is ambiguous. Probably we shall never know
why all felony was made capital or how much discretion the Crown
26. Groot does not discuss the problem of presentment jury "discretion," or the refusal,
on grounds of mercy, to send to the ordeal persons whom the presenters truly suspected.
The evidence he has adduced-and no one has yet dug deeper-does not make clear
whether presenters exercised such discretion. My account encourages the speculation that
presenters played such a role; any excess in this regard should be blamed on me, not on
Groot.
27. Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 23-27. Hurnard thus explains the
requirement for reporting all homicides and the need for a royal pardon even in excusable
homicides. It seems likely that the logic of her argument extends also to cases of theft.
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intended for the presenting jury. zs
The half century that followed the Assize of Clarendon was the
foundation period of the English common law. Henry II put the ancient
practice of sworn lay testimony to work in a variety of contexts. In
private law the grand and petty assize juries came to dominate;29 on the
criminal side, the jury of presentment was in frequent use. All of these
juries, save for the presenting jury, rendered verdicts on the question of
guilt or innocence, or on some other dispositive question of fact. In theory
the purpose of the presenting jury was solely to name persons who were
suspected of having committed a felony. In practice, it then stated
whether it believed there was a credible basis for the suspicion. The
suspects it exonerated went free; those it truly suspected were held to
undergo the ordeal. By and large, dispositive verdicts leading to the
severe sanctions of the criminal law were left to the ordeal and to God.
There was, nevertheless, sufficient leeway for other embryonic forms
of the criminal trial jury to make their way into the workings of the law
around the year 1200. The difficulties and dangers that beset the highly
formal Norman institution of private accusation by the victim of a felony
or by the victim's close kin-the accusation and process known as the
appeal-proved fruitful in this regard. Persons who had been appealed
and imprisoned could secure an inquest into the merits of the appeal
before being subjected to the forms of physical proof available in such
actions-combat or ordeal.30 These early jury trials usually involved
soliciting a verdict from the presenters who had presented the appeal (in
effect, noted the existence of the private accusation) or from an inquest
composed of similar persons. 31 In theory, the jurors usually were to
respond to the question whether the appeal had been made out of' 'hatred
and malice" (de odio et atia), 32 but, in fact, from early on the jurors
28. I shall return to this matter of the "original assumptions" in Chapters 2, 3, and 9.
29. See Plucknett, Concise History, pp. 357-62; S. F. C. Milsom, Historical Foundations
of the Common Law (2nd ed., Toronto, 1981), pp. 130-43; Harding, Law Courts of Medieval
England, pp. 58-63; see also Kappauf, "Early Development of the Petty Jury," pp. 69-71,
132-35.
30. See Roger Groot, "Jury in Private Criminal Prosecutions," pp. 113-41. Because
Groot's recent article appeared as the present work was going to press, I have only partially
incorporated his findings. Groot's work is central: it lays bare the workings of proceedings
set in motion by appeals and relates those workings to the interests (often financial
reparations rather than "punishment" of the accused) of the private parties involved. Taken
together, Groot's articles on presentments and appeals constitute the foundation for the
prehistory of the criminal trial jury.
31. Groot (ibid., p. 126) points out that appeals in the central courts at Westminster could
result in referral of an inquest to a local jury. At the eyre, the jury that presented the appeal
was immediately available.
32. Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, Appendix I, pp. 339-74.
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looked to the more general question of the appellee's guilt or innocence.33
It is not always easy to tell whether such inquests undertook full-scale

resolutions of guilt or innocence or, instead, rendered 3. more modest
assessment of the credibility of the private accusation (the screening
process undertaken by presenting juries in public prosecutions). If merely
the latter, we should not be surprised, for the appellee who received an
unfavorable verdict had still to be tried by a form of physical proof.3 4
Recent research suggests, however, that many early inquests pursuant to
appeals were indeed comprehensive determinations.3 5 If presentmentprocess jury determinations were limited in nature-and even that remains unclear-at least many appeals inquest determinations were not.36
There is some evidence that suggests defendants incarcerated pursuant
to a hundred-jury presentment also availed themselves of writs ordering
special inquisitions. In such cases the need for screening private accusations likely was not involved; that step had already been undertaken by
the presenting jury. It is probable that defendants claiming to have slain
through accident or self-defense were among those who secured the writs.
Like many who had been appealed, they were not asserting noninvolvement or that they had been accused out of malice. They were claiming,
rather, that they had not acted feloniously. Ultimately, they would seek
and obtain a royal pardon; pending the eyre, they would establish their
bona fides and secure bail. Others, too, obtained the writ, either to secure
33. Groot, "Jury in Private Criminal Prosecutions," pp. 118-24. See also Hurnard,
King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 340.
34. Groot, "Jury in Private Criminal Prosecutions," p. 125. See also Hurnard, King's
Pardon for Homicide, p. 343.
35. Groot, "Jury in Private Criminal Prosecutions," pp. 127-28. The use of the word
"guilty" (as opposed to "suspected") is probably significant. In this regard, see Groot's
remarks, pp. 129-30. He rightly points out that the same persons served sometimes as
presenters of presentments, sometimes as presenters of appeals, and sometimes as inquest
jurors in appeals. In practice, presenters may have done much the same thing in their
screening and their inquest roles, whatever the difference may have been in theory between
the two roles.
36. Groot's approach complements the earlier research on the appeal of J. M. Kaye,
trans. and ed., Placito Carone (London, 1966), pp. xxiv-xxviii. Kaye argues that the appeal
remained in use throughout the thirteenth century and that judges were not opposed to it as
a means of accusation. Rather, the bench sought to avoid delays involved both in the
appellee's various defenses to the appeal and in trial by battle. Thus the bench induced
appellees to make a general denial and to opt for trial by jury. The groundwork for this
approach to the use of the appeal had, evidently, been well established in the pre-trial-jury
period. Kaye is probably correct in the view that Holdsworth overstated judicial opposition
to the appeal. See William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 17 vols. (London,
1903-72), vol. 2 (3rd ed., London, 1923), pp. 256-57, 360 et seq. For a recent study of the
use of the appeal in medieval and early modern England see Daniel R. Ernst, "The
Moribund Appeal of Death: Compensating Survivors and Controlling Jurors in Early
Modern England," American Journal of Legal History, vol. 28 (1984), pp. 164-85.
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bail pending trial or to avoid trial by ordeal altogether. Typically, these
last persons paid a substantial sum for the privilege of what amounted to
jury trial at the eyreY
By 1215, when the use of the ordeal in England came suddenly to an
end, there was ample precedent for putting substantial laymen on oath to
say whether or not a suspect was guilty of felony. The prototype trial
juries were very similar to their descendants, although the student of the
history of jury discretion must recognize that the unfavorable verdicts of
the pre-1215 prototypes were rarely final and thus may not have been
rendered by jurors who went through the same psychological process as
the later true trialjurors. 38 The institution of the trial jury had developed
largely, though not entirely, as a remedy for the defects of the appeal that
the evolving procedure of presentment threw into relief. It may in some
few cases have been employed as a true alternative to the ordeal. But that
step, which was momentous if not unprecedented, was not commonly
taken until the ordeal was formally abolished.39

II
It is well known that the institutions of presenting jury and trial jury
were from the outset closely related. It would be too much to say,
however, that, as of 1220, they were usually identical in composition.
That was sometimes the case, but more often the presenters made up one
part of the trial jury, which might be a larger body. This was a time for
experiment, and it appears that the Crown was anxious that the trial jury
carry real authority. 40 The trial jury undertook one facet of the parent
institution's earlier role. Before 1215, that "screening" aspect of the
37. See e.g. Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 345; Kappauf, "Early Development of the Petty Jury," pp. 143, 164, 165.lt is possible that had these suspects been "found
guilty" by the inquests they procured they would have had to go to the ordeal.
38. A suspect who was purged by the ordeal might be required to abjure the realm. Groot,
"Jury in Private Criminal Prosecutions," pp. 118, 140. How this prospect affected jury
behavior we cannot say. The risk that the "suspected" person would not be purged and
would be put to death would probably have sufficed to induce presenting juries to render
merciful verdicts in at least some cases, if anything would have made them do so. See
Kappauf, however, who reports that most suspects were purged by the ordeal ("Early
Development of the Petty Jury," p. 167).
39. See Hurnard's comments (King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 345-46) on Magna Carta,
c. 36, which stipulated that "the writ of inquisition concerning life and limbs ... shall be
issued gratis and shall not be denied" (Stephenson and Marcham, trans. and eds., Sources
of English Constitutional History, pp. 120-21). Hurnard contends that this clause referred
not only to the writ de odio but to writs for inquisitions in cases begun by indictment. The
framers of Magna Carta, Hurnard suggests, were anxious to create the right to jury trial in
place of the ordeal for all who preferred it.
40. Kappauf, "Early Development of the Petty Jury," pp. 188-96.
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presenting jury's role had been nearly incidental and never well-defined.
It had been, I have suggested, largely a by-product of the traditional
method of proof, the ordeal. The ordeal may have been seen as a ritual
that confirmed the judgment of the lawful men of the hundred; in a certain
sense, it may have been "rational" precisely because it was implemented
in accordance with the presenters' own belief about a defendant's guilt.
The ultimate verdict was seen to be God's; He demonstrated the
innocence or guilt of the accused who, presumed guilty by men, was made
to endure the ultimate test. 41 When the ritual was dispensed with, the two
functions of the jury were separated and, thus, more clearly defined. The
presenting jury proper now named all those for whom there was a soundly
based accusation. If the defendant consented to a verdict by the '' country," untempered by God's confirming judgment, he put himself upon the
judgment of his countrymen, who were sworn to give a truly dispositive
verdict on the basis of what they had learned about the suspect's guilt.
The trial jury's role in part corresponded to the earlier screening
function and possibly in practice to the discretionary role of the presenting jury-but only in part. For one thing, it must have made some
difference to the hundredmen that the ordeal stood between their verdict
and the defendant's fate. The trial jury was, in contrast, formally charged
with finding the guilt or innocence of the accused. Moreover, the trial
jurors gave their verdict in open court, not only upon their prior
knowledge but also upon their viewing of the confrontation between the
accused and the bench. Thus, the history of the trial jury can only be
understood in terms of the history of the trial. Since we shall return to
specific aspects ofthe medieval trial in Chapters 2 and 3, a brief overview
of its history will suffice.
The judicial eyres of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries were
undertaken in a given county at six- or seven-year intervals. 42 They were
administrative as well as purely legal undertakings. The king' s justices in
eyre were empowered not only to hear civil and criminal pleas but also to
scrutinize coroners' rolls and other official records for notations of fines
owed to the Crown. It is well known that these visitations inspired a
41. This remains unclear. Much depends upon what the presenters actually did, or were
thought to have done. The more the screening process involved a full assessment of the
defendant's guilt or innocence, the more the ordeal may have been accepted as mere
confirmation.
42. On the judicial eyres see e.g. Meekings, ed., Wiltshire Eyre, pp. 1-9; C. A. F.
Meekings and David Crook, eds., The 1235 Surrey Eyre (Guildford, 1979), pp. 4-26, and
Appendix I: A Bibliography of the Common Pleas Eyre; Harding, Law Courts of Medieval
England, pp. 63-80, 86-88; Milsom, Historical Foundations, pp. 27-31.
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mixture of awe, fear, and hatred. 4 3 The judicial business of the eyre was
routine and tedious. This must have been especially true on the criminal
side, for the justices apparently heard an interminable series of presentments involving defendants who had not been taken or who had been
bailed but did not appear at the eyre. The records contain many more
judicial orders that suspects be taken than judgments upon verdicts of
trialjuries. Process in all of these cases was carefully noted; communities,
frankpledges, and officials were amerced, the fines being inscribed on the
eyre rolls by the busy clerks. The tedium was relieved from time to time
by the trial of a suspect who had appeared and put himself, for good or ill,
upon the country. 44
Most of those persons who were tried at the eyre were brought forward
after they had been named by the presenting jury and were asked how
they pleaded. Virtually all pleaded not guilty and put themselves on the
country. A few refused to plead, exercising a right that was by the later
decades of the thirteenth century a bare fiction. They were subjected to
the infamous peine forte et dure, wherein weights were laid upon them
until they pleaded or expired; the recalcitrant perished, but, not having
been convicted, they avoided forfeiture. 45 To go on the country meant, at
first, to be tried by a body of persons that included some or all of the
hundredmen who had comprised the jury of presentment. 46 From the
outset, however, there were exceptions to this, and over the course of the
century the two juries became increasingly distinct. Some defendants
requested an entirely different jury, or challenged at least some of those
trial jurors who had been part of the presenting jury, but it appears that
defendants could not yet demand such a jury as a matter of right. 47 The
43. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 1:202; Kappauf, "Early Development
of the Petty Jury," p. 58.
44. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 1:201, 2:644 et seq.; Harding, Law
Courts of Medieval England, pp. 63-68; Meekings, ed., Wiltshire Eyre, pp. 16-23.
45. Plucknett, Concise History, p. 126; Harding, Law Courts of Medieval England, p. 67.
See also Groot, "Jury in Private Criminal Prosecutions," pp. 137-41. Groot has found
pre-trial-jury-period cases in which the bench ordered inquests (leading potentially to trial
by ordeal) where neither presentment nor continued appeal was forthcoming. This, he
conjectures, suggests ancient roots of later royal attitudes about subjecting defendants to
trial on the Crown's own order.
46. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2:648-49; Harding, Law Courts of
Medieval England, p. 67; Plucknett, Concise History, p. 120; Kappauf, "Early Development of the Petty Jury," pp. 188-96.
47. Plucknett, Concise History, p. 127. For an interesting case involving a knight who
successfully challenged prospective trial jurors who had served on the jury of presentment
that accused him (of rape) see Henry Summerson, "Plea Roll and YearBook: The Yorkshire
Eyre of 1293-94" (paper presented at the Fifth British Legal History Conference, Bristol,
July, 1981). I am grateful to Dr. Summerson for allowing me to see his important study based
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real break between presenting and trial juries came in the last decades of
the century, however, and accompanied the expansion of the system of
gaol delivery.
We know very little about what transpired after the jury was sworn,
whether at the eyre or at gaol delivery. The defendant stood at the bar, in
the sight of both judge and jury; he stood alone, unaccompanied by
counsel or friend. The sheriff or other official repeated the charges, then
fell back, leaving the defendant to face the bench. No witness could come
forward either for or against him, the self-informed jurors were the
witnesses for good or ill.4s Two voices only were to be heard: the justice
questioned, the defendant answered. Presumably the defendant was
asked what he had to say for himself and in most cases replied he had not
committed the act with which he had been charged. We do not know how
often he supplied an alibi. 4 9 Occasionally, a defendant who had pleaded
not guilty to a charge of homicide admitted he had slain the deceased but
claimed to have done so accidentally or in self-defense.so In such a case
the bench had some leeway to test the defendant's story, at least with
respect to its internal consistency, and even to attempt to trick the
defendant into an assertion that fell short of what the law required for
pardonable homicide. 51 In most cases, however, the exchange between
the bench and the defendant must have been brief and productive of little
hard evidence beyond that which the jury had in hand at the moment they
were sworn to serve.
It is commonplace that the medieval jury was "self-informing." But
just how jurors came to be informed remains largely a matter of
conjecture. The problem is less intractable with regard to the early period.
So long as trial jurors were drawn, at least in large number, from the
upon his comparison of a plea roll with the yearbook version of several cases on the plea
roll. See below, n. 58.
48. This may be an exaggeration of the situation at the eyre. Witnesses as well as others
were attached to appear at the eyre, either as witnesses or as potential suspects. It is not
clear that they gave information at the trial itself rather than before the trial to presentment
and trial juries. When the suspect did not appear they may have given evidence that was
instrumental to his being exacted and outlawed.
49. See Kaye, ed., Placita Carone, pp. 1-31. This mid-thirteenth-century pleading manual
provides the best extant descriptions of medieval trials. It must be used with care, however,
for it was compiled with the purposes of instruction in mind. It is not always clear whether
a particular procedure or colloquy was included because it was typical or because it was
unusual. Most of the "cases" involve appeals (this was above all a form book for pleaders);
the accusations and denials are therefore highly formal. In one case which has the ring of the
commonplace, the defendant, indicted for theft of farm animals, claimed he had purchased
the animals at a certain fair on a certain day (ibid., p. 18).
50. See below, Chapter 2.
51. See below, Chapter 3, text at nn. 3-7.
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presenting jury, the appropriate question to ask is how the presenters
learned the facts of individual cases. The answer, at least in general, is not
difficult to imagine. The presenters were established figures in the
hundred. Although they were not likely to have firsthand knowledge of
slayings and thefts, they were well positioned to make inquiries. They
soon learned of complaints made to local officials, who were bound to
keep track of the raising of the hue and cry. sz In the case of homicide, the
coroner's inquest provided a context for the gathering of testimony, little
of which was taken down by the coroner or his clerk but much of which
must have come to the attention of the village elites. 53
Formal presentments were made in hundred and county courts in the
years between judicial visitations. The rumors and suspicions that circulated in the wake of a felony became the governing perceptions of the
truth of the matter; the early stages of criminal procedure gave shape to
the facts of individual cases. By the time of the eyre, much had been
sorted out, though many cases must have remained tentative for lack of
solid evidence. The eyre and the imminence of trial must have given focus
to those cases where the suspect was likely to be present. The defendant's
reputation, his bearing since the time of the felony in question, the
response of those into whose midst he would be returned if acquittedthese and other considerations must have been central to the men who
would present and try him. This is not to say that these matters were
unknown before the coming of the justices. In many cases, this complex
process of community judgment had been completed long before the eyre,
and its results were well enough known that they conditioned the
willingness or unwillingness of those suspects who were not under secure
guard to come forward after presentment to be tried.54
So far as we can tell, juries rendered their verdicts in simple and
conclusory terms, stating that the defendant was guilty or not guilty, or
that, in some cases of homicide, he had slain the deceased but had done
so accidentally or in self-defense.ss In these last cases, the jury repeated
52. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 1:578-79; R. F. Hunnisett, The
Medieval Coroner, (Cambridge, 1961), pp. 55-58; Alan Harding, "The Origins and Early
History of the Keeper of the Peace," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser.,
vol. 10 (1960), p. 90; Barbara A. Hanawalt, Crime and Conflict in English Communities,
1300-1348 (Cambridge, Mass., 1979), pp. 33-35.
53. See Hunnisett, The Medieval Coroner, esp. chs. 2 and 6. See also below, Chapter
2.
54. See F. W. Maitland eta!., eds., Eyre of Kent. 6 and 7 Edward II, 3 vols. (London,
1909-14), vol. 1, p. xlii.
55. The extant trial rolls record the jury's verdict: est culpabilis; non est culpabilis,
except in cases of excusable homicide, for which see below, Chapter 2. Placita Carone is no
more helpful. It is possible that juries said a great deal more, especially at the eyre where,
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the story the defendant had told, perhaps embellishing it to meet the rules
oflaw. The fact that the jury had in many cases decided upon its verdict
even before it was sworn does not mean that it was not in many others
influenced by the defendant's statements and bearing in court or by the
tone or substance of the questions that the justices asked. The trial often
may have constituted an important part of the process by which the jury
informed itself or confirmed its earlier impressions. 56
The jury may have retired to discuss their verdict among themselves;
the evidence on this point is far from clear. In some instances, juries were
unable to reach unanimous agreement and reported a divided verdict to
the court. In the early decades of recourse to trial jury verdicts, the bench
did not always require unanimity. Later on, when unanimity became the
rule, the justices pushed juries to reach agreement, as was already the
practice in civil cases, and even applied some degree of coercion to help
the process along.57 Only rarely, it seems, did the bench question ajury's
verdict. In cases of pardonable homicide they sometimes did so, but only
because jury verdicts in such cases were not entirely conclusory and left
the bench some measure of freedom to test the jurors' report. ss In the
great majority of cases, the verdict was conclusory and conclusive. Only
the defendant's demeanor provided the bench with grounds for doubting
an acquittal in a particular case, though the steady flow of not guilty
verdicts doubtless made the bench suspicious of acquittals in general. The
pretrial and trial procedure left the jury in almost total control of the
outcome of cases. The bench might doubt the veracity of a defendant's
story or of the jury's verdict, but lacking an independent source of
evidence, the bench was not in a position to challenge either one
effectively. 59
if they found the defendant not guilty, they often said whom they did suspect. See Kappauf,
"Early Development of the Petty Jury," pp. 196-201.
56. This is largely conjecture. It is borne out, however, by sixteenth-, seventeenth-, and
eighteenth-century trial procedure and writings on the criminal trial, and there is no reason
to believe that jury practice had changed in this respect. See below, Chapters 4 and 7.
57. Plucknett, Concise History, p. 129.
58. See below, Chapter 2. See also Summerson, "Plea Roll and Year Book." Dr.
Summerson demonstrates that judges frequently put questions to juries. His study does not
suggest that judges frequently questioned juries on their verdicts; what is most striking about
the evidence he has uncovered-it seems to me-is that judicial questioning (and even
badgering) of juries on specific aspects of given cases did not seem to prevent those juries
from returning an acquittal.
59. In the two chapters that follow, I shall develop this theme in some detail. I have
perhaps overstated the point here. It is possible that witnesses attached to appear at the eyre
in the thirteenth century made representations before the justices; victims of theft,
especially those who had been robbed by persons they could subsequently recognize, may
have played a role. It would appear, however, that such testimony was taken into account
by presentment juries. The justices might choose to weigh all indictments heavily, but from
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The jury's power to determine the defendant's fate was virtually
absolute. Those acquitted were with only rare exceptions released sine
die; a few of them were released upon pledges of an official or other
person of importance for their good behavior.60 The guilty were hanged
almost immediately. There was no time for appeal or pardon. In a very
few cases the bench refused to accept a verdict, but those cases involved
special verdicts of self-defense where the original verdict left some
doubts. It does not appear that a second trial jury ever reversed the
verdict given by the trial jury it superseded.6t
Although jurors might be held liable to punishment for what amounted
to pe:Ijury-giving false verdicts under oath-that liability extended in
criminal cases only to outright corruption. Jurors proven to have been
bribed or who admitted they had lied might be fined or imprisoned. The
more general liability to attaint, and to the extreme form of punishment it
involved, was never extended to the criminal trial jury. 62 The closest the
bench came to application of the dreaded process of attaint was the
impaneling of a second jury to test the first jury's special verdict of
self-defense, and there is no evidence to suggest that the first jury would
have been punished had its verdict been repudiated.
The trial jury's immunity to punishment for an honest but mistaken
verdict has never been easy to explain. It may be that the divine aspect of
the ordeal, which at first delayed the adoption of the trial jury, attached to
the latter institution when it replaced the ordeal after 1215. The verdict of
the criminal trial jury, unlike that of the civil trial jury, was thus not open
to challenge, for its judgment reflected a will greater than that of humans,
a will to which all humans were bound. But this traditional explanation
seems entirely too mechanistic. It is more plausible that the immunity of
the criminal trial jury was owing to the presumption of lawfulness
accorded its members in the institution's early years, when presenters
made up a large percentage of many, perhaps most, juries. Nothing short
the records it does not appear that they were in a position to determine which indictments
were particularly well grounded. So many indictments were ultimately repudiated by juries
on which at least some of the indictors sat, that the justices must have been stymied in their
efforts to get at the truth. At gaol delivery (see below, text at n. 79) their job was doubly
difficult.
60. See e.g. C. A. F. Meekings, "Introduction" to Meekings and Crook, eds., The 1235
Surrey Eyre, p. 126.
61. See below, Chapter 3 text at nn. 3-7 and passim.
62. Plucknett, Concise History, p. 132; Milsom, Historical Foundations, p. 411. On
attaint see Thayer, Preliminary Treatise, pp. 137 et seq. The matter of fining jurors in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is discussed at length below, Chapters 4, text at nn.
149-58, and 6, passim. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century commentary on attaint in
criminal cases is discussed below, Chapters 6, text at nn. 138-46, and 8, nn. 95-96 and
accompanying text.
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of proof of gross abuse of office sufficed to refute the word of the
substantial hundredmen who served as presenters. Moreover, that the
defendant's life was at stake must have counted for something. The power
of the jury may have reflected more than its institutional setting and role:
it may have reflected a social understanding about the appropriate
circumstances under which a person's life might be surrendered to the
Crown. On this view, jury discretion was from the outset a given of the
administration of the criminal law. Abuse of discretion involved conscious subversion of the trial process, the rendering of a verdict in bad
faith. A verdict rendered according to conscience and reflecting the jury's
conception of just deserts was divine in the sense that it was beyond
judicial reproach.63

HI
The adoption of the trial jury as a regular means of proof effected the
first major transition in the post-Angevin administration of the criminal
law-a natural, though profound, step. Less dramatic but perhaps not less
important was the second transition, one that occurred over several
decades: the decline of the eyre and the recourse to regular commissions
of gaol delivery. 64 There were frequent gaol deliveries in the mid- and
late-thirteenth century; by the early fourteenth century, deliveries were
held at least twice yearly .65 The eyre was infrequently held by that time.66
63. Maitland's classic explanation of the finality of the criminal trial jury's verdict
stressed the fact that the defendant "had put himself upon the oath of the jurors; a
professedly unanimous verdict would satisfy the justices; it was the test that the prisoner
had chosen. On the whole, trial by jury must have been in the main a trial by general
repute." Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2:655. Milsom gives a similar
explanation: "Because a jury was the defendant's own proof, chosen by himself, attaint was
in principle not available in criminal cases. This process, by which a verdict could be
challenged before a larger jury, was appropriate to such procedures as the petty assizes,
where the defendant had no choice either in the question or the means by which it was to be
answered." Historical Foundations, p. 411.
64. For discussion of the transition from eyre to gaol delivery and other, related
proceedings (and of the relevant literature on the subject) see Bernard McLane, "The Royal
Courts and the Problem of Disorder in Lincolnshire, 1290-1341," doctoral dissertation
(University of Rochester, 1979), ch. I.
65. SeeR. B. Pugh, Imprisonment in Medieval England (Cambridge, 1968), chs. 12 and
13. See also M. Gollancz, "The System of Gaol Delivery," M.A. dissertation (University
of London, 1936); M. Taylor, "The Justices of Assize," in J. F. Willard and William A.
Morris, eds., The English Government at Work, 1327-1336, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1940-50),
vol. 3, pp. 219-47.
66. See Hunnisett, Medieval Coroner. pp. 114-15; Richard W. Kaeuper, "Law and Order
in Fourteenth-Century England; The Evidence of Special Commissions of Oyer and
Terminer," Speculum, vol. 54 (1979), p. 738.
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The decline of that cumbersome and unpopular administrative and
judicial institution was also signaled by the Crown's increasing use of
special commissions of trailbaston and of oyer and terminer to hear
presentments and to try those taken pursuant to them. 67 These special
commissions had broader authority than did justices of gaol delivery,
whose jurisdiction extended only to persons already gaoled upon an
indictment for felony.6s
Our own interest lies mainly with felony trials at gaol delivery. But we
shall have to keep in mind the contemporaneous proceedings, in the main
for trespasses, 69 before justices upon commission of oyer and terminer,
and we must remember that the transition from eyre to gaol delivery
involved a major readjustment in the Crown's administration of criminal
justice.7° This readjustment, which reflected new and sometimes contradictory attitudes, involved changes-though perhaps unintended onesin the institution of the trial jury in felony cases. The commissions to
justices to deliver England's gaols ordered the justices to make certain
that jurors from each hundred in the counties they were to visit would be
present at the proceedings.7 1 The justices in turn notified the sheriffs of
those counties, and the sheriffs sent appropriate orders to the hundred
bailiffs .72 Typically, a hundred was represented by a panel of eighteen
persons from whom the twelve triers would be chosen for each felony
committed in the hundred.7 3 Those who were tried had been presented
earlier in the county court; because they were not re-presented before the
justices of gaol delivery, the attendance of the presenters was not
required. There was nothing to prevent a bailiff from returning persons
67. SeeR. B. Pugh, "Some Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," Proceedings of the
British Academy, vol. 59 (1973), pp. 83-84; Alan Harding, "Early Trailbaston Proceedings
from the Lincoln Roll of 1305," in R. F. Hunnisett and J. B. Post, eds., Medieval Legal
Records edited in memory of C. A. F. Meekings (London, 1978), pp. 130-38.
68. See generally Kaeuper, "Law and Order," pp. 734-84.
69. See McLane, "Royal Courts and the Problem of Disorder," pp. 11-12, 24.
70. Ibid., ch. I. The increase in actions for trespass contributed to the need for frequent
local sessions; the strain thus placed on the central justices contributed to the use as judges
(for oyer and terminer; not for gaol delivery, where felony was the principal business) of
local magnates and gentry and to the development of the offices of keeper of the peace and,
by the 1330s, of justice of the peace. By then, if not long before, the easy availability of such
actions drew cases away from the gaol delivery and other sessions that heard felonies.
Especially important was the prosecution of much relatively minor theft that might have
been prosecuted as felony, as mere, indictable trespass, or indeed as private suits of trespass
for money damages. On the origins of trespass see Alan Harding, The Roll of the Shropshire
Eyre of 1256 (London, 1981), pp. xxxii-lviii, and sources cited therein.
71. Thomas A. Green, "Pardonable Homicide in Medieval England," doctoral dissertation (Harvard University, 1970), p. 167.
72. Idem.
73. See e.g. C 260/4, no. 19 (1288); C 260/6, no. 7 (1292); C 260/16, no. 12 (1306).
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who had served in the county court on the presenting jury. 7 4 In some
instances there must have been substantial overlap between the original
presenters and those sent to the county town for proceedings before
justices of gaol delivery. But more often than not these frequent proceedings saw men of lesser status, men less able to avoid the onerous service
of the trial juror. The separation of the juries was not, however, merely
the result of the transition from eyre to delivery. During the late thirteenth
and early fourteenth centuries it had come to be thought that the
defendant ought to be tried mainly by persons who had not presented him.
Thus administrative development and nascent concepts of due process
worked together to produce the virtual separation of the two juries long
before 1352, when statute allowed challenge of a prospective juror on
grounds he had served as an indictor.75
The decline in the status of trial jurors was not dramatic in the early
decades of the fourteenth century. But gradually thereafter its impact was
felt as exemptions from service reduced the base of substantial jurors.
This apparent "democratizing" of the trial jury may have weakened the
institution, as its members were now more often susceptible to pressure
from powerful friends or foes of defendants. 7 6 Legislative attention to jury
malpractices grew more intense, and in the fifteenth century there were
attempts to set property qualifications for jury service.77 By then, the
resistance to serving was great enough to doom any meaningful reform.
This is not to suggest that, at least in the fourteenth century, the system
of gaol delivery was unworkable. In fact, it represented in some respects
a great improvement over the eyre in the administration of criminal law
with regard to felonies. The system's most significant virtue was the
frequency of judicial visitations. Suspects who had been taken were tried
within a matter of weeks or months, not years; bail was less important and
less universally resorted to. In homicide, special commissions were very
rarely held after the late thirteenth century, for the denial of bail worked
far less hardship.7s
The conviction rate at gaol deliveries was roughly what it had been for
homicide at the eyre, and double what it had been for theft. Juries
condemned about 15 percent of homicide suspects and nearly one third of
those indicted for theft. 79 One might have expected higher rates of
74. Pugh, "Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," pp. 92-93.
75. Stat. 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5. c. 3. See Plucknett, Concise History, p. 127.
76. See e.g. J. H. Bellamy, Crime and Public Order in England in the Later Middle Ages
(London, 1973), p. 149.
77. See below, Chapter 4, n. 25 and accompanying text.
78. Green, "Pardonable Homicide in Medieval England," p. 148.
79. Given found that 17.4 percent of those charged with homicide alone at eyres in the
thirteenth century were "executed." This may include cases actually tried at gaol delivery
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conviction at gaol delivery than at the eyre: relatively few suspects
appeared at the eyre, and many of those who did had reason to be
confident that they would be exonerated. At gaol deliveries, all those who
were being held pending trial had to come forward to face the bench and
a trial jury. Far fewer suspects had been bailed; certainly those held for
the most heinous offenses and possibly those who were most suspect had
not. If the conviction rates are surprisingly low by the standards of the
eyre, they are even more strikingly low by modern standards. The
reasons for this are complex and require further consideration of the
administration of criminal justice in the period that began with the decline
of the general eyre.
The maturation of gaol delivery belongs to the period of late medieval
criminal administration about which we know least. The attention of
modern scholars has fallen mostly on the mid-thirteenth-century eyres
and on the fourteenth-century system of gaol delivery. It is conventional
to treat the late thirteenth century as the beginning of a long period of
social decline and disruption and to treat the transition from eyre to
delivery as in part a symptom of that decline and in part an attempt to
remedy the disruption. 80 All ages think themselves the victims of increasing criminal activity. In some, people are especially articulate about their
perceptions, and we must not uncritically equate oft-stated fears with
realities. 81 The attention which Edward I's legislation pays to the problem
of crime may say more about such fears 82 and about the impulse to
legislate than about relative rates of criminal activity. Edward's legislation and the creation of new procedures to deal with crime may have
represented (amateurish) attempts to deal with longstanding problems for
which the eyre was too irregular and too cumbersome. 83
but reported and recorded at a subsequent eyre; it does not include many tried by special
commissions and found to have slain in self-defense. James B. Given, Society and Homicide
in Thirteenth Century England (Stanford, 1977), p. 133. Hanawalt gives 12.4 percent as the
conviction rate for homicide at early fourteenth-century gaol deliveries and about 30 percent
as the conviction rate for theft. Crime and Conflict, p. 59. Pugh examined the Newgate
(London and Middlesex) gaol delivery rolls for the decade 1281-90; he found a condemnation rate of 21 percent for homicide (where no other charge was involved) and 31 percent for
all forms of theft (excluding only cases where an additional charge of homicide, forgery, or
prison breach accompanied the charge, or charges, of theft). "Reflections of a Medieval
Criminologist," pp. 6-7.
80. On the literature regarding the "crisis in order and justice" in this period see
Kaeuper, "Law and Order," p. 735, n. 4, and works cited therein.
81. See Kaeuper's excellent treatment of this problem at ibid., pp. 735 et seq. See also
McLane, "Royal Courts and the Problem of Disorder," pp. 60, 115. McLane concludes that
there was an increase.
82. Pugh, "Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," p. 84. See Statute of Winchester,
preamble (Stat. 13 Edw. I, c. I; Statutes of the Realm, 1:96).
83. See T. F. T. Plucknett, Edward I and Criminal Law (Cambridge, 1960), ch. 4.
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The late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries saw the use of special
commissions of trailbaston and oyer and terminer, increased reliance on
keepers of the peace, and an attempt to tighten the bail system.s4 By the
middle of the fourteenth century the keepers had attained the status of
justices, adding the capacity to try misdemeanants and (sometimes) felons
to their traditional power to hear presentments. 85 The quarter sessions of
the justices of the peace soon absorbed most of the criminal business that
had earlier been handled by the less flexible commissions of trailbaston
and oyer and terminer. Local law enforcement capacities had been greatly
enhanced during the period of transition from eyre to quarter sessions and
regular delivery of gaols. 86 Frequent gaol deliveries, therefore, were only
one aspect of a major overhaul of the system of criminal administration.
Conviction rates at gaol delivery must be read in the light of these
reforms: the results must have been disappointing.
The statistics must also be read in light of the disasters that beset
England in the fourteenth century. Famine, plague, and war brought on
social dislocation, hurrying the disintegration of older forms of social
structure and increasing the numbers of dispossessed.S 7 The Crown
sought to establish means to deal with these problems and with the
criminal activity they brought in their wake, but it may have intensified
them through, among other things, the granting of pardons ''of grace'' to
those who would serve in foreign wars.ss Pardons of grace, which
absolved the most hardened criminals of all their felonies by making them
immune to prosecution,s9 were issued in large numbers in the 1290s and
84. Kaeuper, "Law and Order," pp. 735 et seq; Alan Harding, "The Origin and Early
History of the Keeper of the Peace," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser.,
no. 10 (1950), pp. 85-109.
85. Bertha Haven Putnam, Proceedings before the Justices of the Peace in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries (London, 1938), pp. xix-xxxii; "The Transformation of the
Keepers of the Peace into the Justices of the Peace, 1327-80," Transactions of the Royal
Historical Society, 4th ser., no. 12 (1929), pp. 19-48; "Shire Officials: Keepers of the Peace
and Justices of the Peace," in Willard eta!., eds., English Government at Work, 3: 182-217;
Plucknett, Concise History, pp. 167-69.
86. See McLane, "Royal Courts and the Problem of Disorder," pp. 37-43, for discussion
of the reforms effected and the problems they brought in their wake. See also Post, "Local
Jurisdictions and Judgment of Death," pp. 12-15, for the impact of royal commissions of the
peace on residual private jurisdiction over felony.
87. See below, Chapter 3, text at nn. 8-10.
88. Pardons of grace are to be distinguished from pardons of course. All pardons were
emanations of the royal prerogative. Those pardons that came to be granted automatically,
for slaying in self-defense, through accident or through insanity, as though the defendant had
done no wrong, were pardons "of course." All other pardons were granted by "grace" of
the king, who-usually for a price-"mercifully" absolved a person of a wrongdoing, or at
least insured the person against prosecution.
89. See e.g. Humard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 311-23; H. J. Hewitt, The
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throughout the fourteenth century. Assumptions of contemporaries about
the destructive impact of this policy are reflected in parliamentary
petitions and statutes seeking to limit the royal pardoning power. Periodically the Crown consented to limit the sale of pardons but then soon
breached its promise; not until the last decade of the fourteenth century
was even a mildly effective brake placed on the flow of pardons of grace. 90
How, then, does one begin to account for the vast number of acquittals
even of those accused and held for commission of felony? And what
pressures were brought to bear upon the juries that were forced to
respond in individual cases to the question of capital liability? These are
among the questions that the following chapters explore. By way of
conclusion to this introductory essay we may suggest the direction that
our explorations will take.
Some, perhaps many, of those tried at gaol delivery were not guilty of
the acts with which they had been charged. The system of presentment,
including the supporting scheme of amercements for failure to name a
suspect, produced some false accusations. This had been true from the
beginning of the presentment process. 91 It is possible that the replacement
of the ordeal by the jury actually increased the amount of false charging,
for the latter institution provided a more trustworthy and less painful
means of exoneration. By the fifteenth century, the modern indictment
·process was emerging out of the older system of presentment.92 This
process, wherein officials investigated complaints and put the evidence
they had gathered before the grand jury, must have placed a check on
unsubstantiated accusations, but for most of the medieval period the
margin of error at the presentment stage was very great. 93 In addition,
many of those accused were guilty in fact but not proven to be so. Jurors
Organization of War under Edward Ill, 1338-62 (Manchester, 1966), pp. 173-75; Hanawalt,
Crime and Conflict, pp. 235-37. Hanawalt cautions that the gaol delivery rolls do not
provide clear evidence that the pardoning policy resulted in a dramatic increase in crime.
90. See below, Chapter 3, nn. 12-30 and accompanying text.
91. Not all "false" accusations resulted from bad faith. Perhaps the better phrase is
"wrong accusations." Presentment, we have seen, was deemed an improvement upon the
appeal, which produced a substantial amount of truly false ("malicious") prosecution.
92. See below, Chapter 4, text preceding n. 19. For the thirteenth-century origins of
indictment by bill see Alan Harding, "The Origins of the Crime of Conspiracy," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser., vol. 33 (1983), pp. 94-95.
93. The crime of "conspiracy" in its original meaning: an agreement falsely to indict of
crime, was statutorily defined in 1300. Statutes of the Realm, vol. I, p. 139. See also Pugh,
"Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," p. 97. For a recent important account of
conspiracy see Harding, "Origins of the Crime of Conspiracy." Harding marshals the
evidence for a near-crisis in the administration of the criminal law owing to the practice of
false accusation (pp. 97-99). It remains unclear how much such false accusation was
responsible for trials at gaol delivery of persons held for homicide or theft (as opposed to
trials at eyres or before justices of trailbaston for assaults and like offenses).
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were sworn to state the truth, not to confirm susp1c1ons. They were
supposed to acquit those against whom a firm case had not been made,
and probably they generally did.94
At the other extreme were cases where the jury believed the defendant
to be guilty but acquitted him nonetheless out of fear of retribution or out
of partisanship. This latter category included the simple favor shown to
friends and neighbors as well as the more serious instances where the jury
had been bribed to save the guilty suspect's life. Authorities believed that
coercion and bribery were common and that the truly corrupt verdicts
that resulted forestalled attempts to bring very grave offenders to justice.
Concern with this kind of corruption lay behind parliamentary attempts to
secure more qualified jurors and might have been reflected in the
increasing investigative activity of the justices of the peace. 95
There were, of course, many other defendants who were guilty under
the strict rules of the law whom juries refused to convict. These were
persons whose acts, whether theft, homicide, or rape, were not considered sufficiently serious to merit capital punishment. The jury was
reacting to the reputation of the accused, 96 the nature of his offense, andperhaps most important-the punishment he would incur. Thefts of a
relatively trivial amount perpetrated by persons in dire straits, slayings
born of sudden anger by persons long of good standing, these were
offenses for which the law prescribed death but for which the community
frequently refused to convict. Juries in these cases simply nullified the law
of felony. 97
The jury's power to render verdicts against the evidence was perhaps
the most distinctive aspect of medieval criminal law. Whether such
verdicts resulted from mercy, fear, or outright corruption, they evidenced
the trial jury's domination of the system of justice. In part, the jury's
power flowed from its institutional setting. From its inception, and
perhaps until Tudor times, the jury was the source of practically all of the
94. See Pugh, "Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," pp. 97-98. Jurors were sworn
to tell the truth "to the best of their knowledge. If, however, they did not know it or
possessed imperfect knowledge they could not then support the prosecution, for they must
not reach their verdict on the basis of mere 'thoughts."' See also Thayer, Preliminary
Treatise, pp. 100-101, n. 2.
95. See Bellamy, Crime and Public Order, pp. 149-50. On statutes setting qualifications
for jurors see below, Chapter 4, n. 25. On investigation by justices of the peace see below,
Chapter 4, text at nn. 15-21.
96. Pugh, "Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," p. 98: "When acquitting [jurors]
often said no more than that a suspect's character was good. He who had the reputation of
Fide litas must have had a flying start toward liberation." The role played by reputation is
difficult to assess. Jurors might have been using it as evidence and inferring innocence from
good reputation or taking it into account in extending mercy to one they believed guilty.
97. See below, Chapter 2.

The Criminal Trial Jury: Origins and Early Development

27

evidence put before the court. Typically, jury verdicts were conclusions
based on assessment of facts gathered before the defendant went on trial.
Although juries were probably influenced by the defendant's bearing in
court, their reactions to that drama must have been played back against
what they had already learned about him and the circumstances of the act
with which he had been charged.
In part, too, the jury's power reflected deep-seated assumptions about
justice, assumptions which-as may increasingly have become the caseauthorities shared with those they ruled. The verdict was a verdict "of the
country,'' made by persons on oath before God to tell the truth according
to their consciences. It was an inscrutable verdict, though it is by no
means clear to us why that was so. We may try to understand the various
aspects of the inscrutability of verdicts: they were, it was thought,
divinely inspired; if the defendant so chose, the matter of life and death
was for his countrymen to determine. Nevertheless, the trial jury's power
also reflected incapacities of central government that could not be
confronted openly and that may have induced authorities to conceive of
jury verdicts as presumptively legitimate. Only clear corruption was open
to correction; the notion of truth according to conscience was sufficiently
broad to cover misreadings of evidence and verdicts rendered knowingly
against the evidence but inspired by mercy.
The problem of merciful or otherwise principled nullification-the
subject of this study-is extremely complex. In the medieval period, for
one thing, specific instances of nullification were largely hidden from
view. Such verdicts were usually indistinguishable, from the perspective
of the bench, from acquittals based on the belief that the defendant had
not been involved. Moreover, if the justices did in a given case suspect
nullification, they might have thought it of the unprincipled sort, the
product of bribery, extortion, or abject fear. Those were more serious and
perhaps more common problems. Simple merciful nullification, especially
in close cases, was often sheltered from view and frequently protected by
the jury's duty to acquit where the evidence was uncertain. It was also a
relatively trivial matter, given the perception of a substantial increase in
truly serious crimes. Nullification, in this particular sense, was probably
an unintended by-product of the medieval system of criminal justice. But
its importance should not for that reason be underestimated. Although it
was a relatively insignificant form of jury lawlessness, it involved serious
long-term implications for the relationship between rulers and ruled. In
the ensuing chapters we shall search out the evidence for jury nullification
of the rules of capital felony, and we shall attempt to assess the judicial
reaction to this kind of jury behavior. We shall, in short, inventory a lost
part of the legacy of the medieval criminal trial jury that the modern world
inherited and took over for its own.

2

Societal Concepts of
Criminal Liability and
Jury Nullification of the
Law in the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Centuries

We move in this chapter from an overview of the institutional setting of
the criminal trial jury to consideration of one very important aspect of the
jury's social role: the jury as law finder. I shall show that the medieval
criminal trial jury imposed upon the courts the community's-or the
communities'-concepts of liability for felony. In doing so, the jury
exercised a de facto power, since its legal role was to find and declare fact
and to leave to the bench judgment according to law. This extended role
is one of the two main themes of this book. The second theme-the effect
of such jury behavior on the development of the law and on the way
official and lay Englishmen viewed the jury-is introduced in Chapter 3.
Early juries obviously nullified at least to some degree the reach of the
capital laws. It would be more extraordinary, and possibly more interesting, had they not done so. But it is not easy to show juries playing this role
in specific cases. Moreover, it is not obvious that this aspect of jury
behavior mattered very much; from the perspective of the bench, other
aspects of jury behavior must have mattered a great deal more.
The great majority of defendants in felony trials were acquitted. Many
of these acquittals were deserved, for the system of presentment often
resulted in prosecutions of the truly innocent, and the means for gathering
evidence were so rudimentary that in many instances a case simply could
not be made. Many acquittals were, on the other hand, undeserved,
arising not from defects in pretrial procedures but from corruption of the
trial process itself. Juries were sometimes bribed and often fear-stricken;
moreover, they might lie out of dishonest partisanship that did not rise to
the level of conscientious nullification. These problems plagued the
bench, and the fact that the judges were at pains to discover whether an
acquittal was of the former, deserved kind, or of the latter, undeserved
kind, only worsened their predicament. Because the jury produced the
evidence, it prevented the bench from seeing exactly what was occurring
in individual cases. The bench, and officialdom in general, lashed out
blindly against the major forms of corruption-the bribing and intimidation of jurors-which it knew played a role in a substantial number of
cases that ended in acquittal.
Somewhere in between the deserved and undeserved acquittals lay the
presumably large number of acquittals based on jury repudiation of the
28
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death sanction. These jury responses were only partly visible to the
bench. Many of them were indistinguishable from the other, more or less
serious, forms of jury behavior. To speak of them as isolable even in
theory is, of course, to engage in oversimplification, for in any given case
feelings of simple mercy might have been mixed either with doubts about
the evidence or with a purely partisan attitude, or even with fear of
retaliation by the defendant's kin or associates.
What follows in this chapter is a tentative exploration of one relatively
hidden phenomenon that characterized trial by jury: jury assessment of
the nature of the defendant's act. Given the nature of the extant evidence,
the greatest amount of attention shall be paid to jury behavior in
homicide. I mean to accomplish several things: to demonstrate that in
homicide cases juries systematically imposed upon the courts a distinction the formal legal rules did not draw; to establish the presumption that
juries played a similar nullifying role in other kinds of cases, especially in
theft, the other main felony reflected on the trial rolls; to make possible
the drawing of inferences regarding the kinds of nullification in which
juries engaged in felonies other than homicide, again mainly in theft; and
to suggest that the Angevin revolution in procedure and sanctions had less
impact on the actual resolution of cases than is sometimes supposed, and
thereby to raise questions (to be addressed in Chapter 3) regarding the
reasons for using the jury in the way it was used. 1

I
The early history of English criminal law lies hidden within the laconic
formulas of the rolls and law books. The rules of the law, as expounded
by the judges, have been the subject of many studies; but their practical
application in the courts, where the jury of the community was the final
and unbridled arbiter, largely remains a mystery. Only now are we
coming to know something about the social mores regarding crime and
criminals. 2
1. See below, Chapter 3, section IV.
2. Among the recent works that address these latter concerns are Given, Society and
Homicide; Hanawalt, Crime and Conflict; McLane, "Royal Courts and the Problem of
Disorder"; Carl I. Hammer, "Patterns of Homicide in Fourteenth-Century Oxford," Past
and Present, vol. 78 (1978), pp. l-23. Given's book represents the most detailed analysis to
date of the ''sociology'' of homicide. Its strengths lie in its data on perpetrators and victims,
their geographical and social background, and their relationship to each other. Given may
overstate the degree to which violence was accepted (see p. 213) rather than the capital
sanction repudiated. His sources did not give him much room to investigate the behavior of
juries regarding their assessment of the defendant's act. Probably juries reacted to both act
and person, their view of one influencing their view of the other. Given's book, as well as
the other works cited in this note, should be read alongside this chapter.
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The following study attempts to demonstrate that from late AngloSaxon times to the end of the Middle Ages there existed a widespread
societal distinction between "murder," i.e., homicide perpetrated
through stealth, and "simple" homicide, roughly what a later legal age
termed "manslaughter." This distinction, which was imposed upon the
courts through the instrument of the trial jury, was fundamentally at odds
with the letter of the law. It is therefore necessary to state briefly what the
rules of law were.
In the early twelfth century, the Crown took exclusive jurisdiction over
all homicides and defined them as (l) culpable and thereby capital, (2)
excusable and thereby pardonable, (3) justifiable and thereby deserving of
acquittaP The last class at first incorporated the slaying of manifest
felons (e.g., "hand-having thieves") and outlaws who resisted capture.
By the middle of the fourteenth century it came to include the killing of
housebreakers and robbers caught in the act, though it was not until the
sixteenth century that a statute turned this policy into firm law. 4 Pardonable homicides were those committed by the insane, those committed in
self-defense, and those committed unintentionally. The rules of selfdefense were rigorous throughout the entire medieval period. The slayer
had to have made every possible attempt to escape his attacker, must
have reached a point beyond which he could not retreat, and must have
retaliated out ofliterally vital necessity.s All other intentional homicides,
those deliberate but of a sudden, as well as those planned and stealthily
perpetrated, fell into the large category of culpable homicide. According
to the rules of the law, there were to be no distinctions made among them.
This classification remained intact until the late sixteenth century, when
the judicial distinction between murder and manslaughter finally
emerged. 6 Originally, of those meriting pardons for excusable homicide,
only persons who had tried to flee suffered forfeiture of goods; after 1343,
all pardonable slayers were supposed to lose their goods.?
We have seen that the king migl)t as a special favor grant a pardon to a
felonious slayer, usually for a considerable fee, or as a reward for service
abroad in the royal army. These pardons "of grace" (de gratia) were
emanations of the royal prerogative. Pardons for self-defense, accident,
and insanity were, by the late thirteenth century, pardons "of course"
(de cursu): all who deserved them according to the rules of the law were
3. Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 1 et seq.
4. 24 Hen. 8, c. 15 (1532).
5. See below, text at n. 22.
6. J. M. Kaye, "The Early History of Murder and Manslaughter," Law Quarterly
Review, vol. lxxxiii (July and Oct., 1967), pp. 365-95, 569-601.
7. For discussion of the rule of automatic forfeiture see below, Chapter 3, n. 105.
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to receive them.s After 1294, due mainly to the needs of military
recruitment, pardons of grace issued in far greater numbers than ever
before to perpetrators of felonious slayings of all sorts.
Because of the evidence on which this chapter is based, it has seemed
best to proceed in reverse chronological order, to move backward from
late-fourteenth-century evidence to a consideration of the rules of criminal liability in the Anglo-Saxon period. Subsection 1 examines jury
behavior in the decades immediately following 1390 when some coroners
and justices of the peace distinguished in their indictments between
"murder" and simple homicide. Although both types of homicide remained felonious, juries appear to have been loath to convict for the
latter, while they frequently condemned perpetrators of the former.
Before 1390, terms of indictment in all felonious homicides were uniform
and no such correlation can be made. Subsection 2, therefore, utilizes
another source of evidence: a correlation of fourteenth-century coroners'
indictments with their corresponding verdicts for self-defense. It will be
shown that many of those who received pardons for self-defense had in
fact committed a felonious, simple homicide. The area of pardonable
homicide, it appears, served as a possible way out in cases where the
community did not believe the defendant deserved to be hanged.
Because coroners' rolls are very sparse in the period before 1300, there
exists no trustworthy method of proving that the societal attitudes traced
here precede the fourteenth century. In fact, an important study of
pardonable homicide in the thirteenth century argues that jurors were
fairly scrupulous in giving evidence and that their determinations did not
vary substantially from at least the spirit of the law. 9 Nevertheless, in
subsection 3 I shall contend that there is reason to believe verdicts were
fabricated before the fourteenth century. Moreover, I shall argue that the
early history of criminal liability, especially for the period just preceding
the imposition of royal jurisdiction in all homicides, suggests that from
their very inception the official rules ran counter to and never really
became a part of social practice. This argument, admittedly speculative,
takes the following form. During the Anglo-Saxon period only those who
committed homicide through secrecy or stealth-murder-had to pay for
their act with their life. The new, twelfth-century practice subjected to the
death penalty not only "murderers" but the large class of open slayers
formerly allowed to compensate for their act by payment of the wergeld.
The community resisted this harsh extension of capital punishment and
subsequently found means-acquittals and verdicts of self-defense-to
impose upon the courts their long-held notions of justice, a process that
8. See below, Chapter 3, n. 29 and accompanying text.
9. Humard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 267-68.
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becomes visible to us only in the fourteenth century. Thus the societal
distinction between murder and simple homicide had its source deep in
the English past. The introduction of novel and strict official rules of
liability did away with the traditional means of dispute settlement in
simple homicide, but it did not erase traditional social attitudes about
liability. Nor did the imposition of a new scheme of criminal administration prevent society from acting, within the context of that scheme, in
accordance with its traditional attitudes.
Finally, in subsection 4, I shall elaborate upon the nature of the
medieval societal concept of "murder" and the place of that concept
within the process of dispute settlement.

Throughout the medieval period for which written records are extant,
the great majority of defendants who stood trial for homicide were
acquitted. While today many are acquitted, one must take into account
the fact that most suspects do not now stand trial; the vast majority of
them plead guilty. In the Middle Ages few pleaded guilty to any felony
since the penalty was invariably capital. 10
Many defendants doubtless deserved acquittal, for many charges were
poorly supported. The coroner's report might reflect the testimony of
only a few neighbors and might present only the most serious charges that
circulated in the wake of a homicide.n Although coroners were required
to list all those present at a homicide, they often failed to do so. In many.
cases they recorded the details of a slaying, yet maintained that no one
had been present except the slain man, who had died immediately, and
the slayer, who had thereupon fled. 12 What, or who, then, was the source
of those details? There had probably been witnesses who were not
anxious to become involved, who did not wish to risk coming under
suspicion themselves. To come forward later was to risk a fine for not

10. Convictions were particularly rare at the eyre, for few would appear who had neither
a pardon nor assurance of acquittal by the country. At gaol delivery, where nearly all the
defendants had been arrested against their will, the record of conviction was not much
better. The roll of Thomas Ingelby and his associates, e.g., compiled at deliveries of
Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, and
Warwickshire, 40--45 Edward III, contains the trials of 160 individuals accused of homicide
(twenty-four were cited as accessories or receivers). Only fifteen were found guilty;
seventy-four were acquitted, fifty-nine were given special verdicts of self-defense. The
remainder came with pardons or were released for other reasons. Of the principals who
denied the charges against them 80 percent were acquitted outright. JUST 3/142, mm.3 ff.
11. Hunnisett, Medieval Coroner, p. 24.
12. E.g. R. R. Sharpe, ed., Calendar of Coroners' Rolls of the City of London, A.D.
1300-1378, (London, 1913), Roll B, no. 36; Roll D, no. 5.
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having raised the hue. 13 On the other hand, what they had seen must soon
have become the common knowledge of the countryside, and, allowing
for the usual exaggerations or alterations of the true story, may have
appeared in the coroner's enrollment as a fairly accurate account of the
event. But it is difficult to separate the accurate descriptions from the
cases of mere guesswork. The trial jurors probably took a more reasonable view, rejecting unsubstantiated testimony .14
Though malicious prosecution and honestly moved but mistaken indictments may account in part for the high rate of acquittals, other factors
must also have been at work. It is contended here that, for the most part,
those few who were condemned had especially offended against the
standards of the community. By discriminating between them and the
many who committed homicides of a less serious nature, the jurors were
creating a de facto classification roughly similar to the later legal distinction between murder and manslaughter.
The clearest evidence of juries discriminating on the basis of the nature
of the slaying dates from the end of the fourteenth century and the first
decades of the fifteenth. In 1390 century-long protests against the royal
pardoning policy culminated in a statute that restricted the king's power
to grant pardons of grace to those who had committed murder.ts "Murder," as a term of art, referred to the most heinous forms of homicide,
those perpetrated through stealth, at night, or by ambush. The statute
appears to have been directed especially at murderous assaults committed
by professional highwaymen and burglars for monetary gain. The king
agreed not to use his pardon powers casually; moreover, no pardon for
murder would be valid unless it made specific mention of "murder."
Significantly, culpable homicide continued to include both murder and
simple homicide. Both were capital; no judicial distinction was made
between them. The term "murder" was employed, where relevant, solely
for the purpose of administering the Statute of 1390, i.e., for regulating the
granting of pardons of grace to felonious slayers. Though the statute's
effectiveness was short-lived, for several decades "murder" found its
way into some homicide indictments.
Analysis of several trial rolls that include indictments by coroners and
justices of the peace who, despite the courts' failure to apply the 1390
13. Hunnisett, Medieval Coroner, pp. 10, 25.
14. See Humard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 361 et seq. for an analysis of
inquisitions, held on a writ de odio et atia, to ascertain the veracity of appeals and
indictments.
15. The background to the statute of 1390 is given in Kaye, "Early History," Part I. My
interpretation of the statute itself differs from that of Kaye, who argued that it limited
pardons in all types of felonious homicides. See Green, "Jury and the Law of Homicide,"
pp. 462-69.
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statute, bothered to discriminate between murder and simple homicide,
reveals that juries acquitted the great majority of nonmurderers and sent
murderers to the gallows about 50 percent of the time. 16 A gaol delivery
roll covering the first eight years of the reign of Henry VI demonstrates
the point quite clearly. 17 The roll was compiled for James Strangways and
his fellows, who visited the gaols of Lincoln, Nottingham, Northampton,
Warwick, and Leicester. A total of 114 defendants came before them to
answer indictments for homicide in seventy-seven different cases. Of
these, excluding those excused for faulty indictments and those for whom
the jury returned special verdicts, eighty-four persons were acquitted and
twenty were condemned to death. The latter group, with one exception,
had been indicted for murder. Acquittals, on the other hand, were
registered for thirty-seven indicted for simple homicide and for fortyseven held for murder. Taking only principals into account, eighteen of
the nineteen hanged had been charged with murder, and of the forty-five
acquitted only seventeen were murder suspects. Thus, while an indictment for simple homicide practically assured the principal defendant of
exculpation (one of twenty-nine was hanged), an allegation of murder put
his chances at about fifty-fifty (eighteen of thirty-five were hanged). 18
Similarly, John Cokayn's roll, compiled over the years of Henry V's
reign from deliveries of the gaols in Derbyshire, Leicestershire,
Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Rutland, and
Warwickshire, records fifteen convictions based on murder indictments
and only four based on simple homicide, despite the fact that there are
substantially more simple homicides on the roll. 19 The enrollments for
Leicester gaol, based on several deliveries during the reign of Henry IV,
show only four convictions, all based on murder allegations. Of the
thirteen acquittals, seven of the original indictments were for murder, six
for simple homicide.zo John Martyn's roll for the far western circuit
(1424-30) presents ten simple homicides, nine of which ended in acquittal,
and five murders, four of which led to convictions.2 1
16. I have chosen those rolls, or sections of rolls, that contain a substantial number of
indictments for homicide and where it seems clear that coroners and justices of the peace
inserted, when relevant, murdravit or its statutory equivalent: insidiavit. On many other
rolls, of course, where no distinction was made, indictments not including these terms of art
often ended in convictions.
17. JUST 3/203.
18. Two of the seventeen had been indicted for murder by one inquest and for simple
homicide by the other: coroners' indictments often differed from those of the justices of the
peace.
19. JUST 3/195.
20. JUST 3/188.
21. JUST 3/205. The "simple homicide" resulting in conviction was the slaying of a man
by his wife, an act the community frequently construed as murder.
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Despite the lack of evidence on the point, we might speculate that the
judges sometimes urged juries to convict in cases brought on murder
indictments. But it is not safe to conclude that the judges encouraged
juries to acquit those indicted for simple homicide. Only the grounds of
self-defense justified the deliberate slaying of a person who was neither a
convicted nor a manifest felon, and the test for self-defense remained
quite rigorous. As late as 1454 Prisot, J., stated the test for merely
threatening to kill in self defense:
... if a man assaults you in order to beat you it is not lawful for you
to say you will kill him and to menace his life and limb: but if the case
is such that he has you at such advantage that it may be understood that
he is going to kill you as if you seek to flee and he is swifter than you
and pursues you so that you are unable to escape; or if you are on the
ground under him; or if he chases you to a wall or hedge or dike, so that
you cannot escape, then it is lawful for you to say that if he won't
desist, you want to slay him to save your own life, and thus you may
menace him for such special cause.22
2

Our demonstration that juries acted upon their own extralegal notion of
culpable homicide based on the distinction between serious and simple
homicide is limited thus far to the post-1390 period. It is likely that juries
made this distinction earlier, but it is not easy to prove. Before 1390 gaol
delivery enrollments, in recording the indictment made before the coroner
or justice of the peace, almost invariably used only the unenlightening
phrase felonice interfecit ("feloniously slew"). Thus it is impossible to
show from them that juries distinguished between types of felonious
homicides. If we work backward from the trial roll to the indictment as it
appeared on the original coroner's roll, two nearly insuperable problems
are presented: the greater part of the original inquests are no longer
extant; those that do survive generally contain only the operative phrase,
felonice interfecit, with few details from which the nature of the act can
be deduced. One of the few coroners' rolls that does supply such details

22. Year Books, 1422-1461 (Henry VI) (London, 1556-74), 33 Hen. 6, Easter, pl. 10:
" ... quar si un home vous assaute de vou batre n 'e loial pour vous adire que vous voiles
luy tuer, et de luy menasser de vie et de membre: mes si !'cas soit tiel, q'il ad vous a tiel
advantage que par entendment il voilloit vous tuer come si voiles fuir, et il est plus courrant
que vous estes, et alia apres vous, issint que ne vous poies luy escaper; ou autrement que
vous estes desouh luy a!' terre; ou s'il ad enchace vous a un mure ou un hedge ou dike, issint
que vous ne poies luy escape, donq's est loial pour vous adire que s'il ne veut departir de
vous, q'vous en salvatio de vostre vie luy voiles tuer, et issint vous poies luy menasser pour
tiel special cause."
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is the roll of Edmund de Ovyng.23 It is also the longest (sixty-nine
membranes) of the extant coroners' rolls. Of the twenty-five cases on
Ovyng's roll that present homicides identifiable on the trial rolls, only two
ended in convictions. 24 Both show the characteristics of murder, but in
one the defendant confessed and turned approver. 25 This sort of piecemeal evidence, drawn from isolated cases on many different rolls over a
century or more, does not afford convincing proof.
The only feasible approach to our problem is to compare the coroner's
indictment with the trial enrollment in cases ending in a verdict of
self-defense. As we have seen, the law of self-defense was very strict. The
slayer had to have acted as a last resort, which meant, in effect, that the
jury had to detail the defendant's attempts to escape his assailant.
Verdicts of self-defense appear on the trial rolls as a series of formulas
that put the defendant's actions in the best possible light. The slain man
was usually said to have provoked the fight and dealt the first blow; the
defendant then had attempted to escape, only to find himself cornered or
thrown down and held to the ground; gravely wounded, the defendant as
a last resort drew a weapon and saved his life in the only way possible.
Often, it was specified that the defendant had retaliated with a single
blow.26 Some of these details doubtless represented embellishments of the
truth; some even went beyond the rigorous requirements of the law. It
would have been sufficient, for purposes of eligibility for royal pardon, to
allege that the defendant had retreated as far as possible and had struck
23. JUST 2/18 (Cambridgeshire, 14-39 Edw. III).
24. Nine ended in acquittals, eleven in findings of self-defense, one defendant came
forward with a pardon, one died in gaol, and one was remanded to gaol pending further
proceedings.
25. JUST 2/18, m.21/4 (1349): " ... noctanter felonice interfecit R. B. et M. uxorem eius
. . . " The gaol delivery roll (JUST 3/134, m.38/5) used the form, "felonice et sediciose
interfecit ... noctanter." In the second case, testimony was recorded at the coroner's
inquest [JUST 2/18, m.5d/4 (1346)] that " ... post horam cubitus [A] surexit extra cubitum
suum . .. insultumfecit eidem W . ... W. surexit a tecto suo" and raised the hue, at which
point the defendant stabbed him to death. The accused turned approver [i.e., confessed and
then appealed others in hope of obtaining their convictions and, in return, of gaining pardon
for his own offense. See Pugh, "Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," pp. 16-17; F. C.
Hamil, "The King's Approver," Speculum, vol. 11, p. 238; Jens Roehrkasten, "The King's
Approver in the Fourteenth Century" (paper delivered at the British Legal History
Conference, Norwich, July, 1983)]. For the gaol delivery enrollment, see JUST 3/134,
m.34/4 (1346). Although little can be made of such rare cases, they deserve some comment.
They are the only cases that led to conviction. Both have elements of "murder." The first
was secretly done, at night; the second was an attack on a man in his own bed. Though the
defendant confessed, it is unlikely he would have done so had the jury not been about to
declare him guilty. This is precisely what we would expect to find if a more extensive
comparison were possible.
26. E.g. JUST 3/142, m.6d/2 (1367); JUST 3/142, m.10d/2 (1371).
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back as a last resort; had he not yet been wounded or had he needed to
retaliate with multiple blows, he would still have been eligible.
It thus becomes critical to determine just how much the jury embellished the defendant's true case. If juries used the category of pardonable
homicide to exculpate manslaughterers, they would have fabricated
stories of retreat and last resort where in fact there had been neither. They
would have cast fights willingly entered by the defendant, possibly ones
wherein he had struck the first blow, as struggles in which the defendant
was an unwilling participant. If the juries perpetrated such fabrications, it
would be visible to us only through a comparison of the trial enrollments
with the corresponding coroners' enrollments. The coroner's enrollment
was often far less formulistic and represented a more candid response
from the jury. It was a record that could be contradicted or embellished
in court without reprimand to the jury or detriment to the defendant's
case. 27
Admittedly, several methodological difficulties arise in employing the
coroners' rolls. In the first place, the coroner's inquest was held very
soon after the homicide occurred, and in some cases additional evidence
must have come to light after the inquest had been held. Moreover, the
coroners' enrollments nearly always name only one suspect and set forth
only one set of facts as to the circumstances of the homicide. The process
by which these unanimous inquest verdicts were reached is unknown.
They probably represented the belief of the majority of the jurors. Many
inquest votes may have been dose, and their outcome may have resulted
from the prestige or power of one or two persons. Many coroners (or their
clerks) were erratic in the enrollment of details; that only a few facts were
set down in a given case does not mean that others were not stated at the
inquest. Finally, some enrollments were malicious indictments. This is
more likely to have been the case where there had been only one witness,
or where there had not been a witness but merely a "first finder." The
witness or finder would have been in a strong position to place the blame
where he pleased.
Several steps have been taken in order to mitigate the above problem.
Coroners' inquest juries often stated that a homicide had been committed
in self-defense although the evidence they presented did not meet the
legal requirements for a pardon. These cases are the best source of
evidence of community attitudes, and I have relied heavily upon them. I
27. Some coroners' enrollments were highly formulistic, the local inquest apparently
having already "embellished" a suspect's defense. Although the coroner's enrollment could
be (implicitly) repudiated, it probably caused the bench in some cases to examine the
defendant or the trial jury closely. The testimony given at the inquest must have had some
influence; it was not evidence "of record," however.
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have excluded from my study coroners' rolls which include very few
details. It is clear that the clerks compiling these rolls did not bother to
enroll evidence of self-defense but merely characterized all homicides as
felonious. Therefore, it is unsafe to assume that any corresponding trial
verdict of self-defense represented an alteration of the facts. Instead, I
have relied upon rolls that include a great deal of detail in most cases. This
allowed the assumption that where the coroner's inquest did produce
testimony of self-defense it was duly enrolled.
In order to justify killing in self-defense, it will be recalled, the man
attacked had to retreat until retreat was no longer possible. At the trial the
jurors always alleged such a predicament, and though it was sometimes
true,zs a comparison of the coroners' rolls and the trial rolls reveal that it
often was not and that a petty jury had so altered the facts as to make
pardonable what the law considered nonpardonable. Thus from the
community's point of view, a violent attack could be met by a violent
response. A man whose life was threatened did not have to seek some
means of escape; indeed, he need not do so though he was in no danger
oflosing his life. The court's concern with last resort indicates a concept
of criminal liability clearly at odds with prevailing social norms.
A case from a Norfolk coroner's roll indicates the looseness of the
social concept of self-defense:
William put his hand to his knife in order to draw it and strike Robert.
Robert, fearing that William wanted to kill him, in self-defense struck
William on the head with a hatchet.z9
Edmund de Ovyng, the Cambridge coroner, was usually very careful to
report inquest findings in detail.3° He recorded a case of homicide,
described by the inquest jurors as homicide se defendendo, in which the
28. For various examples on coroners' rolls of clearly stated last resort see JUST 2/102,
m.9d/2: "fugit usque ad quoddam angulum domus" (1363); JUST 2/18, m.5/4: "iacuit super
ipsum" (1345); JUST 2/102, m.lld/2 (1364); JUST 2/67, m.5/3: "quandam ripam ubi voluit
transisse et non potuit pro profunditate et largitudine dicte aque" (1354); JUST 2/18,
m.52d/2: "cessidit ad terram . .. A.fuit in propos ito interfecisse . .. B." (1361); JUST 2/18,
m.61/l: "supersit pre dictum J. in ulnas suas" (1364); JUST 2/23, m.2/2: "non potuit evadere
propter multitudinem inimicorum suorum" (1373). The fact that the coroner's inquest
produced such testimony does not mean that the facts were true; they might have been
altered at this early stage. But in such cases the trial jury was not adducing facts contrary
to those of the indictment.
29. JUST 2/102, m.9/2: "Wille/mus misit manum suum ad cultellum suum abtrahendum
et ad percuciendum dictum Robertum. Idemque Robertus timens quod idem W. voluit
occidisse eum in defensione vite sue percussit eundem W. in capite super cervicem eiusdem
cum quadam hachia" (1363). The trial record (Oyer and Terminer) has not been located, but
the slayer was pardoned for self-defense: Calendar of the Patent Rolls, 1232-1422 (London,
1906), May 6, 1367, p. 395. Hereafter cited as C.P.R. See also JUST 2/58, m.2/2 (1379).
30. E.g. JUST 2/18 (14--39 Edw. III); JUST 2/256, mm.1-4 (44-48 Edw. III).
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assailant had seized the defendant's beard. Walter Clerk and Thomas
Clerk argued until Thomas, threatening to kill Walter,
suddenly jumped from the cart and took up an iron fork, intending to
run at Walter, but Walter immediately grabbed the fork in his own hand
and threw it from Thomas lest he do further damage with it; for which
Thomas took Walter by the beard; Walter, because of this, drew his
knife and in self-defense struck Thomas in the left arm so that he
died.JI
Thomas's attack and intentions, rather than the imminence of danger to
Walter's life, were, apparently, the basis for the community's view that
Walter had acted in self-defense. In a similar instance, Hugh Harpour,
chaplain, took John atte Lane, also a chaplain, in his hands and
threw him down feloniously at his feet and wanted to kill him . . .
because of this, John, fearing death and getting up, drew his knife and
stabbed Hugh in the chest.32
Hugh seems to have been weaponless, so that John was not in imminent
danger of death. Nevertheless, he was repelling an attack and, thus,
defending himself. The resistance was excessive, but the community did
not scruple as to the nature of the retaliation. The trial jury provided an
elaborate story of self-defense.33
Jurors at a Leicestershire coroner's inquest in 1365 told a complicated
story with respect to the death of Richard de Sydenfen. 34 Richard Ruskin
and his son William came to the door of William de Assheby's house in
Melton and the elder Ruskin brought Assheby outside with sword drawn
31. JUST 2/18, m.45d/5: "W. C. et T. C .... simul cum una caretta pro garbis querendo
... et contencio mota inter ipsos T . ... stetit super carettam querandam et minavit ipsum
Walterum de vita et membra etfestinans descendens de caretta cepit unumfurcumferratum
et voluit concurasse super dictum W. et incontinenti dictus W. cepit furcum in manu sua et
illud iactavit ab ipso ne dampnum ulterius cum illo face ret quo facto dictus T. cepit ipsum
W. per barbam suam quo facto dictus W. traxit cultellum suum et in defensione sua
percussit predictum T. in brachia sinistro" (1357). The trial enrollment has not been located.
32. JUST 2/18, m.47d/4: "cepit in manibus suis et iactavit ipsum feloniter humo sub
pedibus suis et ipsum voluit interfecisse ... quo facto predictus Johannes atte Lane timens
mortem suam et in resurgendo de pedibus ipsius Hugonis traxit cultellum suum . . . et
percussit predictum Hugonem in pectore" (1358).
33. The trial enrollment (C 47, Cambridge, 6/87) is partly blind, but the legible parts
indicate a classic form of self-defense. See also JUST 2/58, m.4/2 (1380), where the accused
had been thrown to the ground before slaying his assailant. There is no mention of any
weapon used by the assailant, but the jury maintained the homicide was committed in
self-defense. No trial enrollment located. In some cases, the self-defender seems to have
stood his ground and waited for his assailant to reach him despite the fact that there was no
apparent obstacle to retreat. E.g. JUST 2/18, m.16/3 (1351); trial enrollment at JUST 3/134,
m.4111. JUST 2/58, m.3d/1 (1379); trial enrollment not located.
34. JUST 2/53, m.3d/4.
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by calling him a liar. After a struggle, Assheby chased his enemies to the
door of their house where the elder Ruskin's servant, Sydenfen, seeing
that his master was in grave danger, felled Assheby with a blow of a club.
The latter revived and, drawing a small knife, slew the servant "in
self-defense." Assheby did not retreat once he had risen to his feet, but
that was of no consequence. Nor did it matter that he had entered the fray
of his own choosing. When he killed Sydenfen he was acting in "selfdefense. " 35
Jurors at the inquest in Aldgate Ward, London, in 1325, described a
somewhat one-sided fight which grew out of a sudden quarrel:
John le Marche, "pottere," and Agnes de Wycoumbe after the hour of
curfew, were quarreling in the High Street opposite the house of John
... when the said Agnes taking a staff ... out of the hand of John ...
therewith struck the said John on the back and sides; that thereupon
came Geoffrey de Caxtone . . . and Andrew de Wynton, "pottere,"
with staves in their hands to assist the said Agnes and struck the said
John on the head and body, so that he died a week later. 36
A trial enrollment is extant only in the case of Andrew. 37 The petty jurors
testified that John met Andrew some distance from the place of the
slaying and struck him on the head with a staff.38 Andrew fled until he was
up against a wall and forced to retaliate. 39 There was no mention of other
principals to the homicide.
Testimony of a more unusual sort was given by inquest jurors at an
Aldersgate viewing of a dead man, a certain John de Chiggewell:
John Pentyn would have hanged himself in his solar, and on that
account his wife Clemencia raised the cry so that the said John de
Chiggewell, John atte Adam de Mersshe, Wykham and other neighbors, names unknown, came to her assistance, and that when the said
John de Chiggewell would have entered the solar before the others, ...
Pentyn feloniously struck him on the head . . . inflicting a mortal
wound. 40
At Pentyn's trial the petty jury alleged that he had argued with his wife
and, after she had left the house, had locked the door and gone up to his
35. When Assheby came to trial he already had a pardon. JUST 3/142, m.181l; C.P.R.,
Dec. 6, 1366, p. 345.
36. London Coroners' Rolls, RollE, no. 35, pp. 162--63.
37. According to the coroner's roll, Andrew and a certain Robert le Raykere, who had
"aided and abetted" the felony, were immediately captured; Agnes and Geoffrey fled.
38. C 260/37, no. 7 (1326). See also JUST 3/43/3, m.21l (1326) for the original trial
enrollment.
39. Pardon: C.P.R., Feb. 22, 1327, p. 24.
40. London Coroners' Rolls, Roll B, no. 42, pp. 65--66.
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bed in the solar. Clemencia returned in the evening and finding herself
locked out raised the hue, at which point Chiggewell arrived, ascended
the stairs to the solar, and tried to kill Pentyn with a hatchet. Pentyn,
unable to escape, grabbed an iron window bar and in self-defense gave his
assailant one blow from which he died fifteen days later. 41
Finally, a simple homicide led to a special verdict of self-defense in the
case of John Counte, who, after quarreling with Robert Paunchard in
Bishopsgate Ward, London, drew a knife and stabbed Paunchard to
death. 42 The trial jury maintained that Paunchard had thrown rocks at
Counte and driven him to a wall.43
By the middle of the fourteenth century, a defendant who had slain a
housebreaker might be acquitted by judgment of the court. 44 The same
applied where he had slain someone who came to rob him. But the courts
were not consistent in their treatment of such cases, and it appears that at
least until late into the century acquittal might depend upon clear
evidence of self-defense. 4 5 In this area, the community was ahead of the
courts. Trial juries supplied evidence of self-defense where, on the basis
of coroner's inquest testimony, there had been neither true self-defense
nor even clear evidence of housebreaking or attempted theft.
In one instance, where self-defense may in fact have been involved,
though the jurors at the inquest made no mention of last resort, the
deceased had entered the close of William Childerle
at the hour of Prime [about one o'clock, a.m.] without the license of
William and against the latter's will. 4 6
William returned home from the fields and met Richard on the stairs of his
solar where a struggle ensued and the intruder was slain. At the trial, the
petty jury assured the court that William had fled to a wall near the door
of the house where he was finally cornered and forced to strike back in
self defense.47 Thomas Randolph of Braunston, Leicestershire, saw
someone standing outside his window at night and demanded to know
who it was. 48 Receiving no answer, he took up a club and went outside
41. C 260/32, no. 15 (1322). Order to bail Pentyn: Calendar of the Close Rolls, 1272-1447
(London, 1900-1937), April13, 1323, p. 636. Hereafter cited as C.C.R.
42. London Coroners' Rolls, Roll H, no. 9, pp. 242-43.
43. C 260/50, no. 61 (1339). It is possible that the jury was influenced by the location of
the slaying. The fight had taken place in the close of the Earl of Warwick where Robert
Artoys, by whom Counte was employed as a cook, resided.
44. See below, Chapter 3, nn. 53-54 and accompanying text.
45. Ibid., text at n. 55.
46. JUST 2/18, m.4ld/2: "circa horam prima sine licencia ipsius Willelmi et contra
voluntate ipsius Willelmi" (1356).
47. C 260/68, no. 20 (1357); Pardon: C.P.R., May 3, 1357, p. 530.
48. JUST 2/58, m.l/1 (1379).
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where the trespasser, John Sherman, attacked him. Standing his ground,
Thomas dealt Sherman a fatal blow, which the inquest jurors said was
done in self-defense. 49 Similarly, Henry Priour, attacked by William, son
of John Paryn, who came one evening to the door of Henry's house,
retaliated immediately with a club. 50 At Priour's trial, the petty jury
asserted that William attacked Henry "ad domum ipsius Henrici" and
drove him to a wall where he, Henry, happened to find the club he used;
he thus had slain in self-defense.st
In a more extreme case, it was considered self-defense where the
defendant on his master's property slew a man who had hurled insults at
him.sz William de Walynford, "brewere," quarreled with Simon de Parys
in Cheap and the latter followed William home, threatening him as they
went. The coroner recorded that William forbade Simon to insult him in
his master's house and then immediately William fetched a knife and
plunged it into Simon's chest. In the petty jury's account, however, the
facts were altered to show that Simon had attacked William with a knife
as they stood in the king's highway. William fled to his master's house,
where, being cornered by his assailant, he had slain him as a last resort. 5 3
One related and extraordinary case, for which coroner's indictment and
trial enrollment are both extant, shows how the community sanctioned
the slaying of an adulterer. An aggrieved husband was not permitted to
take the adulterer's life, 5 4 but, as in the case of a trespasser upon his land,
he would have been able to drive him away. Robert Bousserman returned
home at midday, an inquest jury testified, to find John Doughty having
sexual intercourse with his wife ("adfornicandum cum illa").ss Bousserman forthwith dispatched Doughty with a blow of his hatchet. The petty
jury altered the facts to make Robert a self-defender who could not escape
and to emphasize the aspect of trespass:
John Doughty came at night to the house of Robert in the village of
Laghscale as Robert and his wife lay asleep in bed in the peace of the
King, and he entered Robert's house; seeing this, Robert's wife
secretly arose from her husband and went to John and John went to bed
with Robert's wife; in the meantime Robert awakened and hearing
noise in his house and seeing that his wife had left his bed rose and
49. No trial enrollment has been located for this case. Possibly, the defendant was
acquitted as a slayer of a thief.
50. JUST 2/18, m.44d/3 (1354).
51. JUST 3/139, m.13d/l (1356). Priour was remanded to await a pardon.
52. London Coroners' Rolls, Roll C, no. 13, p. 80.
53. JUST 3/43/1, m.2111 (1324).
54. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2:484. Referring to an earlier period,
the authors suggest that the right to slay the adulterer was already doubtful.
55. JUST 2/211, m.1dll (1341).
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sought her in his house and found her with John; immediately John
attacked Robert with a knife ... and wounded him and stood between
him and the door of Robert's house continually stabbing and wounding
him and Robert seeing that his life was in danger and that he could in
no way flee further, in order to save his life he took up a hatchet and
gave John one blow in the head.56
The allegation that the slain man had secretly entered a house at night
while the master of the house slept was one of the common elements of
later indictments for "murder. "57 In this case it was unnecessary; the
jurors needed to do no more than provide the usual allegations of
homicide se defendendo. Possibly, the elaborations by the trial jury
indicate an especially strong sense of outrage.
The community was also ready to excuse homicide that occurred in
defense of a kinsman though the slayer was not himself in mortal danger.
The petty jury had to alter the true facts by asserting that the accused
himself had come under attack and had slain his assailant as a last resort. ss
This may be seen in a number of cases. A Buckinghamshire coroner, John
atte Broke, recorded that John Calles, senior, and his son John stood
talking to William Shepherde when an argument broke out. Shepherde
struck Calles senior with a staff.
Seeing this, John Calles junior drew his knife and struck Shepherde in
the right part of the neck wounding him mortally.59
Broke concluded his enrollment with the phrase, "and thus he slew him
feloniously," and indeed the younger Calles had clearly not been attacked. At the trial, however, the petty jury asserted that after Shepherde
56. JUST 3/78 m.2d/l: "infra nocte predictus Johannes Doughty venit ad domum ipsius
Roberti in predicta villa de Laghscales prefato R. cum uxore sua in lecto suo in pace Regis
iacente et sompniente et domum ipsius R. intravit quod percipiens uxor ipsius R. secrete a
viro suo surexit et ad ipsum J. ivit et predictus J. uxorem ipsius R. ibidem concubiit ...
medio tempore predict us R. vigilavit et audiens tumultum in domo sua et percipiens uxorem
suam a lecto suo abe sse surexit et querendo earn in domo sua invenit earn cum predicto J.
et statim predictus J. in ipsum R. cum quodam cultello vocato [tear in membrane] ibidem
insultumfecit et ipsum verberavit vulneravit et inter ipsum et hostium eiusdem domus stetit
semper cum cultello predicto ipsurri percuciendo et vulnerando ipsum ibidem ad
interficiendum et predictus R. videns periculum mortis sibi iminere et se ulterius nullo modo
posse diffugere causa mortem suam propriam evitandi sumpsit quoddam polhachet et inde
percussit predictum J. solo ictu in capite usque cerebrum unde statim obiit." (1342).
57. Green, "Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability," p. 692.
58. Hurnard states the common law rule as restricting self-defense to defense of one's
own life. She appears to have found no cases where defense solely of one's kin was alleged.
59. C 260/105, no.l3: " ... hoc videns extraxit cultellum suum ... et perc us sit prefatum
Willelmum in dextera parte collifaciens ei plagam mortalem et sic ipsumfelonice interfecit"
(1393). The coroner's indictment is enrolled on the King's Bench transcript of the trial
proceedings.
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had begun the quarrel, and had struck Colles senior, Colles junior
intervened to part them. Shepherde then turned on Collesjunior, who fled
as far as a wall between two houses where he was forced to slay his
attacker in self-defense. 6o
According to a London coroner's roll, Simon Chaucer and Robert de
Uptone quarreled on the street in Cordwainer Street Ward; Simon struck
Robert, wounding him on the upper lip (there is no mention of a weapon).
John, Robert's son, who was present and saw the incident, seized a
"dorbarre" with which he beat Simon on the hands, side, and head,
killing him. 61 The petty jury told an elaborate story that made John eligible
for a royal pardon:
A quarrel broke out between Simon and Robert over certain pennies
which Simon owed the latter. Simon took up a staff and wanted to
strike Robert, but Robert grasped it firmly in his hands . . . . Simon
drew his knife and stabbed Robert in the mouth so that blood flowed.
John, sitting in a shop [shopa], saw the fight and rising and taking up a
dorbarre ran to the fight to pacify the two if he could. When Simon saw
John coming he left Robert and went after John with the knife ... he
chased John as far as a wall in Aldermannescherche and held him
tightly against the wall so that John could not escape. 6 2
Similarly, Alice, the wife of James Almand, "Pipere," who slew John
Langetolft in London, was said at her trial to have entered a fray to save
James, only to end by slaying in self-defense. The petty jury added,
however, that she slew John in order to save not only her own life but that
of her husband. 63 The coroner's indictment copied onto the gaol delivery
60. Idem. Colles junior was released, pending his pardon, in the hands of four men, one
of whom was his father.
61. London Coroners' Rolls, Roll F, no. 4, pp. 175-76.
62. C 260/50, no. 60: " ... contencio oriebatur inter Simonem et Robertum de Uptone
patrem predicti Johannis pro certis denariis eidem Roberto per prefatum Simonem debitis.
Ita quod predictus Simon cepit in manu sua quendam baculum ... et inde percussisse voluit
predictum Robertum quem baculum predictus Robertus in manibus suis itafirmiter tenuit .
. . . Simon ... extraxit quendam cultellum suum qui vacatur "Bideu" et inde percussit
predictum Robertum in ore ita quod sanguis inde exivit. Predictus Johannes sedens ibidem
in quadam shopa et videns dictum patrem suum et prefatum Simonem sic fore in contumelia
surrexit et cepit quendam Dorebarre in manu sua et cucurrit eis ad contumeliam il/am
pacificandam si potuisset. Et cum predictus Simon vidit ipsum Johannem sic venientem
reliquit predictum Robertum et se dedit eidem Johanni cum prefato Bideu in manu sua
extracto et ipsum inde fugavit ad quandam parietem de Aldermannescherche contra quem
parietem predict us Simon ipsum Johannem cum manu sua sinistra ita strite tenuit quod ex
nulla parte evadere potuit" (1340). Despite his immediate capture, John did not appear at
gaol delivery until 1339, some three years thereafter. John was pardoned in Jan., 1340
(C.P.R., p. 351).
63. C 260/72, no. 15. (1361).
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roll states that she slew John feloniously, no mention being made of
self-defense.
A Cambridge jury converted a more serious manslaughter into pardonable homicide when it altered the facts of Richard Godmancester's slaying
at the hands of William Holdy. Edmund de Ovyng's coroner's roll states
that William came upon his brother Thomas and Richard as they
quarreled. William drew his knife and stabbed Richard in the back. 64
Ovyng termed the homicide a felony. The trial jury's reworking of the
facts provided ample evidence of last resort and asserted that
Godmancester had died of a wound in the stomach, a rather more
reasonable place for a self-defender to stab his adversary. 65
In none of the above cases had the defendant acted out of true
premeditation. Where the defendant had supplied the initial provocation,
it appears to have been a less than homicidal attack, which then escalated
with fatal results. Certainly, these slayings were not "murders" in the
sense that term was used by the late fourteenth century. The defendant
had not ambushed the deceased or employed other means of stealth. But
in none of them would the defendant have merited a royal pardon under
the terms of the law. Had the true story come out in court, as the
statement ofPrisot indicates, the defendant would have been sentenced to
death. 66
One final and difficult question: Are we dealing here with an eXpanded
notion of self-defense, or with a broader attitude that only murderers
ought to be hanged? The answer must be that there is evidence of both.
In many, perhaps most, of the above cases the community surely believed
the slaying was justified even though the official rules of self-defense had
not been met. But in others there had been little or no element of
64. JUST 2/18, m.l5d/3 (1351).
65. JUST 3/134, m.41/4 (1348). The accused was thrown to the ground and lay "subtus
quandam parietem . . . insurgendo versus dictum parietem se defendendo percussit
predictum Willelmum [sic] in ventre." For a case in which self-defense involved striking a
man in the back see Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous (Chancery), 1219-1377
(London, 1916-37), vol. I, pp. 568-69, no. 2126.
66. This study remains tentative. The great majority of cases for which I located both an
indictment and a trial enrollment could not be used. In hundreds of cases, indictments for
felonious homicide led to trial verdicts of self-defense, but it is unclear that the coroner
bothered to record details of self-defense. In many others where both indictment and verdict
agreed on self-defense the former was so formulistic as to raise suspicion that fact alteration
had already taken place. Another possible approach to the problem of demonstrating fact
alteration is to analyze the formulistic verdicts of self-defense and to infer alteration from the
frequent use of a limited number of excuses. My approach draws attention to the plausibility
of such an inference but goes a st~p further by showing that the formulas were not merely
convenient summaries for what were in fact instances of pardonable homicide.
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self-defense, and the trial verdict appears to be an entire fiction devised
for purposes of saving the defendant's neck.
Perhaps all that can be said is that, given the nature of medieval life, the
rules of both self-defense and felonious homicide were unrealistically
strict. If firmly applied, they would have meant the condemnation of
persons of pride who, when under attack, did not turn tail and flee until
cornered beyond all hope of further escape. They would also have meant
the hanging of men who, in sudden anger, struck a blow not in itself
mortal but which, due to infection or careless treatment, resulted in
death. These are different cases, occasioning different motives for leniency. Many homicides must have combined elements of both cases. It is,
however, impossible to determine where society drew the line between
homicides it viewed as justifiable self-defense and homicides it viewed as
unjustifiable but still not deserving capital punishment. Nor, for that
matter, is it possible to determine which slayings in the latter class were
considered so impetuous as to be akin to accidental homicides. It is likely
that some simple homicides were recast by trial jurors as misadventures,
and hence made pardonable, but there are too few such special verdicts
on the fourteenth-century rolls to make comparison with the coroner's
enrollment profitable. The subgroups within the area of simple homicide
must have shaded into one another, and distinctions among them probably differed over time and locale. Moreover, as I shall suggest in
subsection 4, many social and psychological factors must have played a
role in the formation of the community's attitude toward individual
defendants and its perception of their deeds.
3

The foregoing suggests that in the fourteenth century trial jurors were
not above characterizing as pardonable "simple" homicide, roughly what
we would call manslaughter. The present section of this study seeks to
assess whether thirteenth-century trial jurors' verdicts closely represented the truth. Naomi D. Hurnard concluded her pioneering and
learned study of royal pardons for homicide with the end of the reign of
Edward I, but she hinted that jury behavior might have changed in the
ensuing period. 67 She pointed out that the sudden increase of pardons de
gratia after 1294 caused a fundamental break with earlier practice. The
implication of her remarks is that conclusions arrived at on the basis of
fourteenth-century evidence cannot be carried back into the earlier
67. Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 268: "[T)he jurors were not yet falling back
on one or other of a set of prefabricated tales which could be borrowed, disguised only with
minor variants, to substantiate their declaration that slayings had been in self-defense."
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period. The specific argument here would be that, after 1294, jurors, with
knowledge of the indiscriminate dispensing of pardons to slayers, altered
their outlook toward homicide defendants-especially toward those who
had committed a simple homicide-and found pardonable circumstances
where there had been none. The jury would have reasoned, in effect, that
a man who by acting with more dispatch might have made himself
invulnerable to prosecution should not be hanged unless he was of the
most disreputable sort. In my view, while the new pardoning policy might
have increased the jury's willingness to alter the facts in favor of the
defendant, that policy was not the real source of jury attitudes. Jury
behavior did not change radically after 1294; from the very outset of the
common law period, juries were inclined to structure the evidence in such
a way as to save the life of the manslaughterer.
In her chapter on trial jury verdicts Hurnard examined the extent to
which juries fabricated facts in order to ensure that the defendant would
receive a pardon for excusable homicide. She compared the allegations
made by jurors at special inquisitions held for the purpose of deciding
whether bail ought to be granted with those set forth at the actual trial
before justices in eyre. Her findings support her conclusion that
on the whole, discrepancies between two or more verdicts were over
details of location and the sequence of events, the sort of thing on
which independent witnesses could easily differ. ... The impression
which these comparisons give is of pretty general agreement on the
issue of self-defense or accident. 68
In one case of ''serious discrepancy,'' the eyre jury suppressed the fact
that the defendant had retaliated against blows of a staff with a relatively
more lethal weapon, a small ax, alleging instead that he had used a staff
in self-defense. The inquisition had alleged that the defendant had been
struck on the head and cornered and that he had employed his ax because
he could not otherwise have escaped death. 69 The alteration "may have
been literally vital" to the defendant, as Hurnard argues, but this would
be true only because of the overly strict rules of self-defense, not because
the trial jurors were coming to the aid of a person who had not in fact slain
in self-defense.
How much weight ought we to accord to the "pretty general agreement" between special inquisitions and trial enrollments? The former
were indeed less formal than the latter; they were not necessarily final and
sometimes less attention was paid to the stringent rules of pardonable
self-defense. But special inquisitions were directed to the issue of
68. Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 265.
69. Ibid., p. 261.

48

Origins

excusable circumstances and were held at the ''request of the accused or
his friends, who probably had some reason for confidence in their
outcome. "7o They represented a point in the procedure at which the
community view of the homicide had become known, and they probably
were held only when it was fairly clear that community sympathy lay with
the suspect. This may help to explain why Hurnard was able to find only
one such commission that determined the defendant had slain feloniously. 71 In fact, the partiality of jurors at special inquisitions sometimes
resulted in favorable verdicts that trial jurors later overturned.72
Hurnard's comparison, therefore, is of limited usefulness. Having set
alongside the trial verdicts a body of evidence overwhelmingly favorable
to the defendants, i.e., special inquisitions, she concluded that the trial
verdicts were relatively scrupulous; where they disagreed with the special
inquisitions, they took a more critical, and probably a more objective,
view of the circumstances. But Hurnard was unable to establish the
relationship between a random selection of indictments and the trial verdicts. That relationship can be established, if at all, only by comparing the
coroners' enrollments with the verdicts given at trial. Hurnard recognized
the potential value of such a correlation, but rightly concluded that too
few thirteenth-century coroners' rolls exist to carry it out.
There exists one important piece of evidence that sheds some light on
contemporary practice. A thirteenth-century precedent book, Placita
Corone, describes the case of a man indicted for homicide. The defendant, a certain Thomas, came before the court and told his story as follows:
And because I refused him [the deceased] the loan of my horse he ran
at me in my own house with a Welsh knife, horn handled, in his right
hand and inflicted several wounds on my head, shoulders, feet, and
elsewhere on my body wherever he could reach. I did not at first return
his blows; but when I realized that he was set on killing me I started to
defend myself: that is to say I wounded him in the right arm with a little
pointed knife which I carried, making no further onslaught and acting
in this way to save my own life. 73
One justice put the court's impatience with such formulistic defenses
quite succinctly:
Thomas, you have greatly embroidered your tale and coloured your
defense: for you are telling us only what you think will be to your
advantage, and suppressing whatever you think may damage you, and

70. Ibid., p. 110.
71. Ibid., p. 254.
72. Ibid., p. 110.

73. Kaye, trans. and ed., Placita Carone, pp. 19-20.
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I do not believe you have told the whole truth. 74
Nevertheless, the defendant stood his ground, putting himself upon the
country. When the petty jury testified under oath that Thomas's story was
true, the court could only remand him to await his pardon.
Thomas's case is perhaps an exaggerated example, 75 but it is not very
different from a great many thirteenth-century enrollments. Moreover, it
strongly suggests that the justices were aware that coloration in cases of
self-defense was common but that doubts expressed from the Bench
would not intimidate juries. Hurnard recognized that formulistic descriptions of self-defense raise ''suspicion that some of these circumstances
were borrowed from other cases." She admitted:
It may be judged that too many slayers in self-defense pulled stakes
from fences and poles from carts, bolted into culs de sac or tried and
failed to climb walls, were brought up against dykes or rivers, found
swords unexpectedly but conveniently to hand or made random knife
thrusts that just happened to hit vital spotsJ6

Hurnard concluded that victims of assault "naturally reacted in a similar
manner"; that the "paucity of many of the clerks' Latin vocabulary" led
them to fall back on the same terminology. Before 1307, she maintained,
the jurors were not yet falling back on one or other set of prefabricated
tales which could be borrowed, disguised only with minor variants, to
substantiate their declaration that slayings had been in self-defense.77
Perhaps she is correct, but there appears to be little evidence to support
her view. 78 One must still explain the high number of acquittals on the
medieval rolls, rather than view pardonable homicides in isolation from
other elements of the administration of criminal law. This is so because
74. "Thomas, vous avez mut enbeli vostre parole et vostre defens en.flori: kar vous
pronunciez quant ke vous quidez ke vous poet valer et conceler ce ke grever vos poet, kar
je ne quid pas ke vos eiez tote la verite conte" (idem).
75. See above, Chapter I, n. 49, for cautionary remarks regarding the use of this source.
76. Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 267.
77. Ibid., p. 268.
78. In her analysis of the king's role in the pardoning process, Hurnard argues that "in a
sample of well over 500 cases identified on the plea rolls pardon is very unlikely to have been
granted to felonious killers in more than twenty percent, and even ten percent may be
considerably above the mark" (p. 245). This assumes, of course, that the evidence on the
plea rolls is trustworthy. What the author has proved is that the king did not often grant
pardons to persons for whom there was not some favorable testimony, not that those who
in fact slew feloniously were seldom able to obtain pardons. Hurnard also shows that
presenting juries often used the phrase "mota contencione" to describe "fatal free fights";
they did not adduce testimony of pardonable circumstances in all such free fights. This does
not prove the trial jury would not have done so had the suspect appeared and put his life in
their hands.
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the possibility that the acquittals resulted from jurors' failure to tell the
truth threatens to undermine the notion that jurors were particularly
scrupulous in cases of excusable homicide. There are, in fact, good
reasons to believe that fourteenth-century social attitudes were not
radically different from those of the preceding period. To explore these
reasons, we must turn from the narrow confines of pardonable homicide
to the general contours of the early history of liability for homicide.
We have seen that in the Anglo-Saxon period, and for perhaps a
century after the Norman Conquest, some homicides were unemendable,
leading to punishment-usually capital-at the hands of the Crown.79
These homicides, secret homicides known as "murders," were considered particularly heinous and, as outrages against society as a whole,
were exclusively royal pleas. It cannot be determined how closely the
Anglo-Saxon "murder" corresponded to the "murder" of the late fourteenth century.so Probably the term always had connoted stealth; the
slayer acted when his victim was off guard. But it appears that any
homicide committed in the absence of a witness was presumed to have
been committed through stealth. It was in secret and, hence, a murder. 8 1
Open homicide, on the other hand, remained until the outset of the twelfth
century an emendable act. 82 The guilty party or his kin paid wer, bot, and
wite. Failure to pay the wer could result in liability to the feud; after the
tenth century, only the slayer could be subjected to the vengeance of the
slain man's kin.s 3 Although there is no evidence as to the frequency of
such feuds, it is likely that settlement in money or in kind was the usual
result of sudden and open acts of homicide. If the slaying resulted from a
mutual quarrel and involved fighting on both sides, some elements of
self-defense probably lay side by side with elements of excessive retaliation. Settlements probably took these elements into account, though in
an impressionistic way. The extension of royal jurisdiction in the twelfth
century to encompass the entire area of homicide had two revolutionary
79. See above, Chapter I, text at nn. 5-8.
80. See Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2:486; Kaye, "Early History,"
Part I, pp. 366 et seq. Kaye argues that "murder" retained its ancient meaning of "secret
or stealthy killing" during the twelfth through fourteenth centuries, despite the fact that it
was also used as a synonym for the general term "kill" and a fine for an unexplained
homicide. It seems clear that the concept was deeply embedded in social attitudes during the
entire period. Possibly, the social view of "murder" changed, due to the growth of
professional crime, from certain specific acts, e.g., poisoning, to all planned homicides.
81. See below, nn. 100, 102-3, and accompanying text.
82. Hurnard, King's Pardonfor Homicide, p. 8. Hurnard ventures the judgment that "the
process may have been completed by the end of the reign of Henry I" (1135). But she
cautions: "The date when this occurs is not known."
83. II Edmund, I, in A. J. Robertson, trans. and ed., The Laws of the Kings of England
from Edmund to Henry I (Cambridge, 1925), p. 9.
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effects: many homicides that formerly had not resulted in capital punishment were now made capital under the law; strict and largely unenforceable requirements were introduced into a law of self-defense.
The evidence as to jury attitudes in the fourteenth century may aid in
understanding social attitudes toward criminal liability in the entire period
from late Anglo-Saxon times to the end of the Middle Ages. If so, the
argument would run as follows. Originally, the Anglo-Saxons practiced
the feud in homicide cases. The kin of the slain took vengeance upon the
slayer or one of his kin, who were jointly liable for their kinsman's act.8 4
Whether the mental element was taken into account is unknown. Secret
homicide was a matter for the king, but all other homicides were
emendable; failure to pay the wergild rendered the slayer and his kin
liable to vendetta, though reduction of the amount of compensation by
agreement was probably common. By the tenth century, the laws
restricted liability to vendetta to the actual slayer. They also mandated a
reduction of wergild compensation where there had been mitigating
circumstances.ss In such cases, where the slayer had acted in self-defense
or through accident, the king relinquished the wite. 86 While the kin of the
slain may have taken a narrow view of such mitigating circumstances,
society at large took a broader view of the matter, having nothing to gain
from feud or compensation, and in a day when fights began easily and led
often to death due to sepsis or other results of poor medical techniques.
In its eyes, secret homicide or especially malicious attacks justified
punishment by death. Simple homicides were seen as requiring compensation, with mitigation if the act was unintentional or to some extent
provoked. When all homicides were drawn within the sphere of royal
jurisdiction and made, unless excusable, punishable by death, the community was forced to choose between presentment of the slayer and
payment of the murdrum, a fine imposed for an unexplained homicide.s 7
Before 1215, persons presented for homicide were forced to undergo the
ordeal, so that if the community desired to absolve a slayer it had to fail
to present him in the first place. 8s The records do not permit us to observe
84. Whitelock, Beginnings of English Society, p. 39.
85. III Edgar, I, 2: "[T]here is to be such remission in the compensation as is justifiable
before God and supportable in the State." Quoted by Hurnard, King's Pardon for
Homicide, p. 5; VI Ethelred, 52,1: "[H]e who is an involuntary agent in his misdeeds should
always be entitled to clemency and to better terms." Idem.
86. Francis Sayre, "Mens Rea," Harvard Law Review, vol. 45 (1932), p. 982.
87. Hurnard has traced the use of presentment from the late tenth century to the Assize
of Clarendon. "The Jury of Presentment and the Assize of Clarendon," English Historical
Review, vol. 56 (1941), pp. 374-410. On the murdrum fine see ibid., pp. 385 et seq.;
Richardson and Sayles, Governance of Mediaeval England, pp. 195-96. Pollock and
Maitland, History of English Law, 2:487.
88. Groot ("Jury of Presentment," passim; above, Chapter I, n. 20 and accompanying
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the resulting tension between the bonds of friendship and the demands of
the pocketbook. By the third decade of the thirteenth century, however,
this tension had been relieved: once the slayer had been presented, it was
left to the trial jury to state whether he was guilty or not. 89 This provided
them with an opportunity to acquit or to adduce circumstances of
pardonable homicide. The compromise that resulted is illustrated in
Placita Corone, where a defendant who successfully pleaded self-defense
was asked who put him in prison. He replied:
Sire, my neighbors: for they were afraid of being involved in the affair
and suffering loss thereby.9o
Thus, from the outset of the common law period, trial juries were
prepared to voice a sense of justice fundamentally at odds with the letter
of the law. They persisted throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries in using their role as submitters of evidence to condemn many
murderers and to acquit or render pardonable those whom a later legal age
would term "manslaughterers." Trial juries remained free to say the
"truth" as they knew it, to reject the conclusions of both juries of
presentment and coroners' inquest juries. Of course, in many cases the
process of fact alteration began before the trialjury gave its verdict: it was
not uncommon for a coroner's jury to use elaborate formulas to describe
a case of self-defense. 91 The trial jurors, drawn from the hundred where
the homicide was committed, but not necessarily from the immediate
vicinage, probably reflected already settled attitudes of the countryside
toward individual defendants. 92 It remains to suggest, by way of conclusion to this preliminary study, what the significant determinants of these
societal attitudes were.
text) has shown that the presenters screened suspects before formally presenting them to
make their law. They screened out suspects who they believed had not committed the felony
of which the suspects had been accused by someone in the hundred. Presumably, they were
obliged to present all whom they suspected of committing homicide; if they failed to present
those whom they suspected of having committed simple homicide or even true self-defense,
they were nullifying the law and subject to being amerced.
89. Doris M. Stenton, ed., Rolls of the Justices in Eyre, being the Rolls of Pleas and
Assizes for Lincolnshire, 1218-1219, and Worcestershire, 1221, (London, 1934), pp.
lxviii-lxxi. As Lady Stenton points out, judges had never been partial to the ordeal and had,
before 1215, tried to persuade defendants to put themselves upon the country.
90. Kaye, trans. and ed., Placita Carone, p. 19.
91. E.g. JUST 2/58, m.4/2 (1380).
92. From the 1280s at least, the sheriff, in preparing for a gaol delivery, ordered the
hundred bailiffs of his county to supply a panel of sixteen or twenty knights and freeholders
for use as jurors. See C 260/4 no. 19 (1288); C 260/5 no. 14 (1289). Trial juries at the eyre were
not always drawn from the hundred of the homicide. Meekings, ed., Wiltshire Eyre, p. 52.
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We have seen that in the Anglo-Saxon period murder meant homicide
through secrecy or stealth. Originally, murder was secret in the narrow
sense that the slayer hid his victim's body to conceal the deed, 93 but it
probably was soon used more broadly to refer to any homicide whose
perpetrator was unknown. It is with this aspect of murder that the
murdrum fine was associated, for the hundred was amerced in all cases of
unexplained homicide. 94 It is likely, however, that already in AngloSaxon times murder sometimes implies that the slayer's identity was
concealed from his victim, so that the latter was taken off guard. 95 Both
Glanvill96 and Bracton97 refer to murder as homicide wherein the concealment was relative to third parties, but this may be because by the time
they wrote the sole function of the allegation of murder was to relieve the
appellor from the requirement that he claimed to have seen the deed with
his own eyes. For our purposes, of course, the important question is not
which acts the official concept of murder encompassed, but which acts
society considered so heinous that it believed the perpetrator deserved to
be hanged. The answer to this question for the twelfth century will
probably never be known.
By the fourteenth century, society's concept of serious homicide was
far broader than that corresponding to the original technical meaning of
murder. Evidence shedding light on the notion of serious homicide is
sparse and difficult to interpret. The principal sources of such evidence
are trial enrollments in verdicts of self-defense. In several cases, all dating
from the first half of the fourteenth century, the jurors included elaborate
allegations as to the nature of the attack by the deceased upon the
defendant:
A. M. was staying at the house of S . . . . and R., knowing M. was
staying there, through murder and malice aforethought came to the
house of S. and sought M. in order to kill him ... R. immediately
broke the door of the room and entered it and ... ferociously attacked
98

93. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2:485.
94. See above, n. 87.
95. Hurnard assumes too much when she defines murder as "secret and so presumably
premediated killing." King's Pardon for Homicide, p. I.
96. G. D. G. Hall, trans. and ed., Glanvill (London, 1965), p. 174.
97. Bracton, De Legibus, 2:378-79 (fol. 134b).
98. C 260/15, no. 38 (1305): "M. hospitatus ad domum cuiusdam Sarre F . ... et R. sciens
predictum M. ibidem hospitatum esse per murdram et maliciam precogitatam venit ad
domum predicte Sarre et quesivit predictum M. ad ipsum inter.ficiendum ... R. ostium
eiusdem camere statim fregit et came ram intravit et ... ferociter insultavit ... ''
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B. M .... about noon of that day maliciously entered and afterward,

maliciously abusing the said W. and committing hamsoken against him,
of his malice aforethought, ... attacked him there in the house [and]
threw him to the ground.99
C. R. left the aforesaid house and stood outside the door of the house
of the aforesaid W. beneath the wall of that house lying in wait for A.
in order to slay him because of an old quarrel between them, A.
knowing nothing at all about R. 's lying in wait.IOo
D. W. was in his house and W. B. knew this. W. B. entered the close

of W. at night and hid there during the night through malice aforethought, and maliciously lay in wait for the said W. in order to kill him,
W. being ignorant of this; and when W. arose at dawn and left his house
closing the door behind him thinking no evil, W. B. with malice
aforethought suddenly and feloniously ... 10 1

E. H. and S. fought together in a mill ... and S. attacked H. with a
hatchet and wanted to strike him, but they were separated from one
another by certain bystanders and S. was expelled from the mill ....
S., nevertheless his furious intention continuing, maliciously devised
deceitful plans against H., hiding himself outside of the mill. And
[when] H., believing that the argument between them had been settled,
left a little later thinking he was leaving safely and in peace ... 102
F. J. [was] lying hidden in ambush with two strangers in the house of

H. They saw H. coming along the way and immediately, feloniously
and in a deliberate assault, they attacked H. from all sides. 10 3
99. C 262/111, no. 6 (1318): "M . ... circa horam nonam eius diei maliciose intravit ac
postmodum maliciose ipsum W. insultando et hamsoken super ipsum faciendo ex malicia
sua precogitata ... ipsum W. ibidem in domum ad terram prostravit."
100. C 260/20, no. 26 (1310): "R. exivit domum predictam et stetit extra ostium domus
predicti W. subtus murum dicte domus insidiando predictum A. ad ipsum interficiendum
ratione antiqui odii inter eos perhabiti et ipso A. insidiacionem ill am omnino nesciente."
101. C 47, Bedfordshire, File 4/86 (1314): "W. in domo sua propria extitisset et predictus
W. B. hoc scivisset. W. B. clausum ipsius W. noctanter intravit et ibidem pernoctavit
latitando (sic) per maliciam excogitatam et predicto W. maliciose insidiabatur ad ipsum W.
interficiendum ipso W. hoc omnino ignorante et cum W. in aurora diei surrexisset et domum
suam exivisset et hostium post se clausisset nulli malum cogitans predictus W. B. malicia
precogitata in ipsum W. subito felonice prosiliit et cum quodam bacula ipsum insultavit
"
102. C 260/15, no. 9 (1304): "H. et S. contenderunt adinvicem infra molendinum ... et
idem S. cum quadam hachia que vacatur hache a Pyke ipsum H. insultavit et ipsum H.
percussisse voluit set per quosdam circumstantes seperatifuerunt abinvicem et predictus S.
a molendino illo fuit expulsus . ... [S]et tamen idem S. animo furioso et perseveranti insidias
excogitatas adversus ipsum H. maliciose machinabatur abscondendo se extra molendinum
predictum. Et predictus H. credens contencionem illam inter eos pacificari post pauca exivit
a molendino illo credens secure et pacifice recessisse ... "
103. C 260/54, no. 40. (1343): "1. cum duobus hominibus extraneis latitanter insidiando
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The chief purpose of the testimony in the above cases was to support a
verdict of self-defense. Housebreaking immediately puts those residing
within on the defensive. Stealth on the part of the assailant, whose
presence was until the last moment unknown to the eventual slayer, is
strong evidence that the latter lacked malice (cases C, D, E). It might be
argued that the second part of the testimony, the formal allegation of last
resort (which I have omitted from the above excerpts), was alone
insufficient in proving that the defendant had not provoked the fight. But
it should have been enough merely to assert, as most juries did, that A
attacked B, wounded B, and drove B to the wall. Whatever additional
strength the above details lent to a special verdict, whether they represented the truth or were mere fabrications, the jury was describing what
society took to be the most repugnant form of attack.
There can be no doubt that the jurors were alleging that the deceased
had attempted to commit what was considered to be serious homicidewhat we may call the community's concept of murder. Cases A, C, D, E,
and F involved stealth; housebreaking occurs in A and B; and in all these
cases there was some measure of planning: malice aforethought was
specified in A, B, and D, and seems implicit inC and F; in E, though his
mind was in a fury, the assailant ''devised deceitful plans.'' The difficulty
lies in discerning whether stealth, housebreaking, or malice aforethought
were critical to the societal concept of murder or were merely incidental.
The use of "per murdram" in case A, which was recorded in 1305, is
extremely rare. 104 Murdrum at this time was used almost exclusively to
refer to the fine for an unexplained homicide; it almost never describes the
slayer's act. 105 It would appear, then, that the phrase meant "through
stealth" in the sense that the slayer acted in such a way as to conceal his
identity from third parties. But stealth in C, D, E, and F involves the
intended victims knowing nothing of the presence of their ambusher.
Murder was no longer conceived, if indeed it ever had been, solely as the
concealment of the slayer's identity from third parties.
The only case that does not involve stealth is B. Here the jurors alleged
that the would-be slayer committed housebreaking, presumably with
intent to kill, an act which in Anglo-Saxon times had been regarded by the
law as particularly heinous. 10 6 It may well be that such acts had always
been included in the societal view of murder.
... in domo cuiusdam H. predictum H. transeuntem per viam videbant et statim felonice
et insultu premeditato ipsum H . ... incircuiter insultaverunt."
104. Kaye found a "Latinised form of the English 'to murder,' synonymous with 'to
kill' "in a 1281 eyre roll (JUST 1/147, m.13a). "Early History," Part I, p. 371.
105. The murdrum fine was effectively abolished in 1340. 14 Edw. 3, stat. l, c. 4.
106. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2:457.
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The phrase malicia precogitata and its variants, which I have translated
as "malice aforethought," was used commonly in indictments of homicide throughout the Middle Ages to denote the threshold degree of mens
rea for felonious homicide: mere deliberateness. 107 As I have demonstrated elsewhere, 108 the phrase could also be used in the fourteenth
century to refer to true premeditation. Everything depended upon the
context. In case A, the assailant came to the defendant's house with
malice aforethought, not mere deliberateness; "ex malicia sua
precogitata" in case B seems contextually to represent more than the
formulistic "malicia precogitata"; the ambusher in D, who lay in wait
throughout the night "per maliciam excogitatam," exhibited more than
mere deliberateness. 109 In case C, the assailant carried an old grudge; like
the assailants in E and F, he lay in wait for the defendant. Only the
assailant in E appears to have acted in hot blood.
Clearly, the jurors were attentive to the mental state of the assailant. It
might be argued, however, that this resulted from their concern to blame
the fight on the deceased; or, that planning was merely incidental to most
acts of stealth and that premeditation was a common, but not an essential,
aspect of murder. The foregoing evidence from the early decades of the
fourteenth century is unclear on this point, and, as we shall see, there is
reason to believe that even by the end of the century premeditation had
not yet become a necessary element in the societal concept of murder.
The Statute of 1390 equated murder with ambush and malice aforethought.110 Its drafters were undoubtedly concerned mainly with highwaymen and housebreakers who robbed and slew their victims.lll The
official term, "murder," operative only in the administration of pardons,
now clearly embraced homicide perpetrated through stealth with respect
to the victim. Moreover, true premeditation had come to be conceived
officially as at least a common incident of murderous intent. But most
murder indictments contain only the operative phrase "murdravit" or
"insidiavit" (ambushed), and are thus insufficiently detailed to provide
insight into the social, as opposed to the official, concept of murder.
There is nevertheless some indication that the short lived statute cast
murder in terms too narrow for the community. If murder was, stricto
sensu, homicide through stealth where the victim was taken off guard, it
was in its broadest societal use a particularly repugnant homicide. A case
from the roll of John Fovyll, coroner in Leicester and one of the first to
107. Kaye, "Early History," Part I, pp. 371 et seq.
108. Green, "Jury and the Law of Homicide," pp. 462-69.
109. Later on in the indictment, "malicia precogitata" is used in its formulistic sense.
110. "Murdre, Mort d' orne occis par agait, assaut, ou malice purpense." Stat. 13
Richard 2, stat. 2, c. 1.
111. See below, Chapter 3, nn. 26-30 and accompanying text.
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employ the word "murder" systematically in his indictments, lays to rest
the notion that the societal concept of a murderous act was dependent
upon secrecy or stealth. John Howetson came upon two boys, Roger and
Richard Malynson, working near the road and wanted to strike them
because of a long-held grudge. Seeing this, a certain Robert Malesherbe
interceded, saying he would take whatever punishment was coming to the
boys. Their sister Maud arrived at this point and similarly offered to make
amends, but Howetson, calling her a whore, tried to strike her with a
hatchet, pursuing her as she fled to her house. Malesherbe followed,
imploring Howetson not to strike the woman, at which point Howetson
turned upon him, swinging the hatchet "with great force." Malesherbe,
thinking no evil, neither having a knife with him nor seeing any other
weapon to prevent a blow upon his head, sprang from him and ran into
Maud's house to get some weapon for defending himself.
Malesherbe grabbed a stake, but Howetson broke this and then, aided it
seems by his son and another relative, proceeded to finish the job. While
the two held Malesherbe down, the other struck him, and when the victim
could no longer struggle, all dealt mortal blows so that "they slew and
murdered Robert without any cause." 112
In another case, admittedly a rare one, there was stealth but not
premeditation. It was alleged that after a vigorous argument, one of the
disputants, B,
turned his back to [A] in the field and A ran to B and suddenly drew the
dagger of B and feloniously stabbed him twice in the side. . . . The
jurors say he slew him feloniously and murdered him.II3
The allegation of murder seems to have turned on the deviousness of the
act, which was apparently not premeditated but committed in hot blood.
The word "felonia," rather than "murdrum," was later marginated,
perhaps indicating that the coroner took a different view of the requisite
mens rea.
There is one final point to be made about the late-fourteenth-century
murder indictments. The slaying of master by servant and of husband by
112. JUST 2/61, m.12/l (1409): " . . . nullum malum cogitans nee super se habens
cultellum nee aliqua alia arma videns ictum ilium supra caput suum eminere saltavit ab eo
et cucurrit in domum ipsius Matillidis ad aliqua arma sibi assumenda pro defensione et
salvacione vite sue ... absque aliqua causa dictum R. M. interfecerunt et murdraverunt."
See also JUST 2/61, m.92/2 (1406), where the slayer's dog attacked the victim, bringing him
to the ground, whereupon the slayer "murdered" him.
113. JUST 2/63, m.3/2 (1400): " . . . vertebat dorsum suum ad eundem in campum,
predictus A. cucurrit ad predictum B., subito extraxit daggarium ipsius B. et felonice
percussit ... his in latere .... [J]urati dicuntfelonice interfecit et murdravit."
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wife, two forms of statutory petty treason, 114 had for centuries counted
among the most reprehensible homicides. Such slayings figured prominently in the indictments for murder, and all too frequently the jurors
alleged that the victim had been slain while he slept in his bed or taken at
night by ambush. 115 And, what is more revealing, occasionally it was said
in such cases that the slayer had attempted to hide the deceased to
conceal the act. 116 Thus, murder had not entirely lost its most ancient
meaning, and its stigma, one suspects, could be attached to any homicide
that society found particularly repugnant.
The process by which the community determined that a given slayer
was a murderer was undoubtedly complex and by no means solely a
function of the act itself. Coroners' juries and trial jurors were swayed in
many cases by the status and reputations of the combatants and by what
was known about past relations between them. Such considerations may
have been critical to the determination that the defendant had acted
through stealth, that he had caught his victim off guard. Conversely, these
factors must sometimes have contributed to the conclusion that the
parties had fought together on equal terms, out of sudden and mutual
anger. There is, in fact, evidence that in some cases jurors perceived
simple homicides as "accidental" ones because the parties were known
to have been "friends. " 11 7 It may be, too, that an informal, extrajudicial
system of monetary compensation long outlived the demise of formal
wergild settlement. 118 If so, the relations between the slayer and his
victim's kin may have determined the community's perception of the
homicide or, at least, of the slayer's just deserts.
We must be careful not to assume too much precision in medieval
evidence-gathering techniques. The coroners' rolls leave the impression
one would expect: in many cases the inquest jurors were imprecise,
confessed lack of knowledge or made little effort to assess blame for a
114. Stat. 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c. 2 (1352).
115. E.g. JUST 3/180, m.23d/6 (Gloucester, 1393); JUST 3/180, m.31/l (Hereford, 1390);
JUST 3/203, m.lld/3 (Lincoln, 1429); JUST 2/190, m.4/3 (Warwickshire, ca. 1390); JUST
2/242, m.5d/6 (Yorkshire, 1388). This last case, recorded by a coroner before the Statute of
1390, was one of many indictments reflecting the use of "murder" in a commission to
justices of the peace in 1380. Rotuli Parliamentorum, 3, 84b. For discussion of justice of the
peace indictments based on the commission of 1380, see Kaye, "Early History," Part I, pp.
379 et seq. The Statute of 1390, with slight modification, repeated the categories represented
in the commission. I have based my discussion upon the Statute to avoid confusion, but it
should be noted that indictments began to employ the term "murder" a decade before the
Statute. See Green, "Jury and the Law of Homicide," pp. 461-62.
116. JUST 2/163, m.l/6 (1389) and m.2/ll (1393).
117. E.g. JUST 1/1185, m.3; C 145, File 59/46.
118. Hurnard stated that out of court settlement was commol} during the twelfth century,
but it is unclear how long this continued. Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 9.
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fight ending in homicide. Many homicides must have been viewed from a
distance or not all. To the extent that facts were unknown, poorly
documented, or in conflict with other testimony, social and psychological
assessments unrelated to the actual homicide but related instead to the
parties involved must have been used. 119 It may be true that in the
fourteenth century trial jurors were more lenient in some cases than they
had been before the change in the Crown's pardoning policy.12o But it is
also possible that with the increase in social mobility and the rise of
professional crime trial jurors were called upon more frequently to pass
judgment on strangers to the neighborhood and dealt with them more
harshly. 121 In any case, these would be merely two more examples of
foreign elements creeping into the verdict process. The essential nature of
that process had not suddenly changed. Due to the nature of the extant
evidence, it suddenly becomes visible to us, but the available evidence
suggests that it had for centuries been integral to the phenomenon of
dispute settlement.

II
Theft, in its various forms, was the most common capital offense
committed by medieval Englishmen. 122 To judge from presentments on
the thirteenth-century eyre and fourteenth-century gaol delivery rolls,
thieving was endemic; and these sources reflect only a fraction of the
offenses actually committed. In theft, even more dramatically than in
homicide, the formal legal rules prescribed the death sanction for what
was commonplace social behavior. It comes as no surprise that most
defendants were acquitted-typically two-thirds to three-quarters at gaol
119. For extensive discussion of this and related issues, see the important work of Given,
McLane, Hanawalt and Hammer, cited above, n. 2.
120. Pugh ("Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," pp. 102-3) suggests that the
"additional impediments" of the later period may have made some difference but cautions
against assuming that juries acquitted significantly less in the 1280s.
121. See Hanawalt, Crime and Conflict, p. 54.
122. Hanawalt (ibid., p. 66) found that in the eight counties she studied (1300-48) larceny
(38.7 percent), burglary (24.3 percent) and robbery (10.5 percent) accounted for 73.5 percent
of all felony indictments. These exclude, of course, thefts not reported as well as thefts
prosecuted as criminal or as civil trespasses. See below, n. 135 and accompanying text.
Homicide, though less common, accounted for a substantial minority of those felonies
actually tried. Hanawalt (idem) found 18 percent. Pugh ("Reflections of a Medieval
Criminologist," pp. 86-87) found 22 percent for London gaol deliveries of the 1280s.
McLane ("Royal Courts and the Problem of Disorder") noted a very high percentage of
homicide indictments (more than half of all felony indictments) but suggests this does not
reflect the true rate of occurrence of this felony.
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deliveries. 123
Roughly stated, the forms of theft ranged from violent taking from the
person (robbery) to taking upon a housebreaking, often under cover of
night (burglary), to a simple taking and carrying off (larceny).t2 4 Each was
practiced by all kinds of persons. Nonetheless, robbers frequently were
or were viewed as outsiders and professionals who operated as highwaymen through ambush. 125 They often physically overpowered, injured, or
even slew their victims. Compared with robbers, burglars were more
often "local," less often professional, and they less frequently assaulted
their victims. They were, however, more likely to be professional or to
act in consort than larcenists. Larcenists stole goods ofless value than did
those who committed the more professionally oriented offenses.t26 Nearly
all theft involved stealth or surprise attack. Burglary was frequently
nocturnal and its perpetrator had entered, often unseen, the victim's
private domain. Larceny was the act of the pickpocket or casual
sneakthief. Ambush characterized much robbery. Although actually
committed openly, it usually involved actions that gave its perpetrator an
unfair advantage over his victim. Few thefts were responses to what
society recognized as provocation on the part of the victim. Some,
perhaps many, however, were understood as responses to the hardships
of life. 127 As Hanawalt has demonstrated, the juries' treatment of theft
suspects in the royal courts involved a complex of factors having to do
with the nature of the actor and his act, the relationship between
defendant and victim, and-to put it bluntly-the temper of the times.12s
Analysis of jury verdicts in cases of felonious theft is doubly complicated by the fact that many thefts were not prosecuted at all and many
others were prosecuted as other than felonies. Many minor unlawful
takings were settled informally or privately prosecuted as trespass, even
though an indictment would have been appropriate. Many other unlawful
takings of goods worth 12 pence or more (that were thus felonies) were
presented as mere criminal trespasses. At both the private and the
123. Hanawalt, Crime and Conflict, p. 59. See above, Chapter I, n. 79.
124. See T. F. T. Plucknett, "A Commentary on the Indictments," in Putnam, ed.,
Proceedings before Justices of the Peace, pp. cxxxix-cxlvi. The questions of the carryingoff requirement in burglary and of the intent requirement in larceny are problematic. See
Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2:492-93; Plucknett, Concise History, pp.
446-47.
125. See Hanawalt, Crime and Conflict, p. 83.
126. Ibid., p. 75.
127. Ibid., p. 253. See Pugh, "Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," p. 88. Pugh
observes that most thefts tried at late-thirteenth-century Newgate gaol deliveries involved
goods of "comparatively small value ... taken for immediate use by ordinary citizens out
of houses, often because of poverty or instant temptation."
128. Hanawalt, Crime and Conflict, pp. 52-54 and chs. 4 and 5.
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community level, there was a preindictment sorting process that we can
discern but not always closely examine. 129
Theft and homicide presented different problems for trial juries and for
those responsible for the administration of the criminal law. They do as
well for historians who seek to understand the behavior both of juries and
administrators. Nearly all homicides were reported, and most of them led
to indictments. Although many suspects were not taken, virtually all who
were taken were tried at the felony level. Some significant distortion is
produced by the fact that the least culpable slayers were the most likely
to surrender themselves for trial-or to remain where they might easily be
taken. But while that distortion affected the acquittal and conviction
rates, it does not conceal from us the attitudes of juries toward the least
culpable. Quite the opposite: prosecution of homicide at the capital level
tended to fall disproportionately on the least culpable. In theft such
prosecution fell on the most serious cases, the ones least likely to be
handled as lesser offenses. 130 Moreover, there was no category of
excusable, i.e., pardonable, theft. Juries had either to convict and thus
condemn (before the expansion of benefit of clergy in the fifteenth
century), or acquit the defendants whom they tried. In homicide, not only
was there an intermediate, pardonable category, but juries were required
to state the facts in cases falling within that category . 131 Finally, coroners
were required to hold inquests in homicide, and their records often were
far more detailed than the summary indictments recorded by the clerks or
sheriffs and justices of the peace.
Thus, conviction and acquittal rates in prosecutions for capital theft tell
us far less than the historian of social attitudes would like to know. They
confirm the most obvious fact: juries sent relatively few defendants to the
gallows. Only about a third of those tried were convicted. More were
sentenced to die than in homicide,m but that may have been due as much
to the screening out of "lesser" offenders as to anything else. If we may
draw any conclusion it is that with regard to capital sanction, theft, while
typically involving stealth, was treated little differently by society at large
than was homicide. One ought not make too much of the difference in
conviction rates at gaol delivery; certainly there is no evidence that
129. See the important work of McLane, "Royal Courts and the Problem of Disorder,"
esp. pp. 84-86, 93-95. McLane has carried analysis of this sorting process further than any
other student of medieval criminal administration. See also Barbara Hanawalt, ''Community
Conflict and Social Control," Mediaeval Studies, vol. 28 (1976), pp. 402-3.
130. McLane, "Royal Courts and the Problem of Disorder," p. 85.
131. Even after 1300 when pardons for homicide in self-defense and through accident
were granted de cursu, the verdict had to be sent by the presiding judge to Chancery for
consideration. See below, Chapter 3, text at n. 20.
132. Hanawalt, Crime and Conflict, p. 59. See above, Chapter 1, n. 79.
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property was more highly prized than life.m Theft was common social
behavior, reprehensible but not generally viewed as deserving the ultimate penalty.
Some evidence confirms the commonsense guess that juries distinguished between the professional and the amateur thief, between the
truly premeditated and the opportunistic theft, between the most aggravated and the simplest forms of stealthy behavior. The most serious
cases were those where the law of theft and the law of homicide
converged. Excluding treason, conviction rates in capital cases were
highest in trials on indictments for slaying by ambush by professional
thieves.l34 We have seen also that the pardon statutes ostensibly relating
to murder were aimed mainly at thieves (i.e., robbers), not at slayers who
acted without the motive of pecuniary gain. Once again, there was a
substantial overlap between the interests of the administrators of the
criminal law and the attitudes of trial juries. Nonetheless, not all such
defendants were convicted: frequently fearful juries could be managed by
them or their powerful patrons. This, presumably, posed a serious
problem for legal officials and the classes that sought to reduce the
disorder that plagued the land. We shall return to this issue in the next
chapter.
Jury behavior in the less serious forms of theft is difficult to analyze.
There is little to relate beyond the bare record of massive acquittals, a
record that, as we shall see, in slightly different form extends down to
modern times. As in the case of homicide, juries were influenced as much
by the defendant's reputation and social position as by the act with which
he had been charged. Indeed, it is likely that in theft, even more than in
homicide, who the defendant was counted for more than what he had
done, for even the lesser forms of theft were regarded as very wrongful,
insidious behavior that might reflect a disposition to engage in more
serious forms of theft.l3 5 In homicide, by contrast, many defendants were
considered to have acted justifiably, in defense of their honor, their
family, or their friends. We have seen how difficult it is to determine in a
given case whether the jury approved of the defendant's behavior, merely
"accepted" it, or disapproved of it but nonetheless thought it did not
merit the defendant's execution. Whereas some acquittals or self-defense
verdicts in homicide cases reflected the view that, despite the official
rules, the defendant had acted "lawfully" (true rule nullification), perhaps
133. See the remarks of McLane, "Royal Courts and the Problem of Disorder," pp.
109-10.
134. See Given, Society and Homicide, p. 133: 42.6 percent of those who were accused
of both robbery and homicide and who appeared for trial were condemned.
135. See the remarks of C. M. Radding, "Evolution of Medieval Mentalities: A Cognitive
Structural Approach," American Historical Review, vol. 83 (1978), p. 586.
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virtually all nullification in theft occurred in cases involving socially
disapproved behavior. Acquittals in theft cases typically represented
what we may term systemic nullification of the prescribed sanction, the
phenomenon of the purely ''merciful acquittal.''
Because theft was by definition both insidious and wrongful behavior,
juries were bound to pay close attention to the defendant's social
standing. The stranger who committed casual theft was perhaps necessarily more vulnerable to conviction than the one who committed simple
homicide. Local communities with some justice believed they were
constantly under threat from roving brigands. Moreover, within the
community, status differences betweenjurors and the defendant probably
counted for more in theft than in homicide. And this fact must be kept in
mind also when one assesses the conviction and acquittal rates in the
more highly stratified urban areas.
There are, then, few concrete conclusions to be drawn about jury
nullification in theft. We are left for the most part to draw inferences from
our study of jury behavior in homicide and to test them against what we
do know regarding the prevalence of theft and the outcome of trials of
thieves.
First, as noted above, the most serious forms of homicide, from the
perspective of the Crown, legal officials, Parliament, and trial juries,
involved slayings by professional thieves, mainly highway robbers and
burglars. It is reasonable to suppose that jurors convicted a substantial
number of such thieves even when the offenders did not slay their victims
and that such convictions represent a fair percentage of the total number
of convictions for theft. Second, jurors probably came down hard on
strangers and others whose ties to the local community were attenuated
for one reason or another. The leniency accorded villagers by their
neighbors may be put down to favoritism, but given what jury behavior in
homicide suggests, that may be just another way of saying that jurors
thought the rules too harsh when forced to apply them to persons whom
they knew well enough to identify with.t36
I have earlier suggested that social mores reflected in traditional,
private forms of dispute resolution in homicide influenced the handling of
cases at common law. A similar hypothesis probably ought to be put
forward in the case of theft. In pre-Angevin times, many forms of theft
had been emendable. There is every reason to suppose that in theft the
revolution in sanctions was as out of step with social attitudes as it was in
homicide. The nearly blanket rule mandating capital punishment never
136. Hanawalt's preliminary study of indictment and conviction patterns in Ramsey
Abbey is of great interest. Crime and Conflict, esp. pp. 53-54. I have drawn heavily upon her
conclusions regarding the importance of status and residence to the outcome of theft cases.
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truly took hold within the community, which imposed its own standards
both outside of and within the formal legal system. The hypothesis is
strengthened by what we know about the substantial amount of downgrading of felony to trespass, and what we might expect to result from
such a potentially arbitrary process. Very likely, many whom the indictment jury left to be tried by authorities for the capital offense were viewed
by the community at large as perhaps less savory but as no more
deserving of death than many who were prosecuted merely for trespass.
Finally, the acquittal rate speaks for itself. It is of course possible that
most acquittals were the product of bribery, fear, and belief in the
defendant's innocence. But it is likely that just as many sprang from
mercy and from deeply ingrained notions of how social harmony was to
be maintained through composition with, rather than ultimate rejection
of, the offender. Much thieving was opportunistic and committed against
one's neighbor. Much of it was committed by the desperate and destitute
of the local community, 137 and it was these locals who were the most
likely to be apprehended and made to stand trial. Some of them, no doubt,
suffered as a result of the community's frustration at not being able to
bring all of the truly evil persons to justice. Many others of them,
however, must have been spared simply because they were not among the
truly evil in the eyes of their neighbors.

137. Ibid., p. 253.

3

Judge, Jury, and the
Evolution of the Criminal Law
in Medieval England

We shall never know a great deal about the official response to the
law-finding role of the medieval criminal trial jury. Most of what we do
know we understand by way of inference from records that do not speak
directly to this problem. Our lack of hard evidence, however, should not
discourage speculation. In the present essay I shall attempt to put the
problem of the law-finding jury into perspective. I shall suggest that the
jury behavior described above influenced the bench in its interpretation
and development of the substantive law of homicide. I shall also suggest
the way authorities might have viewed the place of merciful verdicts in
the less serious felonies as they considered the problems of the administration of the criminal law generally.
The difficulties in determining how the Crown, bench, and other
officials viewed jury nullification are compounded by the fact that
nullification was only one pattern of jury behavior that caused concern. 1
Nor was it likely to have been viewed as the most worrisome. Corruption,
though not necessarily determinative in a great number of cases, was
undoubtedly perceived as a greater problem. Jury timidity was less
serious but perhaps more common, and likely to be present in just those
cases in which officials were most anxious to secure convictions. Verdicts
resulting from partisanship that did not involve outright graft were serious
enough and might have seemed more akin to corrupt verdicts than to
merciful ones. By comparison, rule or sanction nullification, whether
systemic or ad hoc, may have been-especially in close cases-relatively
easy for officials to tolerate.
Two other factors require our constant attention. Pretrial procedures
resulted in a substantial amount of overindictment; there could hardly be
a presumption against individual defendants in most cases. Even where
indictments were justified, the trial jury might not be able to obtain
dispositive evidence. Honest acquittals of guilty suspects were probably
very common. On the other hand, simple rule or sanction nullification,
when it did occur, was not easily distinguished from corrupt, timid, or
purely partisan verdicts, and it may not have even captured the bench's
1. For a related discussion of the points raised in these introductory paragraphs see
above, Chapter!, text at nn. 87-97.
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attention. If so, from the perspective of the bench the universe of
exculpatory verdicts was divided mainly between rightful acquittals of the
innocent-or those not proven guilty-and corrupt acquittals of true
offenders. By the same token, however, the bench might have overestimated the instances of nullification in close cases. Attention to this
form of jury behavior might have blinded the bench to much of the
corruption that plagued the system. The procedures that concealed so
much from the bench conceal just as much-or more-from us. In
reconstructing the perspective of the bench, we come to understand how
little insight the judges were allowed into the actual workings of the
system they administered. In the end, we cannot be certain whether they
hesitated to draw any general conclusions, given their actual position of
ignorance, or whether, without real justification, they drew such conclusions. A fortiori, we cannot know whether the bench thought it was more
commonly confronting outright jury corruption, or well-intentioned jury
nullification, or something in between.

I
The Crown and royal officials were of course aware of the many
problems that beset the administration of criminal justice. They sought in
a variety of ways to combat the bribing and intimidation of juries, which
were among the most serious of those problems. So far as one can tell,
however, the official response rarely included either the refusal to enter a
verdict or the punishment of a particular trial jury. Grand juries could be
fined for intentional concealment when they failed to present a felony, but
trial juries were, by and large, immune to penalties for acquittals or
verdicts of pardonable homicide. 2 Why should this have been so?
The nature of criminal procedure shielded jurors against judicial
monitoring of their behavior. In most cases the bench was dependent
upon the jury and the defendant for information concerning the
defendant's guilt or innocence. The judges might have suspected some
mode of corruption, but they could not prove that it existed in individual
cases. The judges at gaol delivery could invoke the strictest standards of
the law but could not impose them upon the jury. They could relieve their
frustration only by getting on to the next case, the next county town.
Evidence of false testimony lay all about them, but pursuing it would have
been very time consuming. Testimony at coroners' inquests and before
sheriffs and justices of the peace could not have been as systematically
wrong as the verdicts of petty juries made it appear. Yet if questioned, the
jurors would simply have continued to swear on their oaths that the
2. See above, Chapter I, text at n. 62.
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defendant was not guilty. The court could have done little, short of
undertaking a full-scale investigation of the homicide or theft, and lacking
a police force or any sophisticated evidence-gathering techniques, even
that seldom would have made the matter any clearer.
Ironically, our best evidence of judicial attempts to get at the truth in
individual cases comes from cases about which the bench possibly cared
least-cases involving verdicts of self-defense. Here the judges had some
leeway in testing verdicts, for the jury had to state the evidence that
justified the special verdict; a simple "not guilty" or "self-defense"
would not do. There can be little doubt that the bench was aware that in
many cases involving verdicts of self-defense the strict rules of the law
had not in fact been met. The numbers of such verdicts were sometimes
overwhelming; we must infer judicial recognition of realities. 3 Moreover,
the rolls themselves reveal judicial caution in self-defense cases and even
attempts to trick defendants or to steer juries into an admission that would
preclude a judgment of pardonable homicide.
The trial rolls indicate that the judges sometimes questioned the jurors
closely, particularly when the jury's original statement left unclear
whether the defendant had in fact been placed in a position from which he
could escape only through physical retaliation. In a few such cases the
jurors responded that the defendant might have turned tail and outrun his
assailant, an assertion that condemned the defendant. 4 But usually jurors
proved to be made of sterner stuff. In several cases from the early 1290s
separate juries resisted what appears to have been a concerted effort to
restrict the availability of pardons de cursu to those who truly deserved
them under the law. Responding to judicial queries, the juries strengthened their original verdicts: the deceased "lay upon [the defendant's]
stomach and held him tightly to the ground"; 5 the defendant was "armed,
but had drawn neither weapon," resorting instead to a broken branch;6
3. See below, section IV.
4. See e.g. Le Livre des Assises et Pleas del'Corone en Temps du Roy Edward Le Tiers
(London, 1670), 43 Edw. 3, pl. 31 (1370). Hereafter cited as Livre des Assises.
5. C 260/7, no. 46A (1293). In this case, the jurors stated that Gregory le Waleis threw
Thomas de Gloucester "to the ground, lay upon him, and drew his knife desiring to kill him.
Thomas, perceiving this, and fearing likewise his own death, drew his knife and struck
Gregory as the latter lay upon Thomas's stomach." The justices then asked the jury whether
in fact Thomas might have escaped without killing Gregory, to which the jury responded,
"No, because Gregory lay upon Thomas's stomach and held him tightly and firmly to the
ground" ("et ipsum strite et firmiter ad terram tenuit"). Their reply having satisfied the
court, the defendant was remanded to prison to await his pardon. The pardon is recorded in
C.P.R., Oct. II, 1293, p. 40.
6. C 260/6, no. 6 (1292). The jurors were asked whether Gilbert had a sword or a knife
and, if so, whether he had drawn either. When they replied that Gilbert was so armed, but
had drawn neither weapon, the court, obviously doubtful as to the lethal nature of Gilbert's
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the defendant could not have fled because the deceased was faster than he
was.7 Only in the second case did the bench refuse to accept the verdict
the jury insisted upon. A secondjury was called, which supported the first
jury and ensured that the defendant would receive a royal pardon.
Although the rolls do not reveal it, it is possible that judges frequently
badgered juries into returning verdicts of guilty. As Henry Summerson
has demonstrated, we may not accept the trial rolls as evidence of all that
transpired at the triaLS If my depiction of jury behavior in self-defense
cases is accurate, then the rolls are patently deceiving guides to the real
world of the medieval courtroom. There are, however, strong reasons for
doubting that judges successfully steered juries toward capital verdicts.
Relatively few defendants, as we have seen, received such verdicts, and
too many verdicts of self-defense were registered for us to imagine a
coercive bench. We must either assume that the bench was in sympathy
with the jury in close cases or that it was powerless to halt a practice it
opposed. The latter possibility cannot be rejected out of hand: clearly the
bench opposed all forms of outright corruption, but the continuing
protests against such practices suggest that they persisted despite official
resistance.
The apparent weakness of the bench and of royal officials should come
as no surprise. The institutional or procedural bars to establishment of
jury corruption or nonadherence to legal rules in given cases-the very
fact of a self-informing jury-reflected the limits to royal administration.
attack, asked the jurors once again whether Robert could have escaped without slaying
Gilbert. The jurors reiterated their opinion that he could not have done so. This failed to
satisfy the court, however, and only after a second jury had been impaneled and had
supported the verdict of the original jury was the defendant awarded a special verdict. The
enrollment indicates in a later hand that Gilbert was pardoned.
7. C 260/6, no. 16 (1292). The petty jury stated that Alan de !a More killed John Tyrel in
self-defense after a great chase. The two had argued until John ran home to fetch a sword.
"Alan, seeing John approaching, and desiring to evade John's malicious intent, kept himself
underneath the horse his father, Robert, was riding. Robert did all in his power to prevent
John from striking Alan, but John chased Alan into a certain corner" where, as a last resort,
Alan retaliated with a mortal blow. The court asked whether Alan could have fled before
John returned from his house armed. The jury replied that the defendant could not have fled
because John was faster than he ("Johannes erat celorior predicto Alana"). Compare C
260/23, no. 23 (1332), where the jurors testified that the defendant fled as fast as he could
("velociori curru quo potuit"), but his assailants were even fleeter and caught up with him
("velociores demum ipsum ... attinxerunt").
8. Summerson, "Plea Roll and Year Book." Summerson has shown that judges questioned juries at the eyre but that the plea rolls record jury statements as though made sua
spome and not in response to such questions. It does not appear, however, that the bench
overturned acquittals; it is possible, however, that judicial attitudes led some juries to
convict where otherwise they might not have done so. Whether the bench questioned jurors
at gaol delivery (as opposed to the eyre) remains unclear. See above, Chapter 1, n. 58.
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In the area of criminal law, the Crown was dependent upon the cooperation of society at large, and continued to be so, though in ever
lessening degrees, until modern times. About the best officialdom could
hope for was to convert its pervasive weakness into a moderate strength
by associating itself with the popular impulses that the jury represented.
This it did, though we cannot be sure it did so with any degree of
self-consciousness. But it was, in any case, only one of several policies
the Crown pursued. We must sort out the contradictory aspects of the
royal administration of the criminal law before we can speculate as to why
the Crown accepted not only the jury but prevailingjury practices as well.

II
Medieval legislation reveals the preoccupation of England's rulers with
serious crime. Homicide and theft were but parts of a larger problem of
disorder that attended changes in late medieval society. The periodic
demobilization of military forces unleashed unmanageable numbers of
potential brigands. Plague and famine created dislocations that taxed the
restraining tendencies of medieval social organization. Town life and
wealth spawned antipathies for which there was no solvent, and assaults
against both were not easily checked. It is difficult to overestimate the
rudeness of conditions, the commonness of petty warfare, and the
insecurity oflife. As time went on conditions worsened, and the elaborate
legislative schemes to halt violence became increasingly utopian and
fruitless.
There remained of course a world of difference between rural settlements and the populous areas along the most frequented highways. But
even peaceful rural villages were subject to occasional pillage by roving
gangs and the henchmen of local political magnates. The late medieval
rolls of the justices of the peace and the justices of gaol delivery evidence
increasing amounts of organized criminal activity in all parts of England.
Until a detailed analysis of late medieval crime is undertaken we shall not
be able to speak with confidence about levels and locales of criminal
activity .9 Nevertheless, if legislation and the extant trials rolls are a guide
to the perspective of the Crown and bench, we must conclude that
officialdom perceived a land almost bereft of public order .10 Governance
9. Hanawalt (Crime and Conflict) has produced such a work for the early fourteenth
century. No similarly comprehensive study exists either for the late thirteenth century or for
the century following the Black Death. For an important discussion of the role of arbitration
as a brake on public disorder in the latter period see Edward Powell, "Arbitration and the
Law in England in the Late Middle Ages," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th
ser., vol. 33 (1983), pp. 49--67.
10. See Kaeuper, "Law and Order," pp. 734-37.
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involved, it would seem, a constant struggle to gain the upper hand over
a large criminal population.
To understand the degree to which the ruling elites focused their
attention on the worst excesses of public disorder, 11 we must examine the
history of the attempts to restrain the royal power to grant pardons of
grace. We have seen that beginning in the 1290s English monarchs
employed their pardon power to raise a military force and to obtain
revenue. 12 This flow of pardons immunized large numbers of offenders
from prosecution for all offenses committed before the date of the pardon,
and many contemporaries apparently believed that the policy encouraged
potential offenders, who might expect to secure pardons in the future.
Parliamentary statutes set limits on the royal pardoning power, especially
for serious homicides, those committed through ambush or other forms of
premeditated attack, typically in the course of highway robbery or
burglary . 13 The Crown acceded to passage of these statutes but continued
to sell pardons to even the worst offenders. Whatever the success of the
statutes, it is significant that the attack on royal pardons of grace was
aimed not at all felonies in general but only at the most heinous kinds of
offenses. The point requires some elaboration for not all historians have
viewed the matter in this way.
The earliest statutes declared that the king might pardon only those
who slew se defendendo or by accident, the traditional grounds for
pardons de cursu. These statutes, therefore, appear to have endeavored
to prohibit all pardons of grace, declaring that all felonious homicides lay
beyond the scope of the royal power to extend mercy. 14 This, in itself,
nearly defies explanation: surely contemporary conceptions of justice
required greater latitude than the statutes allowed, and literal application
11. See McLane, "Royal Courts and the Problem of Disorder," p. 76.
12. See above, Chapter I, text at nn. 88-90.
13. See above, Chapter 2, n. 134.
14. As early as 1309, Parliament petitioned the king about the frequent pardoning of
thieves ("larons") who had been indicted for "larcines, roberies, homicides," and other
felonies. Those responsible for the indictments, so the petition alleged, feared to remain in
their communities; many refused to indict out of similar fear. The petition did not suggest
any specific remedy, but the king replied that in the future he would grant pardons only to
those found to have slain through misadventure, self-defense, or insanity. Rotuli
Parliamentorum, 1:444b (1309). The Ordinances of 1311 carried out the royal response in
more general language: "That no felon nor fugitive be from henceforth protected or
defended from any manner of felony, by the King's charter of peace ... unless in a case
where the King can give grace according to his oath, and that by process of law and the
custom of the realm." Quoted in Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 323-24. The
Statute of Northampton attempted to limit pardons to self-defense and misadventure, Stat.
2 Edw. 3, c. 2 (1328), and in 1336 a new statute ordered that the Statute of Northampton be
observed, Stat. 10 Edw. 3, c. 2.
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of the wording of these statutes plays havoc with the underlying theory of
the king as fount ofjustice. 15 It would be a mistake, I believe, to read the
early pardon statutes too literally. They may in fact have been speaking to
extreme cases rather than to the large intermediate body of simple
homicides, and they may have been assuming a distinction close to the
one that the statute of 1390 made explicit. It is worth considering how this
legislative perspective may have come about.
As we have seen, the law of self-defense required the defendant to
prove that he had acted in extremis. Indeed, by the middle of the
thirteenth century it was considered felonious for a person who was able
to flee to strike and cause death, even if he had been provoked and was
in substantial danger. Yet the early treatise writers, when they considered
felonious homicide, dealt mainly with its core element, malice, in the
sense of a deliberate, unprovoked attack. 16 They rarely considered the
case where the deceased had been the assailant, and the defendant, acting
without true malice but in unnecessary haste, had chosen retaliation
rather than flight. It is unclear even that these writers discussed homicides
committed in the course of a brawl freely joined, where one of the blows
dealt produced an unforeseen fatal result. Given their definition of
pardonable self-defense, had they been pressed to define the outer limits
of excusable homicide they would have had to exclude such acts.17 But
15. The king sometimes pardoned culpable slayers whose acts either bordered on
self-defense or for other reasons were not considered especially heinous. See Hurnard,
King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 244.
16. Bracton seems to consider an unlawful homicide as one committed "in premeditated
assault and felony." Bracton, De Legibus, 2:438 (fol. 155). He describes felonious homicide
"as where one in anger or hatred or for the sake of gain, deliberately and in premeditated
assault, has killed another wickedly and feloniously and in breach of the king's peace."
Ibid., p. 341 (fol. 121). Bracton does not here consider the provoked slayer who responds
merely to save himself without being in extremis. Fleta, written a generation after Bracton,
refers to wilful homicide as one in which "a man, with corrupt intention, wickedly and
feloniously slays anyone by a deliberate attack, in anger or hatred or for the sake of gain.''
Fleta, 2:60.
17. Bracton describes self-defense (by implication) as follows: "[I]f avoidable and he
could escape without slaying, he will then be guilty of homicide." De Legibus, 2:340 (fol.
120b). Here, Bracton implies the strict rule of self-defense, but does not specifically refer to
provoked slayings where the slayer might not have acted out of malice. Nor does he refer
to such acts in his discussion of intentional homicide. See above, n. 16. In his discussion of
self-defense, where the slaying was "unavoidable," Bracton states that the slayer acts
"with sorrow of heart," 2:341 (fol. 121), and "without premeditated hatred," ibid., p. 340
(fol. 120b). But what of the slayer who acts when it was avoidable, though "without
premeditated hatred" and "with sorrow of heart"? Cf. Fleta, 2:60: "[I]fthe necessity were
avoidable, without slaying, a man is guilty of homicide, whereas, should the necessity be
unavoidable, he will not be liable to the penalty of homicide, because he has not slain
feloniously, but from fear and instinctively, to save himself when he could not otherwise
avoid his own death."
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their writings do not articulate a reason for treating these acts as capital
felonies.1s Thus the practice offocusing only on extreme cases had begun.
As concern about professional and secret homicide grew, the chasm
between those acts singled out for special condemnation and those
meriting pardons de cursu grew wider. The attention of both judges and
legislators, like that of the treatise writers, may have been diverted from
the intermediate category of simple homicide. Indeed, this might have
been a result of the prevailing pattern of jury behavior, which, as we have
seen, narrowed the courts' focus on homicide to the more extreme cases.
Yet another factor sheds light on the likely intent of the earlyfourteenth-century pardon statutes: a parliamentary misconception regarding the granting of pardons de cursu. In the thirteenth century, kings
personally oversaw the pardoning process. Under this procedure, a few
technically undeserving slayers, in the interests of justice, had received
pardons for self-defense after trial.19 In the early fourteenth century,
however, the pardoning procedure changed. Routine royal intercession
ceased, and the chancellor was empowered to issue pardons de cursu in
the king's name. 20 By virtue of this new procedure, pardons de cursu were
issued only in those cases where there had been a judicial determination
that the defendant had met the legal standard for self-defense. Thus,
although the king retained the power to grant pardons for self-defense to
slayers who had not met the formal rules of the law, 21 this power was
18. Bracton comes closest to explaining the rationale for the harsh rules of the law, but
his discussion presumes the possibility of rational decision making. In discussing the capital
liability of one who "thinking to strike a light blow, ... has struck a heavy one and killed
... , " Bracton states, "For everyone ought to observe mean and measure in what he does."
De Legibus, 2:438 (fol. 155b).
19. These included those whose acts bordered on, but did not fall within, the legal
category of self-defense (Humard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 239-43) and on
occasion even brawlers (ibid., p. 244).
20. A 1329 Year Book statement reflects the automatic nature of pardons: "Note that
when a man is acquitted before the justices errant for the death of a man in self-defense
["soy defendo"], the process is such, that he shall have the writ of the Chief Justice, within
which writ shall be contained the record of his acquittal to the Chancellor, who shall make
him his writ of pardon without speaking to the king by course of law." Sir Anthony
Fitzherbert, La Graunde Abridgment (London, 1565), "Corone," pl. 361. Cf. ibid., pl. 295
(1330): "Scrope, C. J., and the other justices ordered the prisoner to remove the record into
the Chancery; and the Chancellor made him a charter in such a case without speaking to the
king." Cf. the Commons' petition to the king and the latter's reply in 1309. Rotuli
Parliamentorum, 1:444b.
21. It is, of course, possible that the summary procedure for pardons de cursu reflected
a new royal policy according to which the king conceded his power to pardon except in cases
of accident or in those cases meeting the strict rules of self-defense. Having so reduced his
options, he would have little reason to oversee the issuing of pardons de cursu. But it seems
more reasonable to conclude that the king, in forfeiting the opportunity to pardon some
offenders after trial, did so only as a by-product of his streamlining the royal administration
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seldom if ever exercised. It was the rare case in which a defendant could
convince the judges to carry forward his matter for personal royal
consideration. The drafters of the early pardon statutes, however, may
not have fully understood this; 22 the statutes may have been drafted under
the incorrect assumption that such cases might still go forward after trial
for royal consideration.
In sum, we cannot be certain that Parliament intended to deprive the
Crown of its traditional power in cases long thought appropriate for royal
mercy. By allowing pardons only in cases of accident and self-defense,
Parliament may well have thought it was leaving intact the royal power
not only to pardon de cursu according to the strict rules of the law, but
also to pardon de gratia those simple homicides that the king, out of true
mercy and by appropriate extension of the legal rules, desired to treat as
if they met the formal requirements.
In any event, by the middle of the fourteenth century statutory
preambles and legislative histories provide a clearer insight into the
nature of the protest that Parliament had leveled against the Crown. While
the statutes continued to distinguish between pardons de cursu and
pardons de gratia, it appears that Parliament, seeking to combat what was
perceived as a dangerous rise in professional crime, 23 was concerned
mainly with those pardons de gratia obtained by the worst offenders.
Notorious malefactors who committed homicide in the course of theft
were quite possibly the main targets of the legislation.24 Persons who had
of pardons de cursu. At the time he probably imagined that more suspects would then come
to him before trial for a pardon de gratia in return for money or military service.
22. Yearbook recognition of the chancellor's summary powers with regard to pardons de
cursu dates from the early fourteenth century, the period of the early pardon statutes, but
Parliament may have overlooked this innovation.
23. There is no systematic study of the growth of professional crime that covers the entire
course of the fourteenth century. My argument does not depend on the fact of increasing
crime; it does depend on the contemporary belief in an increase in professional crime. We
owe much of our evidence to parliamentary attention to the problem (see below, n. 24),
which may reflect the perception of the higher classes rather than actual conditions. See
Hanawalt, Crime and Conflict, pp. 235-37. The trial rolls from the later decades of the
fourteenth century indicate frequent indictments of groups of offenders, especially in cases
of theft, and indictments before justices of the peace also reflect a substantial amount of
what seems to have been professional crime. See e.g. Putnam, ed., Proceedings before
Justices of the Peace, pp. 212-39. Gangs seem to have operated openly and ubiquitously.
See Hewitt, Organization of War, pp. 173-75; Bellamy, "The Coterel Gang: An Anatomy of
a Band of Fourteenth-Century Criminals," English Historical Review, vol. 39, (1964), p.
698. For discussions of thirteenth-century crime, seeR. H. Hilton, A Medieval Society: The
West Midlands at the End of the Thirteenth Century (London, 1966), pp. 248-61; Pugh,
"Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," pp. 98-99; Given, Society and Homicide,
passim.
24. The petition of 1309 had referred to the "too free pardoning of thieves [larons] who
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acted on a sudden impulse or in the course of a common brawl were
almost never mentioned, though they were probably responsible for most
homicides. Parliament dealt, in short, with those acts that incurred public
outrage and fear and seemed beyond the most generous limits of legitimate mercy.
During the later decades of the fourteenth century, parliamentary
concern with the problem of professional homicide steadily increased.
Possibly as a result of this concern, the terminology of royal commissions
to justices of the peace came to define more fully particularly heinous
homicide or "murder," as it once again had come to be called in official
documents,2 5 and thus to lend special importance to prosecution in such
cases. The commission of 1380, for instance, which empowered justices
of the peace to take indictments in cases of "murder," associated that
term with ambushing and malice aforethought, or true planning.26 And
had been indicted" for the crimes Parliament sought to prevent. Rotuli Parliamentorum,
l:444b (1309). The statute of 1336 recited: "Whereas murderers, robbers, and other felons,
be greatly encouraged to offend, by reason that Charters of pardon of manslaughters
["homicides"], robbery, felonies, and other trespasses against the peace, have been so
lightly granted." Stat. 10 Edw. 3, c. 2. The statute of 1340 (Stat. 14 Edw. 3, c. 15), repeated
earlier restrictions on pardons: "Charters have been granted without number to felons and
manslayers ["larons et homicides"], to the evil example and fear of good people and lawful,
whereby thieves, felons and offenders ["larons et meffesours"] be comforted to do their
robberies and manslaughters ["roberies et homicides"] and the same do from day to day."
In a petition of 1347, Parliament referred to malefactors without number who received
pardons "to the great destruction of the people." Rotuli Parliamentorum, 2: 17la. See also
Rotuli Parliamentorum, 2:172a (1347). A similar petition of 1353 stated that the king, in
response to "suggestions" which were less than truthful, had granted pardons to many
notorious felons ("larons") and to common murderers, who were to fight overseas and who
returned and plundered the countryside. Rotuli Parliamentorum, 2:253b. Kaye correctly
notes that Parliament did not distinguish types of felonious homicide in these statutes and
petitions. Kaye, "Early History," Part I, p. 378. It is possible that Parliament had in mind
all felonious homicides; but it is unlikely that in its attempt to prevent the pardoning of really
serious malefactors, Parliament proscribed pardons even to those of generally good
reputation who, in a sudden quarrel, struck and slew another person.
25. For an excellent discussion of the use of "murder" as a term of art in justice of the
peace indictments in the 1380s see Kaye, "Early History," Part I, pp. 383-89.
The term "murder" had not been commonly employed as a term of art for a particularly
heinous homicide. But the concept of murder was reflected in the name given to the fine
imposed on the local community for an unexplained homicide ("murdrum").·Many, but not
all, such homicides had been committed in secret, the slayer taking his victim by surprise
and making his escape without detection by third parties. See Plucknett, Concise History,
pp. 444-45; Meekings, ed., Wiltshire Eyre, pp. 61-65; Hurnard, King's Pardon for
Homicide, pp. 385-93. The murdrum fine was abolished in 1340 (Stat. 14 Edw. 3, stat. 1, c.
4.) By that time, the term "murder" was once again coming to be identified in official
documents with slaying itself. See e.g. John B. Post, "Some Limitations of the Medieval
Peace Rolls," Journal of the Society of Archivists, vol. 4 (1973), pp. 633, 639.
26. "We have assigned you to inquire ... into all thefts, notorious or open, and mayhems
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from about that date, legislative demands for limitations on the royal
pardoning power may have prompted the frequent insertion in pardons for
"all felonies" clauses excepting "treason, murder, and rape. " 27 In this
context, "murder" was not employed as a catchall for felonious homicide
but was a term of arus
The statute of 1390 gave these legislative demands their fullest embodiment. Limits were imposed on the king's power to pardon homicides
committed through murder, ambush, assault, or malice aforethought.2 9
Pardons for these offenses were made quite expensive; they could be
obtained only through a request making clear the nature of the killing; and
to be effective they had expressly to cover these offenses. A trial was to
be held to determine the nature of the slaying when a general pardon for
homicide was presented to the court.3o
Like its precursors, the statute of 1390 limited the king's pardon power
only in cases of homicide. This supports the view taken here of the kind
of homicide to which the legislation referred: if the king might not pardon
any slayers save those who qualified for pardons de cursu, why might he
pardon virtually all thieves? More likely, the king was allowed to pardon
all slayers and thieves, save for the most vicious in either class, i.e., those
who slew through stealth or in the course of an assault involving highway
robbery or household burglary. For the most part, it was the professional
criminal at whom the legislation was aimed. And we must suppose that
officialdom not only sought to close the escape route of the royal pardon
to such persons but that it also desired to see them brought to justice by
the juries that tried them. It was these offenders who truly tested the
system, not those lesser offenders who, with a little more time, money, or
and slayings of men through ambush or malice aforethought, and murders, and other
felonies." Rotuli Parliamentorum, 3:84b. "Felonies," I believe, incorporated simple
homicides. See Green, "Jury and the Law of Homicide," p. 468, n. 21 and accompanying
text.
27. See e.g. C.P.R., March 20, 1381, p. 610; May 7, 1381, p. 624; Dec. 12, 1385, p. 71;
Jan. 8, 1386, p. 79; Jan. 16, 1386, p. 94; Feb. 27, 1386, p. 128.
28. See e.g. JUST 3/177, r,n.7/3 (1393), discussed in Green, "Jury and the Law of
Homicide," p. 466, n. 197.
29. Stat. 13 Rich. 2, stat. 2, c. 1 (1390): "[T]hat no charter of pardon from henceforth shall
be allowed before any justice for murder, or for the death of a man slain by await, assault,
or malice prepensed, treason, or rape of a woman ... '' (''[Q]e null chartre de pardon de sore
soit a/owe devant quiconques Justices pur murdre mort de homme occys par agait ass aut ou
malice purpense treson ou rape de femme ... "). For a full discussion of the statute see
Green, "Jury and the Law of Homicide," pp. 462-69.
30. 13 Rich. 2, stat. 2, c. 1 (1390). The section of the statute imposing heavy fines for
pardons for the named offenses was repealed in 1392. See Green, "Jury and the Law of
Homicide," pp. 469-70, n. 205.
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foresight might, through a pardon of grace, legitimately have immunized
themselves altogether against trial and the verdict of the country. 31

III
If the bench, reflecting the attitudes of the elites of English society, was
concerned for the most part with the most serious offenders, so too were
juries. We have seen that few perpetrators of casual homicide were
hanged and that fully half of those alleged to have committed "murder"
were sent to the gallows. 32 Doubtless the bench would have preferred an
even higher rate of conviction for these latter defendants. They probably
suspected that graft and fear accounted for many acquittals of professional thieves and slayers, persons who frequently moved about in gangs
and who possessed the means to buy off or frighten their prospective
jurors. Nonetheless, the judges must have recognized that most of the
law-abiding populace shared a common point of view in this area. This
community of interest regarding the most serious offenders may have
conditioned the judicial response to jury leniency toward the least serious
ones.
We are unable, however, to determine the extent to which the bench
acquiesced in jury leniency in simple homicide and much nonprofessional
theft. Before examining the factors that support the view that there was
very substantial judicial acceptance of jury behavior, we must take note
of a few developments regarding the law of pardonable homicide. These
developments provide a more substantial context for understanding the
impact of jury leniency than I have thus far set forth. The doctrinal
changes we must trace are all the more significant because, in the main,
jury behavior in simple homicide tended to prevent development of the
substantive law.
First, I shall briefly outline the reasons for this process of doctrinal
stultification. Then I shall discuss the changes that did occur and suggest
that jury behavior conditioned the shape of the evolving law. This
discussion sets forth the main body of evidence that reflects the judicial
reaction to jury behavior. I shall argue that jury behavior to some extent
slowed the development of a policy aimed at reducing serious crime, an
ironic result of the dialectical process created by the combined adoptions
of a general capital sanction for felony and a lay criminal trial jury. In the
final section of this chapter I shall tentatively explore the reasons why the
Crown retained the capital sanction for all grades of felony despite the
problems it caused.
31. For further discussion of this theme see below, section IV.
32. See above, Chapter 2, text at nn. 16-21.
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That juries manipulated the evidence in a large class of homicide cases
can hardly have escaped the bench. Although the justices insisted that
nothing less than dire necessity justified killing in self-defense, it is
possible that they tolerated with some aplomb the juries' leniency in the
face of the strict rules. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the bench,
remand to gaol to await a pardon and the loss of goods probably seemed
a small price to pay for those who had in fact committed capital felony.
This fact, then, may have left the justices loath to undertake any
extension of the formal law of self-defense. Rather, in every case in which
self-defense was alleged, they pressed the jury on two questions: Had the
defendant acted out of total desperation? Had he acted without malice?
The jury's inclination to shape the facts in the most positive way for
many favored defendants appears to have significantly retarded development of the substantive criminal law. Doctrinal development in the
common-law system depended heavily upon a flow of cases raising
problems for which the law had no appropriate answer. This flow was
choked off early and effectively by the forms and procedures of the
criminal law. The ab:>ence of special pleading and the inability to raise
questions of law by way of appeal from the courts' decisions were
detrimental enough. 33 But jury behavior played an additional and key
role: juries' efforts to foreclose the possibility of hanging led them to
adopt a few existing and predictable patterns of response to cover a wide
variety of situations. Had trial juries put forward in candid terms the
details of homicides, as inquest juries often did before a coroner, the
history of the law of homicide might have been different.
For example, research reveals no settled doctrine during this period
regarding slaying in defense of one's kin, as opposed to the established
right to defend oneself. Indeed, no discussion of the question by the
bench can be found. It is difficult to believe that slaying in such
circumstances was, in practice, a capital felony. 34 If it was lawful, why
33. See Milsom, Historical Foundations, pp. 415-17.
34. One late thirteenth-century treatise, in dealing with homicide that was not felonious,
refers to a person "who slays a housebreaker, at least if he is defending himself or his
household at the time." Fleta, 2:61. Compare F. M. Nichols, trans. and ed., Britton
(London, 1865), vol. l, p. 113:
Or he may say, that although he committed the act, yet he did not do it by felony
prepense, but by necessity, in defending himself, or his wife, or his house, or his
family, or his land, or his body, from death; or that he killed the man in defense of our
peace, or by some mischance, without any thought of felony; in all which cases, if
proved, the appellees shall have judgment of acquittal.
Britton is here concerned only with defenses to an appeal. He does not suggest that all these
defenses would result in an acquittal if the trial were pursuant to an indictment. Certainly,
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does the legal process hide that from our view? One theory might have it
that when a slaying had been in defense of kin, the defendant, after the
formulistic "not guilty," entered a special plea stating the true facts, and
the court accepted such a defense when it was corroborated by the jury.
The clerk might then have enrolled the details, simply as a matter ofform,
in a manner consistent with the rules of defense of one's person. But that
theory would have the clerks engaging in deliberate, uniform, and
pointless falsification of the record. It is more reasonable to suppose that
the defendant expressed his case in the strongest and safest possible
terms, or that the jury did so on his behalf, and that the litany of deliberate
but excusable homicide was always built upon the foundation of saving
one's own life. 35 Defenders of kin (or of any other person for that matter)
were reported as self-defenders. The concealment of the true facts was
total, and the courts never had to grapple with the question of defense of
another. The formulae of the law had, in the hands of the self-informing
jury, indirectly stunted doctrinal growth.3 6
It is also probable that the conclusory character of jury verdicts
inhibited the development of more subtle rules on the standards to be met
by defendants claiming self-defense. If the judges had had to pass upon a
wide variety of fact situations, ranging along a spectrum from murderous
attack to genuine last resort, they might have developed a series of
doctrinal principles and distinctions. The bench might have developed
rules to deal with defendants who had come under attack and feared for
their lives but had acted somewhat too hastily in retaliation; or, with those
whose temper had gotten the better of them, whose malicious intent was
of the moment and less than homicidal, but whose blow had been deadly.
Instead, the courts were presented with only two types of homicide
defendants: those said to have acted feloniously, with malicia precogitata
and without evidence of mitigating circumstances, and those said to have
self-defense would not lead to acquittal in such circumstances. Nor, for that matter, is the
passage clear evidence for the proposition that one who defended his kin was entitled de
cursu to a pardon of the king's suit.
35. See above, Chapter 2, text at nn. 58-62.
36. In 1506 it was held that a servant might justifiably slay in defense of his master if his
master were otherwise unable to escape, Year Book (Henry VII) (London, 1506), Mich., 21
Hen. 7, fol. 39, pl. 50, but the first clear reference to defense of kin that I have found dates
approximately from the 1530s. Spelman noted that
Fitzherbert showed an indictment [which alleged] that one Parker found a man
between his wife's legs committing lechery, and he killed the man, and all the justices
held this to be felony. But suppose a man means to ravish my wife against her will,
and I kill him, it seems that I can do so in defence of my wife, just as in the case where
he means to kill her.
J. H. Baker, trans. and ed., The Reports of Sir John Spelman, 2 vols., (London, 1977-78),
vol. I, p. 72.
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slain in extremis, in self-defense. Bothjudicial suspicion of the large latter
group and the failure of the system to present "close cases" perpetuated
the strict division between felonious and nonfelonious homicide.37
Although the development of the substantive law of pardonable homicide was thus limited, some significant legal developments did arise out of
the judge-jury relationship. I shall refer to two of them here, one involving
justifiable homicide-in this case, the slaying of thieves caught in the
act-the other involving accidental homicide. Together these developments reflect both the conservative tendencies of the bench, for which
jury behavior was at least in part responsible, and the area of agreement
between bench and jury concerning particularly heinous social behavior.
2

The category of justifiable homicide, meriting acquittal rather than
pardon and forfeiture, was extended in the fourteenth century to include
the slayers of felons caught in the act of burglary, arson, or robbery. An
examination of this development may suggest why those who acted in
defense of property fared better under the evolving law than those who
acted solely in defense of their person.
The line between justifiable and excusable homicide had long been
unclear and prone to inconsistent judicial treatment.3 8 From early times,
execution upon a legal order was justifiable. 39 Slaying manifest felons 4 o

37. The speculative nature of this section should be obvious. The direct evidence on
judicial behavior that would provide the most satisfactory support for these conclusions is
simply unavailable. My argument concerning jury behavior and judicial response is
developed more fully below, subsection 4. The problem is discussed in the light of general
developments in the law of nonfelonious homicide and the role that automatic forfeiture
came to play in the fourteenth century.
38. See Humard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 88-92.
39. See Bracton, De Legibus, 2:340 (fol. 120b).
40. These included "hand-having" thieves, notorious malefactors, and slayers attempting to escape from the "hue and cry" raised against them. For slayers of hand-having
thieves, see e.g. J. Parker, ed., A Calendar of the Lancashire Assize Rolls
[Manchester],l904), p. 87; Maitland, ed., Pleas of Gloucester, p. 23, pl. 89; W. Page, ed.,
Three Early Assize Rolls for the County of Northumberland (Durham, 1891), pp. 78-79, 80,
84 (hereafter cited as Northumberland Assize Rolls); A. J. Horwood, trans. and ed., Year
Books of the Reign of Edward the First, (London, 1863), 30--31 Edw. I, p. 512 (1302). For
slayers of notorious malefactors, see e.g. JUST l/734, m.22d/9 (1256); JUST 1/60, m.23/5
(1272) (keeper of the peace in Buckinghamshire slew a reputed malefactor who refused to
give assurance that he would not harm the countryside and who sought, with drawn sword,
to avoid arrest); KB 27/297, m.26d/l (1334); C 260/55, no. 58 (1343); C 145/21/36 (undated);
G. Wrottesley, trans. and ed., "Plea Rolls of the Reign of Hen. III," in Collections for a
History of Staffordshire (London, 1883), vol. 4, pp. 214-15; J. H. Wigmore, "Responsibility
for Tortious Acts; Its History," Harvard Law Review, vol. 7 (1894), pp. 315, 323. For
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and those formally outlawed, 41 if they resisted arrest, also came to be
justified. Initially, this may have represented an attempt to harness the
ancient custom of private retaliation-perhaps because it could not be
entirely prevented-by legitimating it solely where the wrongdoer refused
to submit to the judicial process. 42 As the judicial system and the test for
refusal to submit to it developed, 43 these slayings came to be seen as being
on behalf of the law (pro lege). While for a time some tension between the
private and pro lege deed may have existed, we may suppose that the
latter eventually won out.
By the thirteenth century, most localities were no longer allowed to
execute captured outlaws and manifest felons without trial; that custom
had become, by and large, frontier law. 44 Indeed, so profound was the
impress of royal law that thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century judges
sometimes insisted that the slayer of a resisting outlaw or manifest felon
show that he had acted as a royal official or pursuant to an official order
slayers of would-be escapers from the hue and cry, see e.g. JUST 1/56, m.44d/l (1249);
Northumberland Assize Rolls, pp. 80, 84.
41. Bracton, De Legibus, 2:362 (fol. 128b) (''An outlaw also forfeits everything connected
with the peace, for from the time he is outlawed he bears the wolfs head, so that he may be
slain by anyone with impunity, especially if he resists or takes to flight so that his arrest is
difficult").
42. As early as the seventh century, slayers of outlaws or of manifest felons who would
not surrender to the ''peace of the king'' were protected by the law against retaliation by the
kin of the slain. See Ine 33, in F. L. Attenborough, trans. and ed., The Laws of the Earliest
English Kings (Cambridge, 1922), p. 47: "He who kills a thief shall be allowed to declare
with an oath that he whom he killed was a thief trying to escape, and the kinsmen of the dead
man shall swear an oath to carry on no vendetta against him. If, however, he keeps it secret,
and it afterwards comes to light, then he shall pay for him." Ine's dooms date from about
A.D. 694. H. G. Richardson and G. 0. Sayles, Law and Legislation from Aethelberht to
Magna Carta (Edinburgh, 1966), p. 13. For a later (tenth century) law to the same effect, see
2 Aethelstan 1.2, in Attenborough, ed., Laws of the Earliest English Kings, p. 127 ("If
however, [the thief] tries to defend himself, or if he takes to flight, he shall not be spared").
Cf. Alfred 5 to Alfred 5.3, in ibid., p. 67. Alfred employed the ecclesiastical "sanctuary"
laws in his own legislation concerning "house protection," i.e., the protection of a suspect
who remained in his home and voluntarily gave himself up to stand trial. See generally C.
Riggs, Criminal Asylum in Anglo-Saxon Law (Gainesville, Fla., 1963), pp. 31-36.
43. Riggs describes the procedure that had come to replace the automatic prosecution of
the feud, Criminal Asylum, pp. 41-42.
44. See e.g. Northumberland Assize Rolls, p. 70. In a case where a felon was slain, but
not while in flight, local officials informed the court that it was the custom in
Northumberland summarily to dispatch robbers taken with goods in hand. The late
thirteenth-century law book Britton, (vol. I, pp. 36-37), probably reflects the older rule
rather than contemporary practice: "If any man be found killed, and another be found near
him with the knife or other weapon in his hand all bloody, wherewith he killed him, the
coroner shall be presently fetched, and in his presence the felon shall, upon the testimony
of those who saw the felony done, be judged to death."
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before he could be acquitted. 45 Other such slayers required royal pardons,
usually for self-defense. 4 6 Here there was confusion. While it appears that
it was lawful for anyone to slay an outlaw or manifest felon who resisted
arrest, it was not uncommon for nonofficial slayers to be recorded, in
addition, as having suffered attack and therefore slain to save their lives.47
This, indeed, was the surest defense for one seeking to show that he could
not otherwise have taken his victim, and it may have been an embellishment intended to allay judicial suspicion of nonofficial slayers. Yet the
inclusion of details of self-defense, which ought to have strengthened the
defendant's claim to an acquittal, may well have been responsible for the
inconsistent judicial treatment of nonofficial slayers. 48 By the middle of
the fourteenth century, however, the confusion was resolved. Most
slayers of outlaws and manifest felons were acquitted; the courts required
neither a pardon nor a theory of self-defense. 4 9
45. See e.g. KB 27/343, m.2/4 (1346) (defendant commissioned by the sheriff of Norfolk
was acquitted); JUST 3/139, m.27d/l (1356) (five men joined two constables in arresting a
person who laid waste to goods and chattels of a resident of Norfolk; all were acquitted. The
court ruled: "And because it seems to the court that what they did in this case, they did
through the law ["per legem"] and through maintenance of the law, it is considered that the
aforesaid seven ought to go quit"); JUST 3/135, m/16/2 (1343) (defendant and thirty-four
others pursued and slew a person who had been indicted for several felonies. The court,
after determining that the deceased had been indicted before his death and that the
defendant had a commission based on that indictment, acquitted the defendant and his
posse); A. Fitzherbert, Graunde Abridgement, "Corone," pl. 288 (1330); Livre des Assises,
22 Edw. 3, pl. 55 (1349).
46. See Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 90.
47. See e.g. JUST l/65, m.47/15 (1286); JUST 3/43/l, m.14d/7 (1325).
48. See Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 91, suggesting that in the thirteenth
century courts may occasionally have seized upon details of self-defense in cases of
justifiable homicide and thought, somewhat irrationally, in terms of excusable homicide.
Hurnard observes that courts more often acquitted where the alleged felon had been slain
while resisting arrest than where he had been slain attempting to commit robbery, and she
speculates "that it was all too easy for the courts to assimilate [the latter] cases to slaying
in self-defense."
49. For example, in KB 27/297, m.26d/l (1334), a certain William, son of Ralph, was
acquitted for the death of Adam Doughty, whom he had decapitated. According to the jury,
Adam was a notorious robber who had feloniously burgled the house of Thomas, son of
Jordan, in Lancashire. William tried to arrest Adam, but Adam stabbed William and fled.
William pursued and slew Adam. The court specifically asked the jurors whether William
could have taken Adam in any other way, to which they replied that he could not. There is
no indication that the bench questioned the jury with regard to self-defense. In JUST 3/135,
m.13d/3 (1344), the defendant, taking part with others responding to the hue and cry, shot
a fleeing suspect with an arrow. The court ruled that the defendant had acted as an executor
of the peace ("ut executor pacis") and acquitted him. In KB 27/528, Rex, m.xlvi/1 (1393),
according to the indictment, the defendant saw a stranger ("extraneus") leading away two
horses belonging to others. He raised the hue and pursued the stranger and, in apprehending
him, struck him on the neck with a sword so that he fell on the ground. Whereupon the
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As we have seen, the class of manifest felons included the ancient
"hand-having thief"-quite literally, a felon caught with the stolen goods.
But it did not include one intercepted in an unlawful attempt to take goods
or commit an assault. In the course of the fourteenth century, however,
the courts began to acquit as justifiable slayers some of those who had
acted to forestall an attempted felony, namely, those who had slain
burglars or robbers. The self-defender, on the other hand, was subjected
to the rigor of the law of self-defense for at least another two centuries.
This uneven development requires explanation. Why the one change
without the other?
While thirteenth-century records reveal occasional acquittals of defendants who slew those attempting burglary or robbery, 50 most such
cases resulted in the granting of a pardon for actual, or alleged, selfdefense.51 As with the other early cases, embellishment by the defendant,
repeated by jurors under oath, produced a sure result where judicial
response to the bare truth was uncertain. The judges accepted the
implications for legal theory of this factual grafting. Thirteenth-century
treatises dealt with defense of property as an extension of self-defense.s2
defendant beheaded the thief. The court considered the indictment "insufficient" and
acquitted the defendant. For further examples see JUST 3/43/l, m.14d/7 (1325); JUST
3/137A, m.21/2 (1353); KB 27/519, Rex m.l/2 (1391).
50. See e.g. JUST V642, m.16/l3 (1256) (Northumberland Assize Rolls, p. 94). Pollock
and Maitland cite this case as an unusual one and assert that the defendant was fortunate
(History of English Law, 2:478). A late thirteenth-century legal treatise refers to such
slayings in somewhat ambiguous terms: "Anyone, however, who slays a thief by night is not
held to be a homicide ["non teneatur"], and he who slays a housebreaker, at least if he is
defending himself or his household at the time, slays justly [" iuste interfecit"], and in the
same way he who slays another to save himself from death." (Fleta, 2:61). Fleta groups such
acts with excusable slayings in self-defense, for which a pardon was required.
51. See e.g. Maitland; ed., Pleas of Gloucester, pl. 362 (1221); C 145/11/33 (1259); C
145113/21 (1266); C 145/32/20 (1274); C 145/49/49 (1290); JUST 3/91, m.IOd/10 (1293).
52. See e.g. Bracton, De Legibus, 2:408 (fol. 144b):
If anyone slays a night thief, he will do so with impunity only if he could not spare him
without danger to himself; if he could it will be otherwise. For the life and death of
men are in the hands of the king, (as in the case of a certain man ... to whom the king
granted a pardon for a death in such circumstances). And so where one defends
himself against hamsocn, which [the English call] the entering of a house in breach of
the peace, and the intruder is slain, he will be free of liability if he who killed could
defend himself in no other way.
(Footnotes omitted.) For Bracton, to be "free of liability" does not mean, in these
circumstances, to be free of the need for a pardon: "[H]e who kills a thief, either a day thief
or a night thief, is not liable, [i.e.,] if he could not otherwise escape danger; if he could he
is liable. Nor is he liable who kills by misadventure." Ibid., p. 438 (fol. 155). Bracton seems
to equate cases of misadventure, where pardons were required, with cases of slaying a thief
to "escape danger."
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In the fourteenth century, however, the judges formulated a new
doctrine giving the victim of housebreaking greater latitude in repulsing
his assailant. The proposition was first stated laconically, as if an
intonement of the hoary law: "It was presented that a man killed another
in his own house se defendendo. It was asked whether the deceased came
to rob him: for in such a case a man may kill another though it not be in
self-defense. " 53 Moreover, the court sanctioned outright acquittal in this
case, thus bringing the defendant under the ancient rule applicable to
slayers of manifest felons. In 1349 Justice Thorpe restated the rule more
broadly: "And in many other cases a man may kill another without
impeachment, as if thieves come to rob a man, or to burgle his house, he
may safely kill them if he cannot take them. "54
For a time, however, the courts were uncertain about the breadth of the
rule. In 1357 Thorpe and his fellow justices were confronted with a
defendant who had slain a burglar. The court ruled: "Because ... what
the defendant did he did in saving his own life in circumstances in which
anyone ought to be able to do so lawfully, it is considered that he be
quit. " 55 This seems to indicate that, while a pardon was not necessary,
the defendant had to show he acted in self-defense.
The hesitation of the bench to separate such cases from those of
excusable homicide was reflected in another case. It seems to have been
settled by 1353 that a man might slay someone who had entered upon his
property with the intention of setting his house on fire. 56 Yet thirteen
years later the justices of gaol delivery of Leicester Castle, Thomas de
Ingleby and John Cavendish, showed indecision as to treatment of the
defendant in Neel's Case:
Reginald Walshman ... came at night around midnight to the house of
John Neel and called to John who lay there asleep in his bed to let him
come in; he wanted to slay John in John's house; and John refused him
entrance, so that Reginald began to break the doors and windows and
he said he would burn the house and John's wife and everything within
the house unless John permitted him to enter. And he intended to burn
the house, and John for fear of his death and the burning and for
salvation of his life and family got out of bed and went to the door; and
Reginald was there with a rock which he threw at John's head, and
John ducked and Reginald stood there with a knife drawn in order to
53. Fitzherbert, Graunde Abridgement, "Carone," pl. 305 (1330).
54. Livre des Assises, 22 Edw. 3, pl. 55 (1349). See Fitzherbert, Graunde Abridgement,
"Carone," pl. 261 (1349); Livre des Assises, 26 Edw. 3, pl. 23 (1353).
55. JUST 31139, m.29d/4 (1357).
56. Livre des Assises, 26 Edw. 3, pl. 23 (1353). See Robert Brooke, La Graunde
Abridgement (London, 1576), "Carone," pl. 100; Fitzherbert, Graunde Abridgement,
"Carone," pl. 192 (1353).
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kill John and attacked him wanting to kill him, and John being naked
and believing that Reginald intended to burn his house and that
Reginald wanted to kill him, in saving his own life, stabbed Reginald
with a knife wherein Reginald was slain. And the jury say that John
could not otherwise have saved his own life. 57
Neel was released in surety pending a gaol delivery seven months later,
when he was acquitted. The court had evidently first considered requiring
Neel to obtain a pardon, and it appears likely that the element of
self-defense was crucial to the judgment of acquittal.
Because the natural inclination of the jury was to embellish instances of
defense of property with details of defense of one's person, few cases
presented the courts with the critical test of pure defense of property. And
those cases that did come forward may have been perceived as ordinary
homicides with some embellishments concerning defense of home and
hearth. The mingling of defense of property with defense of person may
have resulted in judicial caution toward allegations of the former, and it
may have slowed the expansion of the category of justifiable homicide to
include defense of property. Nevertheless, that the court in the end
granted an acquittal in Nee!' s Case suggests that, whether or not
self-defense remained a necessary element, this expansion had been
accomplished. Moreover, by the last third of the fourteenth century
slayers of nocturnal housebreakers ho longer appear among those pardoned for homicide se defendendo, though earlier such cases had been
abundant.5 8
Thorpe's 1349 ruling had pertained not only to housebreaking but also
to attempted robbery. 59 This position, or something very close to it, was
adopted by the whole court when Thorpe put the following case four
years later: "A man was indicted for homicide; it was found that the
deceased was a thief who assailed the defendant and pursued him closely
so that the defendant slew him .... [All] say that he will go quit. " 60 Here,
too, it appears that some element of self-defense remained crucial to the
finding of justifiable homicide. The effect of this ruling is more difficult to
ascertain from the rolls than is the effect of the ruling concerning the
slaying of burglars. Again, the records of acquittals provide very few
details about the cases. Moreover, the absence of victims of attempted
robbery among those pardoned for self-defense is not helpful here. An
attack in the open had always been described as an assault with intent to
57.
58.
59.
60.

JUST 3.142, m.l7d/l (1366).
See above, n. 51.
See above, n. 54 and accompanying text.
Livre des Assises, 26 Edw. 3, pl. 32 (1353).
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slay, since this was a necessary allegation in self-defense. Other motives,
such as robbery, had rarely been mentioned.
This part of Thorpe's ruling was nevertheless of considerable significance because, at least in theory, it broadened the scope of justifiable
homicide to include slaying to prevent felony. The new rule concerning
the slayers of housebreakers was perhaps less novel; the wrongdoer had
already committed the ancient but nonfelonious breach of the peace
known as hamsocn.6t
The extension of justifiable homicide to include slayers of would-be
burglars and robbers was very possibly a response to what was thought to
be-and may in fact have been-an unprecedented contemporary rise in
professional crime. Thorpe's ruling was not expanded, however, to
include slayers of criminals who assaulted with intent to kill rather than to
rob, not even to include slayers of would-be "murderers," as those who
committed homicide through stealth were coming once again to be
known. The failure to treat the slaying of a would-be murderer as
justifiable homicide is particularly puzzling since by the end of the
fourteenth century murderous assault was considered especially heinous.
This is shown, as we have seen, by the 1390 statute greatly restricting the
grant of pardons "of grace" to perpetrators of stealthy homicide.
The courts may have drawn this line between professional robbers and
stealthy killers because the former were considered to be a threat to the
entire community, while the latter were deemed a threat only to their
intended victims. But it seems more likely that the judges were responding to the juries' practice of finding self-defense in many less serious, yet
felonious and undesirable homicides. The bench must have realized that
many homicides described as se defendendo had in fact been committed
in the course of drunken brawls and similar rows. Against these, too, the
law had to provide deterrence, and the procedure of pardon and forfeiture, which was a quasi-sanction, may have seemed an appropriate
deterrent. The true self-defender, however, especially the one who had
repulsed a murderous assault, might have deserved better; moreover, in
his case even the logic of deterrence mandated acquittal. But how were
the judges to identify the true self-defender? Jury testimony and the
defendant's own story were so formulistic that discrimination among
alleged self-defenders was an impossible task. Evidence as to the exact
nature of the victim's alleged assault would have been difficult to obtain,
61. Bracton defines "hamsocn" as "the entering of a house in breach of the peace."
Bracton, De Legibus, 2:408 (fol. 144b). See Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law,
2:454-58. In two early thirteenth-century cases [F. W. Maitland, trans. and ed., Select Pleas
Of The Crown (London, 1888), pl. 60, 86],. "hamsocn" (or "hamsoken") was complicated
by theft.
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as would have been the truth regarding the defendant's efforts to escape
without dealing a mortal blow.
The theory of royal mercy that underlay the granting of pardons may
also have had something to do with the retention of pardons in selfdefense cases. Although by the fourteenth century pardons for selfdefense and accidental homicide were granted de cursu, the vestiges of
the earlier idea of special consideration survived at least in the formulae
that were inscribed on charters of pardon.62 Nevertheless, pardons for
excusable homicide were retained as a matter of policy as well as of
tradition. For, as we shall now see, while self-defenders required pardons
in virtually every case, those who slew by accident did not. "Mercy" was
required, it seems, only where suspicion of wrongdoing remained.
3

Throughout the thirteenth century the prevailing rule in cases of
accidental homicide was that the slayer was required to obtain a royal
pardon. The pardon issued as a matter of course upon a finding of
unintentional homicide (misadventure). Even grossly negligent slayers
were included within this class of excusable homicide. 63 By the late
fourteenth century, however, the courts frequently granted an immediate
acquittal for accidental homicide, no longer insisting that the slayer forfeit
his chattels and secure a royal pardon. Though there is no clear evidence
as to when and how the new policy was formulated, its widespread
application is clear from the rolls.64

62. See e.g. C 66/230, m.21 ("Moved by mercy, we have pardoned .. ."("Nos pietate
moti perdonavimus ... ")]. The pardon still carried the proviso that the defendant "stand to
right" ("ita tamen quod stet recto in curia nostra") should the kin of the slain wish to bring
an appeal (literally, "should anyone wish to speak against him"). By the late thirteenth
century, if not long before, the kin's right to appeal a pardoned slayer had lapsed. It is
unlikely that it remained even in theory, though the form of the pardon was unchanged.
Green, "Jury and the Law of Homicide," pp. 419-20, n. 22. Nevertheless, it is still barely
possible that this ancient claim to private compensation against an excusable slayer
accounted in part for the retention of the pardon requirement. One would still have to
explain why a pardon was required rather than acquittal with an obligation to stand to right.
The rule of automatic forfeiture suggests that pardoned slayers were disadvantaged for
reasons other than the kin's right to appeal. Moreover, the expansion of the class of
justifiable homicide was accomplished without concern for the rights of the deceased's kin.
It led to acquittal of some who formerly required a pardon for self-defense. As we shall see,
judicial policy changed with regard to accidental homicide with the same potential effect on
the theoretical right of the kin to bring an appeal.
63. See generally Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 98-108.
64. But see Year Book (Edward III), Hi!., 44 Edw. 3, pl. 44 (1371); Fitzherbert, Graunde
Abridgement, "Carone," pl. 94 (1371) (judicial statements that acquittal is appropriate in
accidental homicide cases). For a discussion of an unsuccessful attempt during the reign of
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The majority of all homicide defendants delivered before the justices
were acquitted outright. In most of these cases the clerk recorded on the
trial roll only the homicide for which the defendant had been indicted, the
date and place of the act, the jury's verdict of "not guilty" ("non est
culpabilis"), and the court's judgment of acquittal. The evidence does not
permit us even to estimate how many such cases were acquittals on
verdicts amounting to misadventure. Occasionally, however, the clerk
did record the facts of the case in more detail, and from this small body
of hard evidence it is possible to discern a new departure in the courts'
handling of accidental homicide. Judges now acquitted many defendants
who had received a jury verdict of accidental homicide. There is additional support for this conclusion: late-fourteenth-century trial rolls
contain few pardons for misadventures,65 and coroners frequently neglected to record an indictment where the inquest jury found misadventure, as though they believed that the courts were not concerned
with such cases.66
The gradual disappearance in the fourteenth century of the pardon
requirement for accidental homicide may have been the natural outgrowth
of an older distinction between homicides resulting from the slayer's act
alone and homicides produced by intervening circumstances over which
the slayer had no control. Thirteenth-century courts had already more or
less systematically acquitted in some accidental homicide cases, for
instance those involving .carts and ploughs. 67 From one perspective,
acquittals in these cases may be taken as a "rough-and-ready" approach
to the problem of negligence. More often than not the victim, rather than
the driver, had failed to use care.6s In shooting accidents and other cases
where the slayer was more likely to have been the negligent party, the
pardon requirement was maintained. A second plausible explanation of
the early resort to acquittals in driving cases is that, by and large, the
slaying could be attributed to a nonhuman agent. The cart, plough,
horses, or oxen, rather than the driver, might be perceived as the
Edward I (1272-1307) to reform the law in this direction, see Hurnard, King's Pardon for
Homicide, p. 279.
65. E.g., the four rolls discussed in Green, "Jury and the Law of Homicide," p. 430,
dating from the period 1351-85, contain many cases of self-defense but none ending in the
defendant's remand to prison to await a pardon for accidental homicide.
66. See below, n. 96.
67. See Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 101-4.
68. Ibid., p. 102. See, however, George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston,
1978), p. 359. Fletcher stresses "the important conceptual distinction between acquittal for
no homicide and a judgment or pardon for an excused homicide." I agree that this was an
important distinction, but I believe that in some cases the facts supporting a conclusion of
"no homicide" were false and that the bench therefore sometimes required a pardon. See
below, text at nn. 91-95.
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responsible agent. There is an evident confusion between an embryonic
concept of fault and the ancient theory governing homicide committed by
a nonhuman agent, for which payment of a "deodand" was required. 69
The courts' stress on the driver's absence of intent, rather than upon his
lack of negligence, is therefore revealing. Frequently, when a court had
determined that the driver had not "intended" to strike the victim, it
concluded that his horse or cart was to blame. The horse might as well
have been riderless or the cart empty, for the courts treated such a case
as no different from that of a death caused by a tree that had been blown
down in a windstorm. 10
Most of the late-fourteenth-century accidental homicide cases in which
the defendant was acquitted involved situations where it was perceived
that either the slain person himself or an intervening object had been the
real cause of death. In this sense, these cases represented a logical
extension of the earlier pattern of acquittals for accidental homicide.
Archery accidents were among the most common causes of
unintentional slaying throughout the Middle Ages.7 1 Target shooting, a
favorite sport, continued to take its toll despite attempts to require strict
safeguards. 72 Arrows went off course in several recorded instances, one,
e.g., after striking a tree branch7 3 and another after glancing off the
ground.74 The defendant in each of these cases was acquitted, though in
the second only after the court took the matter under advisement.7 5 Of the
shooting-accident cases, these two are the closest in nature to the
thirteenth-century acquittals. The defendant had set in motion the agent
of death, but circumstances perceived to be beyond his control had
69. The deodand (literally, "to be given to God," but in fact given to the Crown)
represented the value of the agent that caused the death. See Hunnisett, Medieval Coroner,
pp. 32-34; Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2:473-74.
70. See e.g. G. Fowler, trans., "Roll of the Justices in Eyre at Bedford, 1227," in The
Publications of the Bedfordshire Historical Record Society (hereafter cited as Bedford
Eyre), vol. 3 (Aspley Guise, 1916), p. 153 (cart); JUST 1/280, m.l8d (1286) (cart); London
Coroners' Rolls, Roll A, no. 30 (1301) (horse ran over deceased "against [the rider's] will").
71. Green, "Pardonable Homicide in Medieval England," pp. 77-82.
72. Jurors at a coroner's inquest, JUST 2/207, m.2dll (1397), described an accident
resulting from the slain man's negligence in the course of an event subject to specific
regulations at a well-marked area: "[I]t happened that . . . William Swayn negligently
["necligenter"] and in a disorderly way stood beyond the marker within the limits and
bounds set up for the shooting match so that while William Swayn stood negligently in the
said manner, William Stonehale shot him with one of his arrows." Cf. JUST 2/59, m.18/3
(1387), where the defendant had yelled a warning to someone who was crossing the shooting
area.
73. JUST 3/167, m.72/1 (1384).
74. JUST 3/177, m.47d/2 (1391).
75. In this case, the court also ordered forfeiture of chattels . .JUST 3/177, m.47d/2 (1391).
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determined the outcome; on the other hand, in no way could it be said that
the deceased had been responsible for his demise. 76
Cases in which the deceased was said to have been at fault were not
uncommon, 77 however, and in the late fourteenth century they began to
play a significant role. A few shooting cases suggest that the deceased's
behavior-contributory negligence, as it were-had become a matter of
great concern. Indeed, it is in the context of the victim's action in these
cases that the term negligence first gained prominence on the medieval
criminal trial rolls. Only on the rarest occasion was that term associated
with the slayer; his negligence was almost never at issue.7s To the modern
mind, it might seem strange that the law was more lenient toward those
who had used lethal weapons in a negligent or even reckless manner79
than toward those who had retaliated against murderous assaults.so But
the paradox is easily explained. The court looked solely to the slayer's
intent, and slaying without malice was not felonious. Thus, if it could be
shown that the deceased had caused his own death in a manner the slayer
could not have predicted, there was a strong presumption ofnonmalicious
76. For an early example of acquittal in a shooting case, see JUST 1/1060, m.13d (1279),
and the discussion in Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 279.
77. See above, text at n. 68.
78. In a 1416 case, JUST 2/170, m.l/2, a coroner recorded the following: "Geoffrey
Angulluskey drove a cart ... [and) through his negligence and inebriation the nearside wheel
of the cart ran across the head of Julia who lay at the foot of the wall of her mother, Lucy,
without any unusual motion of the cart or horses .... The value of the wheel is twelve
pence; the said wheel killed Julia ... and Geoffrey fled and he has no goods." The coroner
assigned the negligence to the driver, the only such case I have found on any of the extant
coroners' rolls, but he then treated the death as a misadventure due to other than a human
agent. He blamed the death on the wheel, and assessed its value for purposes of the
deodand. See above, n. 69. Geoffrey's goods were assessed presumably because he fled
rather than remained and gave evidence. The coroner was subsequently amerced; an assize
clerk later added: "The coroner is at fault for failing to mention who ought to respond."
Most likely the assize clerk, like the coroner, treated the case as a misadventure due to other
than a human agent, and the amercement was for failure to note who ought to respond for
payment of the deodand. It is possible, although I believe very unlikely, that the clerk,
noting the coroner's reference to the driver's "negligence," believed an indictment was
merited and was assessing the coroner for failure to frame one.
79. See e.g. C 145/11/30 (1261) (defendant threw a knife at a cat but hit and killed his wife
instead); C 145/85/18 (1320) (defendant threw a knife at a wall but hit and killed his wife
instead).
80. Maitland remarks: "That a man who kills another in self-defence should require a
pardon will seem to us even more monstrous than that pardons should be needed where
there has been misadventure, for the 'misadventure' of this age covers many a blameworthy
act.'' Pollock and Maitland, History ofEnglish Law, 2:483. In my view, however, the formal
rules of self-defense took account of the fact that jury verdicts of self-defense concealed
many blameworthy acts. While this does not account for the leniency toward negligence, it
does help explain the relative severity of the self-defense rules.
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homicide. It was to that end that the allegations in shooting cases leading
to acquittals recited that the deceased had gotten in the way and been
slain "by his own fault" ("in defectu suo proprio"), 81 or that the deceased
had run into the target area through his own foolishness or negligence. 82
The allegation that the deceased had been foolish, reckless, or at fault
runs through the largest and, for legal theory, the most important class of
cases identifiable as resulting in acquittal for misadventure. These are
cases in which the defendant had the weapon causing death more or less
under his control, but the deceased, it was said, ran or fell upon it. What
came to be of critical importance were the attendant circumstances.
Acquittals were gained easily in homicides caused by accidental contact
with sheathed knives in games of football and wrestling. 83 More problematic were cases that fell between self-defense and accident, in which the
deceased allegedly launched a deadly attack upon the defendant only to
die "through his own fault," unintentionally plunging upon his intended
victim's weapon. 84 In essence, these were cases in which self-defense had
been transformed into accidental homicide.
Accidental death in the course of deadly assault, which appears
occasionally on the early trial rolls,s 5 became very common in the late
fourteenth century.86 By then, of course, a great deal more was at stake
and much depended upon the characterization of the defendant's act.
According to the policy initiated in the 1340s, the excusable slayer not
only was required to obtain a pardon but lost his chattels whether or not
he had fled. 87 By the later fourteenth century, however, if the excusable
81. See e.g. JUST 3/180, m.24d/8 (1393).
82. See e.g. JUST 2/207, m.2d/l (1397). But see JUST 3/185, m.8d/3 (1398), where similar
allegations as to the deceased's behavior led to defendant's remand and pardon.
83. See e.g. JUST 1/1194, m.l/1 (1272) (f~otball); C 145/38/20 (1280) (football); JUST
3/167, m.30/l (1381) (football); Bedford Eyre, p. 1 (wrestling). Cf. C 144/27/31 (1287)
(dancing).
84. Compare JUST 3/176, m.6/2 (1390); JUST 3/181, m.7d/l (1390); JUST 3/179, m.6/2
(1391); JUST 3/183, m.2/l (1395); JUST 3/179, m.49/l (1397); JUST 3/205, m.lld/7 (1427)
(cases ending in acquittals); with JUST 3/179, m.31 (1387); JUST 3/179, m.28d/6 (1393);
JUST 3/179, m.38d/3 (1394); JUST 3/180, m.46d/3 (1395); JUST 3/180, m.14/8 (1397)
(defendants ordered to obtain pardons).
85. See e.g. C 260/2, no. 47 (1280); C 144/31/12 (1292); C 260/20, no. 16 (1309). See also
Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 95-96.
86. See above, n. 84 and cases cited therein.
87. See Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 147. See generally Pollock and
Maitland, History of English Law, 2:481. It is not possible to determine the exact moment
this new policy came into being. The first Year Book reference to a general rule of forfeiture
is Year Book (Edward Ill), Hi!., 21 Edw. 3, pl. 23 (1347). See also Year Book (Edward III),
Mich., 44 Edw. 3, pl. 55 (1370); Year Book (Henry IV), Easter, 2 Hen. 4, pl. 6 (1400).
Examination of the gaol delivery rolls yields very uncertain information. Clerks did not
always record forfeitures, and, even before 1340, they often failed to note flight. Recording
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slaying were accidental, the slayer stood an excellent chance of acquittal
and retention of goods. 88 The court therefore was careful in these cases to
determine-or at least to elicit a sworn assertion-that the defendant had
drawn the knife or sword solely for the purpose of self-defense, that he
had held it steady as a bar to further assault, and that the deceased had of
his own motion plunged onto the defendant's weapon. The defendant, it
was sometimes said, had not supplied any motion or force at all.89 The
tenor and form of the testimony bears a greater resemblance to that
produced in the late-fourteenth-century shooting accidents than to that
set forth in the thirteenth-century cases of deaths suffered by negligent
assailants.9o
Even with explicit, sworn statements from the jurors, the bench
appears to have been cautious with allegations of death resulting from
negligent assault. The acquittal rate when the jury brought back a finding
of this kind seems to have lagged behind that for misadventures surrounded by other less suspicious circumstances.9 1 Indeed, the fact that
very few of these latter cases, such as deaths resulting from target
shooting, appear on the rolls suggests that they led automatically to
acquittal with relatively little testing of the evidence.
flight was unnecessary before forfeiture became general: where forfeiture was indicated
there must have been flight. Afterward, since flight was no longer a prerequisite for seizure
of goods, it W<'S an equally purposeless point for the busy clerks to make. Hence, neither the
failure to indicate forfeiture nor the indication of forfeiture without mention of flight
necessarily indicates whether the automatic forfeiture rule was in effect. For gaol delivery
rolls evidencing the haphazard application of the new rule, see JUST 3/129 (1336-46); JUST
3/131 (1337-55); JUST 3/134 (1341-51), passim. See below, n. 105 and accompanying text.
88. But see JUST 3/177, m.47d/2 (1391), where the defendant was acquitted but forfeited
his chattels.
89. See e.g. JUST 3/137A, m.8/4 (135i) (after the deceased had struck the defendant and
gravely wounded him, he ran after the defendant, who held a pitchfork between himself and
his attacker; the deceased then "stupidly ran upon the pitchfork"); JUST 3/176, m.6/2 (1390)
[the deceased had thrown the defendant into a ditch and had fallen accidentally on the
latter's knife; the court asked whether the defendant had, out of any malice, held his knife
upward toward the deceased ("ex aliqua malicia sursum potuit cultellum suum
versus .. . ")];JUST 3/179, m.6d/2 (1391); JUST 2/60, m.13/2 (1394) (the defendant held a
sword between himself and his assailant without moving it); JUST 3/179, m.3/l (1389) (the
jurors stated that the defendant had not moved his weapon but held it still; he nevertheless
had to obtain a pardon for self-defense).
90. See above, n. 85.
91. Cf. cases cited above inn. 84 with cases cited above inn. 83. It is interesting to note
that Thomas Cauteshangre, one of the coroners who responded to the new judicial policy of
acquitting in accidental homicide cases by not framing indictments in many such cases, did
continue to frame indictments in cases where the deceased was said to have run against a
knife held up in self-defense. See e.g. JUST 2/155, m.9/3 (1382); JUST 2/155, m.10/3 (1383);
JUST 2/155, m.ll/5 (1385); JUST 2/155, m.16/l (1389); JUST 2/155, m.2l/3 (1392).
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The more frequent enrollment of details in cases where "accidents"
stemmed from fights suggests that the courts had some difficulty in
determining liability in such cases. Perhaps the judges suspected that
jurors had now found a convenient way to obtain acquittals for those who
had perpetrated simple homicide: rather than portray them as selfdefenders who struck the fatal blow, jurors could go one step further and
turn them either into "accidental" slayers on whose weapons murderous
assailants had, through their own fault, flung their bodies or into
"nonslayers," the deceased having "slain himself. "92 Evidence of the
bench's suspicion regarding such verdicts can be gleaned from the fact
that many of these defendants who were not acquitted, but who were
instead required to obtain a pardon, were pardoned for self-defense rather
than for accident.9 3 Judicial caution in the face of the new formula is
understandable, yet at times appears extreme. One court, e.g., went so
far as to discuss whether a pardon was required for a defendant who
allegedly ran from his assailant and was spared when the latter slipped
and fell upon his own knife.94 Perhaps the cases involving assailants said
to have fallen upon their own weapons had multiplied beyond all belief.95
92. For cases in which the formula "the defendant slew himself" ("se ipsum interfecit")
appears, see e.g. JUST 3/179, m.4d/2 (1390); JUST 3/179, m.6/2 (1391). In a yearbook case
[Year Book (Edward III), Mich., 44 Edw. 3, pl. 55 (1371)], Knivet, J., stated that had the
defendant slain in self-defense, pardon and forfeiture would have been required; here they
were not required because the deceased, in attacking the defendant, had fallen upon the
defendant's knife and had thereby killed himself.
A sixteenth-century treatise groups this genre of case with suicide ("felo de se"). William
Staunford, Pleas of the Crown (London, 1557), p. 20 (1557). At another point, however,
Staunford treats such cases as though they turned upon the question whether the defendant
had any recourse other than to draw his knife. Ibid., p. 16a. The implication is that such
homicides were perceived as accidents for which no blame attached to the defendant rather
than as true suicides. Staunford distinguishes two fourteenth-century cases in an effort to
explain why one required pardon and forfeiture while the other did not. A defendant who
had held his knife in his hand as he lay on the ground had been acquitted while a defendant
who had remained on his feet and held a pitchfork against his assailant's charge was
pardoned. In both cases the deceased had plunged onto the weapon, but in the latter,
Staunford asserts, the defendant had other means of escape. While fourteenth-century
courts did not in fact adhere consistently to a distinction between defendants lying upon the
ground and those on their feet, it is possible that in an attempt to weigh the credibility of the
jury's testimony, the bench found the former cases more persuasive than the latter. It is also
possible that the former cases more often led to acquittals because they were easier to
assimilate to accidental homicides where parties engaged in sporting events had fallen upon
one another.
93. See e.g. JUST 3/179, m.3/l (1389); JUST 3/179, m.28d/6 (1393).
94. JUST 3/182, m.l8/6 (1395). The defendant was eventually acquitted.
95. See e.g. JUST 3/179, m.27/2 (1388); JUST 3/179, m.27/3 (1388); JUST 3/179, m.4d/2
(1390).
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This convergence of the self-defense and accident formulae came at a
moment when the law of misadventure was in ftux96 and the complaints
about professional crime were intense. The convergence offered an
opportunity for carving out a species of justifiable self-defense leading to
acquittal: only those who truly repulsed murderers would fit within the
class; less worthy "self-defenders" would continue to move through the
pardoning process, suffering forfeiture of goods and chattels. But the new
category was based upon a fiction of accidental homicide that itself
depended upon a tenuous distinction. It is impossible to determine how
well it worked in relieving true self-defenders of the strictures of the law
of excusable homicide, or even how long it persisted. The fifteenth. century rolls are too incomplete for us to judge.
It appears that within two centuries of its inception this trend toward
acquittals in cases of misadventure was reversed. In the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries the rolls once again reflect a need for pardons in
cases of accidental homicide. It is possible that one of the underlying
reasons for judicial insistence upon pardons in misadventure was the
invention and widespread distribution of firearms.97 Whether the courts
were seeking to deter negligence or to punish suspected malice is
impossible to determine, but it appears that they returned to prefourteenth-century practice and refused to acquit defendants, whether or
not the jury stated that the deceased had "slain himself."
4

The foregoing study of the late medieval law of nonfelonious homicide
has centered on the effects of jury behavior on the development of the
96. The new judicial approach to accidental homicide also caused some coroners to be in
doubt as to whether indictment was appropriate in cases of accidental homicide. The nature
and extent of the confusion, however, are difficult to trace. When a human agent was
involved, the coroner was supposed to record the suspect's name, the value of his goods,
and, if he had not taken flight, in whose custody the suspect had been placed. Unfortunately,
the extant coroners' rolls reveal very sloppy recording of the essential details so that it is
often difficult to determine whether or not the coroner recorded an indictment. Failure to
assess the suspect's goods and to note his present whereabouts does not necessarily mean
there was no indictment. Each individual enrollment must be interpreted in the light of the
entire roll. Some coroners marginated "felonia" beside their indictments, and omission of
"felonia" only in cases of misadventure almost certainly indicates failure to indict. Failure
to assess goods only in misadventures indicates that no human agent was being held
responsible. On the basis of a thorough study of the extant rolls dating from 1350 to 1422,
it is clear that treatment of misadventures was highly erratic, depending only in part on who
was coroner; some coroners followed contradictory policies in identical cases. For a review
of the extant evidence on this matter see Green, "Jury and the Law of Homicide," pp.
450-51, n. 149.
97. Ibid., p. 495, n. 299.
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substantive law. I have suggested that jury behavior in cases of simple
homicide to some extent stifled legal development. Specifically, I have
suggested that had there been a free flow of fact situations, judicial
discussion of "close cases" might have resulted in the elaboration of the
rules of self-defense and felony, singling out true self-defenders for better
treatment (acquittal without forfeiture) and producing a class of felonious
but noncapital homicide. But lacking direct evidence, it is difficult to
prove that judges were in fact influenced by jury behavior. It is always
possible, for instance, that judges were mechanically applying the rules of
self-defense and that they would have continued to do so even if juries
had acted in accordance with the formal rules of liability for homicide.
While there can be no empirical evidence about how courts would have
structured the law had juries behaved differently, there are developments
in the law of nonfelonious homicide that suggest some legal fluidity and a
judicial capacity-perhaps after consultation with the Crown-to modify
the traditional common-law rules. The courts singled out slayers of
burglars and thieves as justifiable slayers, thus eliminating for them the
requirements of pardon and forfeiture. And the courts developed the
theory by which some accidental slayers were acquitted on the ground
that they were not true slayers but merely instruments by which the
victims, through negligence, caused their own deaths.
However, in related areas the courts demonstrated considerable
reluctance to modify the substantive rules. The slaying of a would-be
murderer was not included within the class of justifiable homicide,
and, although acquittals were freely allowed in accidents resulting from
target shooting, courts were cautious in acquitting for accidental homicides stemming from fights. The pattern of relative nondevelopment in
areas where the courts were faced with facts that might suggest the
appropriateness of acquittal is as important as the pattern of fluidity and
growth. On the one hand, the law remained static just where one
might expect it to: where the defendant had been involved in a fight
for which he might have been at least in part responsible. On the other
hand, the defendant in some of these cases was under unprovoked and
deadly attack. He was resisting behavior that the law sought specifically
to deter in much the same way as were those who slew robbers and
burglars. Yet only the latter were deemed worthy of acquittal. One is
driven to ask why self-defense, especially in cases of defense against
murderous assault, resulted in the application of the full rigor of the law
of excusable homicide. The answer, at least for the fourteenth century,
cannot lie solely in the mechanical nature of judicial application of the
law. By then some self-defenders and some perpetrators of accidental
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homicide were being acquitted; others were not.9s
A second possible explanation for the courts' behavior might have been
the Crown's need for additional revenue. As long as true self-defenders
required pardons, they suffered forfeiture as well. But considering their
likely numbers, acquittal of all true self-defenders would have cost the
Crown a relatively small sum, and acquittal only of those true selfdefenders who had slain would-be murderers would have involved a still
smaller cost. 99 If the Crown could afford to acquit many of those who had
slain accidentally and most of those who had slain robbers and burglars,
it could have afforded to acquit those who had slain murderers.
The most plausible explanation for the retention of the strict rules of
self-defense was the difficulty, given the pattern of jury verdicts, of
identifying true self-defenders. But if jury findings that the defendant had
slain an attempted murderer were suspect, why were findings that he had
slain a burglar or robber not equally open to doubt? Why did the courts
treat with caution verdicts to the effect that the defendant had slain
accidentally in the course of a fight (i.e., where the defendant had stood
motionless and his assailant had hurled himself upon the defendant's
knife), while apparently giving credence to verdicts of mischance at target
shootings?
98. For a recent, useful comment on this problem see Thomas Glyn Watkin, "Hamlet and
the Law of Homicide," Law Quarterly Review, vol. 100 (1984), pp. 286-87. Watkin, who
deals with this matter only in passing, suggests that the "mere attacker, who is not a robber,
has not at the time of his demise yet committed a felony so as to place himself outside the
law." The "medieval approach was from the standpoint of the victim not the killer." This
is an important point and may speak to the early development of the law. By the fourteenth
century its claim on the juristic mind was probably much attenuated. I am not convinced
that, by that late date, those who prowled the highways waiting to ambush and slay their
victims were thought of as truly different from those who came to rob someone in his home.
Moreover, Watkin's suggestion does not seem to explain the difference between the
treatment of accidental slayers and slayers in self-defense.
99. It is impossible to determine either the number of true self-defenders or the
percentage of them who slew would-be murd·~rers. Of the 10 to 40 percent of defendants who
received verdicts of self-defense, many, perhaps most, had failed to comply with the strict
letter of the law. Of those who had complied, many had retreated from an attack launched
by a friend or neighbor after a heated argument and probably only a few from a truly
murderous assault. In any case, many defendants had no goods; others had goods but
disposed of them before trial. Moreover, the Crown could not depend on juries to assess the
full value of the defendant's goods in cases of true self-defense.
The Crown did stand to gain from forfeiture as it applied to all cases in which juries
rendered verdicts of self-defense. See Green, "Pardonable Homicide," pp. 189-90. Moreover, since most of those cases were in fact instances of felonious homicide, the rule of
forfeiture served important deterrent and punitive purposes. See below, text at n. 105. The
true self-defenders were, of course, victimized by this interaction of jury behavior and
judicial response (unless juries refused to state that the true self-defenders had goods).
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The suggestion here is that juries did not-or that judges supposed
juries did not-engage in total fabrication of the facts but built upon or
modified some core of reality. To emphasize the defendant's absence of
malice, juries were not beyond construing common fights as one-sided
attacks. They assigned to the deceased responsibility for commencing the
struggle, often alleging that he had harbored a grudge against the
defendant or had taken him by surprise. Such descriptions may have been
ritualistic assertions extended by the jury in its desire to promote the
defendant's case. Similarly, the assertion that the defendant held his knife
motionless against his attacker's reckless charge stretches the truth but a
little further than the clearly acceptable assertion that the defendant
actively fought back by striking one blow as he stood, gravely wounded,
with his back to the wall.
But it would have been quite another thing for the jury to invent a
shooting match or to place the parties in a field where they labored side by
side with sharp-edged tools that might go astray. Converting slaying
during a fight into slaying to prevent a burglary may have demanded more
distortion than the jury was prepared to countenance. After all, in many
cases the true facts would have been known to many individuals not
sitting on the jury. Reducing complicated facts to particular forms that did
"justice" might not have engendered popular disapproval; complete
transformation of the facts might have. Moreover, although we cannot be
certain about the nature of medieval trials, it is possible that in many
cases the defendant told his story first and that the jury repeated, or built
upon, his statement. 1oo While the defendant doubtless sought to put the
best possible face upon the basic fact that he had slain in the course of a
fight, he may out of prudence have stopped short of attempting to achieve
acquittal through a total invention.
The fact that the bench countenanced some change within the area of
nonfelonious homicide, and that rational explanations are available for
areas in which the court was reluctant to mandate change, does not,
however, prove the proposition that, other things being equal, the bench
would have been willing either to modify the outer limits of nonfelonious
self-defense or to create an intermediate category of non capital felonious
homicide. Either of those changes would have meant shifting the line
between life and death rather than between acquittal and pardon. It is at
least possible that even had juries behaved differently, the legal definition
of capital homicide would have remained unchanged-that if all perpetrators of felonious homicide had been convicted of that crime, they would
all have been hanged.
100. See ibid., p. 433 text at nn. 76-77.
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Moreover, even if it is assumed arguendo that judicial confrontation of
close cases might have resulted in the elaboration of the law of felonious
homicide and self-defense, it must be conceded that such a development
could have occurred without a body of close cases. Judges must have
been aware that many homicides resulted from brawls that defendants
had freely joined and that juries systematically concealed this aspect of
the defendant's behavior. The judges could have redefined felonious
homicide to secure justice, to induce different jury behavior, or both. Yet
they did not do so. Systematic nullification of the formal rules of felonious
homicide continued for perhaps two centuries or more.J0 1 Why did the
Crown not seek to end such nullification by changing the formal rules? To
answer this question we must consider once again the development of the
administration of the criminal law.

IV
By way of conclusion to Part I, we should attempt to bring together the
main themes of these first chapters, to put the problem of the law-finding
jury in perspective, and to speculate on the role that rule and sanction
nullification played in the larger world of criminal justice. In doing so,
however, we must not exaggerate the degree to which any single aspect of
the administration of the criminal law was shaped by conscious choice.
The history of the English criminal trial jury has its origins in the
twelfth-century transformation of the criminal law .102 This transformation, which represented an evolutionary development about which we
know very little, involved a shift from a more or less private to a more or
less public criminal law and a shift from monetary composition between
private parties to capital punishment at the hands of the Crown. In theory,
neither development required the use of juries, grand or petty. In
practice, Henry II, either through improvisation or through elaboration of
an existing institution, resorted to presentment by a jury oflaymen. It was
a short step to the employment of the trial or petty jury, though had the
church not opposed the use of the ordeal, that step might not have been
taken. The Crown's recourse to the trial jury suggests an acceptance of
deep-seated social attitudes, an awareness of profound administrative
weakness, and a sure instinct about how to make things work. It is
impossible to say how these elements were related causally, if indeed they
101. There is strong evidence of jury manipulation of facts for the period 1250-1430. The
rolls for the period 1430-1550 are too sparse for analysis; thereafter, it appears that juries
infrequently returned verdicts of self-defense. See ibid., p. 493. While there is reason to
believe the new pattern of jury verdicts began before 1550, the date of the change cannot be
determined. See below, Chapter 4, text at n. 69.
102. See above, Chapter l, section I.
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were distinct. Probably we ought to understand them as different aspects
of the same relationship between ideas and institutions.
The juries, both grand and petty, were bound to play a crucial role.
They made possible the implementation (though only on a selective basis)
of a royal and capital law of felony precisely because they were of the
community rather than of officialdom. From the very outset there must
have been a great deal of discretion in the functioning of presentment
juries; certainly the trialjury, which reached decisions concerning life and
death, made broad-based assessments of just deserts.
Unfortunately we know very little about the administration of the
criminal law in the pre-trial-jury period. Specifically we do not know
whether the jury behavior that we can ascertain was anticipated in earlier
procedures. Until we know a great deal more about the assumptions the
Crown and royal officials made concerning lay participation, we cannot
really address the problem of the purpose of the jury. As a result, we can
only describe how the system of criminal justice functioned and assess
official response in the period for which we do have evidence, reconciling
ourselves to the fact that for the most interesting questions we do not yet
have answers.
Our primary observation has been that the trial jury mitigated much of
the harshness of the new system of criminal justice. Given its institutional
setting and powers, the trialjury was able to impose upon the new, formal
royal process the traditional attitudes that had predominated in the
criminal law during its earlier, private phase. This phenomenon is
traceable in homicide, where one would expect it to occur with greatest
frequency, but it doubtless affected all areas of crime to greater or lesser
degree. The substantive law was harsher than social conditions and
attitudes would allow. Moreover, juries were forced to make decisions
about individuals partially on the basis of the reputation of those
individuals in the community. Fact-finding involved an assessment of
personal worth: Was the suspect the sort of person likely to have
committed a certain act with malice? And almost inevitably trial jury
verdicts came to be judgments about who ought to live and who ought to
die, not merely determinations regarding who did what to whom and with
what intent. 103
The official response to jury law-finding is very difficult to reconstruct.
We have seen that officials were likely to be most concerned with the
bribing of juries, with extortionate practices, with intimidation by suspects and their associates. Moreover, the attention of officials was drawn
to the most serious cases. Jury behavior in simple homicide and casual
103. See Pugh's remarks on this subject in "Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," p.
98.
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theft was to some extent concealed from view. Presentment of the
innocent and lack of substantial evidence were all too common for judges
to be certain that a given acquittal was not, strictly speaking, merited by
the rules of the law. Finally, the bench must have been aware that juries
were toughest on the worst offenders, that they made distinctions-both
when they convicted and when they nullified either the rule or the
sanction in the less serious cases-that corresponded to widely held
attitudes.
Jury law-finding, then, was only one aspect of jury deviation from legal
rules. It reflected disagreement with those rules but not necessarily a
corruption of legitimate legal process. Although it also reflected the
Crown's incapacity to achieve enforcement of the law, other aspects of
jury behavior did so much more dramatically. Moreover, it was an aspect
of jury behavior that the bench and Crown could accommodate, for it
could be understood as an appropriate extension of mercy in individual
cases. 104
At the same time, jury nullification, particularly in homicide, involved
some costs, for it slowed development of the law and induced the bench
to deal too circumspectly with some cases meriting generous treatment.
The true self-defender suffered most. Those true self-defenders who had
slain in the course of resisting burglary or robbery were assured of full
acquittal without the pardon requirement only after the middle of the
fourteenth century. This seems especially ironic given the bench's
concern with professional crime. Even in the very late fourteenth
century, when officialdom was attempting to deal with those who committed homicide through ambush by removing eligibility for pardons of
grace, slayers of such offenders still required pardons. Thus jury resistance to the fuH reach of the capital law of felony interfered, albeit
indirectly, with the judicial attack on the truly pressing problems of the
criminal law.
The law of sanctions and the criminal trial jury interacted to produce a
substantial distortion in the legal process. In the law of homicide, a large
and mainly false category of self-defense was employed as a catchall for
less serious forms of homicide. Pretrial incarceration, the strains of
standing trial, remand to await pardon, and the forfeiture of goods became
the de facto sanctions for what a later age called "manslaughter."
Acquittal was probably accorded some true self-defenders, though probably not most. The Crown maintained the substantive legal rules and the
institutional structure despite this quite obvious distortion. It did so at the
104. See ibid., p. 9, for the suggestion that in the late thirteenth century the bench showed
compassion toward some "imprisoned or fined for appeals which failed," releasing them
"for their poverty." This "compassion may have infected jurors."
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risk of increasing difficulties in confronting serious crime. Why, we must
ask, should this have been so? Why did the Crown not introduce a lesser
offense corresponding to simple homicide, or casual theft, for which
imprisonment and/or a fine would be the penalty, thereby singling out the
worst offenders for capital punishment and the true self-defenders for
pardon without forfeiture, and removing the aura of suspicion that
attended slayers in self-defense against thieves and ambushers?
In one sense, of course, perpetrators of simple homicides who were
alleged to be self-defenders were fined. At least after 1343, all of them
were supposed to suffer forfeiture even though they received pardons.
Indeed, the rule of automatic forfeiture, which penalized the true selfdefenders as well, may have been a belated response to juries' handling of
simple homicide.tos In another sense, some thieves and some felonious

105. Maitland ascribes the new rule to royal desire for revenue generally:

So far as we can see, the homicide who obtained a pardon on the score of
misadventure or self-defence (unless he had fled on account of his deed), did not in
Henry Ill.' s time incur that forfeiture of his chattels which was inflicted upon him in
after days. But very often he had fled, and this, so it seems to us, may have enabled
our ever needy kings to establish forfeiture as a general accompaniment of the
"pardon of course." [History of English Law, 2:481].
I suspect, but cannot prove, that the bench was influenced by the frequent recourse of juries
to a verdict of self-defense. The new rule of forfeiture also affected misadventure, but, as we
have seen, judges began to acquit accidental slayers, except where they suspected
misadventure verdicts concealed simple homicides.
There is, howe~er, another explanation, which the bench itself gave as early as 1347. A
Year Book entry of that year noted that the Statute of Gloucester, Stat. 6 Edw. I, c. 9 (1278),
authorized a pardon for cases of accident and self-defense but said nothing about saving the
defendant his goods. Year Book (Edward III) Hi!., 21 Edw. 3, fol. 17, pl. 23 (1347). In fact,
the Statute of Gloucester dealt with procedures for the granting of writs of inquest into cases
of homicide. See Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 281; Pollock and Maitland,
History of English Law, 2:481. It therefore provided no occasion for dealing with the matter
of forfeiture.
The same Year Book entry reveals an important misconception of the Statute of
Marlborough, Stat. 52 Hen. 3, c. 26 (1267). That statute decreed that the murdrum fine (the
fine imposed upon a hundred for an unexplained homicide) was not to be levied in cases of
misadventure. The murdrum fine was abolished altogether in 1340, perhaps some decades
after it had fallen into disuse. The bench in 1347 read the Statute of Marlborough to say that
misadventure was no longer to be treated as "murder," in the substantive sense of felonious
homicide. Due to this misreading, the judges concluded that pardons de cursu in accident
and presumably self-defense cases were of relatively recent vintage (1267), and that the
procedure in such cases had been developed soon after by the Statute of Gloucester (1278).
Since neither statute dispensed with the rule of forfeiture, which applied in all cases of
felonious homicide, the judges' conclusion that forfeiture applied to all of the "new"
excusable homicides is understandable. For a discussion of these erroneous statutory
constructions and subsequent commentary upon them, see Pollock and Maitland, History of
English Law, 2:481-82.
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slayers could avoid prosecution by paying a ''fine'' -the cost of a pardon
of grace: money in normal times, forty days of service in time of war.
Between these two provisions, many thieves and felonious slayers
suffered a penalty even if they were not prosecuted or, in the case of the
former, were prosecuted but avoided conviction through securing a verdict
of self-defense.
There were advantages to the system as it worked in practice. The
retention of a general capital sanction in felony meant that many slayers
and thieves sought a pardon of grace from the Crown. Even those who
had committed the less serious forms of these offenses may not have
trusted their lives to juries and, instead, immunized themselves from
prosecution. They turned themselves in, relieving central and local
officials of some of the overwhelming burden under which they worked.
Fewer suspects had to be taken, incarcerated, and tried. The threat of
execution, in short, automatically acted as a dragnet.
Moreover, the pardon power gave the Crown considerable control over
the destiny of many subjects. Recipients of pardons of grace were direct
beneficiaries of royal largesse. Whether the Crown exacted military
service or money, or nothing at all, the pardoned offender owed his life to
the king.J06 This was also true, though in an attenuated form, if the
offender stood trial. If he was acquitted or was granted a verdict of
excusable homicide and a pardon de cursu, he stood as the beneficiary
both of his peers and of the Crown. Of course, the open availability of
pardons of grace may have increased jury leniency, and judicial toleration
of jury leniency may have increased the number of offenders who put
their lives on the country. This, in turn, must have diminished the
numbers who sought refuge in the Crown. Indeed, as it operated in
practice, the system probably tended to drive into Chancery seeking
pardons of grace a disproportionately large number of the most serious
offenders, i.e., those whom juries were far more likely to convict, and
tended instead to encourage lesser offenders to stand trial. If so, this
unintended result must have made enforcement of the statutes limiting the
royal power to pardon all the more imperative. The advantages of the
system were intimately connected with its disadvantages. If the pardon
While the judicial misreadings of earlier statutes are understandable, there remains the
question of what occasioned judicial inquiry into the problem of forfeiture in excusable
homicide. Maitland's suggestion regarding the need for revenue and my own related
suggestion regarding jury behavior in cases that otherwise would clearly have led to
forfeiture must remain tentative. In any case, my analysis of the effect of the rule once it had
been propounded does not depend upon my suggestion regarding the motivation of the
bench in 1347.
106. For discussion of this theme as it relates to the use of pardons and other forms of
mitigation in the eighteenth century see below, Chapter 7.
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power was a source of strength-and certainly it was-it was also
productive of substantial weakness.
In any case, casual theft and everyday brawling (with the inevitable
ensuing deaths) could not be ended altogether by formal legal rules.
Indeed, from the perspective of the Crown and bench, a moderation of the
law might only have made matters worse. The adoption of a lesser
sanction for simple homicide and lesser forms of theft might have seemed
to condone jury attitudes and thereby resulted in their amplification. Or it
might have produced more convictions only at the expense of encouraging already endemic physical violence. In short, by adhering at least in
theory to the strictest rules of criminal liability-by posing what might
have been thought to be the greatest threat to the greatest number-the
Crown might well have believed that its approach to homicide and theft
represented at least a modest deterrent, one that also produced an
important source of deference, money, and military service.
On balance, then, it is not surprising that the Crown and bench
accommodated themselves to jury leniency. Serious offenders were the
real enemy, and so long as juries were relatively harsh in dealing with
them the Crown's incapacity to enforce the legal rules against less serious
offenders was not fatal to the administration of the criminal law. The
bribing and intimidation of jurors by professional criminals posed a far
greater threat to the system. Moreover, although jury-based nullification
in casual theft and simple homicide both slowed the development of
substantive rules designed to deal with serious offenders and established
a tradition of community participation that would sometime be difficult to
control, it also served dramatically to advertise the merciful quality of
royal justice.

Part II

Transformations

4

The Transformation
of Jury Trial in
Early Modern England

The extensive powers of the medieval criminal trialjury resulted not from
legal theory but from social and institutional circumstances. The jury
helped the royal administration of criminal law to function, perhaps even
alleviated tensions that might have brought it to a halt, by exercising its
mediatory powers in two distinct but related ways. In individual cases,
juries prevented the imposition of sanctions they deemed too harsh in
light of the defendant's behavior, reputation, or the hardship he had
already suffered. More generally, and as the result of its role in individual
cases, the jury reflected the interests of the local community as opposed
to those of central authorities. The Crown required the jury to play a role
the royal bureaucracy was as yet unprepared to undertake-the gathering
of evidence; this, in turn, enhanced the jury's power to render verdicts
that both blunted royal power and made what power there was relatively
palatable.
The stronger central institutions became, the less they required of
juries, either as substitute bureaucrats or as political mediators. Indeed,
the stronger the position of central government, the more it was bound to
regard the jury as part of the problem rather than as a solution. By the
Tudor period, jury-based nonenforcement of the rules of law seemed less
often a political and social necessity and more often an affront to justice.
The question remained: How far would the government go in its purification of the jury? Would an attack on embracery and similar perversions of
justice suffice, or would the government attempt to remove the jury's
power to reflect a different notion of justice on the merits of a given case
than that embodied in formal rules?
Very little is as yet known about the institution of the trial jury in Tudor
and Stuart England, about governmental policy toward juries, or about
the vicissitudes of jury power. Much of what we do know we infer from
the broader history of criminal law in the period. A virtual revolution was
under way from the mid-fifteenth century, if not earlier, which had the
effect of reducing the power of the trial jury and placed greater power in
the hands of the bench. Although there is uncertainty about the reasons
for this transformation in the criminal law, the institutional developments
are unmistakable. The jury ceased during the later Middle Ages to be a
(mainly) self-informing institution. Although the process by which this
105
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occurred and the corollary emergence of the prosecution are largely
hidden from our view, the later stages of prosecutorial development in the
second half of the sixteenth century are visible. Crown officials then took
increasing responsibility for the initiation and prosecution of criminal
cases and for the management of the trial itself. The effects of these
changes upon the jury were substantial. For one thing, the government
sometimes used great art in persuading juries of the defendant's guilt;
perhaps more significantly, the jury lacked the means to manipulate the
evidence, to suppress whatever might give the lie to the way it chose to
view the facts. Moreover, perhaps as a result of these changes, the bench
brought pressure to bear upon some juries that acquitted in the face of
inculpatory evidence, binding them over to appear before Star Chamber
or even fining and imprisoning them directly.
The government applied the most pressure-took the greatest pains to
persuade-where its interest was greatest. In a succession of well-known
state trials, mainly for treason, the Tudor and Stuart monarchs pressed
their advantage to the fullest. Juries in these cases were probably chosen
for their presumed loyalty and were discouraged from disappointing royal
expectations. This is not to say that state trials invariably, or even often,
ended in the sacrifice of the innocent but that the government tried to
avoid the acquittal of the guilty through either mismanagement of the
prosecution or an excess of mercy.
Yet there is reason to doubt that the state trials accurately reflect
criminal procedure in the routine felony cases, which the Crown lacked
both the interest and the capacity to manage. Although in particularly
serious cases of homicide or theft the bench might take a special interest,
pressing its view strongly upon the jury, in a far larger number of cases
the bench actively questioned the defendant and revealed its point of view
but left the jury to reach its own conclusion. To be sure, the mere fact of
a prosecution-pretrial examinations available to be read in court,
witnesses ready to testify for the Crown-must have made some difference. But in routine cases the jury's traditional role was never expressly
repudiated. Though usually closely guided by the bench, the jury was
allowed to weigh all the evidence in light of both the defendant's
reputation and bearing and its own conception of his just deserts.
The direct and indirect changes in the administration of the criminal law
in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century produced a pattern of
verdicts that differed from its medieval counterpart. The new pattern,
which scholars are only now beginning to sketch out in detail, may
usefully be summarized at this point. The overall percentage of convictions at assizes was strikingly higher than in the later Middle Ages. This
was true both in homicide and in theft. The former offense came to be
divided in the late sixteenth century into murder, which was capital, and

The Transformation of Jury Trial in Early Modern England

107

manslaughter, which was not unless it was the second such offense. The
conviction rates were relatively high for both. The crime of theft remained
divided into burglary and robbery, for which conviction was very
common, and grand larceny, for which conviction was far less common.
Many of those indicted for grand larceny were, by virtue of the jury's
undervaluation of the goods stolen or their own plea of guilty to a lesser
offense, convicted of petty larceny, which was not capital, just as some of
those indicted for murder were mercifully convicted of manslaughter.
Convictions were high in those capital felonies that had long been viewed
as particularly heinous and in those noncapital offenses that had come to
serve as catchalls much as self-defense had served in earlier times. This
series of changes in case outcomes resulted in part from the new divisions
between capital and noncapital offenses and in part from the pressures
that officials were able to bring to bear in the wake of changes in the
administration of criminal law. Still other outcomes reflected age-old
social attitudes that authorities were either unable or unwilling to resist.
At some points, there was conflict between judge and jury; at others,
authorities acquiesced in traditional jury practices, or even encouraged
those practices.
The developments of the early modern period, then, mark only a partial
revolution in criminal process. Moreover, the changes made for little
difference in most cases, though they made for a dramatic difference in
cases where the Crown or the bench used the new tools to the fullest. A
new judge-jury relationship was emerging, but the old habits of thought
and behavior survived, leaving the implications of the developing law
obscured. How far the Crown had gone, in at least some cases, toward
reversing the old, de facto order of things is evident from the attack
launched on the judiciary during the Interregnum by those proclaiming
the jury's right to find the law. This attack the Cromwellian regime
disdainfully brushed aside; neither would the restored Stuart monarchy
concede such a right to the jury. How well, on the other hand, the
medieval ethic of the jury's right to find the facts according to its own
conscience survived is evident in the judiciary's concession in 1671 of the
principle of noncoercion. The rhetoric of the jury right, the law of
noncoercion, and their fusion in some legal literature toward the end of
the seventeenth century are the subjects of the two following chapters of
this middle section. These chapters analyze the unofficial and official legal
writings from the years 1640-89 that established the ideology of the jury
right.
Before turning to these writers and their discussion of the history and
role of the trial jury, we shall, in the present chapter, survey the evolution
of criminal procedure in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.
This interpretive and necessarily selective overview is divided into four
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sections. The first deals with the major changes in the administration of
the criminal law and how they came about. The second analyzes some
effects of the new criminal procedure on the substantive criminal law. The
third discusses the impact of these procedural and substantive developments on the trial and on the role of the jury. The final section examines
the relationship between the problems of the administration of the criminal
law generally and the bench's handling of individual cases, specifically the
role that the bench found it convenient for juries to play. I suggest that
although this period saw a significant shift in courtroom power from the
jury to the judge, the jury continued in many routine cases to function in
a manner that provided a credible basis for many of the arguments of later
pro-jury writers.

I
The most important changes in early modern criminal procedure were
the decline of the self-informing jury and the development of the prosecution.1 Which of these two developments came first is not known. The link
between them is a problem of the greatest importance and may provide
some hint regarding the origin of modern criminal procedure.
As we have seen, the medieval jury was presumed to know something
of the events underlying the cases it heard. 2 Doubtless it often knew a
very great deal-or at least some of its members did. Before the middle of
the fourteenth century, petty jurors were sometimes among the presenters who promoted the case from the start. In the case of homicide, some
who served on the inquest jury subsequently served on the petty jury or
spoke of the case to those who did. We have seen also that the discourse
between the judge and the defendant may have influenced the jury in
some cases. But the job of the bench was far from easy, for aside from
what the trial jury reported there was in the formulistic indictments little
1. I am grateful to Professor James S. Cockburn for allowing me to cite and comment
upon a typescript version of his forthcoming book, the Introduction to his multi-volume
edition of Calendar of Assize Records: Home Circuit Indictments, Elizabeth I and James I
(London, 1975-82). I have incorporated chapter and subsection references to Professor
Cockburn's forthcoming book (hereafter cited as Cockburn, Introduction) alongside references to his earlier works that convey similar information. Where his Introduction modifies
his earlier work I have so noted. Though it deals only with the Home Circuit, Professor
Cockburn's detailed study will, upon publication, stand as the most comprehensive account
of procedure at late-sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century assizes. My own (largely
derivative) account of trial procedure, the text of which was completed before I had access
to Professor Cockburn's Introduction, serves as a framework for my synthetic and
interpretive essay on the impact of the major procedural changes. My commentary on the
differences between Professor Cockburn's conclusions and my own is below, n. 179.
2. For discussion of details in this paragraph see above, Chapter I.
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evidence about the crimes charged. A clever and steely defendant was not
easily gotten round.
By the mid-sixteenth century the situation was very different. There
were several sources of information to which the jurors were exposed
after they had been sworn. Much of this information resulted from pretrial
activity undertaken by the justices of the peace, in accordance with duties
set forth in the Marian bail and committal statutes.3 The information was
also available for the use of assize clerks, clerks of the peace, and the
bench. 4 In two steps, taken in two consecutive years, the traditional but
intermittent investigatory activities of the justices were regularized and
significantly elaborated. The Marian statutes mandated practices that for
a century or more had served to inform grand jurors and that probably
also established a public version of the facts that came to the attention of
prospective trial jurors.
The first step in this process, and possibly the only step that the Crown
intended at the outset, was the Marian bail statute of 1554, which
tightened the procedure for the granting of bail. To remedy abuses that
had frustrated the assize courts in their attempts to try suspected felons,
the statute ordered that the justices granting bail examine the prisoner and
"them that bring him" and send the results of the examination, in writing,
to the judges at the next gaol delivery. 5 The assize courts would then be
in a position to monitor bail procedure. They would, as Langbein states it,
3. Stat. 1 and 2 Philip and Mary, c. 13 (1554--55); Stat. 2 and 3 Philip and Mary, c. 10
(1555). See John H. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance (Cambridge, Mass.,
1974), Appendix A and Part I, "The Marian Statutes"; John H. Langbein, "The Origins of
Public Prosecution at Common Law," American Journal of Legal History, vol. 17 (1973),
pp. 315-24.

4. For an important discussion of the practice regarding use of depositions generated by
the Marian statutes, see James S. Cockburn, "Trial by the Book? Fact and Theory in the
Criminal Process, 1558-1625," in J. H. Baker, ed., Legal Records and the Historian
(London, 1978), pp. 69 et seq. Cockburn argues that most of the "orchestration" at trial was
done by the assize clerks. Justices were frequently not present; their indictments underwent
some significant changes. In the present treatment, I assume that witnesses were in fact
bound over and that some check on them-or prompting of them-was possible through the
use of the examinations provided by the justices of the peace. See Cockburn, Introduction,
ch. viii, sect. iii. Cockburn ("Trial by the Book?" p. 69) concedes the role of the justice of
the peace down to the time of the trial. Orchestration at the trial by the assize clerks and
bench is fully consistent with the views expressed here. See also Inner Temple Petyt MS
511113, fol. 69. And see John H. Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedure at Common Law,"
in James S. Cockburn, ed., Crime in England, 1550-1800 (Princeton, N.J., 1977), p. 16, for
a synthesis of the views of Langbein and Cockburn.
5. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime, pp. 10--11; Langbein, "Origins of Public Prosecution,"
pp. 320--21. See also Langbein, Prosecuting Crime, p. 6, for discussion of an earlier (1487)
attempt to deal with the problem of bailing by justices of the peace.
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have a basis for reviewing the propriety of the bailment in any case in
which the accused had turned fugitive and the issue now was whether
to discipline the bailing JPs. But when the accused was going to be
gaoled, not bailed, there was no danger that he might not appear to
stand trial. 6
In the latter case there was no requirement that the justices of the peace
make an examination. The bail statute was not concerned with procedure
at trials of those held without bail-the most serious cases-and had only
indirect and unintended effect on trials of those who had been bailed. For
this latter group, the depositions that had been produced to defend the
bailment might then have been used in court, though there is nothing in
the statute to suggest that either Crown or Parliament had this in mind.
The bail statute appears, in short, to have dealt solely with the problem of
bail.
Within a year, Parliament passed a second statute, the so-called
committal statute, dealing with pretrial procedures conducted by the
justices of the peace. This statute extended the examination and deposition procedures to cases in which suspects were held without bail.
Moreover, it ordered the justices to bind over witnesses to appear at trial
and to give evidence against the accused. The committal statute, it has
been argued, "turned the pretrial investigation.. into a device for the
production of prosecution evidence at trial in every case of felony in the
realm. " 7 The statute ensured the appearance, where it could be had, of a
private prosecutor. In theory, a private prosecutor was necessary in
every case; in practice, an official might play the role ofprosecutor.s The
prosecutor and any other witnesses who had been bound over gave their
evidence in open court, where they might be prompted by, or examined
in the light of, their pretrial depositions. Although the written depositions
were not given under oath and thus were not binding as such, they were
useful in coordinating and sustaining the case for the prosecution.9 In
many if not all felony trials, the jury witnessed a rigorous testing of the
defendant's story. No longer could the defendant tell an elaborate tale and
then reply to all skeptical queries with mere repetitions of his side of the
case. The judge was now armed with evidence that he could use to
challenge the accused's statements. More effectively than in the past, the
6. Langbein, "Origins of Public Prosecution," p. 321.
7. Idem.
8. Ibid., pp. 317-18.
9. For an analysis of the assize clerks' treatment of pretrial evidence see James S.
Cockburn, "Early-Modem Assize Records as Historical Evidence," Journal of the Society
of Archivists, vol. 5 (1975), pp. 229-31. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. viii, sect. iii.
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bench could sum up the evidence, comment upon the defendant's story,
and leave the jury in little doubt regarding its view of the case. 10
These developments in criminal procedure have the deceptive look and
feel of carefully planned Tudor governmental machinery. Until recently,
the Marian statutes were regarded as an imitation of Continental criminal
process, part of a program to make English criminal procedure more
efficient and effective. 11 That view is no longer tenable. The procedure
which the statutes mandated differed crucially from Continental procedure.12 The all-important committal statute appears to have been something of an afterthought, drafted hastily and with the bail statute as its
model,B and both the bail and committal statutes may only have made
mandatory investigatory practices that were already common among the
justices of the peace. 14 If the examination and binding over of witnesses
did not begin with the Marian statutes, when and why did they begin?
Were they nonetheless a tool of Tudor or pre-Tudor statecraft? There is
as yet no answer to these questions, but we may consider some tentative
hypotheses.
The role of the justice of the peace in the prosecution appears to have
been a natural evolution that took place over a century or more. 15 We
have seen that the justices were an active part of criminal administration
from the middle of the fourteenth century . 16 Their duties ranged widely,
from arresting persons suspected of the most trivial offenses and releasing
them on recognizances for their good behavior, to trying felons at quarter
sessions, and even to condemning convicted felons to death.J7 From these
duties grew the justices' capacity as prosecutors. To their duty to arrest
10. For a contemporary account of a felony trial see Thomas Smith, De Republica
Anglorum, Mary Dewar, ed. (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 110-16. [The original edition was
published in 1583; the work was written in the period 1562-65 (ibid., p. 1). I have left
quotations from Smith in the original, as given by Dewar.] Smith must be used with care; on
this point, however, his account is probably trustworthy. For a discussion of routine felony
trials see below, section III.
11. Holdsworth, History of English Law, 4:528-29.
12. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime, Part I. See esp. pp. 21-33. The central difference was
that the English deposition was not given under oath and was not an instrument of record.
13. Ibid., pp. 61-62; Langbein, "Origins of Public Prosecution," p. 322.
14. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime, pp. 79-93.
15. Langbein, "Origins of Public Prosecution," pp. 319-20. Although my account leans
heavily on Langbein's work, in this and the following several paragraphs I draw conclusions
(by way of speculation) that Langbein does not draw and for which his work bears no
responsibility. Professor Robert L. Woods, Jr., is presently completing an important study
of the early Tudor justices of the peace which promises to expand our knowledge in this area
substantially. I am grateful to Professor Woods for his comments on this section of this
chapter.
16. See above, Chapter 1, text at nn. 84-86.
17. Putnam, Proceedings before Justices of the Peace, pp. xix-xxxv.
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persons on susp1c10n was added the power to examine suspects and
witnesses. 1s From keepers of the peace (with powers of arrest) to justices
of the peace (with summary powers of conviction in minor offenses) was
a dramatic step. To dislodge the local constables as law officers was one
thing; to become a part of the English judiciary was quite another. What
may have made this step possible was that the keepers' powers to hold or
release suspected persons were so great that they inevitably involved
investigation and judgment. The distinction between release on bond and
release after summary conviction and payment of fine must at some point
have become negligible, for the bond itself might be set in accordance
with the quantum of evidence produced against the suspect and the
seriousness of the act with which he had been charged. 19
It was natural for the justices to examine suspects in cases in which
they were bound to render judgment, whether technically a legal "judgment" or something closer to an administrative decision. It was also
natural for them to examine in cases on which they or some other, higher
judge would sit pursuant to a grand jury's accusation. Thus, having grown
accustomed to examining those accused of disturbances of the peace, the
justices may have treated in similar fashion those suspected of treason,
theft, or homicide, whom they were to bind over pending the action of a
grand jury. It is possible that such investigatory action was commenced
primarily in order to secure an indictment rather than to gather evidence
for the trial itself. Inevitably, information that led to an indictment would
subsequently be held over for use at trial. Thus, during two centuries of
English criminal administration largely hidden from our view there were
three critical, and probably connected, developments: the justices of the
peace began to investigate, perhaps even to act as prosecutors; the grand
jury underwent its metamorphosis from active presenter to passive
indictor; and the trial jury began to receive most of its evidence at the trial
itself.
All of these developments represented a kind of internal institutional
growth, but at least indirectly they were also responses to external
pressures. The expansion ofthe duties of the justices of the peace was, as
we have seen, 20 a governmental response to social and economic problems of the later Middle Ages. Some of those duties, including the power
to examine, were fashioned specifically to deal with the criminal activity
that such problems produced. In this sense, the transformation of the
18. Langbein, "Origins of Public Prosecution," p. 319.
19. See Harding, "The Origin and Early History of the Keeper of the Peace," pp. 102-9,
for a fuller discussion. Harding stresses the keepers' role in receiving, and ultimately
judging, complaints of trespass.
20. See above, Chapter 1, section III.
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criminal process was partly the result of governmental action. It is
difficult to show, however, that in other than this sense the justice of the
peace as prosecutor was a creature of governmental conception or
mandate.
The social changes that created the need for the justices may also have
helped to shape their specific responsibilities. Both the jury of presentment and the self-informing trial jury were by-products of the society
whose decline the justices were supposed to halt. Those institutions
presumed a stationary population; their capacities might be outstripped
by more than modest levels of crime. The increase of serious crime,
especially that perpetrated by roving gangs or by persons from afar, must
have revealed the limitations of the two juries ;2 1 the at least partial default
of these essentially local institutions left the population without the
protection it required. A vacuum from "below" drew the justices in at the
same time that the need to produce indicted and convictable persons
before commissioners of oyer and terminer constituted pressures from
"above." Moreover, the pressures from below were more direct and
suggested the very nature of the remedy: the justices must see to it that
juries were informed.
The origins of early modern trial practice are therefore more ancient
and more complex than the most visible agents of change, the Marian bail
and committal statutes, suggest. Nevertheless, the Tudors knew a useful
institution when they saw one, and they were responsible for the
crystallization of prosecutorial practice. For the transformation of trial
procedure paralleled-perhaps touched-several interrelated developments that are commonly associated with early Tudor government.
Although these developments do not explain the emergence of the
prosecution, or provide evidence of its pre-Marian stages, they help us to
understand the nature of the terrain in which the justices came to function
as quasi-prosecutors.
The early Tudors sought to ensure the stability of their monarchy
through making existing institutions work as they were in theory supposed to work. They employed the Council and the court of Star Chamber
to monitor the actions of royal officials and to root out the abuse of official
institutions.22 Tudor efforts to purify jury process follow this pattern.23 By
subjecting to investigation and judgment not only persons believed to
have tampered with jurors but jurors themselves-in some cases entire
juries-the Crown opened an important avenue to royal control of trial
proceedings. For the moment, the object of Star Chamber interest was the
21. See above, Chapter 3, text at n. 9.
22. See J. A. Guy, The Cardinal's. Court (Sussex, 1973), pp. 30-31, 52-53,63-64.
23. Ibid., pp. 61-63, 137.
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true malefactor: the person who obviously abused the juror's oath to
render a verdict according to conscience. Unlawful pressures and inducements were alleged and proved: obstruction of the law, not unlawful "lawfinding," was the most common charge against jurors in the early
sixteenth century. 24
Throughout the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, Parliament
sought in a more traditional manner to render juries impervious to the
political pressures that local magnates might bring to bear on behalf of
their retainers. A series of statutes continued and attempted better
enforcement of property qualifications for prospective trial jurors.zs To
the extent these were enforced, they must have in the great majority of
cases separated jurors and defendant both by class and by neighborhood
and thus exacerbated the problems that social mobility and professional
crime created for effective operation of the self-informing jury. The
statutes effectively reduced the pool of eligible jurors, concentrating it
within a class many of whose members did not desire to serve and found
means to avoid doing so.Z6 It is possible that this particular governmental
strategy hastened the day when resort to whomever bailiffs could find on
assize days regardless of station (the tales de circumstantibus) became, if
not the rule, something more than the exception.27
Still, it would be wrong to conclude that the vitality of the concept of
trial by the country was weakened to the point that the very existence of
24. See below, n. 149 and accompanying text for discussion of cases in Star Chamber.
One early statute relating to the Welsh Marches [Stat. 26 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1534)] dealt with
punishment for pe!jury. It mandated fines for verdicts against "good and pregnant
evidence," but it seems to presume subornation of pe!jury or browbeating of jurors by
friends or relatives of the accused: "[D]ivers murderers, friends and kinfolk to such
offenders have ... suborned [jurors] to acquit [offenders]." See also G. R. Elton, Policy and
Police: The Enforcement of the Reformation in the Age of Cromwell (Cambridge, 1972), pp.
310 et seq. Elton's discussion leaves open the possibility that jurors were punished merely
for being too merciful, but seems to indicate that true pe!jury was almost always at issue.
Elton's analysis of jury decision making is perhaps the most interesting "inside" look in the
literature.
25. For statutes relating to criminal trial jurors, see e.g. Stat. 2 Hen. 5, st. 2, c. 3 (1414):
lands or tenements of an annual value of 40 shillings; Stat. 23 Hen. 8, c. 13 (1531): in trials
of murder and felony in cities and towns,jurors shall have forty pounds (suspending freehold
requirement to prevent constant challenges on basis of previous statutes and substituting
total worth requirement). For a complete listing of statutes, 1225-1730, see James C.
Oldham, "The Origins of the Special Jury," University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 50
(1983), Appendix, pp. 214-21.
26. James S. Cockburn, A History of English Assizes (Cambridge, 1972), p. 118. See
Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi, sect. i.
27. Cockburn, History of English Assizes, p. 118. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi,
sect. i. See Stats. 4 and 5 Philip and Mary, c. 7 (1557-58) and 14 Eliz., c. 9 (1572) for
extensions of the use of the tales to criminal cases.
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the institution was brought into question. Rather, the unquestioned right
to trial by peers underlay the urgency of the reform measures; abolition
was not a live issue. There were doubts in some circles about the
effectiveness of the institution of the trial jury but not about the need for
its continued use. 28 Early sixteenth-century judges were not unmindful
that the jury shielded them from a role they had little desire to play. 29 A
century and a half later even so powerful a figure as Sir Matthew Hale
conceded that rendering verdicts on the facts was an awesome responsibility that the bench should not be anxious to shoulder. 30
The sanctity of the trial jury was revealed in yet another way. Charges
of subornation of jurors had been leveled at grand juries as well as at trial
juries. With the development of the indictment process, control over the
grand jury was greatly increased, for royal officials were no longer at the
mercy of the hundredors' selective memories. In turn, increased royal
control of indictment helped make possible the mid-sixteenth-century
changes that increased judicial control over the trialjury.3I But in the late
fifteenth century control over indictment coincided with the moment of
greatest threat of political decentralization, and the Crown's mastery of
the indictment process depended upon its leverage over the powerful
local figures who administered grand jury proceedings. Although the trial
jury seemed to require men of greater substance, the grand jury might
well-from the Crown's point of view-have benefited from an infusion of
thinner blood. The government of Henry VII, drawing upon the momentum of its centralizing progra.ns, attempted to avoid the grand jury
altogether in noncapital, statutory offenses. The infamous statute of
1495, 32 as short-lived as its drafters, Empson and Dudley,33 introduced
28. Baker, ed., Reports of Sir John Spelman, 2:106-7. (Italics indicate references to
Baker's "Introduction.")
29. Ibid., p. 43: "The judges sought refuge from the evils of mankind and the agonies of
decision by umpiring the ancient game strictly according to the rules, and by refusing to
meddle with questions of fact." (Baker here seems mainly to refer to civil trials.) See also
ibid., p. 138: "No doubt judges could exert influence on a jury, but the forms of charge and
oath made plain that the ultimate responsibility for a conviction rested on the jurors'
consciences. The judges' task was to see that the rules were observed, and they evidently
performed that limited role with absolute propriety.'' See Sir Thomas More, The Apology of
Sir Thomas More, Knight (London, 1930), p. 150. More wrote in 1533 that "I durst as well
trust the truth of one judge as of two juries. But the judges be such wise men, that for the
avoiding of obloquy they will not be put in the trust.''
30. Sir Matthew Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae: The History of the Pleas of the
Crown, 2 vols. (London, 1778), vol. 2, p. 313.
31. See below, section III.
32. Stat. II Hen. 7, c. 3 (1495). [Repealed: Stat. I Hen. 8, c. 6 (1509)].
33. On Empson and Dudley see G. R. Elton, England under the Tudors (London, 1958),
pp. 56-57; Kenneth Pickthorn, Early Tudor Government: Henry VIII (Cambridge, 1934), pp.
148-49. According to Pickthorn: "The main motive of repeal was certainly not a sense of
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prosecution on informations into criminal procedure in noncapital cases.
By its terms, however, it virtually conceded the requirement of an
indictment jury in capital cases; 34 and by implication, the statute and the
crisis it provoked recognized the requirement of a trial jury in all felonies.
The experience strengthened the foundations of jury theory by drawing
attention to the argument that the defendant's right to trial by peers
involved not one, but two, decisions by the country.3 5
There were, of course, limits to the role that jury reform alone could
play in the efforts to create a greater degree of social order. The
prosecution and condemnation of serious offenders had long been hampered by the system of royal pardons;36 secular court jurisdiction over
felony suspects had, in the course of the fifteenth century, been substantially reduced due to expansion of the benefit of clergy;3 7 and to a more
limited but significant degree, the privilege of sanctuary38 became a
serious problem in the early sixteenth century. The early Tudors took
steps to bring these impediments to order under control, though not to
eliminate them entirely. The closest Henry VII and Henry VIII came to
eliminating one of the ancient privileges was their handling of sanctuary,
a subject we need not pursue here. 39 In the case of pardons of grace, the
outrage in a public mind saturated with jurisprudence, jealously tenacious of law above
statute, but rather a determination of the propertied to be done with the exactions of
Empson and Dudley" (ibid., p. 149).
34. "Provided always that any such information extend not to treason, murder or felony,
nor to any other offence wherefore any person shall lose life or member."
35. The statute and the roles played by Empson and Dudley figure prominently in
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century jury tracts. See e.g. below, Chapter 6, n. 116.
36. See above, Chapter I, text at nn. 88-90.
37. See below, nn. 42-50 and accompanying text.
38. A felon who had escaped to a church or other designated holy place could remain
there inviolate for forty days. If he confessed his felonies to a coroner within that time, he
was allowed to abjure (swear he would leave) the realm. The coroner then assigned the
abjuror a port and gave him a cross to carry as a sign of his abjuration. So long as the felon
headed straight for the port, no one was permitted to harm him. See Hunnisett, Medieval
Coroner, pp. 37-54. See generally N. Trenholme, The Right of Sanctuary in England
(Columbia, Mo., 1903). For the Anglo-Saxon background of medieval sanctuary see Riggs,
Criminal Asylum in Anglo-Saxon Law, pp. 31-36.
Although sanctuary was not abolished untill624 (Stat. 21 Jas. 1, c. 28, §§ 6, 7), the Tudors
set strict limits upon the institution. Abjurors were branded to ensure their identification
[Stat. 21 Hen. 8, c. 2 (1529)), and the statute of 1530-31 did away with abjuration of the realm
(Stat. 22 Hen. 8, c. 14, § 1). Now the felon in sanctuary was to choose, or be assigned to, one
of a number of appointed sanctuaries in England. Thereafter, he could not leave that
appointed sanctuary without pardon or special license. See R. F. Hunnisett, "The Last
Sussex Abjurations," in Sussex Archaeological Collections, vol. 102 (London, 1964), p. 39;
I. D. Thornley, "The Destruction of Sanctuary," in R. W. Seton-Watson, ed., Tudor
Studies Presented . .. to Alfred Frederick Pollard (London, 1924), pp. 198-207.
39. See Eric W. Ives, "Crime, Sanctuary, and Royal Authority under Henry VIII: The
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Crown did not seek their elimination but sought intermittently to employ
them in a manner that discouraged, rather than encouraged, heinous
offenses by accepting legislation that revived the medieval proscriptions
against the pardoning of particularly serious offenders. 40 Pardons de
cursu, on the other hand, continued to flow copiously in cases of
"self-defense"-until, that is, the reform of the privilege of clergy and
the mid-century developments in the criminal jury trial combined to
create a workable law of felonious but noncapital manslaughter. 41
The institution of benefit of clergy took its basic form during the
late-twelfth-century struggle between church and state, symbolized in the
clash between Henry II and Thomas Becket. 42 The Crown conceded to
the Church ultimate power to try and punish ordained clergy, but it
ordered that a cleric first be tried in a royal court and, if convicted, that
he then be delivered over to the bishop as guilty in the eyes of the secular
law.4 3 Access to benefit of clergy originally required that letters of
ordination be formally presented to the trial court. By the late fifteenth
century, however, mere literacy, and even feigned literacy, had come to
suffice, so that even some of the worst lay offenders could avail themselves of the benefit. 44
In 1489 the Crown sought to reduce the impact of benefit of clergy by
prohibiting a layman from twice having recourse to it for homicide, rape,
robbery, theft, "and all other mischievious deeds. " 45 In order that the
court might know who had already been once benefited, the offenders
were ordered branded after first conviction. For "manslayer," the brand
letter was '' M'' ;46 for all other felonies, of which theft was by far the most
common, "T." An offender other than an actual cleric may not have been
Exemplary Sufferings of the Savage Family," in Arnold et aL, eds., On the Laws and
Customs of England, ch. 10.
40. Statutes granting pardons were issued frequently, but typically they excluded serious
homicide, burglary and robbery. See e.g. Stats. I Edw. 6, c. 15 (1547); Eliz. I, c. 30
(1562-63); 13 Eliz. I, c. 28 (1571); 27 Eliz. I, c. 30 (1584-85); 3 Jas. I, c. 27 (1605-6). For
references to cases in which defendants charged with homicide pleaded eligibility for such
a pardon on grounds they had slain "on a sudden occasion," or the like, see below, n. 63.
41. This development is discussed at length in section II.
42. See G. Dalzell, Benefit of Clergy in America (Winston-Salem, N.C., 1955), pp. 9-42;
Leona Gabel, Benefit of Clergy in England in the Later Middle Ages (Northampton, Mass.,
1929); Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 1:441-57.
43. See e.g. JUST 3/l27D, m.lld (1337): "And in order that it might be ascertained in
what capacity [the prisoner) should be delivered, let the truth of the matter be inquired into
by ajury."
44. Plucknett, Concise History, p. 440; Joel Samaha, Law and Order in Historical
Perspective (New York, 1974), pp. 57-62; Stephen, History of Criminal Law, 1:459-64.
45. Stat. 4 Hen. 7, c. 13 (1488). See also Baker, ed., Reports of Sir John Spelman, 2:329.
46. "Murder" was at this time used as a catchall term embracing all felonious homicide.
See Green, "The Jury and the English Law of Homicide," pp. 473-74.
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turned over to the church; certainly he was not after 1576. If after
conviction he successfully pleaded clergy, he was subjected to branding
and, at the discretion of the court, up to a year's imprisonment. 4 7 This
important curtailment of benefit of clergy was only the beginning. Soon
thereafter, legislation excluded laymen from pleading clergy for petty
treason, that most heinous of common law felonies. 48 Subsequently, in
piecemeal fashion, most other serious offenses were similarly placed
outside benefit of clergy for laymen. 4 9
As we shall see, this regulation of the benefit of clergy bore rich fruit.
Statutory recognition of clergy for virtually all ''literate'' male offendersso
for the first commission of a lesser felony (including manslaughter and
simple theft) removed much of the pressure from juries, at least in some
cases. Where clergy was proscribed the pressure remained, but this
cannot have been serious so long as the parliamentary approach to the
gradation of punishment and the typical juror's concepts of liability
continued to overlap. Where these were in conflict, the jury presumably
sought to use its de facto power to put the defendant beyond the law.
Until the jury's power to do so was substantially reduced, the system
would, in cases of conflict, function much as before.

II
The development of English criminal trial procedure was more evolutionary than sudden. We have seen that the Marian statutes dealt with
practices that to some extent predated the 1550s; and it has been
47. 18 E1iz. 1, c. 7, § 2 (1576). See Cockburn, "Trial by the Book?" p. 76. See Cockburn,
Introduction, ch. xi, sect. ii.
48. Stat. 12 Hen. 7, c. 7 (1496-97). See Green, "The Jury and the English Law of
Homicide," p. 475, n. 223.
49. E.g. robbery or murder (used as term of art) in a church, on the king's highway or in
the victim's house: Stat. 4 Hen. 8, c. 2, § 1 (1512) (statute only temporary); arson added to
previous list: Stat. 23 Hen. 8, c. I; buggery: Stat. 25 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1533-34); piracy: Stat. 27
Hen. 8, c. 4, § 3 (1535-36).
50. See Cockburn, "Trial by the Book?" p. 77: "Between 1559 and 1589 the assize files
do not reveal a single instance in which clergy was denied because the claimant failed the
reading test." Thereafter, such failures were noted; Cockburn suggests that the evidence
"indicates the reemergence of benefit of clergy as a meaningful test of literacy," and that its
reintroduction was connected with the "introduction of 'plea bargaining' at assizes." See
Cockburn, Introduction, ch. xi, sect. ii. For an important discussion of the treatment of
women at the Home Circuit assizes see ibid., ch. xi, sects. ii, iii, and vi (table II). Women
were not allowed benefit of clergy until 1693 (stat. 4 Wm. and Mary, c. 9). By virtue of a
statute of 1623, however, they were allowed to claim the benefit in cases involving larceny
of goods worth ten shillings or less (stat. 21 Jas. I, c. 6). Many women did claim pregnancy,
a claim that was often false or that was made "true" through conception during imprisonment after conviction (technically, too late, but often allowed).

The Transformation of Jury Trial in Early Modern England

119

persuasively argued that the procedures outlined in the statutes represented an ideal that, in practice, did not become universal until long
thereafter.s 1 The line of development is flatter than focus on the statute
book alone would suggest. Nonetheless, the Tudor and early Stuart
period witnessed a sharp and important increase in the production of
pretrial examinations and witness testimony for use in criminal trials. This
is reflected in virtually every aspect of the system.s2 Though we know
little about how such testimony was employed, who employed it, and on
whose direction they did so, it is likely that the assize clerks wielded
significant influence in the conduct of trials and that they were in some
fairly direct fashion carrying out government policy.s 3 But it is not
altogether clear just what the government policy was or whether the
changes that flowed from that policy were foreseen.
The shift from a trial dominated by the self-informing jury to a trial
based mainly on evidence produced by the prosecution not only transformed the relationship between judge and jury but gave greater opportunity for judicial instruction and enhanced the growth of the substantive law. Open confrontation between the witnesses and the defendant
must have produced far more candid testimony than the conclusory tales
that juries had formerly recorded in their verdicts. Now close and difficult
cases came inescapably to the attention of the bench. Complicated
testimony of a sort not often heard before allowed the bench to refine and
elaborate rough distinctions, and to apply and elaborate those already
propounded in the Inns of Court. In this process the law of crimes took on
its modern form. 5 4
The paradigm example of substantive legal development is once again
the law of homicide. 55 Of the two other principal concerns of the royal
courts, treason and theft, little will be said. The law of treason was
51. Cynthia Herrup, "The Common Peace," doctoral dissertation (Northwestern Univ.,
1982), ch. 5. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. viii, sect. ii.
52. See Cockburn, "Trial by the Book?" passim, whose discussion assumes the
existence of a substantial body of pretrial documents. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. viii,
sect. iii.
53. Idem.
54. Baker (Reports of Sir John Spelman, 2:303) has definitively shown that discussion of
the substantive law had already begun at the Inns in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth
centuries. Some of this discussion was prompted by cases wherein defendants based claims
upon statutes dealing with clergy and pardons. My own discussion focuses on the
application and further development of the emerging law in actual cases before the royal
courts. I have on a previous occasion overstated the degree to which the post-1550
development was innovative rather than elaborative ("The Jury and the English Law of
Homicide," pp. 491-92).
55. This discussion is a foreshortened version of my fuller account in Green, "The Jury
and the English Law of Homicide," pp. 473-97.
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elaborated in a series of statutes and applied in state trials that are now
famous and have been described at length elsewhere. 56 There were
notable developments in the law of theft, but they were either statutory
and geared mainly to increasing the scope of capital theft by the
preclusion of benefit of clergy for specified offenses, 57 or judicial and
concerned largely with the definition of physical circumstances involved
in such offenses as burglary and robbery. 58 Few of the changes in
commonly tried cases of theft involved the theory of felonious intent and,
as we shall see, it was this problem that lay at the heart of future tensions
between judge and jury.
The development of the substantive law in homicide as in other crimes
involved a dialectical process that centered on the judge-jury relationship
but which was affected by much else, including, of course, the Tudor use
of the benefit of clergy. The statutes defining eligibility for benefit of
clergy, unlike the medieval statutes dealing with pardons of grace,
succeeded in making a lasting impact on the substantive law of felonious
homicide. Perhaps the most important difference between those two
attempts to deal with professional or otherwise serious homicide was the
stage of the judicial process at which the protection proscribed by the
legislation was normally obtained. As we have seen, pardons of grace
were obtained before trial, and, until 1390, they foreclosed prosecution.
Thereafter, while courts were in theory required to test such pardons,
they generally took at face value almost all pardons set before them and
thus, by default, left administration of the statute of 1390 to the Crown. 59
56. John Bellamy, The Tudor Law of Treason (London, 1979); G. R. Elton, The Tudor
Constitution: Documents and Commentary (Cambridge, 1960), pp. 59-60, 80-81. For a
study of the application of the law of treason during the Reformation, see G. R. Elton, Policy
and Police, pp. 384-400.
57. See above, n. 49.
58. Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedures," p. 41. For an example of the interplay out
of which rules developed (though in this case not a new rule), see J. H. Baker, "Criminal
Justice at Newgate 1616--1627: Some Manuscript Reports in the Harvard Law School," Irish
Jurist, vol. 8, new ser. (1973), p. 313. In an indictment for theft [Harvard Law School
(hereafter, H.L.S.) MS 112, p. 296], where a servant stole from his mistress and placed the
stolen items in his own trunk (as the evidence showed), the jury, having left the bar, returned
to ask advice of the court. Their concern was that it had not been shown that the trunk had
been removed from the house. The Recorder told the jury that under the law the alleged
deed was a felony, for the act of putting the goods in the trunk and afterward denying that
he had done so indicated that the defendant had taken the goods with felonious intent. (The
jury convicted the defendant and he was hanged.)
In the sixteenth century, the bench began to exclude from the categories of "luxuries,"
which could not be the subject of an indictment for theft, certain edible birds and animals,
thus increasing the scope of the law of capital theft. See Baker, ed., Reports of Sir John
Spelman, 2:318.
59. See Green, "The Jury and the English Law of Homicide," pp. 469-72.
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Benefit of clergy operated in a different way. Although in the Middle Ages
the benefit could be pleaded either at the outset of the trial or after an
adverse verdict, 60 the trial was always held, a jury impaneled, and a
verdict given. That remained the case as clergy expanded; indeed, with
that expansion, it came to make no sense at all to turn over to Church
courts most of those who benefited from "clergy."
Because many convicted defendants were likely to plead clergy ,6 1 and
because clergy was not available for all offenses, the nature of the
felonious homicide became an important jury question. For the first time,
it would seem, juries had to be questioned closely concerning the specific
nature of the defendant's felonious act. 62 For the first time, ajury verdict
of "felony but not murder" might save the defendant's life, even though
it would not spare him entirely from punishment. 63 The new statutory
scheme regarding clergy presented an important opportunity for legal
growth.
The combined effects of the clergy statutes and of the transformation of
the trial itself were significant. Some of them are easily traceable in the
reports and legal literature of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries; others are less well understood. One clear result of these changes
was that the law of homicide as applied by the courts evolved within a
matter of decades into one of the most complex areas of the substantive
criminal law. For the purpose of determining eligibility for clergy, the
general rule of Salisbury's Case, 64 which distinguished deliberate but
sudden homicide from homicide through something approaching true
60. In the reign of Henry VI, it was established that the "clerk" had to be convicted
before claiming the benefit. Stephen, History of the Criminal Law, 1:460. See Leona Gabel,
Benefit of Clergy, p. 30.
61. See Cockburn, History of English Assizes, p. 129 (20 percent of all felony defendants
for the period 1558-1714); see Cockburn, Introduction, ch. ix, sect. ii (46 percent of men,
1559-64); Samaha, Law and Order in Historical Perspective, p. 62 (28 percent of all felony
defendants in Essex for the period 1558-1602). See Green, "The Jury and the English Law
of Homicide," p. 493.
62. Salisbury's Case (1553) [Edmund Plowden, Les Commentaries (London, 1558), fol.
100] is the earliest recorded case that demonstrates this point. See below, n. 64 and
accompanying text. There are no gaol delivery or criminal assize rolls for most of the
fifteenth century or the first half of the sixteenth century.
63. See Baker, ed., Reports of Sir John Spelman, 2:305, n. 5, for two cases (1531, 1540)
in which defendants, claiming eligibility for statutory pardons, pleaded that they had
committed felonious homicide but not murder. Such cases may have required close
questioning of the jury, but it is unlikely that there were a great many of them (as there were
regarding benefit of clergy). Nevertheless, the development of the law of homicide resulted
in part from the Tudor revival of the medieval statutes precluding pardons of grace in
murder.
64. See above, n. 62. And see my discussion in Green, "The Jury and the English Law
of Homicide," pp. 484-85 and accompanying notes.
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premeditation, was further refined. 65 For example, of all the new doctrines which emerged from the bench in its treatment of complex cases,
none was more difficult to apply than the rule of manslaughter committed
in "hot blood," or "continuing fury. " 66 Rules applicable to the slaying of
officials-most important, the rule of implied malice, which made such
slayings murder-also took a heavy toll of the once-streamlined law of
intentional slaying. 67
A second, less easily traceable result of the benefit of clergy statutes
and the changes in trial procedure was their effect upon the treatment of
defendants in homicide cases. Since assize records are primarily indictments with brief and sometimes ambiguous notations as to the outcome at
the trial stage, 68 they do not provide much insight into jury behavior.
Nevertheless, the pattern oflate-sixteenth-century jury verdicts in homicide is revealing. Compared with the fourteenth century the conviction
rate was high (50 percent or more as compared to 20-25 percent), but the
percentage of defendants actually condemned remained about the same
(20-25 percent) and the percentage of self-defense verdicts was significantly lower (3-8 percent as compared to 10-40 percent).69 Thus it
appears that juries, recognizing that benefit of clergy provided an alternative sanction for simple homicide, or, as it was now coming to be called,
"manslaughter," felt free to convict in many cases they had formerly
described falsely as acts of self-defense. The formal rules and the social
response had come closer together. And we may speculate that more
often than in the past recipients of pardons for self-defense were in fact
true self-defenders. The extension of justifiable homicide by a statute of
1532 to cover slayers of would-be murderers 70 may have been facilitated
by a lessening of the fear that manslaughterers would be acquitted along
with true self-defenders. Indeed, although officially the medieval treatment of excusable homicide was not abolished until 1828,71 there is
evidence that judges frequently allowed self-defenders, whether they had
slain murderers or not, to go quit without pardon or forfeiture as early as
65. J. M. Kaye, "The Early History of Murder and Manslaughter," pp. 590-92.
66. Green, "The Jury and the English Law of Homicide," p. 492, n. 286.
67. Kaye, "Early History of Murder and Manslaughter," pp. 591-92.
68. James S. Cockburn has edited the extant assize indictment files for the reigns of
Elizabeth and James I. See his forthcoming introductory volume (Cockburn, Introduction)
for his analysis of these records.
69. Green, "The Jury and the English Law of Homicide," p. 493. Not all of the
"condemned" were in fact hanged. Some probably were pardoned or had their sentences
commuted. See below, nn. 162-68 and accompanying text. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch.
ix, sects. iii-vi.
70. Stat. 24 Hen. 8, c. 5 (1532). For a discussion of the intended scope of this statute, see
Green, "The Jury and the English Law of Homicide," pp. 480-82 and nn. 245-48.
71. Stat. 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, § 10 (1828).
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the sixteenth century.72 This too may have reflected heightened confidence in jury verdicts.
The history of the judicial treatment of accidental homicide, on the
other hand, appears to be more complex. It is difficult to chart the line of
development in this area from the adoption, in the fourteenth century, of
the rule of automatic forfeiture for excusable homicide to the abolition, in
the nineteenth century, of both pardon and forfeiture. At the outset, we
have seen, the judicial handling of accidental homicide was relatively
lenient: the courts granted acquittals in a wide variety of cases that had
formerly led to pardons for accidental homicide. 73 The theory most often
employed to rationalize acquittal in these cases was that the deceased,
through his own actions, had slain himself. Although this theory was
repeated in the sixteenth century ,74 and might still have governed the
outcome of some cases, it is clear from the notations of judgments on the
late-sixteenth-century Chancery records that pardon procedures were
followed in the majority of accidental homicide cases.75
The reasons for this strict treatment of accidental homicide are not
altogether clear. The most dramatic aspect of the new approach was the
insistence upon initiating the pardon procedure for deaths resulting from
shooting accidents, both by bow and arrow and by firearms.7 6 The latter
72. Very little is now known (or may ever be known) about judicial treatment of
defendants for whom a jury returned a verdict of self-defense. Scholars have assumed that
even before the statute of 1828 (Stat. 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, § 10), judges allowed juries to acquit
such defendants, but the evidence these scholars have adduced is inconclusive. See Michael
Foster, Discourse on Homicide (2nd ed., London, 1776), pp. 288--89; Pollock and Maitland,
History of English Law, 2:481, n. 3; Stephen, History of Criminal Law, 3:76-77. See also
Joseph Beale, "Retreat from a Murderous Assault," Harvard Law Review, vol. 16 (1903),
pp. 573-76.
The evidence from the assize rolls is also unclear on this point. In the late sixteenth
century there were still cases ending in verdicts of self-defense and, apparently, an order
that the defendant obtain a pardon. See e.g. James S. Cockburn, ed., Calendar of Assize
Records: Sussex Indictments, Elizabeth I (London, 1975), p. 319, no. 1639 (1596). In other
self-defense cases there is no indication that a pardon was required. See e.g. ibid., pp.
281-82, no. 1475 (1594); p. 333, no. 1714 (1597).
The strongest evidence for the proposition that self-defenders were not required to obtain
pardons is the fact that Chancery class 260, which contains many post-1550 cases in which
the pardon procedure was required for accidental homicide, contains practically none by
that late date for homicide in self-defense.
73. See above, Chapter 3, text at nn. 64 et seq.
74. See William Staunford, Les Flees del Coron (London, 1557), p. 16a, commenting on
a 1370 case (Y.B. Hil. 44 Edw. 3, pl. 94).
75. See Chancery classes 260 and 244, passim. The hundreds of cases where pardon
procedure was followed for accidental homicide between 1550 and 1650 suggest that judges
were infrequently allowing such defendants to go quit.
76. See e.g. C 260/166, no. 20 (1573); C 260/171, no. 46 (1583); C 260/173, no. 52 (1588);
C 260/184, no. 131 (1631).
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devices, of recent invention and currency, were responsible for close to
40 percent of the accidental homicides for which pardons de cursu were
granted in the century 1550-1650.77 The special dangers surrounding the
use of firearms no doubt contributed to judicial conservatism in accidental
homicide generally, and this concern might explain the insistence on
pardons in cases of unintentional slayings through the use of more
traditional weapons.
It is also possible that the flow of evidence now revealed more clearly
than before the degree of negligence attributable to the defendant in
accident cases. Juries, having lost most of their control over the production of evidence, might have found it more difficult to persuade the court
that the deceased had been responsible for his own death. Indeed, jury
verdicts of excusable accidental homicide might have been returned in
cases that, according to the evidence produced at trial, appeared to the
bench to fit within the emerging category of involuntary manslaughter. 78
Surely, in these cases, the bench might have deemed insistence upon the
pardon requirement appropriate. In those (presumably) rare instances, on
the other hand, where trial testimony was consistent with a special verdict
that the deceased had slain himself in the course of an attack upon the
defendant, the bench might have felt greater confidence in assimilating the
cases with self-defense and allowing an acquittal.7 9 If so, this was one
more example of the effect of the new trial procedure onjudicial treatment
of excusable homicide. But this remains a matter of speculation.so
77. This estimate is based upon a study made for me by David Clark, formerly of the
Public Record Office, of the post-1550 cases contained in Chancery classes 260 and 244.
78. This category was recognized as early as 1576. See Robert Brooke, La Graunde
Abridgment (London, 1576), "Carone," pl. 229. See Kaye, "Early History of Murder and
Manslaughter," p. 593 for a discussion of Brooke's view. See also Baker, ed., Reports of Sir
John Spelman, 2:314. Baker cites an early sixteenth-century reading that sets forth the
distinction drawn by Brooke.
79. Such cases rarely appear among those accidental homicides for which pardons were
granted.
80. The history of the jury and the law of homicide after 1550 remains shrouded in
mystery. The subject requires a systematic analysis of the series of criminal assize records
that begin in the 1550s.
I have suggested that the emergence of a large category of noncapital felonious homicide
and the beginnings of modern trial procedure produced changes in the behavior of both
bench and jury. My tentative thesis is that the conditions that had produced the earlier
pattern of jury behavior and judicial response had been substantially removed. There were
fewer verdicts of self-defense and probably there was greater judicial leniency in those cases
that did occur. Factors other than the existence of a category of noncapital felony and the
new trial procedure probably played an important role. But these factors, I believe, must be
considered in relation to the formal law and trial procedure. Juries might have been
comprised of persons less inclined to save defendants through verdicts of excusable
homicide, but it may still be true that, absent the category of manslaughter, they would not
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Certainly tension between judge and jury as to the border between
manslaughter and excusable homicide was still common after the middle
of the sixteenth century. s1
The rough distinctions in the Tudor law of homicide reflected age-old
attitudes regarding capital liability. The success of the new use of the
benefit of clergy, the chief agent for introducing these distinctions into
daily courtroom judgments, depended upon a means of monitoring the
veracity of verdicts. Without such a means, there would have been no
assurance that the new category would not suffer at the hands of jurors.
The substitution of clergy for pardons de cursu would have availed the
Crown and bench almost nothing. For although the law of homicide was
being made to reflect social attitudes, its operation was also intended to
set limits where particular juries might otherwise respond to ''unwarranted" feelings of mercy or illegitimate forms of pressure.
Although the friction between law and social attitudes was greatly
reduced, it was by no means eliminated. And, in time, as the law of
murder and manslaughter was further refined, the potential for disagreement increased. The policy that led the bench to "imply malice" or to
take a strict line with the negligent use of firearms must have had some
connection with widespread social views. But the fit between judicial
policy and a jury's sense of justice could not be perfect. The judicial
concern with application of the law to set an example, for instance, might
make the bench impatient with a jury's merciful desire, in a given case, to
overlook the general reasons for concern with a certain sort of behavior.
have been willing to convict. Judges might have threatened and fined juries to force
convictions, but it is hard to see how these measures could easily have been applied had trial
procedures remained unchanged: as in earlier times, it would have been extremely difficult
to separate the cases of honest verdicts from the cases of pure fabrication.
I introduced statistics (above, p. 122) on verdicts to suggest a relationship between the
structure of formal legal categories and jury behavior, and to suggest that, taken at their
broadest, characteristics of social attitudes toward homicide remained fairly constant
throughout the period 1300-1600. I do not mean to suggest that these observations constitute
an in-depth picture of the social history of the law of homicide in Elizabethan England.
Further research can shed light on a number of important questions and provide significant
refinement of the rough outline presented here. It is possible to determine the social status
of defendants and jurors in homicide cases and to correlate that information with verdicts.
It may be possible also to establish differences in the practices of justices of the peace and
the bench. See e.g. Samaha's analysis of the extant Essex criminal records (Law and
Authority in Historical Perspective). See also Joel Samaha, "Hanging for Felony: The Rule
of Law in Elizabethan Colchester," Historical Journal, vol. 21 (1978), pp. 763-82; Herrup,
"Common Peace," ch. 5; J. A. Sharpe, "Enforcing the Law in the Seventeenth-Century
English Village," in V. A. C. Gatrell et al., eds., Crime and the Law: The Social History of
Crime in Western Europe since 1500 (London, 1980), ch. 4.
81. See below, Chapter 6, text at nn. 70-83.
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The jury's most important factual inquiry, and the one that most often
led to friction with the bench, involved its assessment of the defendant's
intent. Of course, judge and jury sometimes disagreed on the matter of
whether the defendant had struck a blow, shot a gun, or taken an object
of value, but disagreement was far more likely to concern the defendant's
motives. The factual issue of intent was complicated enough, but it was all
the more so when juries brought to it powerful feelings about the
defendant's personal worth and the justice of taking his life for the act he
had committed. Although Tudor developments in criminal procedure did
not el~minate the jury's field of play regarding these considerations, they
may have substantially circumscribed jury discretion by making recourse
to it visible to the bench. It is ironic, then, that the ambiguity of the
merciful role of the jury was intensified.
Part of the ambiguity surrounding the trial jury resulted from the jury
playing a different role in each of the three main kinds of cases it
commonly faced. Its role in homicide cases was the most complex. The
emergence of the distinction between culpable-but-sudden homicide and
slaying through malice aforethought simultaneously reduced the number
of cases involving judge-jury tension and built into the fact-finding
process more room for the kind of discretion juries had always exercised.
The flow of evidence provided some control, but in fact many cases lay so
close to the legal line between capital and clergyable homicide that the
bench had no grounds for second-guessing the jury. s2 Moreover, homicide
had always involved a large number of cases of relatively little interest to
authorities. Casual fights that resulted in death were always of less
concern than were homicidal attacks in the course of robbery or arson.
For centuries the law reflected an attempt to prevent the kind of brawling
that might result in serious injury, but the administration of criminal
justice reflected also the recognition that such a policy could have only a
very limited impact. The transformation of the criminal process, to the
extent that it was planned at all, was not effected in order to deal with
such cases. Nor did it in fact have a determinative impact on the historic
role of the jury in its resolution of those cases.
Theft, like homicide, was a routine felony. Much of it was casual, in the
sense of opportunisticS3 rather than truly planned, and much of it was
perpetrated by vagrants filching to sustain a mean existence rather than
by gangs of professional thieves. Nevertheless, even much casual theft
82. The difference between capital homicide and true self-defense had of course been
very clear. The new line between murder and manslaughter was blurred, as was that
between manslaughter and true self-defense, for manslaughter covered the entire universe of
cases that had not in reality fit within one of the two more ancient categories.
83. See e.g. J. S. Cockburn, "The Nature and Incidence of Crime in England
1559-1625," in Cockburn, ed., Crime in England, pp. 63-64.
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was committed stealthily, and by outsiders, and if it was not specifically
planned, it was nonetheless committed by persons ready to seize upon an
unexpected opportunity. There was no element of provocation, at least
not in the ordinary sense; one did not (typically, at least) steal to defend
one's honor. If the petty thief was pitied it was because necessity had
stripped him of any honor whatsoever.
The line between nonclergyable and clergyable theft was mechanical,
but it perhaps corresponded roughly with a general view that trivial,
nonviolent takings ought not to place the thief beyond redemption and
that even some substantial nonviolent ones ought to be forgiven at least
once. 84 The preclusion of clergy in robbery and burglary may have been
popular, for many such cases involved gang attacks or truly professional
crime; the conviction rates in these offenses were relatively high. 85 Of
course, these lines could make but rough approximations. There may in
general have been opposition to the literacy standard. In particular cases,
a robber or burglar might seem to have more in common with an unlucky
petty thief, and the fact that he took several pounds rather than several
pence might reflect nothing more than the fortuity of his victim's wallet.
The jury's role in such cases was quite different from its role in
homicide. Because there was in theft little question regarding intent, there
was little opportunity to conceal a merciful verdict. Juries were forced to
acquit the defendant, perhaps against substantial evidence that he was
involved, i.e., to deny robbery or burglary when one or the other had in
fact been proven, or to undervalue goods despite incontrovertible evidence of their real worth. The jury's role in theft was open to view,
especially after the decline of the self-informing jury. Moreover, justices
of the peace, assize clerks, and the bench probably took an active role in
cases that fell within the statutes of preclusion, for these cases represented a kind of behavior that Parliament had singled out as especially
threatening to the social order. Merciful verdicts were not unknown in
theft; in fact they were very common. In the Elizabethan and Jacobean
period many defendants indicted for grand larceny were, through open
undervaluation of the goods that had been stolen, 86 found guilty of
84. The effect of the statutes regulating benefit of clergy was to make larceny of twelve
pence or more capital for the second offense. Multiple offenses oflarceny ofless than twelve
pence remained petty larcenies and noncapital.
85. Herrup, "Common Peace," pp. 267 et seq. See also Cynthia Herrup, "Law and
Morality in Seventeenth-Century England," Past and Present (forthcoming, 1985), for an
important discussion of mitigation and conviction in theft cases. I am grateful to Professor
Herrup for allowing me to cite her unpublished manuscript.
86. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. ix, sect. i. It should be noted that where a
defendant's act was clergyable he might be indicted for petty larceny, or found by the jury
to have committed petty larceny, in order that he might be whipped, a harsher punishment
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noncapital petty larceny. But most of these merciful verdicts were
strongly recommended by, or in any case undertaken with the leave of the
bench, and they did not lead the bench to conclude that what the jury was
doing was deciding difficult questions of law. There is some indication
that a social theory of necessity was coming to play a quasi-legal role,87 as
simple homicide had done in the Middle Ages. By and large, however, to
the extent that there was conflict between judge and jury in cases of theft,
it was a matter of differing opinions on the appropriateness of extending
mercy (in specific cases) to thieves who clearly fell within the new classes
of capital theft. 88
Treason cases became common in the sixteenth century, especially
after the English Reformation. They were complex cases that raised legal
and factual issues of nearly every kind. Treason, which was altogether
nonclergyable, went through many changes in its definition, but at its core
the crime included writing or speaking words signifying an intent to do the
Crown serious harm. 89 It was not always easy to prove that a person had
spoken certain words, and often their correct interpretation was not
obvious without reference to the demeanor and inflection of the speaker.9o
Here, within factual issues involving both commission and intent, there
was more than enough room for jury discretion, but acquittals in treason
than mere branding for a first offense. This practice was common in the late seventeenth
century, until transportation was ordered for clergyable felony. At that point, verdicts of
simple grand larceny increased and a harsh punishment (short of execution) was achieved.
See below, Chapter 7, n. 30. I am grateful to John Beattie for this important point.
87. For evidence that some commentators thought necessity might even be a legal
defense, see Baker, ed., Reports of Sir John Spelman, 2:300, 323. For discussion of
necessity in theft cases, see Cockburn, "Nature and Incidence of Crime," pp. 60-61. The
notion of necessity was reflected in the justifications stated for pardons (usually commutation) granted after conviction. It is possible that juries began to take such considerations into
account (as though it was a form of mitigation at law) in reaching their verdicts. See below,
Chapter 7, section III, for discussion of this kind of jury behavior in the eighteenth century.
88. But see Baker, "Criminal Justice at Newgate," p. 314, where the jury may have been
attempting to reject the law (H.L.S. MS 112, p. 296). The defendant was indicted as an
accessory to a burglary; it appeared on the evidence that he had received the principals and
the goods but had not had knowledge of the breaking and entering. The jury convicted the
principals of burglary and the accessory of mere felony (clergyable). The judge directed the
jury "not to distinguish whether the party were accessory to the burglary or to the felony
only," but one of the justices "was in doubt." The jury "were very much unsatisfied, yet
they went and afterwards returned and found the accessory guilty of accessory to the
burglary."
89. Bellamy (Tudor Law of Treason, pp. 31-33) argues that this had been the law since
1352 (Stat. 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c. 2), and that it is wrong to think that the 1536 statute (Stat.
28 Hen. 8, c. 10) originated the standard that required no overt act beyond words proving the
intent.
90. Ibid., p. 178.
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were far fewer in number than in homicide and theft.9 1 The Crown paid a
great deal of attention to treason prosecutions, making certain that the
evidence for conviction was very strong. On occasion, judges spared no
effort to charge the jury with the importance of conviction and the
inappropriateness of mercy. 92 There is some question concerning how far
the Crown went to ensure that the jury would be sympathetic to its point
of view, but it cannot be doubted that the Crown exerted pressure in some
cases.
In summary, at the same time that advances in criminal procedure
strengthened the position of the bench vis-a-vis the jury, developments in
the substantive law reduced the area of conflict between the two institutions. Conflict remained, but in varying degrees, depending on the kind of
case involved. Treason cases were few enough, and important enough,
for the Crown to manage most of them in a way that avoided conflict. In
theft, the new form of prosecution made it difficult for the jury to conceal
merciful verdicts within findings of fact; if there were merciful verdicts,
they were recognized as such-even encouraged-by the bench. Homicide presented far fewer instances of conflict than in the past because of
changes both in substantive law and in procedure. But fact-finding was, if
anything, more complex than ever, especially in cases close to the
borders of the newly drawn legal categories. Here the jury continued to
have some freedom of action, and, unlike the situation in theft, its
freedom extended beyond the open granting of mercy to the concealed
finding of law.

III
The extent to which juries exercised discretion in routine cases, or were
led to believe that they might legitimately do so, naturally depended on
the manner in which judges oversaw trials, charged juries, and reacted to
verdicts that displeased them. These are subjects about which all too little
is known.93 Trial records are somewhat fuller for the late sixteenth and
early seventeenth centuries than for the Middle Ages, but they remain
opaque on the point that most interests us, the judge's handling of the
jury. Nor is there abundant material reflecting official views (bench,
91. See Elton, Policy and Police, p. 387. See also Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, p. 117.
92. Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, pp. 164-65.
93. See generally Cockburn, "Trial by the Book?" and Cockburn, History of English
Assizes, pp. 120-24. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi, sect. iv. The only comprehensive
contemporary description of a routine case in the pre-Restoration period is Smith, De
Republica Anglorum, ed. Dewar; pp. 110-16. Additional glimpses are provided by accounts
in State Trials and in early seventeenth-century chapbooks. See Langbein, "Origins of
Public Prosecution," pp. 324-34.
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council, or Crown) ofthe jury's role. Enough of the official view remains
for us to be certain that trial juries were thought to be fact finders and
assessors of the credibility of those who testified at the trial, not law
finders. But on the question of the limits of appropriate jury discretion,
especially as regards the granting of merciful verdicts, the evidence is
ambiguous. What does emerge, however, is the outline of the central
paradox of the early modern history of the criminal trial jury. The development of controls over the jury, and their use in some cases (mainly the
so-called state trials), produced a reaction in which it was asserted that
the jury possessed a legitimate law-finding role. At the same time, judicial
attempts to deal with the great press of routine cases led to a form of
judicial dependence upon the jury. It began to appear that efficiency and
at least a limited degree of jury discretion were natural allies. As a result,
although the bench's position vis-a-vis the jury became stronger, the
system of criminal law continued to function in a way that allowed for the
inferences that proponents of jury law-finding desired to draw.
Although the Tudor transformation of criminal procedure appears to
have redesigned the balance of power between judge and jury and
between defendant and prosecution, it did not immediately result in a
much more highly structured trial. Rather, a few substantial changes
radiated new prosecutorial powers in ways that were sometimes dramatic, sometimes subtle. The extent to which these powers were used
depended upon the government's interest in a given case or upon its
concern with establishing an efficient process for a large class of cases.
Because so little of the trial was formalized and so much of it proceeded
according to the needs of the moment, it is difficult to speak of the
"typical" trial. There were relatively few state trials, where governmental interest and power were most determinative; there were numerous
routine felony trials, where the courtroom balance of power was more
even; there were a myriad of trials that fell between these two extremes.
Most of the extant evidence regarding the management of the Tudor
and early Stuart criminal prosecution comes from the collections of state
trials, predominantly composed of treason cases. These trials were well
known in their own day, both because of the personalities involved and
because of the government's interest in publicizing the prosecutions of
suspected traitors.94 Most of the important treason trials were held in
London, either before King's Bench or before justices of oyer and
terminer ,95 and thus they were assured of a large and politically significant
94. Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, p. 137.
95. Ibid., p. 133. For a decision to remove a case to London see Sir James Dyer, Ascun
Nouel Cases. Les Reports des divers select matters et Resolutions, 3 vols. (London, 1794),
vol. 3, p. 286b (Hil., 1570).
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audience. But the point of the prosecution was not lost on the county
where the offense was committed, for indictment proceedings continued
to be held locally. 96 Those who knew anything at all about criminal trials
must have been aware of the difference between proceedings at the great
political trials and proceedings in more routine cases at the assizes. But
the differences were largely of degree and may have been thought to
reflect-as they almost certainly did-different levels of governmental
interest in getting all of the facts before the jury. What was apparent was
that the government had not taken political cases out of the hands of the
jury, however much more pressure it in fact brought to bear upon jurors
to render a verdict of guilty.
As we have seen, early modern criminal procedure was distinguished as
much by the passive indictment jury as by the passive trial jury. The
Crown could assert itself by handpicking the grand jury97 or by overwhelming it with evidence. The latter strategy was usually successful and
can hardly have been thought illegitimate. Most of the important state
trials for treason followed upon reports to the Council, which then carried
on an extensive investigation and forwarded the most promising cases to
grand juries.9s Indictment under these circumstances was nearly a foregone conclusion.99 The resulting document was usually long and denunciatory, embodying the essentials of the Crown's case, and very likely
drafted in part for its dramatic effect upon a hushed courtroom, as the
defendant-perhaps a once-mighty subject-stood at the bar listening to
the charges against him. It was in any case more elaborate and devastating in tone than the typical charge of homicide, theft, or other routine
felony.
An overwhelming majority of defendants in most kinds of cases pleaded
not guilty-in this there had been no change since the Middle Ages-even
in response to the most detailed indictments, including those based upon
examinations of the accused himself. 100 In some treason trials this meant

96. Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, p. 133.
97. British Library (hereafter, B.L.) MS Caligula B. i, fol. 319. According to Bellamy
(Tudor Law of Treason, p. 128): "In the sixteenth century, when the government felt it to

be necessary, it did not hesitate to appoint the [grand) jurors itself."
98. Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, pp. 125-27. Perhaps a quarter of the cases
investigated in the period 1532-40 were dropped. See Elton, Policy and Police, pp. 386-88.
99. Statistics regarding specific kinds of cases are difficult to compile. Typically, bills not
found were discarded. See Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedure," pp. 19-20; Cockburn,
"Trial by the Book?" p. 71. Elton's statistics (Policy and Police, p. 387) indicate that not
more than 5 percent of treason cases put before grand juries resulted in an ignoramus. For
common-run cases see Cockburn, Introduction, ch. v, sect. iv.
100. But see Cockburn, "Trial by the Book?" p. 73. Cockburn notes that there were,
apparently, no confessions at assizes between 1558 and 1586, but that thereafter confessions
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the repudiation of an alleged confession, with occasionally the implication
that the confession had not been voluntary . 101 In all felony cases the court
was supposed to ensure that defendants were fully aware of the implications of a guilty plea, 102 although by the end of the sixteenth century there
is substantial evidence of a form of "plea bargaining" that produced
confessions to reduced, noncapital charges.103
We have seen that the early Tudors continued the late medieval
campaign to obtain twelve honest men, if not a jury downright solicitous
of the Crown's interests. In the mid-1580s, the forty-shilling requirement
was raised to four pounds, a figure that remained in force with minor
exception until the late seventeenth century . 104 These efforts were often
frustrated by nonattendance of the panel at the assizes. Thus the growing
dependence upon the tales, and, ironically, the decline-rather than the
upgrading-of the common-run felony trial jury . 10s
At state trials, however, this was rarely the case. Royal officials were
generally too careful on such occasions, and failure to attend was less
often braved by those called.1°6 How far the government went in state
trials to secure a friendly jury is still a matter of debate. Surely it defended
itself against a jury inimical to its interests. There is some evidence of the
"preparation" of jurors before the trial got under way, even an indication
that Star Chamber played a role in pretrial rehearsals of the case for the
became common in theft, when there were experiments with "plea bargaining." See
Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi, sect. iii.
101. Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, p. 164.
102. Seventeenth-century sources reveal this. See e.g. Hale, History of Pleas of the
Crown, p. 225: "[B]ut it is usual for the court, especially if it be not of clergy, to advise the
party to plead [not guilty] and put himself upon his trial." See, however, Baker, "Criminal
Justice at Newgate," p. 315, for a report of a case (H.L.S. MS 112, p. 297) in which one who
had "confessed the indictment" and "afterward, being asked what he would say why
judgment of death should not be given against him, answered that he was not guilty and that
his former confession was out of ignorance and unadvised. But [the Recorder] cited the
example of David with the Amalekite, Samuel2, Cap. I, that his blood must be upon his own
head."
103. Cockburn, "Trial by the Book?" p. 73; See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi, sect. iii.
Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedure," p. 35.
104. Stat. 27 Eliz. I, c. 6 (1584-85). For the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries see
below Chapter 7, n. 4 and accompanying text. For discussion of the impact of inflation on
sixteenth-century juror-qualification requirements see Oldham, "Origins of the Special
Jury," pp. 148-50. Oldham concludes that the real value of the property requirements was
small, even after the statute of 1584-85.
105. Baker, ed., Reports of Sir John Spelman, 2:107; Cockburn, History of English
Assizes, p. 118. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi, sect. i; see also Oldham, "Origins of the
Special Jury," pp. 146--47.
106. Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, p. 168. Jurors at state trials were frequently men of
substance, both socially and economically. See Oldham, "Origins of the Special Jury," p.
154.

The Transformation of Jury Trial in Early Modern England

133

prosecution. 107 In general, however, the Crown seems to have relied upon
the force of its case and upon the defendant's lack of opportunity to
foresee the elements of the Crown's case rather than upon true jury
packing. The government's efforts may as well have been aimed at
countering the impact of local interests that might sway a jury to acquit;
for it must have been the case that the classes from which the Crown
sought to select trial jurors were subject to the very pressures of county
politics that the elaborate ritual and presentation of monarchical sanctity
were designed to erode. 108 In more routine cases, local sympathies rather
than politics had to be overcome. But there were simply too many cases,
too few willing jurors, and too little effective governmental machinery to
ensure that even a "neutralized" jury would always be impaneled. It
seems likely that the government achieved less through efforts at jury
selection than it did through charging (and threatening) those selected.J09
Just as one must be alert to the difference between state trials and
common-run proceedings, one must also recognize that trials in London
and other urban centers generally differed in important respects from
trials in the provinces. This was especially true with regard to the
relationship between jurors and defendants in cases of theft, which
dominated the assize calendars. Smith, whose account is open to question
on many points, probably was accurate in stating that in London
defendants rarely knew the jurors, and vice versa, for they came from
very different classes. 11 o London assizes processed a virtual parade of
lower-class robbers and pickpockets, many of them professional; even
men of the tales must have been a cut above these rogues. In the counties,
and especially in rural areas, the jurors far more frequently faced their
neighbors or village ne'er-do-wells of whom they had long been aware, or
with whose more fortunate relations they fraternized. 111
107. Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, pp. 167-68.
108. Ibid., p. 181. See Stat. 33 Hen. 8, c. 23 (1541), which empowered the Crown to hold
treason trials upon commission of oyer and terminer in the shire of the Crown's choosing.
109. Cockburn, History of English Assizes, p. 123. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi,
sect. i. But see below, n. 179 and accompanying text for discussion of this problem. In my
view, the bench exercised its power selectively. Cockburn himself notes ("Trial by the
Book?" p. 73) that the court apparently manipulated the law to counteract jury leniency; if
so, the bench could not always rely on its own powers of persuasion to obtain the verdict it
preferred.
110. Smith, De Republica Anglorum, ed. Dewar, p. 113.
Ill. For a study of trial jury composition at early seventeenth-century quarter sessions
and assizes see Herrup, "Common Peace," ch. 5. Herrup found that those (mainly
quarter-session) jurors whom she could trace came from the lower end of the yeomanry,
lower-middling persons of some property who were used to undertaking official responsibilities that the more wealthy, substantial freeholders were able to avoid. Herrup's conclusions
accord roughly with those of Joel Samaha ("Hanging for Felony," p. 781): "The trial juries
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Smith's point, however, was that defendants rarely challenged prospective jurors: neither knowing them nor being known by them, they had
little reason to do so.m Whatever the truth of Smith's remarks about
class differences, such differences as there might have been hardly suffice
to explain the relative rarity of recourse to challenges in criminal cases
over practically the entire early history of jury trial. 113 Traditionally,
defendants had been entitled at common law to three dozen peremptory
challenges. 114 This number had been reduced in the 1540s to twenty,l15
though it is difficult to imagine why anyone paid attention to the matter.
In 1554, however, Throckmorton probably set a record by challenging as
many as ten of his panel, 116 and in the following year Parliament increased
the allowance in treason to the original thirty-six. 117 Perhaps these
maneuverings were purely symbolic. The fact is that, by exercise of their
challenge rights, defendants could have brought assizes to a standstill.
Either they did not know this, or they were discouraged from such lawful
sabotage.
Having been selected and sworn, jurors once again heard the indictment against the accused. 118 At state trials the impact of this recital upon
the jurors (and those in attendance) was meant to be very great. In more
routine cases, where jurors might hear up to a half dozen or more cases
before reaching their verdicts, 11 9 the court supplied them with notations
of the prisoners' names and the charges brought against them. 120 Except
for the great state causes, most trials were very brief. From the jurors'
perspective, trial was a contest in which accuser and accused exchanged
[in Colchester] were comprised of ordinary people in the town-petty tradesmen such as
alehouse keepers and occasionally even day labourers."
112. Idem. But see Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi, sect. i, for exceptions.
113. The medieval trial records are unhelpful on this point. For the Elizabethan and
Jacobean periods, see Cockburn, History of English Assizes, p. 120; see Cockburn,
Introduction, ch. vi, sect. i; Herrup, "Common Peace," p. 376, n. 2. Apparently, challenges
were more common in the early sixteenth century in urban areas where defendants sought
to remove those who failed to meet statutory property qualifications [see Stat. 23 Hen. 8, c.
13 (1531), which removed the freehold requirement and substituted a high (forty pounds)
personal worth standard. Above, n. 25].
114. Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedure," p. 36. For contemporary discussion of
challenge (in assize order books) see B.L. MS Harleian (hereafter cited as Harl.) 1603,
fol.76v. and B.L. MS Lansdowne (hereafter cited as Lansd.) 569, fol. 9v.
ll5. Stat. 33 Hen. 8, c. 23 (1541-42).
116. Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, p. 140.
117. Stat. 1 and 2 Philip and Mary, c. 10 (1555).
118. B.L. MS Lansd. 569, fol. llv.
119. Cockburn, History of English Assizes, p. 119. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi,
sect. ii.
120. [T. W.], Office of the Clerk ofAssize (London, 1676), p. 48; B.L. MS Lansd. 569, fol.
llv. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi, sect. ii.
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their stories in a heated give-and-take. The accuser might be prompted by
the bench, which had in hand a written record of the charges he had laid
before the justices or, in pretrial sessions, before the assize clerks.121 The
accuser's statement was supposed to correspond closely with the actual
indictment upon which it had been based, lest the indictment be quashed
for variance. In fact, there were frequent variances in details, which were
rarely challenged. Nonetheless, the jurors' impressions of the main
elements of the case against most defendants must now have been distinct
and convincing. 122 Other witnesses 123 for the Crown then spoke, perhaps
prompted by the bench, 124 sometimes adding little to the prosecution case
beyond emphasis and whatever force their reputation, demeanor, and
number might have carried. It is not clear whether the jurors always heard
the pretrial examination of the accused; where it supported the Crown's
case they almost certainly did, but probably in other cases they did not. 125
The case for the defense was put by the accused, for himself and by
himself. No one interceded on his behalf to influence the impression he
made upon the jurors. In rare cases, the accused had the assistance of
counsel at the outset of the proceedings in order to make objections on
matters of law as they arose from the indictment;126 but at trial, upon
indictment,m the accused was not allowed counsel, a rule that persisted
in treason until 1696 and in all other capital cases until well into the
eighteenth century. 128 We may never, at this remove, understand how
contemporaries felt about the denial of counsel. Some apparently believed that the judge served as counsel to the defendant, 129 or that the
government's case had to be so strong to convict that it would be beyond
the power oflegitimate legal advice to refute it. Do Most may have worried
that intervention by counsel would make it more difficult for the jury to
121. See above, text at nn. 8-9.
122. For discussion of Cockburn's contrary view (Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vii, sect.
ii) see below, n. 179.
123. On witnesses see B.L. MS Harl. 1603, fols. 76v-77. See also Smith, De Republica
Anglorum, ed. Dewar, pp. 113-14.
124. Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedure," p. 38.
125. T. G. Barnes, ed., Somerset Assize Orders, 1629-1640 (Frome, 1959), p. xviii. See
Cockburn, Introduction, ch. viii, sect. ii.
126. Sir Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (4th ed.,
London, 1669), p. 137.
127. The rule was different in appeals and misdemeanors, where counsel was allowed.
Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedure," p. 37.
128. Stat. 7 and 8 Wm. 3, c. 3 (1696) (treason). The extension of the right to counsel in
felony [see Stat. 6 and 7 Wm. 4, c. 14 (1836)] was recognized in practice long before it was
made statutory.
129. For a relatively late expression of this view see William Hawkins, Pleas of the
Crown, 2 vols. (London, 1721), vol. 2, p. 400.
130. Rex v. Thomas, 2 Buist. 147, 80 Eng. Rep. 1022 (1613), per Coke, C.J.
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get at the truth, m and this appears to be the way that contemporaries
rationalized a rule that was sometimes subjected to telling criticism. 132
Some of the criticism of the denial of counsel stemmed from the fact that
counsel for the prosecution played a prominent role in state trials. There
was a hollow ring to the bench's refusal to even the scales in such
cases,m and the belief that the rule was intended to secure convictions
may have carried over into attitudes toward the handling of routine cases
where counsel rarely appeared for the Crown.
However much ammunition the Crown employed in a given case-the
coaching of witnesses, the reading of examinations (including those few
induced by torture), the use of counsel for questioning the defendant or
for making dramatic, inflammatory speeches-from the jurors' perspective the defendant's answer remained the crux of the contest. The
government may have therefore assumed that the truly innocent person
could not be made to appear guilty, whereas the guilty might not reveal
themselves without being subjected to the most searching interrogation.
For the Crown forced the defendant to rebut evidence he had not seen
beforehandl 34 and to answer questions designed to throw him off balance.
Moreover, the Crown employed sworn witnesses to aid private prosecutors, while only grudgingly allowing any witnesses, and never sworn
ones, for the accused. 135 It appears that the Crown devised a proceeding
wherein the accused was stripped of defenses that, from its perspective,
only stood in the way of truth and aided the accused in the too-easy task
131. Staunford, Les Plees del Coron, fols. 15lv-52; Ferdinanda Pulton, De Pace Regis et
Regni (London, 1609), pp. 184-85: "[P)eradventure, [the defendant's) conscience will prick
him to utter the truth, or his countenance or gesture will show some tokens thereof, or by
his simple speeches somewhat may be drawn from him to bolt out the verity of the cause."
Cf. the earlier eighteenth-century rationale of Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, 2:400: "This
indeed many have complained of as very unreasonable, yet if it be considered, that generally
every one of common understanding may as properly speak to a matter of fact, as if he were
the best lawyer; and that it requires no manner of skill to make plain and honest defence,
which in cases of this kind is always the best; the simplicity and innocence, artless and
ingenuous behaviour of one whose conscience acquits him, having something in it more
moving and convincing than the highest eloquence of persons speaking in a cause not their
own ... whereas on the other side, the very speech, gesture and countenance, and manner
of defence of those who are guilty, when they speak for themselves, may often help to
disclose the truth, which probably would not so well be discovered from the artificial
defence of others speaking for them."
132. E.g. Robert Parsons, The Jesuits Memoria/for the Intended Reformation of England
under their first Popish Prince (London, 1690), p. 249.
133. Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, p. 142.
134. See Stephen, History of Criminal Law, 1:227-28, n. 239.
135. Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedure," p. 38. Witnesses for the accused were not
allowed to be sworn until1696 in treason and 1702 in felony. Stats. 7 and 8 Wm. 3, c. 3, § I;
I Anne, st. 2, c. 9, § 3. See also B.L. MS Lansd. 569, fol. II.
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of fooling his countrymen or playing upon their compassionate tendencies. Smith's description of a routine felony case is famous: the accused
and accusers stood in "altercation"; 136 the judge asked questions, guided
by examinations that the defendant would have ex tempore to explain
away. All of the pressure was brought to bear on a single point: the jurors
waited to hear the accused speak for himself.
It is easy to underestimate the importance of the oral and personal
aspect of trial by jury. The proceedings I have described in summary
fashion were weighted in the Crown's favor, but they did not do away
with the centerpiece of the medieval trial: the defendant's unsworn
testimony and tacit appeal to his countrymen. That remained inviolable.
None of the pretrial examinations was of record; the defendant might
repudiate any confession he had made; and every prosecution witness had
to testify personally, regardless of the strength of his deposition.137 The
coordinated prosecution developed within the logic of the English trial by
peers; it was not an attempt to undermine that form of trial. From the
government's perspective, it redressed a severe imbalance that had
resulted from the inability to challenge the defendant and thus turn the
trial into a proper test. Juries typically had been inclined to hang only the
nastiest offenders, and even these they sometimes acquitted out of fear,
pity, or infirmities of evidence. The Crown had a long way to go if it was
intent upon substantially broadening the field of offenders it could convict
of capital charges, or significantly reducing the chances that an individual
offender would mislead the jury. In state trials, where the stakes were
especially high, each "mistaken" acquittal loomed very large. Precautions were called for, the more so because defendants were often
clever, in league with others, and politically powerful enough to sway an
insufficiently "neutralized" jury. Common-run felonies were handled
differently. The prosecution could go only so far, given the press of time
and the difficulty of securing detailed evidence. Far less was at stake, and
jury leniency was to be expected, indeed, to a certain extent, tolerated.
The odd case of unwise leniency, or plain obduracy, could be dealt with
by stern treatment by the bench or even by procedures in Star Chamber.
At some point the judicial coercion of juries violated the sanctity of trial
by peers, but it is not clear just where that point was. This problem has
received more attention than careful sorting out. Although little will be
offered here by way of firm conclusions, it is necessary to provide a
background to the discussion in Chapter 6 of the debate over the legality
136. Smith, De Republica Anglorum, ed. Dewar, p. 114.
137. An exception was made where the deponent had died or fallen gravely ill before the
trial. See Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown, 2:284-85.
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of threatening and punishing juries that was carried on in both lay and
official literature of the mid-seventeenth century.
From medieval times the bench played a leading role in the questioning
of defendants. Medieval juries had two overlapping and presumably
complementary duties: to state what they knew and to render a verdict.
They were not under a duty to know all the facts. They might, and often
did, say they did not know the truth of the matter, but they were not to
suppress what they did know or to avoid the opportunity to become better
informed. At the trial the principal source of information, over and above
what the jurors had already learned, was the defendant himself. The fact
that the jury was "self-informing" in no way implied that their verdict
was to be settled by the time they were sworn. Like the judge, they were
sworn ''to hear and to determine,'' and they were expected to put
questions where they desired further information. Having consented to be
tried by the country, the defendant could be examined by them, or by the
judge on their behalf. If there were limits to the judge's role of informing
the jury, they were imposed by his dependence upon the defendant and
the jurors for evidence.
The transformation of the trial in the early modern period did not bring
this judicial role to an end. Quite the opposite: it enhanced that role, and
made it far easier to play. Even the appearance of counsel at the state
trials was in service to the bench, which followed up the counsel's
questions or the accused's replies to them with questions of its own. Of
course, it was impossible for the bench to take so active a part in the
trying of the accused without signaling to the jury its own view of the truth
of the matter. This must have been all the more inevitable as the flow of
candid evidence increased. Whether the practice of commenting upon the
evidence followed from the fact that often the judge's views were at all
events obvious, we cannot say. We do know, however, that the practice
was common by the mid-sixteenth century, if not long before,138 and it
may have been thought a part of the judge's duty to help inform the jurors.
Judicial impartiality did not require that the judge keep his opinions to
himself but only that his comments be favorable to the defendant where
that was appropriate. As we shall see, there developed a significant
tradition of favorable comment on the evidence and on the desirability of
a "partial," or saving, verdict. 13 9 The tradition of the active judge was
integral to trial by peers, and it remained so long after "coercion" was
ruled unlawful.
138. See Baker, ed., Reports of Sir John Spelman, 2:141. Baker asserts that the bench
used this role with discretion.
139. See below, Chapter 7.
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There was no real separation between the judge's comments upon the
evidence and his charge to the jury. The charge might embody the most
direct statement of the judge's point of view and must have been
influential in many major trials. During the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries it does not appear that charges were elaborate in most routine
cases: the law was typically straightforward and the judge rarely bothered
to sum up his views of the facts. 140 Many cases must have resolved
themselves into assessments of credibility that the bench either happily or
for a lack of time or interest was willing to leave to the jury. The judge's
charge always invoked the jurors' duty to God and their consciences,1 41
and it was upon that admonition that the trial proper ended and the jury's
resolution process began. About that process we know very little. It is not
even clear whether juries typically retired from the bar to discuss cases
or, as appears to have been the case at eighteenth-century Surrey assizes,
simply huddled together in front of the bench. 142 Juries usually heard
several or more cases before "retiring" to resolve them and, in the press
of time, must have reached their verdicts quickly . 143 Having been guided
by the bench, jurors probably knew how they would determine most
cases even before they gathered for discussion. They probably also knew
which cases remained unclear and had been left largely to their discretion,
the judge having given only some indication of his view concerning the
range of appropriate results.144
Where the bench believed that the jury had convicted the defendant
against the evidence, it might reprieve the defendant and request that the
Crown pardon him either. freely or upon condition, 145 a practice that
140. Cockburn, History of English Assizes, p. 122. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. viii,
sect. iii. For what was probably a typical charge, see Smith, De Republica Anglorum, ed.
Dewar, p. 114.
141. See Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance, p. 50. Langbein quotes a
"charge" that seems to have been in its entirety: "Doe in it as God shall put in your hearts"
[The wonderful discoverie of Elizabeth Sawyer a witch ... written by Henry Goodcole,
Minister ... and her continual Visiter in the Gaole of Newgate (London, 1621)]. See also
Smith, De Republica Anglorum, ed. Dewar, p. 114: "[D]oe that which God shall put in your
mindes to the discharge of your consciences, and marke well what is saide."
142. There is some evidence that in this period the jury left the bar and sequestered itself.
See STAC 5, A3, no. 30 ("in usual manner did sequester themselves"); Smith, De Republica
Anglorum, ed. Dewar, p. 114. See however Cockburn, Introduction, ch. viii, sect. iv, who
suggests that juries may have deliberated at the bar.
143. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi, sect. ii.
144. But see Cockburn, Introduction, ch. viii, sect. iv, and ch. ix. Cockburn suggests that
juries did not exercise much discretion; resolutions, he believes, were made speedily and
largely ratified the views of the bench. For my comments on Cockburn's conclusions see
below, n. 179.
145. See below, nn. 165-67 and accompanying text.
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extended even to some state trials. 146 Most instances of judge-jury
disagreement, however, involved perceived acquittals against the facts,
and here the bench often confronted the jury head-on, using what
pressure it could. Judicial coercion must be kept separate from the judge's
unquestioned right to make his views known to the jury. Coercion
involved threat of punishment for not finding as the judge deemed
appropriate. At some point, even the physical discomfort involved in
being held without refreshment or sleep by a judge who would not accept
a verdict amounted to coercion, but it was, of course, its least serious
form and the one most difficult to characterize as unlawful. 147 The judge
might examine each juror individually in the hope of breaking his
resolve, 148 but probing the jurors to make certain they were firm in their
view and forcing them to consider further and to report again was a
standard and accepted part of trials. Threatening to punish, and actually
punishing, were of another sort of behavior-one that historians are only
now beginning to explore in depth.
We have seen that the early Tudors took steps to punish bribery and
extortion at all levels, including such behavior when it touched criminal
trial juries. Star Chamber was active in these cases, and, no doubt, this
was one part of the Court's business that made it popular. The use of
examinations and witnesses for the prosecution made it easier to monitor
such behavior, for the presumption of embracery or perjury was strong in
cases where the verdict clearly flew in the face of the evidence. Did the
Crown use the theory of true perjury as a makeweight in prosecutions of
jurors who were not thought guilty of bribe taking or other "ministerial"
wrongdoing but were thought nonetheless to have found against the
evidence? Perhaps so. More likely, however, the Crown typically presumed that a finding against the evidence involved bribery or similar
wrongdoing and punished the jury accordingly within accepted notions of
its duty to enforce the law.
The surviving records of Star Chamber proceedings do not settle all
questions regarding the theory upon which that institution punished
juries. During the reigns of the first three Tudors, such prosecutions were
common enough, but they appear to have been aimed mainly at ministerial wrongdoing. 149 Thereafter the quantity of Star Chamber prosecutions
146. See Elton, Policy and Police, p. 303.
147. It was a longstanding rule that jurors were not to eat or drink until they rendered
their verdict. See e.g. B.L. MS Harl. 1603, fol. 77.
148. B.L. MS Add. 25228, fol. 41, pl.850 (1620).
149. See e.g. STAC l, II, no. 121 (perjury); STAC 2, XXIII, no. 114 (perjury); STAC 2,
XXIV, no. 199 (peijury). "Peijury" may in fact be the charge when the jurors were thought
to have been too merciful. More likely, authorities believed the jurors had gone against their
oaths knowingly and for an ill motive. STAC 3, VI, no. 69: the information charged that half
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of jurors increased. Although in 1554 the entire common-law bench ruled
that it could not on assize fine or imprison jurors, 1so its members
occasionally continued to do so as well as to exercise its increasing power
to monitor juries by binding them over to Star Chamber, 151 typically for
finding ''contrary to the evidence,'' a phrase that had become common by
the later decades of the sixteenth century. In many such cases where
juries were bound over to Star Chamber or were subsequently summoned
to appear there, the informations aver that the jurors acted for personal
gain or out of favoritism, or the interrogatories include questions concerning allegations of bribes. 152 A few of them may be interpreted to proceed
of the jury were "men corrupted," but this may mean only that they went against the
evidence. See also above, n. 24 (regarding punishment for "peJjury" of jurors in the Welsh
Marches).
150. "Dalison's Reports," B.L. MS Harl. 5141a, fol. 27. The report states that the bench
proscribed fining by courts presided over by justices of assize, justices of oyer and terminer,
justices of the peace, or justices of gaol delivery. This accords with the view expressed by
Hale in the 1660s, when he grudgingly admitted King's Bench's right to fine (or, at least, its
immunity to collateral review) because it was a superior court. See below, Chapter 6, text
at n. 38.
151. For juries bound over to Star Chamber see below, nn. 152-56. For juries fined (or
threatened with fines) by assize judges see Cockburn, History of English Assizes, p. 123. See
Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi, sect. iv. See also Smith, De Republica Anglorum, ed.
Dewar, p. 121. Smith remarked that juries sometimes "not onely be rebuked by the Judges,
but also threatned of punishment, and many times commaunded to appeare in the
starrechamber, or before the privie counsel! for the matter. But this threatning, chaunceth
oftener than the execution thereof, and the [jurors] answere with most gentle wordes, they
did according to their consciences, and pray the Judges to be good to them, they did as they
thought right, and as they accorded all, and so it pas seth away for the most part.'' Smith may
have understated the use of coercion in such cases. [Cockburn ("Trial by the Book?" p. 72)
calls it a "pious disclaimer." But see his Introduction, ch. vi, sect. iv, for practice on the
Home Circuit after the mid-1570s, and my comments below, n. 179. Herrup's study of early
seventeenth-century East Sussex quarter sessions and assizes ("Common Peace"), however, suggests that judicially imposed fines were rare and that Star Chamber was employed
primarily where there was suspicion of outright corruption.] Smith noted that he had "seene
in [his] time" a jury "for pronouncing one not guiltie of treason contrarie to such evidence
as was brought in were not onely imprisoned for a space, but an houge fine set upon their
heads, which they were faine to pay.'' This seems to refer to the punishment of the jury in
Throckmorton's Case (see State Trials, 1:901-2 and Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, pp.
172-73). Smith concluded: "But those doinges were even then of many accounted verie
violent, and tyrannical, and contrarie to the libertie and custome of the realme of England.
This cometh verie seldome in use, yet so much at a time the enquest may be corrupted, that
the Prince may have cause with justice to punish them: For they are men, and subject to
corruption and parcialitie, as others be."
152. E.g. STAC 4, VIII, no. 17. The interrogatories in this case follow a common form
used even where, as here, the extant record of the information states only that the jurors
found "against pregnant evidence." The questions put to the jurors were designed to
determine: how the jurors came to serve; whether they had been chosen by the defendant
or by his friends or relatives; whether they had received money; what evidence the jurors
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solely upon the theory that the jury wrongly but with good intention took
the law into its own hands, or extended mercy where doing so was
inappropriate, but typically the charges were much stronger.I 5 3 In most of
the cases brought into Star Chamber the jurors actively defended themselves by asserting that they had evidence of their own 154 or that the
evidence presented in court seemed to them to be inconclusive. 15 5
Occasionally some members of a jury claimed that they had been
persuaded by their cojurors. 156 By and large the jurors deposed in Star
Chamber asserted their right to assess the evidence as they saw it and
denied having acted out of corrupt motives.
based their verdict upon. STAC 4, X, rio. 31: one of the jurors disclosed after the trial that
the other jurors had forced him to go along with an acquittal. He stated that two others had
gone along on the belief that the remaining nine "be all bribed and have received money."
These allegations led to the entire jury being bound over to Star Chamber. STAC 4, X, no.
32: strong suggestion that Star Chamber was investigating a charge of bribery; STAC 8, II,
no. 42: the jurors denied corruption or hope of gain, as alleged; STAC 8, II, no. 46:
corruption and subornation alleged in the information; STAC 5, A 34, no. 3: the jurors
denied that they had been "laboured" or spoken to on the defendant's behalf.
153. E.g. STAC 4, III, no. 41; STAC 4, Ill, no. 43: some suggestion that the foreman
overbore the others for a corrupt motive; STAC 4, VIII, no. 16: information alleges that the
jury "most wilfully, falsely and untruly found ... not guilty"; STAC 4, VIII, no. 16; STAC
4, X, no. 35; STAC 5, A 3, no. 30.
154. STAC 4, III, no. 41: the jurors were charged with neglect of duty to find according
to "pregnant evidence" and for "little dreading the offense of pe!jury." Most of the jurors
said that they were "near neighbors" of the parties and the witnesses and knew "the credit
and estimation of every of the same deponents and witnesses, and also some of the said
defendants, knowing more of themselves in that matter than was openly given in evidence.''
STAC 4, X, no. 35: one juror deposed that six of the others "said of their own knowledge
they knew that [the defendant] was not at the felony and further said that their own
knowledge was as good to them and better than any evidence" given in court. STAC 5, A
51, no. 6: jurors said that the chief witness for the Crown was known to most of them "to
be of light behavior and small credit although he was not so known to the judges." See also
STAC 5, A4, no. II.
155. E.g. STAC 4, III, no. 41: the jurors said that "they did according to their oaths,
consciences and the truth of the matter justly and truly give their verdict.'' They said that
"all of the evidence given against [the defendant] was only matter of suspicion and
presumption, not sufficient in the conscience of the [jurors] .... All which matters the said
defendants are ready to aver and prove as this honorable court shall award, and [they] pray
that they may be dismissed out of this honorable court without any further vexation or
trouble." (No result noted.) STAC 5, A4, no. II: jurors gave a very detailed answer
reviewing the large body of testimony given against the defendant (for counterfeiting coin)
and explaining why it seemed insufficient for a conviction. See also STAC 5, A 34, no. 3;
STAC 5, A 51, no. 6; STAC 5, A 52, no. 34.
156. STAC 4, III, no. 43: Eleven of the jurors stated that the foreman was the only juror
who could read and that he convinced them that there was no evidence against the
defendant. The foreman said that he believed the defendant to be innocent and admitted to
some persuading of the others. STAC 4, VIII, no. 17: Two jurors claimed that although they
opposed the others' opinion that the defendant had acted in self-defense they finally gave in.
They gave their verdict "against their minds." See also STAC 4, X, no. 35.
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It would appear that as common as the binding over of juries to Star
Chamber became, the theory upon which such treatment proceeded never
entirely detached itself from the traditional notions of jury corruption
over which, it was agreed, Star Chamber hadjurisdiction. 157 Nearly all of
the disputed verdicts were given in trials on indictments for what
authorities deemed particularly egregious behavior. From their perspective, the jury was either corrupt, in the sense of acting for personal gain,
or wilfully dishonest, in the sense of going against their true beliefs out of
contempt for the law. It is significant, for example, that these cases did
not raise the kind of issues raised by cases on the border between murder
and manslaughter. These issues did emerge by the middle of the seventeenth century, by which time the common-law courts had inherited from
Star Chamber the power to monitor verdicts and to fine and imprison
jurors who acted wrongfully . 158 By then, surely, the courts no longer
always required a theory of ministerial wrongdoing, and the true issue of
coercion-as opposed to protecting against foul play-was squarely
presented. As we shall see, coercion on such grounds was practiced, but
also protested, and never entirely assimilated.
Whatever the theory was upon which jury verdicts were monitored and
jurors punished, because of the presumption of ministerial wrongdoing
that theory was broad enough to cover virtually any case wherein the
bench believed the defendant ought to have been found guilty on the
evidence. In practice, then, juries were sometimes "menaced" or even
punished, and whether one thinks contemporaries viewed these constraints as prevention of perjury or as coercion of jurors' consciences,
they were a part of the criminal process that presumably left its mark both
upon the fate of defendants and on contemporaries' understanding of the
role of the criminal trial jury.
157. See William Hudson, A Treatise on the Court of Star Chamber, in Francis Hargrave,
ed., Collectanea Juridica, 2 vols. (London, 1791-92), vol. 2, p. 72. Hudson addresses the
issue of peijury, which he does not define. He asserts that in the Tudor period "there was
scarce one Term pretermitted but some grand inquest, or jury was fined for acquitting felons
or murderers; in which case lay no attaint.'' Hudson gives several examples, some of which
relate to grand juries, a coroner's inquest jury, persons 'lying in an affidavit or examination.
Six appear to be trial juries: Throckmorton's jury and five others (including the one that
acquitted one Hoody, who may be the same Hoody as in STAC 5, A 3, no. 30, above, n.
153). Hudson does not make clear the reasons for the fines. Peijury probably means a
conscious lie under oath, and excludes merely foolish (or otherwise) opinions about the
evidence. It might include "lying" in order to extend mercy in a case where the jury
honestly believes mercy is appropriate, but possibly it was charged only where, on the
bench's view of the evidence, the jury was acting out of fear, favoritism, or contempt for the
law. See also R. Crompton, Authoritie et Jurisdiction des Courts (London, 1637), fol. 32b.
158. See below, Chapter 6, section II.
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IV
The increased duties and activity of the justices of the peace insured
that the institution of indictment by true bill would supplant the more
ancient system of presentment. The indictment procedure and the preparation necessary to it paved the way for the pretrial examinations and the
production of witnesses that were central to early modern prosecutorial
practice. In turn, systematic in-court presentation of evidence enhanced
the powers of the trial judge, while it diminished the evidence-gathering
role of the jury, and thus its powers. The new triangular relationship of
prosecution, judge, and jury accompanied the development of substantive
legal doctrine, a development that the Tudor adjustment of benefit of
clergy helped greatly to stimulate; doctrinal refinement and gradation of
offenses eased the tension between judge and jury, though tension
remained and occasionally the bench used one technique or another to
induce the outcome it desired. But trial by jury had by no means become
trial by the bench: older traditions were maintained, depended upon, and
further sanctified.
One important measure of the harshness of early modern criminal
process is the rate of execution for treason, murder, and felony. Modern
historians have recorded their shock at the numbers sent to the gallows,
for by eighteenth-century standards, not to mention later ones, the
numbers are high. 159 From the perspective of Elizabethan and Jacobean
Englishmen, too, these figures may have seemed lamentably high,J6o
though the execution scenes themselves were boisterous and revealed a
fascination with morbidity that was fueled by the popular chapbooks of
the day. 161 Nevertheless, although the numbers of men and women
hanged may have been high in absolute terms relative to those executed
in the Middle Ages, the percentage of those tried who were found guilty
of capital crimes and condemned was no higher than it had been for the
three preceding centuries, and the percentage of accuseds actually hanged
was substantially lower.J62

159. See Donald Veal!, The Popular Movement for Law Reform (Oxford, 1970), p. 3.
Veal! quotes statistics from J. C. Jeaffreson, ed., Middlesex County Records, 4 vols.
(London, 1886-92), vol. 2 (1887), p. xvii, and vol. 3 (1888), pp. xvii, xix, for executions in
Middlesex, 1608-58.
160. See Coke, Third Part of the Institutes, p. 255.
161. See Langbein, "Origins of Public Prosecution," pp. 326-34.
162. Cockburn, History of English Assizes, pp. 128-31. Cockburn estimates that "only
about ten per cent of those convicted were actually executed." He apparently is including
many who were convicted of a noncapital offense by virtue of jury leniency as well as those
convicted of a capital offense and subsequently favored by Crown or bench. His figure, then,
does not include those indicted for a capital offense who were ultimately acquitted. The
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Some of the means used to avoid carrying out sentences of death were
in the hands of the bench or Crown. Here, too, the transformation of
procedure played a role. The Crown now embarked on the large-scale
posttrial system of pardon and commutation that was to dominate the
administration ofthe criminal law well into the nineteenth century. To be
sure, reasons of state-rewarding the turning of state evidence, obtaining
fit and able military conscripts-accompanied the application of emerging
penological ideas and the influences of post-Reformation religious
thought. 163 But pretrial depositions as well as posttrial petitions rationalized selection of those to be saved. In this regard, the flow of evidence at
trial was of particular importance where the bench reprieved offenders it
believed had been convicted against the evidence. 164 Some of the of-

percentage of medieval accuseds hanged was 20-30. See above, Chapter I, n. 79. See also
Herrup, "Law and Morality in Seventeenth-Century England," nn. I, 9.
163. The problem of postconviction mitigation of the law of sanctions in the eighteenth
century is treated below, Chapter 7. The beginnings of this development have received
relatively little attention in the literature on the history of the criminal law. See Cockburn,
History of English Assizes, pp. 128-31; Cockburn, "Trial by the Book?" p. 75. See
Cockburn, Introduction, ch. ix, sect. vi. Pardons granted at the request of justices of assize
cited a variety of reasons for clemency. As a group, they are not markedly different in this
respect from the many more such pardons granted in the eighteenth century. See e.g. C
66/1329, mm.25-26 (July 2, 1584): (infanticide) on the information of the Mayor and J.P. and
on the plea of mercy from the jury; C 66/1256, m.32 (March 22, 1585): (clipping coin) in
consideration of convict's confession of the crime, his informing against an accomplice, and
the trivial extent of the offense; C 66/1388, m.27 (May 27, 1592): (housebreaking) a young
man led astray by comrades, able to do good service, and his first offense; C 66/1426,
mm.20-21 (July 14, 1594): (treasonable words) that she was pregnant at the time and in
compassion for thefrailty of her mind; C 66/1413, mm.ll-12 (May 24, 1596): (burglary) truly
sorry for his offenses, has revealed many criminals, some of whom have threatened him with
death or robbed him of his goods; C 66/1591, m.22 (Nov. 14, 1602): (highway robbery) acted
on the instigation of an accuser and also he is young and it is his first offense.
164. Smith provides insight into reprieve on grounds of an unsafe verdict (De Republica
Anglorum, ed. Dewar, p. 120): "If the enquest of xii men do seeme to the Judges and the
Justices to have gon too violently against the evidence given in matters criminall, either it is
that upon slender evidence they have pronounced him gilty, whom the judges and most part
of the Justices thinkes by the evidence not fullie prooved guiltie, or for some other cause,
do thinke the person rather worthie to live than to die. The enquest is neverthelesse
dismissed: but when the Judges should pronounce the sentence of death ... he [sic] will
differ it, which is called to reprive the prisoner (that is to say to send him againe to prison)
and so declare the matter to the Prince, and obtaineth after a time for the prisoner his
pardon: for as for provocation and appeale which is used so much in other countries, it hath
no place in England, after sentence given by the xii."
The bench might also seize upon technical error in the indictment (so that the defendant
might move to quash the indictment) where it believed the verdict unsafe or the punishment
too harsh. See Baker, ed., Reports of Sir John Spelman, 2:301.
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fenders who were reprieved were conscripted into the military, 165 transported overseas, 166 or unconditionally pardoned 167 after sentence had
been pronounced. More were never sentenced at all but were allowed
clergy despite their ineligibility or their failure to read, or were allowed
claim of pregnancy although they were not in fact pregnant, or had not
been at the time of their conviction. 168 In these latter cases, too, the
defendant's fate was in the hands of the bench, although it is possible that
the jury that convicted had reason to anticipate such merciful treatment.
Leaving aside all such instances of postconviction escape from the
gallows, the percentage of accuseds the jury had reason to believe it was
condemning to death was little if at all higher than in the Middle Ages. It
is, then, fair to ask whether very much had changed with regard to the
balance of power between judge and jury.
Indeed, there had been change. By redefining the scope of capital
felony, the Crown turned a significant percentage of the cases involving
concealed verdicts against the law into lawful verdicts of clergyable
felony or simple misdemeanor. These verdicts had the imprimatur of the
bench; juries in these cases were now finding fact in accordance with the
accepted view of their role. Moreover, in some cases where the jury left
to its own devices might have found a clergyable offense, the bench
induced, even directed, a verdict of capital felony. And probably in many
cases in which the defendant received merciful treatment, it was the
bench, not the jury, that made the decision to mitigate the law. This was
obviously so where reprieve or pardon followed conviction; it was
arguably so where the jury extended mercy on the recommendation of the
bench, a matter to which we shall turn in due course.
165. Cockburn, History of English Assizes, p. 129. See Cockburn. Introduction, ch. ix,
sect. vi.
166. Ibid., p. 130. See M. S. Gretton, ed., Oxfordshire Justices of the Peace in the
Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 1934), pp. lxxxix-ci.
167. See class C 66 passim. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. ix, sect. ii.
168. Cockburn, History of English Assizes, pp. 128-29. The bench might, on the other
hand, apply the literacy test strictly. See Baker, "Criminal Justice at Newgate," p. 315,
where the Recorder (H.L.S. MS 112, p. 297) doubted that a convicted felon who read
"distinctly and well" could in fact read. Believing the defendant had memorized the usual
lines, the Recorder assigned the defendant another passage. [The defendant read the new
passage with ease; the reporter "doubted whether (the defendant) ought to be put to read
again." Had the "Quod legit ut clericus" been entered on the record, the reporter stated,
"clearly ... (the defendant) ought not then to have had another (passage) assigned him."]
On judicial treatment of convicted women who claimed pregnancy see Cockburn, Introduction, ch. xi, sect. iii. As Cockburn points out, the bench often exercised leniency in such
cases. According to Cockburn's figures [ibid., ch. xi, sect. vi (table II)], about 15 percent of
indicted persons were female; about 40 percent of indicted females were convicted; of those,
about one third successfully claimed pregnancy. See also Herrup, "Common Peace," ch. 5,
for similar indictment and conviction figures.
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In sum, the Tudor transformation of criminal procedure combined
several interrelated factors that greatly increased judicial control over the
exercise of discretion. In a sense, the Crown and bench had turned their
weakness into a strength. Unable to impose rules of law greatly at
variance with widespread social attitudes, authorities modified the substantive law, implicitly recognizing the power of those attitudes and
dramatically reducing the field of disputed cases. Resolution of these
cases was kept largely in governmental hands: making use of the tools of
pretrial examinations and witnesses for the prosecution, the bench
monitored verdicts, employed blunt threats, and, where necessary, called
upon the support of Star Chamber process. Having secured convictions in
apparent conformity to the rules of law, the bench made a show of its
beneficence through relieving the rigors of these very rules in selected
cases.
There were, of course, limits to the Tudor and early Stuart revolution
in criminal trial procedure. Even in state trials, where acquittals were
relatively rare, 169 some juries stood firm although the evidence against the
accused was strong enough to produce a close case. 170 In routine felony
trials juries held out more frequently in the face of pressure from the
bench. 17 1 Jury finality regarding the facts put in evidence was by no means
completely overthrown; not only did it remain a matter of daily practice
but, given the narrowness of the government's most commonly stated
rationale for the punishment of juries, it retained vitality at the level of
legal theory . 172 Finally, and most important, the relative strength or
weakness of the government was reflected in the scope of the cases it
chose-or dared-to dispute.
For a variety of reasons, the government often chose to work with and
not against juries in order to achieve its central aims. The administration
of the criminal law had made important strides forward with regard to
determining the outcome of significant cases, but those cases were still a
very small percentage of the total number of criminal offenses. Much
crime went unreported, or unprosecuted;m evidence in routine cases
169. See Elton, Policy and Police, p. 397; Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, pp. 169-72.
170. Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, p. 181.
171. Cockburn, "Trial by the Book?" p. 73 (by implication; see above, n. 109). Cockburn
(Introduction, ch. vi, sect. iv) argues that after the mid-1570s the jury was very passive, as
evidenced by, inter alia, the absence of Home Circuit bindings over to Star Chamber. See
my comments below, n. 179.
172. See also below, n. 179.
173. Cockburn, "Nature and Incidence of Crime," pp. 50-5!. Cockburn cites the "not
implausible" estimate of a contemporary magistrate, Edward Hext, that 80 percent of all
criminals evaded trial. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. viii, sect. i. See also Bruce Lenman
and Geoffrey Parker, "The State, the Community and the Criminal Law in Early Modern
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often was hard to obtain; and only so many juries could be brought under
control. The machinery of detection and prosecution simply failed to hold
its own. Moreover, so many offenders had been statutorily precluded
from pleading benefit of clergy that in property crimes especially the rules
of law and social attitudes remained apart. 174 The number of cases in
which jury and bench were bound to clash was once again on the rise. At
the same time, by the late sixteenth century the continued increase in
criminal activity had reached what authorities thought were crisis levels.
This may have increased the interest of society in prosecution, conviction, and punishment, but only to a point: the severity of the law of
sanctions and perhaps also a growing sense that much property crime was
less the product of inherent evil than the result of the economic troubles
of the day 175 undermined the effectiveness of law enforcement at all
stages.
Then as now authorities lacked a coherent strategy for dealing with
serious criminal behavior. Rather, they responded in several contradictory ways. On the one hand, authorities apparently experimented with a
form of "plea bargaining," reducing charges from nonclergyable to
clergyable (or to petty larceny) in return for guilty pleas. In so doing, the
bench implicitly conceded that it could not ensure a guilty verdict at the
capital level or even count on a given jury to convict of minor theft or of
manslaughter rather than acquit the defendant altogether. 176 On the other
hand, the bench urged-even coerced-juries to convict defendants in
order to set an example. In still other cases, the bench encouraged juries
to undervalue goods and convict the defendant of a clergyable offense,
Europe," in Gatrell et al., eds., Crime and the Law: The Social History of Crime in Western
Europe since 1500, pp. 18-20.
174. Probably this was not so with regard to professional criminals or hardened rogues
who committed highway robbery and burglary; it may have been so with regard to first
offenders who committed these offenses "opportunistically." Inflation had driven many
petty robbers into the ranks of the nonclergyable.
175. The problem of the relationship between jury behavior and attitudes toward the
causes of crime is addressed below, Chapter 7, section III, with reference to the late
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the
evidence is sparser and more difficult to assess. Some contemporaries seem to have equated
crime and poverty, not always in a sympathetic fashion. Cockburn, "Nature and Incidence
of Crime," pp. 60-61. Society as a whole may have adopted a more sympathetic view. Much
remains to be done, perhaps county by county. See Herrup's pioneering work, "The
Common Peace," ch. 6. Herrup assesses the relationships among religion, poverty, crime,
and mercy in her study based upon early seventeenth-century East Sussex quarter sessions
and assizes. See also T. C. Curtis and F. M. Hale, "English Thinking about Crime," in
Louis A. Knafia, ed., Crime and Criminal Justice in Europe and Canada (Waterloo,
Ontario, 1981), pp. I 16-26. And see my comments below, Chapter 9, section III.
176 .. Cockburn (Introduction, ch. vi. sect. ii) suggests that "plea bargaining" was
undertaken to avoid time-consuming jury trials.
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either to avoid the possibility of a full acquittal against the evidence or,
out of compassion, to do rough justice in cases where the punishment
would otherwise have appeared disproportionate to the culpability of the
offender. Inevitably, especially in close cases, the bench had either to
fight with juries or to adopt their standards of justice and, having thus
stamped most resolutions as in accordance with judicial will, to allow
juries some leeway in reaching their verdict. 177 There was a cost in this:
the failure to contest the verdicts of merely merciful juries, seen alongside
the determined attempt to overturn verdicts authorities viewed as corrupt
and truly damaging, must have reinforced society's sense that jury
insistence upon the former kind of verdict was appropriate. The bench
strove, of course, to retain its substantial degree of control over such
discretion. By recommending merciful acquittals or partial verdicts, the
bench attempted to maintain the notion that the discretion to mitigate the
law lay with it and not with the jury. But not all could have been really
deceived. It was in fact a shared power, and the age-old view that a shared
power was integral to the very right to trial by peers survived the legal
transformations of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries .178
Two important additional factors guaranteed the survival of the tradition of the jury's right to exercise discretion. The fact that the trial
remained oral and personal reinforced the popular conception that the
trial was as much an assessment of just deserts as it was a search for the
truth in the case at hand. This was not, of course, the way in which
authorities viewed the matter. The oral and personal trial was also
consistent with the view that the jury was bound to find the facts and
nothing else. It represented both the concession of a fundamental right to
have the truth of accusations tested under the most grueling circumstances and the potentially contradictory notion that the accused could
not be shielded by another personality from the heat of the contest.
Nevertheless, so long as the sanction for felony remained so severe, and
so long as it applied at least in theory to so large a field of cases, the very
nature of the trial was bound to be seen as related to the concept of
merciful verdicts.
Moreover, the development of the substantive law of homicide at once
reduced the number of disputed cases and provided cover for jury
discretion in some of those cases in which the jury was inclined to go its
177. I deal with this point more generally, below, Chapter 7, section IV.
178. Some contemporaries may have exaggerated the barbarousness of English law,
because, as Baker points out (Reports of Sir John Spelman, 2:299, 300), of their understatement of the "extent to which sanctuary, abjuration, clergy and the jury system itself, saved
lesser felons from the gallows." But it is likely that society at large, though it may have
viewed the law of sanctions, and occasionally its application, as "barbarous," understood
the extent of mitigation of the law in practice.
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own way. The question of life or death more than ever depended upon a
subtle assessment of intent, and that assessment had to be made retrospectively by way of inferences drawn from the defendant's present
assertions and demeanor.
The survival of the right to grant merciful verdicts did not, in logic,
imply the survival of the power to find the law. This power had never had
a grounding in theory; the medieval jury's de facto power to find law had
always been founded on the realities of process. The age of nearly
unlimited jury control of evidence was passing; the age of the law and of
the bench was commencing. The conflict between judicial and social
concepts of liability remained, to be played out perhaps less often but far
more visibly in the courtroom relationship between judge and jury.
Whether the jury would return a verdict clearly at odds with the evidence
set forth by the prosecution, in the face of judicial charge and threat of
punishment, was now the question upon which control of the legal
process depended. The right of the jury to do so had now to be invented
and given a place in political and constitutional theory . 179
179. How far the balance of power had in fact shifted from jury to judge-leaving aside,
for a moment, the question of society's perception of the matter-remains unclear.
Marshaling evidence regarding several related points of procedure, Cockburn (Introduction,
ch. x) draws the inference that on the Home Circuit after the mid-1570s the jury was virtually
a passive body. I do not find the arguments for such a view of the jury entirely persuasive
even for the Home Circuit. (Cockburn concedes that his conclusion might not apply to other
circuits.) I shall summarize and comment upon Cockburn's main points.
Cockburn notes that the increase in the number of indictments in the latter half of
Elizabeth's reign led the bench to experiment with plea bargaining, thereby removing many
cases from the jury. To speed up trial procedure and to reduce the total number of jurors
required to hear cases, judges increased the number of cases that a single jury heard before
retiring. Each case, Cockburn concludes, must have proceeded rapidly, given the number of
cases tried in the few days during which the bench sat; the relatively inexperienced jurors
(most sat at only one assize) cannot have found it easy to keep each case separate or to recall
much more than the judge's opinion as to the appropriate outcome. Few cases (5-10 percent)
resulted in partial verdicts, which suggests relatively little recourse to discretion on the part
of the jury. After 1575, there is little evidence of judicial punishment of jurors, which again
is suggestive of the degree to which the jury did as the bench bade it to do.
The overall trend seems clear, and in the main we are in accord on the point that the bench
exercised very substantial control. Certainly this seems to have been the case at Home
Circuit assizes. But judicial control had its limits; and even when it was dominant, it did not
preclude some significant degree of jury-based mitigation. I have dealt in my own essay with
some of the factors to which Cockburn points, but have not drawn from them the same
inference with regard to the role of the jury.
I think it particularly important that redrafted indictments and plea bargains siphoned off
a large number of cases in which the jury might otherwise have exercised discretion, though
it seems to me that this suggests not only that judges sought to expedite process but also that
they entertained doubts about their ability to obtain a capital conviction in such cases. At
any rate, this hardly accounts for the great majority of cases; and Cockburn himself shows
that much mitigation was postconviction, by virtue of judicial intervention. Thus not all
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cases where mercy was thought appropriate had been dealt with before they went to the
jury. We cannot assume, therefore, that the jury did not have the opportunity to extend
mercy; more likely (as Cockburn would agree), the jury substantially reduced the number of
cases that the bench would otherwise have dealt with through posttrial reprieve and
recommendation for pardon. The question remains, Did the jury do so solely on judicial
mandate?
Multiple arraignments must have made it somewhat more difficult for jurors to keep
individual cases in mind. But jurors would not have found it beyond them to recall the one
or two (if that many) of the six or so defendants arraigned for whom they independently
concluded that death was too harsh a sanction. As Cockburn establishes, ten to twenty cases
per day meant that each case averaged no more than half an hour, and many cases took no
more than fifteen or twenty minutes. But jurors (on Cockburn's evidence) did not deliberate
after each case. Rather, they deliberated toward the end of a two-or-three-hour period of
testimony. For all we know, many cases took a mere ten minutes and the total time for
deliberation was that much longer. For the few "difficult" cases there may well have been
ample time. It is premature to conclude that jurors, who typically sat only at one assize
session, were too inexperienced to reach decisions on their own: they may well have sat
previously at quarter sessions or on any of the many other kinds of juries of the day.
Doubtless, service before royal judges was more awe-inspiring and induced an unusual
degree of timidness. Cockburn's findings concerning frequent resort to mere bystanders and
the apparent institution of professional jurors are in this regard of great importance. It is not
clear, however, that these corruptions rendered jurors "passive" in all, or even most cases.
Judicial attitudes probably deterred acquittals in egregious cases and ensured them where
the offense was slight: as I have argued, changes in the law and the use of benefit of clergy
had brought judge and jury closer together. But judicial attitudes had probably changed in
other ways, too, perhaps also because of the press of business. We cannot be certain that the
bench cared very deeply about the ultimate resolution of all those close cases that had not
already been resolved through bargain. It is true that there were relatively few partial
verdicts on the Home Circuit, but there were many acquittals. Why should not these stand
as some evidence of jury-based discretion? Many acquittals followed a pattern that suggests
that the quantum of evidence was not the sole determinant. It is, of course, possible that the
bench told juries to acquit women or persons who stole one kind of object rather than
another; more likely, however, juries were themselves inclined to do so, and where the
offense did not seem particularly serious, or definitively proven, the bench did not attempt
to dissuade them.
It is not even clear that in the more serious cases the bench always had its way. Cockburn
(Introduction, ch. ix, sect. i) states that "forty two percent of those tried for non-clergyable
highway robbery were acquitted." This was a relatively serious offense, and Cockburn cites
the acquittal rates as dramatic evidence of the reluctance to send offenders to the gallows.
But whose reluctance? Can all these acquittals really have been mandated by the bench?
Moreover, there were cases, Cockburn states (idem), where, because "attempts to
influence the jury were time consuming," judges "simply ignored the jury verdict and
ordered the punishment of prisoners whose delinquency was, presumably, notorious or had
been demonstrated to the judge's satisfaction by the evidence. Despite acquittal, such men
might be whipped [or] imprisoned." This in itself suggests a certain degree of jury
independence, and it reveals the effects on the bench of the all-important constraints oftime.
Juries in such cases might have been frustrated in their desire to acquit, but not in their
desire to prevent execution. They might in fact have been well satisfied with the "compromise" punishments that were inflicted.
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In some other, perhaps less serious cases, jury resolution probably went on as before, at
least in the popular imagination. Surely the bench often recommended a specific verdict, but
it was still the jury that actually rendered that verdict. In form, certainly, the jury undertook
the exercise of discretion. Often it did so in substance as well, in a certain sense: i.e., if we
ask, not merely whether the bench gave orders, but whether jurors thought of themselves as
sharing in the decisions they were rendering. For even when judges were dominating juries,
they were often using them to register verdicts that departed from the letter of the law and
accorded with widely held social attitudes; and, from the point of view of the bench, so
much the better if the jury genuinely favored the result. To be sure, Cockburn's important
work suggests we must proceed with great caution. Nonetheless, I believe it remains a fair
conclusion that, amid all the abuses, shortcuts, and cynicism, from the perspectives both of
jurors and of the observing community, the exercise of jury-based discretion remained a part
of the doing of justice, even at Home Circuit assizes. Surely this could have been the case
on other circuits. As Cockburn points out (Introduction, ch. ix. sect. i), partial verdicts
appear to have been common at London and Middlesex trials, and the struggle between
bench and jury reflected in punishments at the bar or in Star Chamber continued in still other
parts of England, long after Home Circuit justices had, for whatever reason, abandoned the
practice of formally disciplining jurors.

5

Conscience and the True Law:
The Ideology of Jury Law-Finding
in the Interregnum

The government that tried and condemned Charles I in January, 1649,
found later the same year that it was unable to have its way with John
Lilburne. As leader of the Levellers, the most imposing of the groups that
clashed with the Cromwellian regime, Lilburne appealed to his jurors, in
a celebrated phrase, "as judges of law as well as fact. " 1 When the jury
acquitted him of treason, this claim to a "jury right"-a right of the jury
to decide the law-brought the criminal trial jury for the first time into the
forefront of English constitutional and political debate.2
The emergence of a theory of the jury's right to decide the law was not
in any simple way a reaction to the transformation of criminal process in
early modern England. On the one hand, much of what the radical
reformers attacked predated the Tudor period; on the other, much of their
program was inspired by the political crisis that accompanied the struggle
against the Stuart monarchy .3 Nevertheless, the Leveller attack on the
judiciary in criminal cases was a response to the power and behavior of
the bench, and that power and behavior were largely owing to new forms
of criminal procedure.
1. See below, text at nn. 67-77. On the Levellers see e.g. H. N. Brailsford, The Levellers
and the English Revolution (London, 1961); Joseph Frank, The Levellers (Cambridge,
Mass., 1955); G. E. Aylmer, ed., The Levellers in the English Revolution (London, 1975),
pp. 9-55. Aylmer reviews the history of the Levellers and discusses recent literature that
points to important differences among the leaders of the movement. See also Robert B.
Seaberg, "Remembering the Past: Historical Aspects of Leveller Political
Thought, "doctoral dissertation (Syracuse University, 1977). Seaberg takes issue with much
recent writing on the main thrust of Leveller thought; see below, n. 32.
2. This obviously has relevance to debate in published works. The issue appears not to
have been formulated as one regarding a right to "find law" until the late 1640s either in
published writings or in discourse generally. If it was formulated earlier, it appears not to
have attained widespread currency.
3. In one sense, the Leveller program was aimed at the Westminster bench as it had
developed since the twelfth century. I suggest below (text at nn. 36-37) that the Levellers
overstated the actual powers of the bench (and understated those of the jury) in the medieval
period. In their minds, they were attacking usages that long predated the Tudor period. Not
only were they attacking what they took to be ancient practices, but they were also
contending with particularly virulent symptoms of what they believed to be the Norman
disease that had manifested themselves in the Parliamentary struggle against Charles I.
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At the same time, the radicals' insistence on a community-based
system of criminal justice was not a claim to an entirely novel approach
to the criminal law. For, as we have seen, even as the power of the bench
increased, some substantial degree of reliance on the trial jury's discretion continued. And if the bench viewed such discretion as appropriate
within fairly narrow limits, others might have inferred from actual
practice that the jury was supposed to have considerable leeway in
rendering verdicts according to its sense of justice. Of course, what the
radicals most insisted upon the actual administration of justice did clearly
deny them: truly local trials before a lay bench or before a weak official
bench. 4 For the government, jury discretion was tolerable only within the
context of a centrally administered, closely overseen, and highly managed
system of criminal law. For at least some of the government's opponents
the purpose of jury discretion-the essence of the historic right to trial by
peers-was being frustrated by what had become the official approach to
the administration of the criminal law.
What did Lilburne mean by the jury's right to decide "law as well as
fact"? What was the source of his theory of trial by jury? How did that
theory evolve during the Commonwealth? In the discussion that follows,
I shall attempt to answer these questions through an analysis of Leveller
political theory and the conception of English history on which it was
based. The "jury right" was more than just another Leveller reform item:
the supposed right lay at the very heart of Leveller political and social
theory, and at least in its theoretical implications the right involved the
gravest threat that the Levellers posed to the governments of the
Interregnum. For Lilburne and for some of his followers, the coercion of
jurors meant more than the deprivation of the defendant's right to trial by
jury. Coercion of jurors also meant the loss by Englishmen of control over
the law. Finality of the verdict of the country had long implied the sanctity
of the community's judgment concerning the accused. Now it also came
to stand for the sanctity of the community's judgment regarding the
substance of the ''true law.''
The Levellers were only one of many groups that comprised the
mid-seventeenth-century movement for reform of the law. There were
many sides to that movement, nearly all of which, save for the debate
over the criminal trial jury, have received significant scholarly attention.
It may be useful to sketch the outlines of the entire movement and the
Levellers' distinctive place within it against the background of the Civil
War and its immediate aftermath, the Interregnum governments. 5
4. See below, text at nn. 85 et seq., for discussion of such writers as John Jones and
James Frese.
5. The most recent and comprehensive account of the movement for law reform is Donald
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Even before the outbreak of the Civil War, the Long Parliament forced
upon Charles I the abolition of the Courts of Star Chamber and High
Commission. 6 Reform of the common-law judiciary included dismissal
and punishment of those judges who, in Parliament's eyes, had rendered
unconstitutional decisions; after the Civil War began in 1642, it also
included attempts to subject the bench to parliamentary (as opposed to
executive) control.7 The legal reformers in Parliament moved against
feudal tenures and the Courts of Wards and Liberties, and reflected broad
agreement among the propertied as a whole on the need to undertake
reform of some of the procedures that resulted in excessive costs and
delays both in the common-law courts and in Chancery.
Divisions among groups demanding law reform were soon mirrored by
divisions within the revolutionary movement. The Levellers were among
the first to challenge the moderate goals of the parliamentary leadership
during the Civil War. They were a mixture of soldiers from the ranks of
the New Model Army that had been formed under the leadership of Oliver
Cromwell in 1645, and civilians, who by the mid-1640s experienced
disenchantment with the limited goals espoused by the leaders of the
parliamentary cause.s The surrender of Charles I in 1646 and the
commencement of negotiations between the king and Parliament for a
reformed constitutional monarchy alienated the burgeoning Leveller
movement and gave it a basis for opposition. In a profusion of tracts and
broadsides, this embryonic opposition proclaimed its demands for reform
of suffrage and for social and legal reform. The last entailed a trenchant
attack on the common law, both private and public, and particularly on
Veall, The Popular Movement for Law Reform (Oxford, 1970). See also Stuart Prall, The
Agitation for Law Reform during the Puritan Revolution (The Hague, 1966); Barbara
Shapiro, "Law Reform in Seventeenth Century England," American Journal of Legal
History, vol. 19 (1975), pp. 288-97; G. B. Nourse, "Law Reform under the Commonwealth
and Protectorate," Law Quarterly Review, vol. 75 (1959), pp. 512-29; C. R. Niehaus, "The
Issue of Law Reform in the Puritan Revolution," doctoral dissertation (Harvard Univ.,
1957); Mary Cotterell, "Interregnum Law Reform: The Hale Commission of 1652," English
Historical Review, vol. 83 (1968), pp. 689-704.
6. For the abolition of Star Chamber (and the conciliar courts of the Council of the
Marches of Wales and the Council of the North) see Stat. 16 Chas. I, c. 10 (l64l); for the
abolition of High Commission see Stat. 16 Chas. I, c. II (1641).
7. See Shapiro, "Law Reform in Seventeenth Century England," and sources cited
therein.
8. Mark A. Kishlansky, "The Army and the Levellers: The Roads to Putney," Historical
Journal, vol. 22 (1979), pp. 795-824. Kishlansky downplays Leveller influence in the army
before late 1647. Moreover, until 1647 the Levellers' disenchantment with Parliament had
mostly to do with Presbyterian measures against the separatists and with their own
"ill-treatment" at parliamentary hands. See below, text at nn. 9 et seq., for discussion of the
post-1647 Leveller movement.
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the control over the common law manifested by the centralized bench at
Westminster and the elitist legal profession.
Negotiations with the king were paralleled in late 1647 by discussions
between Cromwell and the Army representatives of the radicals, many of
whom were now openly known by the epithet of ''Levellers.' '9 The
stalemate in the latter negotiations was followed by an outright conflict
between the Army's establishment leadership and some radicals, but the
escape of Charles and commencement of the second phase of the Civil
War (1648) brought all opponents of the king closer together. Lilburne
(who had been held in the Tower for his attacks on Parliament, then
released in 1647 only to be sequestered once again the following year),
Richard Overton, and William Walwyn were by now widely recognized as
the leading Leveller publicists. w Rapprochement with Cromwell in 1648
halted neither Leveller diatribes against the Presbyterian-dominated
Parliament (including demands for religious toleration) nor their proposals
for "universal" male suffrage and a system of law accessible to the
common man.
Purged by the Army, the rump of the Long Parliament proceeded to
bring the captured king to trial and public execution. In February, 1649,
a Commonwealth was established to bring order to the strife-torn country. Although the Levellers had taken part in the discussions that led to
the purge and to the execution of Charles, they remained suspicious (to
put it mildly) of the Rump's membership, especially after the readmission
of the Conformists, and hostile to its reforms. These reforms included
appointment of a High Court of Justice, which did not provide for trial by
jury, and the passage of a series of Treason Acts .1 1 Leveller disenchantment and published criticism of the new regime resulted in the arrest of
Lilburne, Overton, Walwyn, and Thomas Prince. In May, the Army put
down a small Leveller rising at Burton with force. By the autumn of 1649,
when Lilburne was brought to trial, the movement had been largely
destroyed.
Political and religious radicalism, though no longer perceived as a
threat to the very existence of the regime, both pushed the Rump forward
and intensified its determination to embrace only a very moderate reform
program. It led, also, to the Rump's decision to afforce the activities of its
own parliamentary law committee by the creation of an extraparliamentary law reform commission under the leadership of the respected barrister
9. For discussion of the "Putney debates" see e.g. Brailsford, Levellers and the English
Revolution, ch. 13; Aylmer, ed., Levellers in the English Revolution, pp. 28-29, 32-33.
10. See sources cited above, n. 1. On Lilburne's career, arrests, protestations, etc., see
Pauline Gregg, Free-Born John: A Biography of John Lilburne (London, 1961).
11. Veall, Popular Movement for Reform, p. 163; Aylmer, ed., Levellers in the English
Revolution, pp. 45-46.
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Sir Matthew Hale . 12 Although the Hale Commission functioned during the
early 1650s to draw the steam out of the radical reform movement, it
promoted a number of substantial, moderate reform measures.B Its
failure to effect many of these, despite the dissolution in 1653 of the
Rump, reflected the power of the prevailing legal establishment and the
deep suspicion, prevalent even among moderates, of those groups,
largely, by this time, religious radicals, most insistent upon purifying the
common law and its institutions. The demonstrations surrounding
Lilburne's trial in 1653 for returning to England without permission while
under decree of banishment cannot have helped matters. 14
From late 1653, Cromwell was Lord Protector by virtue of a new,
written constitution. 15 For the next five years, until his death and brief
succession by his son Richard, the movement for far-reaching law reform
slipped into the background. Some changes in the legal system were
effected by the essentially moderate government, changes that did not
meet the demands of either the remnant of the Leveller movement or the
religious radicals (The Fifth Monarchy Men). These reforms, as well as
other moderate proposals for reforms that were debated but not enacted,
touched private common law, the Court of Chancery, the system of land
registration, and some aspects of the law of sanctions. 16 The record, by
the end of the Protectorate and the Restoration in 1660 of Charles II, was
one of intense and widespread interest in eliminating that part of the legal
quagmire that inconvenienced the propertied classes, but little more. As
we shall see, there were proposals regarding the jury. These, however,
were in the direction of securing more trustworthy jurors, not of democratizing the institution or of shifting power to it and away from the bench.
The jury reforms that the radical Levellers demanded were never seriously considered.
12. The definitive study of the Hale Commission is Cotterell, "Interregnum Law
Reform." Many members of the committee that selected the Hale Commission members sat
on the Parliamentary Law Committee. A majority of those selected either had been called
to the bar or had at least studied at one of the Inns of Court. Cotterell (ibid., p. 692) found
that thirteen members of the Commission were not radicals but were "men of power, wealth
and position, devoted to the pursuit of power and status, whose interest lay with a strong
establishment. ... They sought, not an overturning, but the reform continuity for which
Cromwell stood." Five "radicals" sat on the Commission. Three of the twenty-one
members cannot be assigned to either group (ibid., p. 693).
l3. Ibid., pp. 695-704. See also Shapiro, "Law Reform in Seventeenth Century England," pp. 291-97.
14. For Lilburne's 1653 trial see below, section VI.
15. For discussion of the "Instrument of Government," see J. P. Kenyon, The Stuart
Constitution (Cambridge, 1966), pp. 333-35; Godfrey Davies, The Early Stuarts, 1603-1660
(Oxford, 1959), pp. 176-77.
16. See sources cited above, n. l3.
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The term "Leveller"-it should be stressed at the outset-is employed
largely as a term of convenience. The Levellers were not a unified group;
those who called themselves Levellers, took part in Leveller demonstrations, or signed Leveller petitions stood for different positions on a
variety of issues.J7 Even those usually referred to as leaders of the
Levellers were by no means in agreement on all matters. Lilburne and
Walwyn differed in their religious views. Overton and Walwyn have been
considered "true Levellers," being more radical on social and economic
issues than Lilburne, Prince, and John Wildman, the "constitutional
Levellers." 18 As I shall indicate, there was no one Leveller theory
regarding the criminal trial jury. Nonetheless, there may have been more
agreement regarding that institution than any other. Political and social
disagreements were probably more pronounced with regard to the civil
jury, especially as it dealt with property issues, just as disagreements over
the institution of property itself loomed large among Leveller leaders and
their followers.I9
The account I shall give of Leveller political and historical theory is
generalized and obscures some differences among the leading Leveller
writers, but, again, these differences did not necessarily affect Leveller
views of the criminal trial jury. Most Levellers-indeed most Leveller
leaders-did not think deeply about the history of the jury. Although their
views about the jury were probably influenced by Lilburne's 1649 trial,
they did not develop a systematic theory that explained why the jury
ought to have the powers Lilburne claimed for it.
In what follows, I shall delineate the framework of ideas-political,
legal, social, and religious-into which contemporary radical claims
concerning the criminal trial jury seem to have fit. Though we cannot
know how many caught up in the Leveller movement viewed the
institution in any one way, we can attain a collective impression of the
range of views they held. I shall also identify the strain of Interregnum
radical (or law-finding) jury theory that was passed on to posterity. Here
disagreement between Lilburne and other more radical Leveller leaders
proved important. From the perspective of this book, it is the Leveller
legacy that is of greatest interest. In this essay, however, it is the more
radical, stillborn jury theory that receives greatest attention. In its light
we may understand the distance between many of the Levellers and the
Cromwellian regime; we may see how central the institution of the
17. For an excellent summary of the recent scholarship on Leveller factions and
disagreements among Leveller leaders see Aylmer, ed., Levellers in the English Revolution,
pp. 9-55.
18. Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down (New York, 1972), pp. 86-120.
19. Ibid., pp. 91-99.
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criminal trial jury was to a truly revolutionary conception of society; and
we may marvel both at the manipulation of contemporary historical
learning and at how far that learning was from the actual history of the
criminal trial jury.
There were three phases in the mid-seventeenth-century criminal trial
jury debate. In the first phase, up to Lilburne's 1649 trial, "radical" law
reformers combined an insistence on the right to indictment and trial by
peers with specific demands for frequent, convenient, and local trials.
Jurors were to be "of the neighborhood," for such persons were best
informed regarding the circumstances of the felony and the credibility of
the witnesses and principals. There was in this first period little, if any,
public discussion of the jurors' knowledge oflaw; indeed, the early tracts
assume the correctness of the "old decantatum": judges are to determine
the law; jurors are to determine the fact.2°
What Lilburne meant when he claimed in 1649 that his jurors were
"judges of law as well as of fact" is not entirely clear. The writings
occasioned by his 1649 trial, as the debate over the jury deepened,
represent the second phase of the jury argument. John Jones, who seems
to have shared many of the Levellers' ideas, gave meaning to Lilburne's
aphorism in the course of his elaboration upon traditional Leveller
historiography. His works set forth a far-reaching argument for total jury
control over the law, an argument that may have been no more than a
posthumous statement of Leveller theory a year after the Cromwellian
regime had largely destroyed the Leveller movement.21 Jones provided a
rationale for taking nearly all power out of the hands of the bench. His
defense of the jury right combined his own version of Leveller historical
views with a radical Puritan argument concerning the right of the people
to interpret the law as they would interpret Scripture, which he conceived
to be the law's principal basis.
The final phase of the debate over the jury right began with the regime's
second prosecution of Lilburne in 1653. Lilburne now enunciated a more
precise theory of the jury right, one that appears to have taken its form
from the specific circumstances of his prosecution. He claimed that the
statute of banishment under which he was tried was not valid under
English law. The jury had the right and duty, he argued, to judge a statute
or an indictment in the light of English fundamental law, and to acquit the
defendant if, despite a judicial charge to the contrary, the jury found that
the statute was void. Moreover, Lilburne now asserted that the jury ought
to acquit the defendant if it believed that the prescribed punishment was
20. See below, text at nn. 48-50.
21. For a discussion of the decline of the Leveller movement see Christopher Hill, The
Century of Revolution (Edinburgh, 1961), pp. 134, 139, 169-70.
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unconscionably severe in light of the acts proved to have been committed
by the defendant. The jury should test the "legality" of the indictment
and decide the fairness of the prescribed punishment. The elements of this
new law-finding theory proved to be of great significance. They did not
perish with the opposition to the Interregnum government but rather (as
we shall see in Chapter 6) passed into the hands of the Quakers and
subsequently became a staple of post-Restoration pro-jury argument.

I
For seven years the jury debate smoldered in revolutionary and
Commonwealth England. The debate began with Lilburne's 1646 tract,
The Just Man's Justification, and ended with the last of Lilburne's trials
in 1653. Ironically, the most intense discussion of the jury came in the
wake of Lilburne's trial in September, 1649, when the Levellers were no
longer a large and unified force. Only then did it become clear that, at
least for some of the more significant writers, the jury issue represented
one of the truly unifying themes of Interregnum radical political theory.
However, at the outset of the entire reform movement, which encompassed the activities of many different groups reflecting various
political views, the role of the jury in the everyday criminal trial was not
of great concern. For virtually all reformers, other demands respecting
the criminal law took precedence over the jury: among them bail, speedy
trials, reform of the law of sanctions, and prison reform.22 These
demands, which had their origin in early seventeenth-century reform
agitation,23 continued throughout the Interregnum to interest most reformers, including both moderates and those radicals who came to oppose
the new Cromwellian regime. Moreover, against the backdrop of the
entire law reform movement, reform of the criminal law was for most
reformers only one of many issues, and it was concerned less with a
vision of a new society than with mitigation of the necessary evils of the
old society. In time, the criminal law might wither away; for the present,
it ought not to be so repressive.
The modest aims of early Leveller thought regarding the jury are
reflected in the third Agreement of the People (1649), which declared that
"judgments of conviction of life, limb, liberty or estate" must not be
achieved other than by "twelve sworn men of the neighborhood; to be
22. See e.g. Richard Overton, Certain Articles for the good of the Commonwealth
(London, July 17, 1647), [British Library (hereafter, B.L.): E. 398(28)], reprinted in Aylmer,
ed., Levellers in the English Revolution, pp. 82-87. See generally Veal!, Popular Movement
for Law Reform, chs. 5-7. Cotterell ("Interregnum Law Reform") provides the best account
of the "moderate" reforms that were eventually taken up by the Hale Commission.
23. Shapiro, "Law Reform in Seventeenth Century England," pp. 281-88.
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chosen in some free way by the people ... and not picked and imposed,
as hitherto in many places they have been.' ' 24 This declaration brought
together the three principal pre-1649 demands about the criminal trial
jury: that all felony trials be jury trials, that the jury come from the
neighborhood where the crime was committed, that the jury be selected
by the people rather than by officials.
Speedy, cheap, and local trials met with the approbation of many early
reform writers. Several tracts complained of the time-consuming and
costly trips to Westminster, though it is true that these complaints were
mainly directed at the hardships of civil pleas.zs But the decentralization
issue was not one-sided: critics countered that the hundreds could not
produce a sufficient number of competent persons, either literates or men
of reputation. 26 For the most part, consideration of convenience and
capacity dominated the discussion concerning jury trials until, in late
24. An Agreement of the Free People of England (London, May I, 1649), [B.L.: E.
571(10)], p. 6, § xxv, reprinted in William Haller and Godfrey Davies, eds., The Leveller
Tracts (Gloucester, Mass., 1964), pp. 318-28. (This tract was probably authored by
Lilburne, William Walwyn, Overton, and Thomas Prince.) In an earlier section of the
Agreement the authors stated that in all capital cases other than treason "recompense shall
be made to the parties damnified, as well out of the estate of the malefactor, as by loss of life,
according to the conscience of his jury" (p. 6, § xxi).
The 1647 Agreement of the People (London, Nov. 3, 1647), [B.L.: E. 412 (21)], reprinted
in Aylmer, ed., Levellers in the English Revolution, pp. 89-96, did not deal directly with the
jury. The 1648 Agreement of the People (London, Dec. 10, 1648), [B.L.: E. 476(26)],
provided that "judgment or conviction of life, liberty, or estate" should be "only by twelve
sworn men of the neighborhood" (p. 14, § 9).
25. E.g. To His Excellency Thomas Lord Fairfax: . .. The Humble Representation of the
Desires of the Officers and Souldiers ... for the County of Northumberland (London, Dec.
5, 1648), [B.L.: E. 475(13)], p. 5; The Declarations and Humble Representations of the
Officers and Souldiers in Colonel Scroops [etc.] Regiment (London, Dec. 7, 1648), [B.L.: E.
475(24)], p. 5; A Petition presented by the Inhabitants of Newport-Paynell (London, Dec.
26, 1648), [B.L.: 669 f. 13(63)]; The Humble Petition and Representation of the Officers and
Soldiers of the Garison of Portsmouth (London, Jan. 18, 1649), [B.L.: 699 f. 13(73)]. See
also Gerrard Winstanley, More Light Shining in Buckinghamshire (London, March 30,
1649), in G. Sabine, ed., The Works of Gerrard Winstanley (Ithaca, N.Y., 1941), p. 638:
"[T]hat all trials be in every hundred by twelve men of the same neighborhood"; The
Remonstrance of( those Reproachfully called) the Levellers (London, Sept. 21, 1649), [B.L.:
E. 574(15)], p. 6.
26. E.g. The Representative of Divers well-affected persons in and about the City of
London (London, Feb. 6, 1649), [B.L.: E. 541(16)], p. 1: "[I]t is impossible to find a
competent number of jurors to try any criminal or civil matter within any Hundred in
England ... whereunto there shall not be put in a lawful challenge, that they are either
kinsmen, friends, tenants, parties, or concerned in the matter"; William Ashurst, Reasons
against Agreement with . .. The Agreement of the People (London, Dec. 26, 1648), [B.L.:
E. 536(4)], p.ll: "And all this justice to be done, and lie in the breasts of twelve men in every
hundred, who may be chosen of men that can neither write, read, nor have any estates." See
also below, nn. 112-20 and accompanying text.
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1649, Lilburne focused attention on the law-finding role of the criminal
trial jury. Only then did discussion center on the history and purpose of
the institution rather than on its formal attributes.
Nevertheless, from 1646 on, Lilbume was feeling his way toward the
proposition he announced in the heat of his 1649 trial. Just Man's
Justification had called for trials "in the County, or Hundred ... without
any appeal but to a Parliament." All causes civil and criminal should
"monthly be judged by twelve men, of free and honest condition, chosen
by themselves, with their grave or chief officer amongst them .... " 27 For
Lilburne, local trials meant both freedom from the obfuscations of
Westminster jurists and jury control over determination of guilt or
innocence. Jurors were to "judge" cases, a term Lilburne did not explain;
control over law, as separate from and in addition to control over fact,
was at most an implicit assumption of this early tract. Lilburne criticized
what he implied were typical aspects of the criminal trial-the formidable
justices, whose rulings were both incomprehensible to the defendant and
beyond challenge by him; the incompetent jury, selected from knownothings of the city rabble and willing to follow the judge's lead. 28
Lilburne sought in his 1646 tract to return the trial to what he deemed its
historic place in the local community. The tenor of the tract suggests that
despite the routine nature of the demands in successive versions of the
Agreement of the People, the criminal trial jury played a significant role
in Leveller thought.29
The Leveller conception of the criminal trial jury was based upon a
distinctive view of the history and nature of English law. How was it that
the Levellers' legal theory could combine systematic criticism of the
common law with a glorification of the jury system? To answer this
question, it will be useful to set forth some elements of the Levellers'
"Norman Yoke" theory of history, which was a reaction against the
establishment historical view inherited in the late 1630s from Sir Edward
Coke.
27. John Lilburne, The Just Man's Justification (London, June 10, 1646), [B.L.: E.
340(12)], p. 15.
28. Lilburne railed against the use of Latin ("and so without [the people's] understanding" [ibid., pp. 11-12]), the inconvenience of the Westminster courts, and the coercive
aspects of the Westminster bench (ibid., p. 15).
29. See also John Lilburne, The Copy of a Letter (London, Aug. 9, 1645), [B.L.: E.
296(5)], p. 17, which may refer mainly to civil cases: "Oh for Justice! Justice betwixt a man
and his neighbour, impartially, without respect of persons, which alone under God is the
only cure of all England's maladies." Hill [Puritanism and Revolution (London, 1958), pp.
76-77] recognized the importance of the criminal-trial jury for Lilburne in the pre-1649
period.
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Coke had found a basis both for growth of the common law and for
resistance to Stuart divine right pretensions in the common law itself. The
common law in its purest form was expressive of reason; through long and
careful study of it one might grasp the reasoning process that allowed for
determination of what was right. This formulation had proved convenient
to the common lawyers for denying the king's claim to be able to interpret
the law. 30
Moreover, Coke's view was attractive to the parliamentarians who
beheaded the king in the name of the law. For if the common law was as
old as English society and had never been supplanted by monarchical
force-in 1066 William had confirmed and assented to the liberties of the
common law-then law preceded kingship. Thus kingship and prerogative
were part of and must conform to the rules of the common law, and the
assembly of the kingdom was responsible for defense of the fabric of the
common law. While this view of the common law and common law
reasoning supported an argument against a particular king and against a
peculiarly royalist concept of the law, it did not constitute an argument
against kingship, as the rulers of the interregnum period came increasingly to understand. Coke's proposition was an argument for the common
law and for reform of that law on an incremental basis, as those
professional lawyers and judges trained to understand the legal system
saw fit. It rested on an ingrained trust in the common law. The Puritan
Revolution did not, after 1649, move steadily to the left until a reaction set
in. The revolution, at least with regard to the essential structures of the
common law, was the reaction.JI
The Norman Yoke view, on the other hand, cut against the most
fundamental political and social conceptions of the Cromwellian ruling
elite. The Leveller historical argument constituted an attack on feudalism
and on what were alleged to be Norman feudal perversions of the ''true''
law. The attack focused on the Norman invasion, which cut feudal
England off, historically, from its Anglo-Saxon past. The Leveller
"myth" of Anglo-Saxon liberties argued that in that almost forgotten age
all men were "free," held their land freely, met in free popular assemblies, declared the law, and judged one another in their free, local,
and popular courts. These assumptions were employed both sincerely and
polemically to buttress arguments against a social and political hierarchy
30. On Coke and the common-law tradition see e.g. J. G. A. Pocock, The Ancient
Constitution and the Feudal Law (Cambridge, 1957), chs. 2-3; Christopher Hill, Intellectual
Origins of the English Revolution (Oxford, 1965), ch. 5; Hill, Puritanism and Revolution, pp.
57-67.
31. See Hill, Puritanism and Revolution, pp. 57-67; Pocock, The Ancient Constitution
and the Feudal Law, pp. 125-26. For discussion of the Parliamentarians' approach to law
reform see below, n. 109 and accompanying text.
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that not only placed power in the hands of the central government but also
drastically limited representation in Parliament. 32
The Levellers drew their political theory from history and Scripture. 33
They found in these sources the basis for a contractual form of civil
polity, one that England's rulers had often breached but which had always
been revived, and one that would once again be restored by a new
"Agreement. "34 Their approach to Parliament reflected a deep ambivalence concerning the limits of valid delegation of authority. A people's
representatives could not be deputized to pronounce law that conflicted
with God's will. The remedy was either to reinstate the ancient tradition
of local assemblies or to make Parliament more representative and to
resist a Parliament that defied divine command. 35
32. See e.g. Hill, Puritanism and Revolution, pp. 75-82; W. Schenk, The Concern for
Social Justice in the Puritan Revolution (New York, 1968), pp. 78-79. See also Robert
Seaberg, "The Norman Conquest and the Common Law: The Levellers and the Argument
from Continuity," Historical Journal, vol. 24 (1981), pp. 791-806. Seaberg argues, against
Hill (idem.), Pocock (The Ancient Constitution and Feudal Law, pp. 125-27), and Richard
T. Vann ["The Free Anglo-Saxons: A Historical Myth," Journal of the History of Ideas,
vol. 19 (1958), p. 268] that the Levellers did not reject the notion of historical continuity,
though the one they adhered to differed from that adopted by Coke and his followers.
Seaberg rightly stresses the overlay of Norman procedures that, from the Levellers' point of
view, undermined the true substance of the common law. He argues that the Levellers
believed that the "true substance" remained implicit in the law and that the Levellers did
not retreat from a historically based theory of rights to one based on "natural right and
reason" (Pocock, p. 126). Rather, they called for a reform of institutions and procedures that
would save the historically identified "true" law. This essay is not the place to attempt a
resolution of the on-going debate on Leveller political and social ideas. Suffice it to say that
not all Levellers agreed on this issue, and that arguments from history and from "natural
right and reason" lay side by side in Leveller (as well as in other contemporary) thought. My
discussion of the Leveller perspectives on the institution of the criminal trial jury
complements Seaberg's approach.
33. For the Levellers' reliance on history see above, n. 32. I argue that the Levellers drew
upon Scripture (see below, text at nn. 105-7) with regard to the criminal law and the rights
of Englishmen before the law. I believe that some of the Levellers tended to equate the
Anglo-Saxon past with a society that lived according to Scripture. This was the social
context they hoped to revive; at some level it had never entirely lapsed, though Norman rule
had nearly destroyed it. Thus, although the Leveller claims do have a "natural rights" ring
[see Quentin Skinner, "History and Ideology in the English Revolution," Historical
Journal, vol. 8 (1965), p. 162; Perez Zagorin, A History of Political Thought in the English
Revolution (London, 1954), pp. 27-29], they do not constitute a rejection of historically
based rights. See below, n. 107.
34. Seaberg deals extensively with this important point: "Remembering the Past," pp.
49-64, 138-39, 211 ff., 279, 317, 337, 339, 341-42, 461-63. See also [Richard Overton?],
Regal! Tyrannie Discovered (London, Jan. 6, 1647), [B.L.: E. 370(12)], p. 42: "[T]he King
receives his crown by contract and agreement."
35. See Aylmer's summary statement in Aylmer, ed., The Levellers in the English
Revolution, p. 13.
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The Leveller argument was an argument not only for political leveling
but for legal leveling as well. Law, according to the Leveller view, was a
form of divine command comprehensible and accessible to the common
man. Legal procedures and institutions could-and since Norman times
did-vitiate the substance of true law. Thus the Levellers joined those
who criticized the use of Law French, complicated legal terminology,
expensive writs, inconvenient delays, and the other obstacles to speedy
and "equal" justice. Legal institutions were supposed to guarantee that
equal justice prevailed, and no institution was more important in this
regard than the criminal trial jury.
Although the Levellers shared the Cokeian view that the jury preceded
the Conquest, they broke with that view on two fundamental issues. First,
the Levellers asserted that the jury also preceded an organized judiciary.36 Second, they argued that Norman feudal governance, far from
embracing the jury, nearly destroyed it. According to the Levellers, the
Normans and their successors had attempted to pervert and eliminate the
jury, despite the fact that Magna Carta had confirmed its use and a
succession of medieval monarchs had in turn confirmed Magna Carta. 37
Of the true history of the criminal trial jury, they, like Coke, knew very
little. The fact that the criminal trial jury emerged after Magna Carta; that
its original role was, at least in the main, to gather evidence; that the
medieval jury had nevertheless been able to apply the law almost at will;
that its de facto role had been greatly reduced only in the sixteenth
century: all this would have come as a surprise to the Levellers. Not only
would it have clashed with the Levellers' reading of history, it would have
undermined an important element of their argument concerning the
practical impact of Norman and Plantagenet rule on English liberties.
Although the Levellers identified the jury as one of the first elements of
English social and political life, they said very little about the institution's
historical role. They appear at first to have accepted the view that the
jurors' task was to find fact; law was for the (preferably community36. E.g. [Richard Overton?], A Remonstrance of Many Thousand Citizens (London, July
7, 1646), in Don M. Wolfe, ed., Leveller Manifestoes of the Puritan Revolution (New York,
1944), p. 125; [Overton?), Regal/ Tyrannie Discovered, p. 16. Overton probably assumed
that someone from the community served as judge. His main point was that the Normans
created a centralized judiciary that was not responsive to community mores. By "organized
judiciary," I refer to the Norman itinerant justices. Some Leveller writings are ambiguous
even about the existence of a local judge and seem to treat the early jury as a group of law
sayers.
See Seaberg, "The Norman Conquest and the Common Law," p. 801. Seaberg contrasts
the views of the chroniclers Holinshed and Daniel (''who judged trial by jury as a Norman
custom") to the view shared by both Coke and the Levellers.
37. [Richard Overton?], Vox Plebis, or, The Peoples Outcry (London, Nov. 19, 1646),
[B.L.: E. 362(20)], pp. 6, 9-10.
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based) judges to pronounce. But if the judges found the law ineptly or
wrongfully, they ought to be removed and punished according to the
example set by the Levellers' hero, King Alfred. 38 Before 1649, the
Levellers did not go beyond this remedy to embrace a theory of jury
intervention on behalf of the true law. Their predominant concern was to
resist attempts to pack, influence, or overbear juries or to eliminate them
altogether. The Levellers' glorification of the jury may have drawn them
closer to the position that the jury, representing the people, ought to find
the ·law directly rather than merely apply it in accordance with the
instructions of the people's delegates and the delegates' chosen functionaries. But that position remained latent in the Levellers' political theory,
in their understanding of institutional history, in their concept of the
source and nature of law.
A modest form of law-finding was latent, too, in the Levellers'
arguments for reform of the law of sanctions. The Levellers constantly
invoked the notion of the "reason" and "equity" of the law. 39 In their
view, a true or godly magistracy interpreted the law in the light of
"conscience," thereby doing justice according to God's will. 40 And just
as legal forms ought never to soil this process of doing justice, legal
sanctions ought not to deviate from divine mandates concerning just
deserts. Thus, the Levellers' (and others') attack on the death penalty in
cases of theft was scripturally based; to take life for simple theft was
contrary to equity and conscience, literally contrary to Scripture. 4 1 It may
38. For discussion of the role of Alfred see Seaberg, "Remembering the Past," pp. 43,
374. See also e.g. [Overton?], Vox Plebis, p. 6; John Lilburne, An Impeachment of High
Treason Against Oliver Cromwell (London, Aug. 10, 1649), [B.L.: E. 568(20)], p. 6; James
Frese, A Second Why Not (London, Sept. 3, 1649), [B.L.: 669 f. 14(72)], p. viii.
39. E.g. John Lilburne, England's Birthright Justified (London, Oct. 10, 1645) in William
Haller, ed., Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution, 1638-1647, 3 vols. (New York,
1934), vol. 3, pp. 2, 32; William Walwyn, England's Lamentable Slaverie (London, Oct. 11,
1645), [B.L.: E 304(19)], p. 5; Richard Overton, The Commoners' Complaint (London, Feb.
10, 1646), in Haller, ed., Tracts on Liberty, 3:380; Richard Overton, A Defiance against all
Arbitrary Usurpations (London, Sept. 9, 1646), [B.L.: E. 353(17)], p. 6; John Lilburne, The
People's Prerogative and Priviledges, asserted and vindicated (London, Feb. 14, 1648),
[B.L.: E. 427(4)], p. 41.
For a discussion of the Leveller concept of "equity," see J. C. Davis, "The Levellers and
Christianity,'' in Brian Manning, ed., Politics, Religion and the English Civil War (London,
1973), pp. 227-34.
40. E.g. Richard Overton, England's Miserie and Remedie (London, Sept. 19, 1645),
[B.L.: E. 302(5)], p. 3; Richard Overton, An Appeal (London, July 17, 1647), in Wolfe, ed.,
Leveller Manifestoes, p. 159.
41. Overton, An Appeal, p. 193: "That according to the law of God, and the old law of
the land, matters of theft may not be punished with death"; William Cokayne, The
Foundations of Freedome, Vindicated: or, The Reasons of William Ashurst ... Examined
and discussed (London, Feb. 17, 1650), [B.L.: E. 541(25)], p. 10; See Veal!, Popular
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be that the Levellers considered the role ofthe trial jury to be particularly
important in such cases. Whether the jury acted on its own or at the
behest of the bench, it applied the law according to "conscience" in order
to ensure that the defendant would receive his just deserts. This may be
what Lilburne had in mind when he referred to the ancient practice by
which jurors would "judge" cases. Reform might be achieved by statute,
but statute could go only so far: each case, each instance of finding fact,
required its own verdict according to "conscience. " 4 2
In the years preceding Lilburne's 1649 trial, Leveller political thought
emerged largely piecemeal in tracts that were responses to immediate
political developments. Moreover, before 1649 the chief political threat to
Leveller leaders (and specifically to Lilburne) came not from the common
law bench but from Parliament.43 Thus, alongside the reform movement's
denunciations of Norman legal institutions and procedures, there developed an attack on the parliamentary exercise of criminal jurisdiction over
commoners. It was in this context that Walwyn, Overton, and Lilburne
charged that Parliament had adopted the tyrannical ways of the Stuarts.
Parliament (or what remained of it) had become, they charged, an
arbitrary lawmaking body rather than a representative of the people that
defended God's law on the people's behalf. Instead of stripping away the
hated Norman perversions of the true common law, Parliament employed
them for its own ends. Vindication of the "equity, justice, and mercy" of
the law had not been achieved and could not be unless subjects were
allowed recourse to their traditional right to trial by peers before a truly
law-abiding magistracy.
Movement for Law Reform, pp. 128-36, for a discussion of the movement to abolish capital
punishment for theft.
42. Lilburne wrote, in 1653, that laws should be devised so that "as little as possible ...
should be left to the discretion, will or pleasure of the Administrator." The Upright Mans
Vindication (London, Aug. I, 1653), [B.L.: E. 708(22)], p. 14. As we shall see, however, this
did not apply (as of that date) to Lilburne's views on the jury with respect to its taking notice
of the probable sanction.
43. Lilburne, The Copy of a Letter, pp. 1-2. Lilburne had been arrested and imprisoned
by the House of Commons in 1645. He sought specification of the cause of his imprisonment
and asserted that he was entitled to "the lawful trial of his equals." Overton, England's
Miserie and Remedie, pp. 1-6. Overton wrote on behalf of Lilburne, similarly castigating
Parliament. Walwyn (England's Lamentable Slaverie, pp. 1-6) joined the chorus of criticism
of Parliament's treatment of Lilburne in Oct., 1645. Lilburne's major tracts decrying his
imprisonment in 1649 and continuing his claim to a right to trial by jury include: The Legall
Fundamentall Liberties (1st ed., London, June 8, 1649), [B.L.: E. 560(14)]; An Impeachment
of High Treason; Strength out of Weaknesse (London, Sept. 30, 1649), [B.L.: E. 575(18)].
See also Walwyn, The Bloody Project (London, Aug. 21, 1648), in Haller and Davies, eds.,
Leveller Tracts, pp. 135-46.
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Lilburne' s attacks on Parliament grew out of his arrest and imprisonment for allegedly libelous writings between 1646 and 1648. 44 During
those years he attacked both the laws he was charged with breaking and
the claims of the Lords and the Commons to jurisdiction to try him.
Lilburne's most powerful pre-1649 tracts on the role of judge and jury
date from early 1648, when he was seeking a writ of habeas corpus. 45
After the writ was refused Lilburne (and others on his behalf) criticized
the courts for acceding to parliamentary despotism. When Lilburne was
eventually brought before King's Bench and the court denied having
power to release a person held by order of Parliament, Lilburne criticized
and belittled the common law bench for its timidity. 46 None of Lilburne's
writings during this period articulates a jury law-finding argument; their
focus is the right to trial by peers and the alleged usurpation of legal
authority by Parliament. The members of Parliament were neither his true
judges nor his true jurors. Parliament, he claimed, had resolved lawfinding and fact-finding into a single power and had taken that power upon
itself. 47
Lilburne at this early stage expressed a traditional view of the commonlaw judge-jury relationship. His aim was to deny the right of Parliament to
try him; he asserted that Parliament had in notorious instances
arbitrarily and tyrannically summoned and convened men before them
(for things decideable and determinable only at common law) without
any due process of law, and have taken upon them, contrary to all law,
justice, equity, and conscience, to be both informers, prosecutors,
witnesses, parties, jury, and judges, and thereupon have passed most
illegal, arbitrary, and tyrannical censures upon the free Commons of
England ... when as by the fundamental law of the land, no judge
whatsoever, can be judge of matter of law and fact both, it being the
proper right of the jury of twelve men, of a man's peers or equals to be
judge of matter of fact, which must be proved by legal witnesses duly
44. Gregg, Free-Born John, pp. 135-249.
45. Lilburne's pleas for a writ of habeas corpus and for trial by common-law judge and
jury include, e.g., The Prisoners Plea for a Habeas Corpus (London, April4, 1648), [B.L.:
434(19)], p. 8 (Lilburne sought "justice without partiality, mercy, pity, or compassion");
The Prisoners mournful cry, against the Judges of the Kings Bench (London, May 9, 1648),
[B.L.: E. 441(17)], p. 5 (Lilburne sought "the benefit of the law ... that is all the favor,
mercy, pity, and compassion he craves").
46. John Lilburne, The Lawes Funeral (London, May 15, 1648), [B.L.: E. 442(13)], pp. 1,
26, et seq.
,
47. Lilburne, People's Prerogative and Priviledges, p. 41; Lilburne, A Whip fo'r the
present House of Lords, or the Levellers Levelled (London, Feb. 27, 1648), [B.L.: E. 431(1)],
pp. 16-17; Lilburne, A Plea, or Protest (London, March 17, 1648), [B.L.: E. 432(18)], pp.
13-14; Lilburne, The Lawes Funeral, p. 7.
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sworn, and not by the complainer, prosecutor, or party, and then the
judge is only to be judge in matter of law. 48
Lilburne's division of law and fact, and his assignment of the former to
the judge, can be found also in the writings of Overton and, indirectly,
John Wildman. 4 9 Wildman approvingly reprinted the petition to the House
of Lords in February, 1648, of the conservative Parliamentarian John
Maynard, who had met and befriended Lilburne in the Tower. Maynard
argued that the "jury are sworn to find according to the evidence." They
are "bound to indifferency and impartiality," for they may themselves be
passed upon as defendants on another occasion. The jury are to be of the
neighborhood, for
the law presumes, that such may have either some cognizance of the
fact, or of some circumstances thereof, or of the party accused, whose
condition and manner of conversation is much to be regarded, for
discovering his intention in any fact supposed to be treason or felony.
The matter of law, on the other hand, is entrusted to the judge "for
preventing all errors, confederacies or partiality." 50
During the spring of 1648 Lilburne continued to seek release from the
Tower and a trial by judge and jury.51 He never abandoned the conventional law-fact distinction, although at one point he characterized the jury
"as it were the God Almighty" and the judge "as the minister or priest to
pronounce and declare the sentence and judgment of the God Almighty."52 When King's Bench refused to free him in May, Lilburne
declared that the judges were "indeed and in truth mere ciphers." 53 They
were "ciphers" because they deemed themselves powerless to overturn
the unlawful acts of the House of Lords, "their superiors. "54 Lilburne
would use the epithet ''ciphers'' to great and different effect in 1649, when
48. Lilburne, People's Prerogative and Priviledges, p. 41. See also Lilburne, A Plea, or
Protest, pp. 13-14.
49. [Overton?], Vox Plebis, p. 18: "That which is of matter of fact, is to be tried, per
legalemjudicium parium, or a lawful trial of a man's peers: That which is of matter of law,
is to be tried by the judges"; John Maynard, The Humble Plea and Protest (London, Feb.
14, 1648), reprinted in John Wildman, The Lawes Subversion (London, Mar. 6, 1648), [B.L.:
E. 431(2)], p. 35: "The matter of fact is only intrusted to the jury, and the matter of law to
the judge, for the preventing of all errors, confederacies or partiality."
50. Maynard, Humble Plea, pp. 34-35.
51. Lilburne, A Plea, or Protest, pp. 13-17.
52. Ibid., p. 17 (margin).
53. Lilburne, The Lawes Funeral, p. I.
54. Idem. Lilburne repeated this charge in the spring of 1649, in a letter to Lenthall, the
speaker of the House of Commons, to whom Lilburne complained about his imprisonment
on order of the Lords. By allowing the Lords to act as they did, the Commons made
"ciphers of [themselves]" (The Legall Fundamentall Liberties, p. 13).
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he was allowed trial at common law by judge and jury. Then, when the
target was no longer a parliamentary tribunal, Lilburne found the bench
too powerful, declared that judges ought to be "mere ciphers," and
claimed that his jurors were judges both of law and of fact. 5 5
Lilburne's 1649 charge that the judges were mere "ciphers" and that
the jurors were true judges went to the heart of what the Levellers
believed was the establishment fallacy. The allegation challenged the
view that the government, rather than the community at large, was
ultimately responsible for determining the law. It also brought the myth of
the Anglo-Saxon popular (and law-deciding) jury into the courtroom and
into political debate. The impact of Lilburne's aphorism upon the history
of the English criminal trial jury was profound. But at the time of its
introduction, it was merely an aphorism and one without a fully articulated historical basis.

II
Lilburne was tried in October, 1649, at the Guildhall, before a commission of oyer and terminer on a charge of high treason. 5 6 The Rump
Parliament had passed several statutes of high treason in the spring of that
year, a period during which Lilburne was engaged in almost constant
publication against a government he succinctly characterized in the title
of perhaps his most famous pamphlet, England's New Chains .57 The new
Treason Acts extended the crime to include expressions of opinion. 5 s The
55. See below, text at nn. 67-77.
56. State Trials, 4:1269-1470. This account of the trial is a reprint of The Trial! of Lieut.
Collonel John Lilburne [compiled by Clement Walker] (London, Oct., 1649), [B.L.: E.
584(9)]. Walker worked "under Lilburne's direction, from documents provided by him and
a stenographic report of the trial" (Haller and Davis, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 31). My
account of the trial stresses Lilburne's invocation to his jury and his defense of his claim to
the jury right, a subject to which other accounts (understandably) give little space. For other
discussions of the trial see the splendid account in Brailsford, Levellers and the English
Revolution, ch. 30; Gregg, Free-Born John, ch. 25; Frank, The Levellers, pp. 325-26, n. 105.
The Commission included inter alia the Lord Mayor of London, the justices and barons of
all the courts of common law, and Richard Keble, one of the keepers of the Great Seal
(Brailsford, p. 528). As Aylmer remarks (Levellers in the English Revolution, p. 46), it is not
clear why the authorities did not try Lilburne, without a jury, before the High Court of
Justice. Perhaps they did not dare. The jury had been "impanneled by the sheriffs of
London," presumably in the usual way. See John Jones, Jurors Judges of Law and Fact
(London, Aug. 2, 1650), [B.L.: E. 1414(2)], p. 57. Lilburne challenged four of the original
panel before his jury was fully selected (Brailsford, p. 592).
57. John Lilburne, England's New Chains Discovered (London, Feb. 26, 1649), in Haller
and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, pp. 157-70 and The Second Part of England's New
Chains Discovered (London, Mar. 24, 1649), in ibid., pp. 172-89.
58. Veal!, Popular Movement for Law Reform, p. 163.
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accusation against Lilburne was that by his writings he "maliciously,
advisedly, and traiterously did plot, contrive and endeavour to stir up,
and to raise force" against the government, and that to this end he both
denied the supreme authority of the House of Commons and asserted that
the government was tyrannical, usurped, and unlawful.S9
The trial is now famous and Lilburne's defense is well known. At the
outset he denied both the authority of the trial commission and the legality
of the proceedings, including the closing of the trial to the public.6° He
strongly asserted a right to counsel to assist him in making his way
through trial formalities (that he claimed mystified him) including a statute
as well as an indictment written in foreign tongues.6 1 Lilburne's initial
protestations produced a remarkable reply from Judge Jermin that revealed how similar were the antagonists' conceptions of the ultimate
source of law, despite their differences on questions of the delegation of
authority, the role of the judiciary, and, hence, the allocation of power in
the courtroom:
[B]ut you must know that the law of England is the law of God .... It
is the law that hath been maintained by our ancestors, by the tried rules
of reason, and the prime laws of nature; for it does not depend upon
statutes, or written and declared words or lines .... Therefore I say
again, the law of England is pure primitive reason .... A pure innocent
hand does set forth a clear unspotted heart. . . . If you refuse to [hold
up your hand] you do wilfully deprive yourself of the benefit of one of
the main proceedings and customs of the laws of England.62
Although Lilburne had spoken (without elucidation) of a "pretended
crime" as the basis of his accusation, his plea, when it was finally coaxed
from him, revealed no objection to the Act of Treason, either to the
procedure that occasioned its passage or to its substance. He pleaded:
"That I am not guilty of any of the treasons in manner and form, as they
59. Gregg, Free-Born John, pp. 294-95. Gregg lists the pamphlets named in Lilburne's
indictment: An Impeachment of High Treason, A Salva Libertate, The Legall Fundament all
Liberties, Outcry of Apprentices, Hue and Cry. According to an article in the weekly
Mercurius Elencticus (London, Oct. 22-29, 1649), [B.L.: E. 575(38)] at p. 208, the grand jury
foreman told the bench: "We have only found [Lilburne] guilty of writing some part of those
books he is charged with in the indictment, but not of high treason: which so astonished the
judges, that they looked as if they would have eaten the jury." This (allegedly) occurred in
open court; Lilburne had asked that the grand jury that had indicted him appear and repeat
its indictment. There is no mention of this incident in the State Trials account. A similar
version of the incident is recounted in The First Days Proceedings (London, 1649), pp.
10-11.
60. State Trials, 4:1270-83. The doors to the courtroom were subsequently opened to the
public.
61. Ibid., pp. 1291-94.
62. Ibid., pp. 1289-90.
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are there laid down in that indictment.'' If Lilburne' s formal plea was that
the Act was null and void, he gave no hint of it in the version of his plea
that he himself later recorded. 63
In the trial the government first presented its evidence, introducing
witnesses to Lilburne's role in the "treasonous" publications and then
reading at length from some of them. 64 Lilburne's renewed request for
counsel was met with the assurance that the court itself would act as his
counsel when a matter of law arose. The bench was his protector; as
Keble put it, "[W]e are on our lives too as well as you. " 65 Thus having
pleaded to the indictment, Lilburne raised two main arguments on the
merits: there was no proof that the writings were published after the
passage of the Treason Acts, an important factual issue; and the evidence
did not suffice for a conviction, because the government could not meet
the "requirement" of two witnesses or prove unlawful intent. The latter
argument mixed a question of law (on which the court ruled, against
Lilburne, that two witnesses were not required) and a question of fact,
sufficiency of the evidence of intent (on which, it is possible, the jury,
having set its own standard, based its acquittal of Lilburne).66
63. Ibid., p. 1294. But see Diane Parkin-Speer, "John Lilburne: A Revolutionary
Interprets Statutes and Common Law Due Process," Law and History Review, vol. 1 (Fall,
1983), pp. 276-96. Parkin-Speer, whose article appeared while my book was in press, makes
an interesting case for reading Lilburne's assertions to the bench at his 1649 trial in light of
several claims made by Lilburne in Legal! Fundamental! Liberties, published earlier that
year. The assertions themselves should not be assumed to be part ofLilburne's formal plea,
but they are integral to his overall defense. How many of them were made before his jury
is not clear; most were made to the bench before Lilburne's jury was selected and sworn.
But the assertions and the claims in Legal! Fundamental! Liberties do indicate the direction
in which Lilburne's thought was moving. Parkin-Speer stresses Lilburne's view that the
special commission of oyer and terminer and, indeed, the continuation in power of the Rump
itself, were unlawful. Presumably, this would have made the Act under which Lilburne was
tried unlawful, though Parkin-Speer doesn't stress this point (perhaps because Lilburne
seems not to have stressed it). Parkin-Speer emphasizes Lilburne's view that "when an Act
of Parliament is against common right, or reason, or repugnant ... the common law shall
control it, and adjudge this Act to be void" (Legal! Fundamental! Liberties, p. 50). This
view, drawn (indirectly) from Coke's famous dictum in Bonham's Case, was applied to the
Act that continued the Rump in power. Parkin-Speer discusses Lilburne's view that, absent
a lawful Parliament or bench, the defendant was left to interpret the common law. This the
defendant could do given the nature and source of common law; Parkin-Speer relates
Lilburne's view in this regard to his "Protestant individualism," and I do not think her
approach here differs markedly from my own. My lengthy discussion of John Jones, below,
provides a link between this view of law and the Leveller appeal to the jury, a matter about
which Parkin-Speer has very little to say.
64. State Trials, 4:1320-73.
65. Ibid., p. 1317.
66. Ibid., pp. 1373-76, 1382-93. The jury's reason for acquitting Lilburne will never be
known. It is less likely that the jury nullified the Treason Acts on which the indictment was
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Having been denied assistance of counsel in making his defense,
Lilburne asked the court whether he might then speak to the jury on
matters of law as well as fact:
that I may speak in my own behalfunto the jury, my countrymen, upon
whose consciences, integrity and honesty, my life, and the lives and
liberties of the honest men of this nation, now lies; who are in law
judges of law as well as fact, and you [i.e., the court] only the
pronouncers of their sentence, will and mind ...
Lord Keble: Master Lilburne, quietly express yourself, and you do
well; the jury are judges of matter of fact altogether, and Judge Coke
says so: But I tell you the opinion of the Court, they are not judges of
matter of law.
Lilburne: The jury by law are not only judges of fact, but of law also:
and you that call yourselves judges of the law, are no more but Norman
intruders; and in deed and in truth, if the jury please, are no more but
ciphers, to pronounce their verdict. 67
It is difficult to find a source for this remarkable claim as it applied to
the jury; it does not appear in the pre-1649 writings. 68 As it happened, it
was Lilburne' s adoption of the role of defense counsel that occasioned his
invocation of the jury's right to judge matters of law. Had the court
acceded to Lilburne's extraordinary claim to counsel, he might never
have made his claim to a jury right, although he could have hoped to
provoke a debate on the law between his own counsel and the
government's attorney, a debate which the jury might then have resolved
by its verdict, with or without the approval of the bench. Lilburne's
jury-right claim was, in part, couched in the familiar terms of the Norman
Yoke theory. His judges were but "Norman intruders," agents of the
usurper William and his successors. But what was Lilburne's conception
of the pre-Conquest trial? Were there local "judges," or did jurors fill the
"judicial" role? In their writings Lilburne and the other Leveller leaders
had left their view of the original role of the jury unclear; there is only
based than that it determined Lilburne did not "traiterously ... plot" to stir up revolution.
(In his defense, Lilburne did not spare the jury the details of his acts of patriotism during the
Civil War.)
67. Ibid., p. 1379. Note Keble's use of the word "ciphers" earlier in the proceedings
(ibid., p. 1314): "You [Lilburne] would make yourself judge in your own cause, which you
are not, and so make ciphers of us."
68. Hill (Puritanism and Revolution, p. 77) notes that, on an earlier occasion, Henry
Marten "told [his] jury to put their hats on in court, to demonstrate the fact that they were
'the Chief Judges in the Court,' and the judges inferior to them.'' But it is not clear that this
meant judges of law; Marten may have been insisting upon the jurors' right to make
untrammeled determinations of fact.

174

Transformations

occasional indication that they believed that pre-Conquest jurors were
"judges. " 69
We may learn something of the nature ofLilburne's theory of jury right
from his ensuing colloquy with the bench. Lilburne turned the court's
attention to his copy of Coke's Commentarie upon Littleton, which he
had with him throughout the trial. The first page he quoted related to the
assize of novel disseisin: "In this case the recognitors of the assize may
say and render to the justices their verdict at large upon the whole
matter. "7o This practice, Lilburne asserted, was common in "all actions
of trespass or assault, where the jury do not only judge of the validity of
the proof of the fact, but also the law, by assigning what damages they
think just. "7 1 Moreover, he noted, Coke stated that verdicts might be
general or special, and Littleton observed: "Also in such case, where the
inquest may give their verdict at large, if they will take upon them the
knowledge of the law, upon the matter they may give their verdict
generally. " 72 Coke, Lilburne stated, supported Littleton on this point.
This, and only this, was the case that Lilburne put at his trial for his claim
that jurors were judges of the law. His closing speech dealt with disputed
questions of fact (the date of publications alleged to be his; the testimony
of the witnesses; his intent), and assertions that his treatment, from the
time of his arrest until the closing moments of his trial, prevented him
from making a proper defense. Toward the end, he repeated his claim to
the right of the jury to judge law as well as fact, again in the course of a
protest against the absence of counsel. 73
The bench thought little of Lilburne's jury-right assertions. They
dismissed his contention without addressing themselves to it. Keble's
reply to Lilburne' s citations from Coke was blunt: "You have spent a
little time, but you have done yourself no good; I thought you had
understood the law better than I see you do. "74 According to the
surviving record, the bench was content to let the matter drop, as
Lilburne turned immediately to matters of fact and thereafter made only
rhetorical reference to the jury right.
The court may have considered Lilburne's jury-right claim too insubstantial to require rebuttal. At most, Lilburne had pointed out that
where there were "mixed" questions of law and fact, the jury was
permitted to apply the law to the facts as it found them. It is difficult to
believe that Lilburne was unaware that the civil jury to which Coke was
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See above, n. 36 and accompanying text.
State Trials, 4:1381 (Coke, Commentarie upon Littleton, p. 366).
Idem.
Idem (Coke, Commentarie upon Littleton, p. 368).
Ibid., pp. 1382-1401.
Ibid., p. 1381.
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referring was subject to attaint for mistaking the law. Surely nothing he
read out suggested either that judges might not charge juries on the law or
that juries might with impunity disregard judicial charges. Actually,
Lilburne had disregarded Coke's contrary views in the very source from
which he read to the court. At the end of Littleton's short statement on
juries in cases of novel disseisin, from which Lilburne had drawn his first
citation, Coke had appended his famous dictum: judges, not juries, are to
respond to questions of law; juries, notjudges, are to rule on questions of
fact.7 5 In counterpoint to Littleton's most general statement about jury
verdicts, the last to be cited by Lilburne (and the one Lilburne appeared
to find most helpful), Coke had immediately juxtaposed: "Although the
jury, if they will take upon them (as Littleton here says) the knowledge of
the law, may give a general verdict, yet it is dangerous for them so to do,
for if they do mistake the law, they run into the danger of an attaint.
. . . "76 Lilburne had in fact read to the court from Coke's comment, but
only so far as the words "general verdict"; on the matter of attaint, he
had remained silent.
Lilburne's assertion regarding the jury right remained merely rhetorical, not surprisingly since there was no basis at English common law for
the proposition that jurors were the only judges of law, and barely any
that they might take their own knowledge of the law as their guide.
Moreover, Lilburne did not distinguish civil and criminal cases. He found
nothing in the law books that diminished the authority of the bench in the
conduct of jury trials, though it was at least in part from his disrespect for
judges that his inspiration regarding jurors was derived. He quoted out of
context, in what the bench must have taken to be an outrageous fashion.
Finally, Lilburne gave the jury little direction on those questions of law he
apparently meant them to take upon themselves. He seems to have
wanted the jury to find unlawful the entire proceeding, especially the
standard refusal of counsel, and to acquit him on that account: Lilburne
did not at this juncture specifically allege that the law on which he was
indicted was void, due either to its substance or to the procedure
attending its passage. He seems to have stood on his initial argument
concerning the number of witnesses required in cases of treason, and he
may have wanted to argue the law of intent. These were weak reeds, but
perhaps they were among the issues of law on which his "countrymen"
were to pass their judgment. n
And pass judgment they did. Lilburne's jury took less than an hour to
find him not guilty. Brailsford has described the ensuing scene:
75. Coke, Commentarie upon Littleton, p. 366.
76. Ibid., p. 368.
77. See above, nn. 63-66 and accompanying text.
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The jury were then discharged, and through the cheering multitudes
Major-General Skippon escorted the prisoner back to the Tower. The
very soldiers who guarded him shouted for joy .... At the Fleet Bridge
the people lit bonfires .... As the evening wore on, the church bells
rang out and bonfires sprang up all over the City, while the people in
their thousands shouted and drank and feasted in the streets. 78
In honor of the jury a medal was soon struck bearing their names,
Lilburne's portrait, and an inscription: "John Lilburne, saved by the
power of the Lord and the integrity of his jury, who are judge of law as
well as fact. " 79 At least in London, events had given prominence to
Lilburne's invocation to his jury, whatever the common man took its
meaning to have been.
The weakness of Lilburne's jury-right claim must have been apparent
to many contemporaries. Certainly it was apparent to lawyer Henry
Parker, a proponent of moderate law reform, who launched a powerful
attack on Lilburne in his tract, A Letter of Due Censure, published in the
spring of 1650.80 (Parker's tract took no account ofthe recently published
Judges Judged, the first of John Jones's two tracts in defense of Lilburne.
That tract and Jones's second one-a reply to Parker-will be considered
together in the next section.) Parker made short work of Lilburne's
''authorities'':
All that is affirmed by Littleton and Coke is this, that in some cases the
inquest may render a verdict at large upon the whole matter .... In the
application of these authorities, you rush hastily upon three gross
errors. For first you strain these authorities to all cases and questions
of law, whether easy or uneasy whatsoever, and this cannot be done
without manifest violence to the words of your authors. Secondly, you
strain these authorities to all jurors whatsoever, whether they have
knowledge of the law, or not. ... Thirdly ... you infer: therefore the
judges are mere ciphers, therefore the judges have no right or power
to deliver their judgments, therefore the determination of the judges is
no way forcible or obliging. This is a non sequitur. For though the
verdict be given in upon the whole matter, and so enclose law as well
as fact, yet the binding force of the verdict, as to matter oflaw, may be
derived from the sanction and ratification of the judges, not from the
jurisdiction of the inquest. And it may well be supposed, that the jurors
may err in matter of law, in which case the judges must alter the
erroneous verdict by a contrary judgment. 8 1
78.
79.
80.
81.

Brailsford, Levellers and the English Revolution, p. 602.
Ibid., p. 603.
Henry Parker, A Letter of Due Censure (London, June 21, 1650), [B.L.: E. 603(14)].
Ibid., pp. 23-24.
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Parker excoriated Lilburne for belittling his judges and mocked him for
setting up his jurors above the bench. Among the "common tradesmen,
and husbandmen, such as ordinarily [are] empanelled, there is not one of
a thousand that understands law in a point of any intricacy. "82 Lilburne,
Parker retorted, had concluded that ''judges, because they understand the
law, are to be degraded.' '83
These were all points well taken. Lilburne appears foolish to have taken
his stand on Coke, and the reliance on civil cases made his invocation of
jurors' knowledge of law all too suspect. But Lilburne was headed in
another direction. His claims were based not upon existing law or jury
practice, but upon what he conceived to be his heritage, his birthright.
They were claims upon "good law" and upon a tradition of resistance to
longstanding adulterations of that law.84 Although Lilburne did not
elaborate the point, the jury right was a claim-an aphorism-based on
the Levellers' political theory. If Lilburne' s claim is viewed in the light of
the Levellers' understanding of England before the Conquest, that claim
gains considerably in force and content.

HI
Lilburne's aphorism was given specific meaning in the two most
detailed and interesting of the Interregnumjury tracts, The Judges Judged
and Jurors Judges, written in 1650 by John Jones. 85 These tracts were at
once commentaries on Lilburne's 1649 trial and attacks on Coke's version
of the history of the criminal trial jury. Jones's writings, which contained
the most important discussion and analysis of trial by jury in England
before the Restoration, built upon Leveller historical learning and politi82. Ibid., p. 24.
83. Ibid., p. 21.
84. See The Second Part of the Trial/ of Lieut. Col. John Lilburn (London, Dec. I, 1649),
[B.L.: E. 598(12)], written by Clement Walker with Lilburne's help (see Frank, The
Levellers, p. 227). The author(s) claim that in the trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton
("Throg-Morton") in 1554 "the jury took upon themselves to be judges of law as well as

fact, and against the will and minds of all the judges acquitted the prisoner, and at the Bar
justified their verdict and would not revoke it. ... Without doubt ... Lilburne had seriously
read over that notable trial of ... Throgmorton, in whose very steps he treads, in making
his application to the jury, as the absolute guardians and judges of his life, as he in Queen
Mary's time did" (pp. 27-28). Lilburne had probably found the account of Throckmorton's
trial in Holinshed. See Raphael Holinshed, Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland
(orig. published ca. 1579, 6 vols., London, 1808), vol. 4, pp. 31-55. In Holinshed's account,
Throckmorton told the jury that the statutes applied in his case were not according to God's
law (p. 54), but in his final statement to the jury he did not directly appeal to them as judges
of law (p. 55).
85. John Jones, Judges Judged Out of Their Own Mouthes (London, May 6, 1650), [B.L.:
E. 1414(1)]; Jurors Judges of Law and Fact (London, Aug. 2, 1650), [B.L.: E. 1414(2)].
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cal theory. Although Jones was not, strictly speaking, a Leveller, his
works reveal the radical implications of the Leveller position.s6
In Judges Judged, Jones labored to demonstrate that the later medieval
monarchs had overturned a system of local determination of pleas in
which the original royal justices in eyre had played a crucial and popular
part. This historiographical tour de force, based upon an intricate and
novel argument, developed more systematically than any other contribution to the Norman Yoke tradition an attack on the Westminster judiciary
in general and on Sir Edward Coke in particular.
Are not all the people of England disseised of their freehold, liberties,
franchises, and free customs, when they are deprived of that justice
which they ought to have administered amongst them at home by virtue
of the King's writs ... directed to sheriffs of their own choice, in their
own counties or stewards of hundreds, and courts baron, in their
precincts, where the free-holders themselves are judges themselves, by
ancient common-laws, and customs of England, before Magna Charta
and by it declared, and confirmed unto them as aforesaid?S 7
The answer to this rhetorical question was obvious.
But how had the original system of justice lapsed? King's Bench, Jones
argued, had imposed itself upon the system of popular justice. The critical
turning point in the history of the judicial system, according to Jones,
began with the failure of King's Bench to follow up on indictments before
sheriffs and itinerant justices that had not led to trial and punishment
before justices in eyre. The Statute Articuli Super Cartas (1300) sought to
remedy this situation. 88 It provided, said Jones, for temporary commissions to royal justices, the later justices of trailbaston, who were
empowered to act on their own discretion in pursuing indictments that had
not been prosecuted. The result of this series of events was the undermining of the justices in eyre. This was doubly unfortunate. First, the
justices in eyre had not been responsible for the original defects; the fault
lay with King's Bench, which had failed to ensure the making of
indictments. Moreover, Jones asserted, the justices in eyre had never
been entrusted with discretion to decide whether fines or imprisonment
86. Veal! (Popular Movement for Law Reform, p. 103) describes Jones as a pamphleteer
"sympathetic to the Levellers." My discussion places Jones as a critic of contemporary
lawyers and legal practices, whose historical account of the bench and jury has much in
common with Leveller notions about the source of human rights, the delegation of authority,
and the constraints on the power of delegates. In the main, I believe that on these issues
Jones was elaborating on Leveller thought in a way that the leading Leveller writers (who
admittedly did not themselves speak with a single voice) would have approved, at least as
of 1649-50.
87. Judges Judged, p. 36.
88. Stat. 28 Edw. I.
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ought to be imposed. The grant of that power to royal justices in
Westminster represented an unwelcome shift of power away from the
local community. The final stage, regular and routine trial by royal
justices of gaol delivery, destroyed whatever vestiges of the old, locally
based system had persisted into the fourteenth century.s9
Jones argued that, unlike King's Bench, the justices in eyre predated
Magna Carta and were confirmed by that document. 9o Further, the
justices were "chosen by the people,"9 1 a conclusion Jones drew from
Coke's assertion that "[o]fficers or ministers ... for execution of justice
... were ... chosen in full and open county, by the freeholders ... , ''92
which in reality referred to sheriffs, keepers of the peace, and coroners,
but not, of course, to justices in eyre. Jones read Magna Carta's
prescription "that all offenders ought to be amerced by their equals,
according to the quantity of their trespass" to have given freemen the
power, in county court, before sheriffs or justices of local choosing, to
determine fines and sentences of imprisonment. Jones purported to have
understood this system to have predated Magna Carta, and· in its
essentials to have predated Henry II. He berated Coke for failing to
acknowledge the seniority of the justices in eyre to the more recent King's
Bench, ascribing Coke's view to "spite and envy."
And where, in this leaf, he would persuade the people to suspect
justices in eyre of corruption and of monopolizing justice to wrong the
people that chose them, can the people believe that these justices (who
are to be chosen by them, and to be displaced by them, when and as
often as they see cause) will, or can wrong them more than those
chosen by the King and his servants, without their consent, unless they
can believe that they may be persuaded to give their consent to wrong
themselves ?93
Finally, Jones argued that the Crown had duplicitously turned the
Statute Articuli on its head. The statute's provision to supply justice
"where no remedy was before," he asserted, had in fact been intended to
give justices in eyre power to move against the king's servants in
Westminster, who had failed to give force to the original system. The
justices in eyre were supposed to remain an instrument of the people;
their jurisdiction was to extend beyond enquiring into offenders against
the laws-they were now to hear of the failure of royal justices to execute
89. Ibid., pp. 75-82.
90. Ibid., p. 79.
91. Idem.

92. Idem; Sir Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England
(3rd ed., London, 1669), fol. 558.
93. Judges Judged, p. 80.
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upon the people's indictments and assignments of punishment. Coke's
interpretation of the statute had supported that of the Crown, which,
Jones argued, turned the mandate of Parliament against the people's
courts and judges, and instead concentrated all judicial power in the
hands of royal servants, the justices of King's Bench-a concentration of
power to which Coke was himself heir.94
Jones's use of historical evidence was, to say the least, amateurish and
manipulative. He primarily depended upon Coke's flawed account, which
he reworked to suit his own point of view. The immediate target of
Jones's attack was the Commonwealth bench. Rather than reject the
entire history of the royal judiciary, Jones sought to divorce the early
period of the eyre system from its successor stages. In this lay his
originality, a flight of fancy that led to ludicrous conclusions: the hated
eyres, whose justices were the scourge of the countryside, appeared in
Jones's account as popular visitations to local tribunals whose ancient
and definitive powers continued unabated, before whom fines and
amercements were imposed by "equals," as ordered by Magna Carta.
Judicial history had been rewritten in a way that actually glorified one of
its darker moments.9s
Jones's version of legal history after the Conquest deemphasized the
importance of the Conquest itself and thus did not depend so heavily as
some other accounts on the sparse Anglo-Saxon evidence. Unlike
Lilburne's or later versions, it conceded a role for royal justices, while
accounting for their authority in such a way as to make them agents of the
people. Nevertheless, this elaborate attack on Coke and on the
Westminster bench shared a central objective with the Leveller writings
of the late 1640s: the resurrection and strengthening of the imaginary
"original" jury system at the expense of the bench. Jones's history of the
judiciary was in fact a history of the jury system, and it promoted two of
the most important aims of the radical reform movement, the decentralization of legal institutions and the conferral upon the jury of
control over the law. Jones's tract distorted history in the service of a
theory of a community-based system of law and legal administration.
In Jurors Judges of Law and Fact Jones turned his attention more
directly to the question of the role of the jury .96 This essay, published in
August of 1650, filled in his historical account of the judiciary by
94. Ibid., pp. 79-82.
95. See above, Chapter I, text at n. 43, for a discussion of the judicial eyre.
96. See above, n. 85. In Judges Judged, Jones had written about the jurors as judges of
fact: "Are not men's lives triable for matter of fact, and not of law (except treasons that
reach to thoughts?) Are not jurors the judges of matters of fact? What great learning, or
experience in law is requisite for a judge to pronounce the sentence of death, where the
verdict has determined the life?" (p. 27).
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describing (once again in details drawn largely from Coke) the powers of
jurors who gave evidence before royal officials. The tract also set forth a
theory oflaw that substantiated Leveller claims. The occasion for Jones's
tract on jurors was the publication in June of Henry Parker's A Letter of
Due Censure, which attacked Lilburne's arguments to the jury in his trial
of the preceding year.97 Jones replied to Parker:
In the next place, where you say Mr. Lilburne promoted his twelve
men to a new jurisdiction: I am sure, that is another lie of yours, for
you may read in the Lord Coke's Institutions upon the thirty-fifth
chapter of Magna Charta that county courts, courts baron, sheriff's
tourns, and leets were in use before King Alfred's time; in all of which
courts the jurors were the judges, and their then untra versable verdicts
were the judgments in all causes; and sheriffs and stewards, who were
the King's commissary judges in their tourns, and leets, ... were and
still are but the suitors' clerks in counties, hundreds and courts baron,
to enter their judgments, and do execution thereupon by themselves
and their bailiffs, as public servants, or ministers of common justice, to
their jurors, and the rest of the Commonwealth. 98
Jones's account oflegal institutions in the period before King's Bench and
its circuit justices took control of all felonies managed to jumble public
and private courts, criminal trials and view offrankpledge, local and royal
officials, and, indeed, prefeudal and feudal England. All judicial proceedings, Jones asserted, culminated in the "untraversable" verdicts of
jurors, verdicts that were attended and later executed by royal officials. 99
That such officials had no power save that of execution and that such
power involved no discretionary aspects was clear in Jones's mind.
Indeed, these were propositions that flowed from the nature and sources
of legal command:
And what is dissenting, or not assenting to jurors' verdicts, but a
denial, which is more than a failure of justice, for the speeding whereof
they [i.e., the judges] may have no negative voice; for ordinary
jurisdiction that was the Supreme One that gave the sovereign (which
is superior to every singular person) to Kings (as now to the keepers of
the liberties of England); there is still the superlative jurisdiction
beyond all comparison, that can be inferior to no authorities, but God's
that gave it to his people, to his children, not to be given by them to any
above them in their generalities, but himself, from whom they have
received, and to whom they must restore themselves and all that is
theirs, but to be contrived, and substituted by them unto the worthiest
97. Parker, A Letter of Due Censure.
98. Jurors Judges, pp. 24--25.
99. Idem.
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men amongst them, to be employed for and under them, as they might
find most convenient for their worldly peace and subordinate government; to which end they deputed kings, as now the Parliament hath
done keepers of the liberties of England, reserving so much of their
ancient ordinary jurisdiction to freemen, that none but such may be
jurors, and none but such may be their judges for their lives, lands, and
estates. And therefore as the keepers of our liberties are subordinate to
the Parliament, so are their commissaries to them, and both in their
judgments, to the verdicts of the jurors, which [are] their true saying of
the whole matter, as well for law, as fact.JOo
All that remained was the power, and duty, of execution, for which legal
orders-writs de procedendo ad judicium, attachment, and compulsion to
execute-were provided. The remedy of attaint was also available to the
prosecution or the defendant, Jones announced, but it gained its force and
effect only through the verdict (on law as well as fact) of a subsequent
jury.tot
It was this system of jury domination of the law, Jones argued, that
later and unwarranted extensions of power to royal justices undermined.
The original and total jurisdiction of jurors derived from God's grant of
divine command to the people. All power was thereafter delegated by the
people, through monarchs, their agents, to royal officials. Jurors were
more "ancient" than such officials and retained full power over the law;
as officialdom grew, embroiled itself in civil wars, and changed its form,
"always the freemen judged their neighbors constantly." to2 Until, i.e.,
the destruction of justices in eyre by the Westminster bench. Thereafter
the history of the judiciary was the history of the usurpation of a power
implanted in the people by God. It was an account of a changing structure
of officialdom, of centralization, and of waning local judicial institutions,
that, by the seventeenth century, had produced a perversion of justice:
But how many true men have been hanged, and thieves saved by
judges interposing, and obtruding their pestiferous pretended learning
and experience in their laws between the weak consciences of ignorant
jurors, and the truth? Which kind of jurors they make sheriffs return for
such purposes, when they may have such returned as know the facts,
and have sounder learning and experience in express law than themselves.103

100. Ibid., pp. 32-35 (emphasis added).
101. Ibid., pp. 35, 44.
102. Ibid., p. 47. See also ibid., pp. 49 et seq., for Jones's challenge to Parker's assertion
that "mechanics, bred up illiterately to handicrafts" were not capable of understanding the
law.
103. Judges Judged, p. 27. Jones's (surprising) remark about thieves suggests that,
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IV
Jones's history ended where the jury debate had begun: the complaints
about judicial packing and badgering of juries that arose just before the
creation of the Commonwealth. Jones resorted to historical discussion in
order to counter the view that Lilburne' s defense was based upon a
fictional jury right. According to Jones, the right to jury trial was ancient
and had never wholly been taken away, though its true purpose had been
undermined by the development of the judiciary. Not only was jury trial
ancient, but through usage and through that compilation of good usage,
Magna Carta, it had been confirmed as one of the liberties of Englishmen.
It was, however, more than one of the fundamental liberties. The very
existence of jury trial, and the scope of the jurors' power, rested
ultimately on the source of law. God had granted to the people-to the
community-knowledge of his law. Though the people had, in turn,
delegated ministerial functions to officials, judicial responsibility had been
retained by the community; the jurors declared and applied the law in
judging their fellows. Judicial badgering usurped the people's right and
duty not only to find fact but to decide the law. To the people, as the
source of knowledge of the true law, fell the responsibility to interpret the
law. In this theory lay the originality and power of Jones's version of
radical jury ideology.
At first glance, Jones's concept of the source of law does not seem a
radical departure from Interregnum political theory. Even the most
fervent republicans, who accorded absolute power to parliamentary edict,
would have agreed that statute represented an application of divinely
inspired reason by delegates of the people. The striking feature of Jones's
view, however, was its insistence that the power of ultimate declaration
of the law had not been delegated-not, at least, that declaration oflaw to
be made in the context of judgment by peers. Presumably such judgment
would by its nature conform to the essence of statutory pronouncement,
but the latter was a collateral lawmaking process, less fundamental and
less pure precisely because it was the by-product of the delegation of
authority to enact law on divine command.
Establishment political theory developed the notion of delegation much
further than Jones (and perhaps the more radical Levellers) allowed.
Prudence-divinely inspired reason, Commonwealth officials might have
said-dictated that because the law was by nature complex, its interpretation was beyond the lay mind. Consistency, fairness, and adherence to
legislative intent required the knowledgeable guidance of the judge. The
despite his strong reliance on Scripture, he was not among those who opposed the death
penalty for theft-at least not in some kinds of cases.

184

Transformations

people's legislative representatives had spoken in the framing of laws;
what remained was the interpretation of those laws by trained legal
minds. Jurors therefore had nothing to do with law; their province was
solely the finding of fact.
In an attempt to defend Lilburne's claim regarding the right and duty of
the trial jury, Jones drew upon ideas in Leveller writings of the late 1640s,
making explicit for the first time the implications of those ideas. For most
Levellers, as we have seen, the institution of the bench and its role in
stating the law was a given. They shared Jones's view of the source and
nature of law and seem to have gone well beyond the official notion of the
jury's role in their discussion of verdicts according to conscience. But
they had subsumed the jury's interpreting of legal mandate and its doing
of discretionary justice within the fact-finding process. 104 Jones spoke for
all the Levellers when he articulated the relationship between jury
verdicts and ultimate justice but only for some in his denial of a
law-declaring role for the bench. History and theory mandated for Jones
a conclusion that logic supported but did not necessitate. In reality, we
have seen, judge and jury shared the law-finding power that traditional
legal theory gave exclusively to the bench. So long as the bench accepted
even discretionary, merciful jury verdicts as though they were purely
findings on fact, the fact-finding process remained relatively open-ended
and the Leveller discussion of the role of conscience and just deserts
could be understood as a commentary upon that process. Disagreement
might arise concerning the considerations appropriate to the finding of
fact, but disagreement need not take the form of a debate over the
legitimacy of the traditional law/fact dichotomy.
Lilburne's trial and Jones's tracts, however, made it difficult to view
Leveller thought as concerned only with fact-finding. They brought the
latent law-finding tendencies of Leveller writings to the surface, thereby
seemingly connecting Leveller political and social thought to a theory of
the trial that threatened governmental control over law and legal proceedings. Through Jones's tracts we may better understand not only the
implications of Lilburne' s claims but also how far those claims and the
tendencies of the pre-1650 radical law tracts, even those with a conventional view of institutional arrangements, must have suggested a revolution in the administration of criminal law.
At base, the most radical theory of jury trial clashed with the Cokeian
view on the issues of delegation and the nature, if not the original source,
of law. The Levellers insisted that law was not inherently complex; in
criminal trials it was just a matter of right and wrong. Law came to the
104. See above, nn. 39-41 and accompanying text. See, however, James Frese, A Second
Why Not, p. viii.
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mind and conscience of the simplest man. The very nature of law
presumed judgment by peers in accordance with standards comprehensible to the defendant. Jury trial was not to be formed in the image of
enacted laws; rather, enacted laws were to conform to the logic and
purpose of trial by jury. The more they did so, the more they would
become simple and direct expressions of reason based on divine command.Jos
Simple, direct expressions of reason: such were the worldly embodiments of God's law. If only the common law might be reduced to that
form. There was, of course, an available source for determination of right
and wrong and of the punishment appropriate to specific wrongful acts:
Jones and most of the Levellers were ready to advert to the Scriptures.
But what constituted commission even of those wrongs? When was there
malice in the heart? That mixed question of law and fact required
interpretation, an application of reason to the facts and, thus, a judgment
according to divine inspiration. In short, it was within the province of the
jury. There had been a time, so the theory ran, when the jury functioned
in its purest form, before the growth of a meddling judiciary, and while
laws were yet in the language of the people and were pronounced publicly
by the wisest in the hundred moot. Those were the days of the vindication
of God's law, as that law was meant to be vindicated. Now the
post-Reformation Church had once again been purified, stripped of its
diverting ritual, its members brought close to God. The importance both
of the relationship between man and God and of the ongoing process by
which men achieved an understanding of the meaning of God's will had
been affirmed: each person would read, comprehend, and interpret
Scripture for himself. Thus could the common law now be purified,
returned to its original form and meaning, made conformable to the
essence of Scripture. Like the Anglo-Saxon "lawmen," the latter-day
jurors would come to know and interpret the law. Judgment would be
passed as the conscience directed.J06
"Conscience," of course, embodied the community's sense of justice.
Only the community could know the particular nature of the actor and his
deed. Legal decentralization meant less expense and delay, greater
freedom from judicial interposition; but it also meant community control
and a resurrection of the true jury of neighbors. It meant as well
vindication of the community's sense of justice as guided by its knowledge of the defendant and his act, and as guided by its understanding of
law. Thus were the most radical legal minds radical purifiers. Their vision
105. Schenk, Concern for Justice in the Puritan Revolution, pp. 78-79.
106. See Hill, Puritanism and Revolution, p. 81, for discussion of the importance of the
translation of the Bible into simple and direct language.
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of the true English society imagined a pre-Conquest community of Puritan
freemen, equal in the eyes of God, whose judgments they passed upon
their peers gone astray .101
So read, the arguments of the radical Levellers augured a truly
decentralized system of criminallaw. 108 Not only would trials be local,
but-as authorities especially might have perceived it-law itself would
be local and no longer "common" in the original sense of that term.
Moreover, the very purpose and nature of the legal system, as represented by the handful of most radical tracts, had little in common with
the established understanding of that system. For the radicals, the
criminal law was a matrix of community mores, to be imposed communally-neighbors judging neighbors. Shared experiences and context
would guarantee fairness. This system was corrective, perhaps in a
therapeutic sense, or retributive, as in the Old Testament tradition. The
radical reformers were not primarily concerned with a national crime
wave, with judicial administration, or with interpretation and enforcement of parliamentary statute. For them the criminal law was primarily a
process of community self-identification and confirmation, and only
second a system of rational self-defense.

v
Both Cromwell and the radical Levellers began with the Scriptures;
their legal theories shared the same ultimate premise. For Cromwell,
however, the exigencies of governance revealed the divine origins of
delegation of authority to the Godly Magistrate. The criminal trial jury
was a tool devised and employed by the Magistrate. It informed him in the
use of his wisdom but only in a most limited sense. It comes as no surprise
that Interregnum law reform conceded the existence of juries but not
much more. Between 1652 and 1655, during the period in which the Hale
Commission was active and after the publication of nearly all of the
radical Leveller pamphlets, the government entertained proposals regard107. This I take to be the implication of Jones's account oflaw, community; and jury trial.
I am bringing together a body of radical Leveller ideas in a way that not even Jones did in
order to suggest what must have underlain Jones's view of the jury. It also seems to me that
Jones saw in the jury the true embodiment of historical continuity-or the institution that
retained the potential for vindicating God's law, the true theory of delegation, and the
revival of England's "pure" society. Although the rights of Englishmen could be understood
as "natural rights," they could also be identified with the original English society. See
above, nn. 32, 33.
108. Hill (Puritanism and Revolution, p. 81) states that the oft-repeated Leveller demand
for trials in the county or hundred was "like the elevation of the jury over the judge ... an
appeal from the existing state power to surviving vestiges of the old communal institutions.''
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ing jury composition and challenges to jurors, with the end of making the
jury a more reliable system of fact-finding.Jo9 The reforms were based on
the assumption that the judges found the law and that the judges were
themselves tightly controlled agents of a centralized system.
The law tracts ofthe early 1650s reveal the distance between the radical
Leveller conception of the criminal trial jury and the perspective of
moderate reform proponents. Though it was during this period that
reform activity reached its height, it proceeded largely on establishment
terms. The principal areas of reform interest included private law, equity,
and court procedure. On the criminal side, the law of sanctions garnered
most interest; and there was talk of gaol reform: even the most complacent men of affairs knew a scandal when they saw one.uo
The question of jury reform centered more often on the civil than on the
criminal trial jury. The tracts resonate with the traditional concerns of
men of property. Even the Levellers-men of property themselves-ll 1
complained as much or more about the costs, delays, and inconveniences
of private suits. Nevertheless, the criminal trial jury had come to
symbolize the real testing point regarding lay participation in matters of
government. The debate between Lilburne and Jones on the one hand,
and Parker on the other, continued to reverberate even after the eclipse of
the Leveller party.
Parker himself continued to criticize the Levellers' program of decentralizatbn. In a tract on the resolution of "Cases Testamentary"
Parker advocated reforms that would reduce the "surplusage of testamentary business," but he opposed shifting the locus of litigation from
Westminster to the provinces. Conceding that local litigation was "the old
manner of jurisdiction, which was used in England long before the
Norman Conquest," Parker asserted that England was no longer "a
cantonized country" that "obeyed several petty princes." He attacked
"that party which would cantonize us the second time" and thereby
increase "quarrels and controversies." Parker's targets here were "illiterate judges, and unexpert counsellors" rather than jurors who were
109. The Commission's discussions of reform proposals are preserved in "Minutes of the
Extra-Parliamentary Committee for regulating the law," B.L. MS Add. 35,863. Discussion
of the jury (mostly civil) is at p. 41 (juror qualifications and methods of appointment), p. 65
(jurors to value land for payment of debt), pp. 77-81 (juries to be retained in probate cases).
I am most grateful for the help of Professor Cotterell, who kindly furnished me with a guide
to these and other parts of the "Minutes." She corroborated my own conclusion that the
Commission was attempting to strengthen the jury system by raising qualifications with
regard both to economic status and to literacy.
110. Veall, Popular Movement for Law Reform, Chapter 6.
111. Ibid., p. 100.
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not up to the task.1 12 Other moderate reformers, however, did not spare
the jury. Henry Robinson complained that ''most commonly one or two
active and nimble-pated men oversway all the rest ... and too often for
the worst." Moreover, they escaped punishment:
If they give a corrupt or erroneous verdict, there cannot justly be any
penalty inflicted on them, because they may pretend they did at first
declare themselves unfit for such employment: that they undertook it
unwillingly, but were compelled thereunto; and when they saw there
was no avoiding it, they endeavored to proceed therein according to
the uprightness of their own consciences; if they be thought to have
done amiss, it was but what they could not remedy, and are heartily
sorry for it. 113
Robinson, whose main concern was with civil causes, preferred a
county-based system with one judge for each hundred. The judge, who
would not be elected by residents of the locale, so that he would not be
"swayed with alliance," would decide cases without the use of ajury.1 14
John March, who professed to respect the jury in civil and criminal cases
as ''the most exact and equal way of trial in the world,'' pleaded for
reform of the rules of qualification. 115 He sought ''twelve able understanding gentlemen . . . such as are known in their country to be men of
competent worth for so great an employment [i.e., jury service]." This
would preserve the institution of the jury as ''the only judges of matters
of fact." March resisted the notion that the jury ought to be closely
directed by the judge. He acknowledged that juries were "weak and
ignorant," but sincerely desired to see the institution strengthened.
March believed jurors ought to "judge [fact] according to their own
conscience"; they might ask the judge's advice but were not bound to do
so, nor if they did ask were they "tied to follow it." 116 Only reform could
save the virtues of the jury system, and that reform ought to deal with
procedures for securing responsible (and respectable) jurors, not with the
existing relationship between judge and jury. This was in fact the path of
reform taken by the Hale Commission.m
112. Henry Parker, Reformation in Courts, and Cases Testamentary (London, Nov. 14,
1650), [B.L.: E. 616(5)], p. 7.
113. Henry Robinson, Certain Considerations ... to a more speedy, cheap and equal/
distribution of Justice (London, Nov. 14, 1650), [B.L.: E. 616(2)), pp. 2-3.
114. Ibid., p. ll.
115. John March, Amicus Reipublicae. The Commonwealths Friend or An Exact and
Speedie Course to Justice and Right (London, May 19, 1651), [B.L.: E. 1360(1)], p. 100.
116. Ibid., pp. 104, 103, 102, 103.
117. See "Several Draughts of Acts ... "(London, July 12, 1653), in A Collection of
Scarce and Valuable Tracts (Somers' Tracts), 13 vols. (2nd ed., London, 1809-15), vol. 6
(1811), pp. 218-19, § xxx-xxxiii.
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The voices of radical trial jury proponents were still audible during
these years, but barely so. Stripped of a movement-even, for a time, of
a prominent leader-and with no foothold within the moderate law reform
camp that dominated the work of the Hale Commission (whose own place
within the councils of government was tenuous), radical jury proponents
were left to aim their arguments and epithets at a deaf political establishment. Walwyn's Juries Justified, the most significant jury tract to appear
after the publication of Jones's writings and before Lilburne's 1653 trial,
was a reply to Robinson's critique of the jury. Walwyn reiterated the
Leveller historical position. Never one to accept all of Magna Carta
uncritically, Walwyn distinguished its "superstitious" elements ("[that]
are but as a French garb or clothing, which the Conqueror and his
successors, by main strength, forced our forefathers to put on") from its
"true English liberties" that had been "reduced into that excellent law
... the Petition of Right, and wherein trials per juries is the principal." 11s
Robinson was wrong, Walwyn asserted: there were "understanding fit
men" in every hundred. Everything depended, of course, upon what one
thought the nature of law and the jury's task ought to be. For Walwyn, the
jury was to discern "right and wrong," what "an ordinary capacity
(careful to keep a good conscience, and [one] that is tender of an oath)
shall soon perceive the true state thereof; and be able to do right therein
according to the evidence." 119
Walwyn denied that one or two wrongheaded jurors could determine
the outcome; the unanimity requirement prevented that. Moreover, he
rebutted Robinson's charge that there was no penalty for a corrupt or
erroneous verdict; the jury, he said, faced the possibility of an attain1.12o
Perhaps Walwyn, like Robinson, had civil causes mainly in mind, for a
controlled tone pervades Juries Justified. The issue was the right of the
local community to resolve its own "causes and controversies" between
private parties rather than to resolve those between society and an alleged
criminal offender.
Walwyn's renewal of the Norman Yoke theme was carried forward in
early 1652 by several tracts. Their authors opposed the setting of a steep
property qualification for jury service, which would "violate" the "fundamental constitution. "121 Causes were to be tried locally by people, to
118. William Walwyn, Juries Justified: or, a Word of Correction to Mr. Henry Robinson
(London, Dec. 2, 1651), [B.L.: E. 618(9)], p. 5.
119. Ibid., pp. 4, 9.
120. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
121. The Onely Right Rule for Regulating The Lawes and Liberties of the People of
England (London, Jan. 28, 1652), [B.L.: E. 684(33)], p. 6. This tract also asserted "that until
the Norman Conquest, the Nation never knew or felt the charge, trouble, or intanglements
of judges, lawyers, attorneys, solicitors, filors, and the rest" (p. 5). See also To the Supreme
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whom, in the words of one writer, "the laws shall be read by the minister
... four times a year. " 122 In two of these tracts there was a distinctly
religious tone reflecting the views of the radical religious reformers who
had begun to figure more prominently than the remnant of the Leveller
party .123 And there was, too, a shift of focus from the role of the jury to
the appropriate sanctions for serious offenses. 124 Here the last voices of
the Leveller movement melded with those of many Interregnum reform
proponents. It had long been common, and even respectable, to oppose
the imposition of capital punishment for theft. One had only to separate
the question of who would control the determination of punishment from
the matter of what that punishment ought to be to gain an ear among even
the moderate proponents of law reform.
The movement for reform of sanctions, which lasted until the closing
years of the Interregnum, united those who believed that the criminal law
ought to conform to scriptural command with those whose main concern
was more practical-that, e.g., thieves, with little to lose, were more
inclined to kill their victims so that they could not bear witness against
them.12s The movement produced the first great burst of English penological writing, which subsequently fed into Continental streams and reemerged in England a century later. 126 The English writings were themselves influenced by the early New England experience, where the ideas
they expressed had been put into practice three decades before. In that
setting, the administration of the criminal law was dominated by godly
magistrates; the criminal trial jury played as yet a less significant role than
it did in the parent country .1 27 The English experience, on the other hand,
Authority, the Parliament of the Common-Wealth of England (London, June 29, 1652),
[B.L.: 699 f. 16(54)].
122. Articles of High-Treason . .. against One Hundred and fifty Judges, Lawyers, and
Attornies (London, Feb. 21, 1652), [B.L.: E. 655(10)], p. 8. For the Levellers this did not
mean the most common people. As has often been said, the Diggers viewed the jury, even
the Leveller version of it, as an instrument of the propertied classes. See, e.g., Veal!,
Popular Movement for Law Reform, p. 156. I suspect, however, that Winstanley's political
(as opposed to religious) objections to the jury had more to do with the civil than the criminal
jury (save perhaps for criminal cases involving trespass to land).
123. Articles of High-Treason, p. 8. See also John Cook, Monarchy no Creature of Gods
making (London, Feb. 26, 1652), [B.L.: E. 1238(1)]. Cook argued that law should be "that
which the judicious and most learned men judge so to be, not the sense or judgment of any
private man" (p. 34). See below, n. 125 and accompanying text. On religious radicalism and
law reform see Shapiro, Law Reform in Seventeenth Century England, p. 290.
124. E.g. The Onely Right Rule, p. 9; Articles of High Treason, p. 8. See above, n. 41 and
accompanying text.
125. For the movement to abolish the death penalty see Veall, Popular Movement for
Law Reform, pp. 128-36.
126. See below, Chapter 7, section III.
127. See e.g. George L. Haskins, Law and Authority in Early Massachusetts (New York,
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was doubtless influenced by the fact of juries and jury behavior. Reform
writers rarely referred to actual practice, but it is difficult to believe that
they were not seeking to legitimize attitudes given daily expression in the
courts of law, where judge and jury shared the power of mitigation
generally and in cases of theft especially. 128 Moreover, most reformers
were proposing an alternative sanction that accorded with prevailing
notions of justice: imprisonment at hard labor, rehabilitation, and, above
all, restitution.1 29
Within this embryonic movement the contribution of the Levellers was
distinctive. More than any other group, they connected the scriptural
approach to sanctions with the role of the criminal trial jury .Bo We have
seen that for many Levellers the apportioning of just deserts was integral
to the fact-finding process. 131 After 1649 claims regarding the jury's duty
to play this particular role melded with a broad-based assertion of the
jury's right to find the law, a development that helped pave the way for
Lilburne's 1653 defense. If the government would not reform the law of
sanctions, or charge defendants at a level that accorded with justice, it
was the jury's duty to intervene and to vindicate God's law on earth.
In some important respects, Lilburne' s own position fell short of that of
his most radical followers. Although his writings evidence a progression
from his 1649 aphorism to a better defined position in 1653, they also
suggest that he did not follow Jones in equating law with unmediated
Scripture. Instead, he clung to the more traditional notion that English
fundamental law was historically evolved but remained consistent with
Scripture, and thus with a more traditional form of political and legal
theory.m By 1653 the jury, for Lilburne, was the common political
1960), pp. 118 et seq. The jury played an important role in felony cases, but these constituted
a relatively small percentage of the cases before early and mid-seventeenth century colonial
courts.
128. See above, Chapter 4.
129. On prison reform, rehabilitation, and restitution, see Veall, Popular Movement for
Law Reform, pp. 132-37, and works cited therein.
130. The "moderates" sought to rein in the jury; religious radicals sought to replace the
common law with Scripture and frequently favored application of statute by a magistrate.
See Shapiro, Law Reform in Seventeenth Century England, p. 290.
131. See above, nn. 39-41 and accompanying text.
132. I believe Parkin-Speer ("John Lilburne: a Revolutionary Interprets") would agree
with this. See above, n. 63. See also Schenk, Concern for Social Justice in the Puritan
Revolution, pp. 78-79. Schenk distinguishes the more radical Levellers from Lilburne with
regard to the quest for equality, making a point similar to the one I have developed here:
"The radical Levellers, inspired by beliefs derived from both books of the Scriptures and by
various conceptions of a state of nature, envisaged a federation of small communities of
neighbours, fairly equal in ownership and status, ruling themselves without the interference
of professional magistrates or lawyers according to simple and well-known laws. This ideal
... was not entirely absent from Lilburne's mind, but in his case it was obscured by his
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denominator. That it was of the English people at large was as important
as that it was of the local community. The people did not ab initio find the
law; rather, they retained the ultimate authority to overturn a judicial
ruling, indictment, or statute on the grounds that it did not accord with the
substance or sanctions of the fundamental law. He had not yet in 1649
formulated the argument, with specific reference to the jury, in just that
way. He would do so four years later in what ultimately proved the most
important of his trials. Then, in the shadows of Leveller defeat, he
formulated an argument less radical than that of Jones and other proponents of a purely scripturally based and jury-found law but one that was
to outlive the Cromwellian period. 133

VI
Lilburne's 1649 trial suggested an expansion of the jury's function,
thereby giving direction to Leveller and other early Interregnum political
writings on law and legal institutions; his trial in 1653 produced a more
enduring argument respecting the jury, one that survived among dissidents and reappeared a decade later in the aftermath of the Restoration.
Lilburne returned to England in June of 1653 after two years of a
perpetual banishment imposed upon him in 1651 by parliamentary statute.B4 According to the terms of the statute, by returning Lilburne
subjected himself to arrest, trial (to determine whether it was the real
John Lilburne who had returned), and, potentially, sentence of death.t35
By the time of his return, Cromwell had dissolved the Rump Parliament,
and Lilburne, still a popular figure around whom political opposition to
the regime might coalesce, evidently hoped that his statutory judgment
would similarly be dissolved.B6 Lilburne believed the statute to be void,
an unlawful attainder passed upon him ex parte and without trial on the
grounds of his alleged slander (against the privileges of a member of
Parliament) of Sir Arthur Haselrig and the Committee of Haberdashers'
Hall.m It is ironic that the most feared political opponent of the
preoccupation with purely political reforms and the limitations of his desire for equality.
Lilburne's chief aim, we might sum up, was equality before the law; that of his more radical
friends, equality established by law."
133. For an interesting discussion of the mid-l650s jury debate, local politics, and jury
selection see Stephen Roberts, "Jury Vetting in the Seventeenth Century," History Today,
vol. 33 (Feb., 1982), pp. 25-29.
134. Gregg, Free-Born John, pp. 321-23.
135. State Trials, 5:408-9.
136. Gregg, Free-Born John, p. 320; Veall, Popular Movement for Law Reform, p. 165.
137. John Lilburne, A Second Address directed to his Excellency the Lord Cromwell
(London, June 16, 1653), [B.L.: 669 f. 17(20)): "Parliament in the said Act did not judge your
petitioner an offender according to any law in being."; "(T]he said Act is a law made after
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Cromwellian regime had been placed in extremis because of his remarks
opposing the resolution of a case involving the sequestration as royalist
property of a Lilburne family colliery . 13 s The statutory judgment, the
basis for the 1653 trial, proved to be crucial to the shaping both of
Lilburne's defense and of his theory of the jury's right to decide questions
oflaw. The development of this theory marked the third, and final, phase
of the Interregnum jury debate.
Lilburne's defense and the surrounding pamphlet literature, which he
publicized on his own behalf between the time of his return and arrest in
mid-June and his acquittal in mid-August, dealt both with the allegedly
unconstitutional nature of the statute of banishment and with the inequitable and, hence, unlawful sentence of death for a minor crime.l39
The defense was anticipated in a remarkable tract, A Jury-man's Judgement upon the Case of Lieut. Col. John Lilburn, which was written
anonymously (but likely by Lilburne himself) and published within a week
of Lilburne's arrest. By subtitle the tract purported to prove to "every
jury-man's conscience" that he "may not, cannot, ought not find
[Lilburne] guilty upon the Act of Parliament"; to do so would make a
juror a murderer "by the law of England. "14o
Addressed to "my dear friends and loving countrymen," A Jury-man's
Judgement warned that it was necessary to "consider things very well
beforehand, and come substantially furnished and provided with sound
and well-grounded consciences," lest one be called upon to serve and
then to find himself, from "fear, hope or favor," a murderer.
[E]xcept we are fully satisfied in our consciences, that [Lilburne] has
committed ... some crime, which in the known law of England and the
very nature of the offence is felony, and justly deserves to die for it,
with what conscience can any of us pronounce him guilty? ... [N]o,
the law of England has not placed trials by juries to stand between men
the fact is done."; "[Y]our petitioner was not tried with liberty of defense."; "[T]hat
sentence is not proportionable to the offense."
138. Gregg, Free-Born John, pp. 305-11.
139. E.g. Humble Petition of divers well-affected people including the Cities of London,
Westminster . .. (London, June 24, 1653), [B.L.: 669 f. 17(24)); To the Parliament of the
Commonwealth of England. The Humble Petition of many grieved People ... (London, July
26, 1653), [B.L.: 669 f. 17(35)]; [John Lilburne], Lieut. Col. John Lilburn's Plea in Law (2nd
ed., London, July 2, 1653), [B.L.: E. 703 (12)); John Lilburne, Malice detected (London,
July 15, 1653), [B.L.: E. 705(19)); Lilburne, The Exceptions of John Lilburne . .. To A Bill
of Indictment (London, July 16, 1653), [B.L.: E. 705(20)); Oyes, Oyes, Oyes (London, July
30, 1653), [B.L.: E. 708(7)); Lilbume, The Upright Mans Vindication. See Gregg, Free-Born
John, p. 326, and Frank, The Levellers, pp. 233-34, for Lilbume's orchestration of the
pamphlet and petition campaign.
140. A Jury-man's Judgement upon the Case of Lieut. Col. John Lilburn (London, June
22, 1653); [B.L.: E. 702(6)).
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and death to so little purpose, as to pronounce men guilty without
regard to the nature of the offence, or to what is to be inflicted
thereupon. 141
Moreover, jurymen must be "satisfied in [their] understandings of the
Parliament's authority to make such an Act." The author denied that
it was ever a felony under English law ''to scandalize members of a
committee" or "to break the unknown privileges of a Parliament. " 142
Thus the Act of banishment was "null and void." 143 Moreover, the
parliamentary judgment itself was ''contrary to the standing laws of the
nation" because it was a judgment of life and limb without trial by
peers and without the due process entailed in such trials.1 44 Had
Lilburne had such a trial "the jury [would have] been bound by the law
of England to have proportioned the punishment to the offense. "1 45
The tract exhorted its readers to consider that ultimately they too
would be judged:
[F]or what shall it profit us, either to please the malice or opinions of
men, for to lose our own souls, rather let it be our choice not to fear
those that can kill these bodies of ours, but to fear him who is able to
cast both our bodies and souls into hell fire .... [T]he justness of our
proceedings is that which will bear us out in the great and terrible day
of the Lord.
And let us all pray earnestly unto God, that he will be pleased to give
us all eyes to see, and hearts to consider, how much the safety and
happiness of us all depends upon our sticking close to the old and good
laws of the land, and to lay to heart how much it concerns the good men
of England, the jurymen, especially, who are to determine all causes,
to be able to judge, and to distinguish between true and counterfeit
laws.146
The proceedings against Lilburne at the Old Bailey began in mid-July
(from the thirteenth to the sixteenth) and were carried over to mid-August
(from the eleventh to the twentieth) . 147 Lilburne refused to plead before
seeing a copy of the indictment. 14S Here he won a great victory: a copy of
the indictment and assistance of counsel were allowed him; indeed he was
given time to enter written exceptions. In the course of arguing for these
"rights," Lilburne established the framework of his defense, stating by
way of "exceptions" several of his central claims. He questioned whether
141. Ibid., pp. 1-2, 6.
142. Ibid., pp. 2-3, 6.
143. Ibid., p. 7.
144. Idem.: " . . . by twelve good men of his neighbourhood, giving also liberty of
exception and challenge of five and thirty, without showing cause."
145. Ibid., p. 8.
146. Ibid., pp. 10, 12-13.
147. State Trials, 5:407-19, 419-44.
148. Ibid., pp. 416-19.
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the ''Act for the Execution of a Judgment'' was an act of a true parliament
of England. Furthermore, he asserted that a judgment of the sort
contained in the act could only follow "an indictment, presentment, or
some information or accusation" for "some crime," and a trial at which
the accused was present; otherwise it was void in law and any indictment
for breach of a condition of the judgment was likewise void. 149 The
exceptions did not, however, focus on the failure of the Act to state facts
that amounted to capital felony under the English law. This charge
Lilburne reserved for the jury stage of his trial, which came on, after a
month's recess, in mid-August.
Lilburne's speeches to the court andjury in August of 1653 are not well
preserved. 150 But it seems clear that the defendant termed the Act
grounding his indictment ''a lie and a falsehood, an Act that has no reason
in it, no law for it.'' 151 He repeated his charge that no true parliament had
passed the Act and that, in any case, the judgment it imposed could only
be imposed by a jury following trial at common law. Lilburne then called
upon his jury to decide law as well as fact, to acquit him on the ground
that the Act, the judgment, and the ensuing indictment were all null and
void under the true law of England.1 52 It appears, also, that Lilburne
reiterated the exhortation contained in the opening paragraph of a short
tract, anonymously authored, which he circulated at the outset of the
August session. A Word to the Jury in the behalfe of John Lilburn 153
blended the Old Testament flavor of the radical Puritan jury tracts with
the forthright appeal to English law that had been sounded in A Juryman's Judgement:
You [i.e., the jury] are of the neighbour, and Christ shows in the lOth
[chapter] of Luke that that person is a neighbour that does works of
love and mercy; it would be an abominable cruelty if you should find
him guilty upon that pretended Act of Parliament, in regard he was not
legally accused or convicted of any crime or fact for which he was
banished or that it could be made felony if he returned. 154
149. Ibid., pp. 419-41.
150. Ibid., p. 443. The account in State Trials, written mainly by Lilburne, states that
"[n]othing of these three last days [August 18-20] proceedings are printed." What we infer
about Lilburne's speeches on these days comes from contemporary tracts, including those
by Lilburne himself. See Gregg, Free-Born John, pp. 331-32 and 395, n. 31.
151. Ibid., p. 443. See Lieut. Colonel John Lilb. Tryed and Cast: Or, His Case and Craft
discovered (London, Nov. 22, 1653), [B.L.: E. 720(2)], p. 125. See also John Lilburne, The
Tryall of L. Col. John Lilburn at the Sessions House in the Old Baily (London, Aug. 19,
1653), [B.L.: E. 711(9)], pp. 4-6.
152. Gregg, Free-Born John, p. 332; State Trials, 5:443-44.
153. A Word to the Jury in the behalfe ofJohn Lilburn (London, Aug. II, 1653), [B.L.: 669
f. 17(44)].
154. Idem.
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The tract characterized the Act as a bylaw, "such as have been .
made [by tyrants] to succour themselves in their tyranny." The Rump
Parliament had set itself up as a supreme power despite the flow of
petitions exhorting its members ''to surrender their power to a new
Representative equally chosen by the people." The tract spoke also to the
"soldiery," which had been raised to aid the people against tyrants and
which was now obliged to use its arms "against those that impose such
illegal, cruel, and bloody commands. " 155 The merciful neighbor was to
judge statute in the light of good English law and, finding it the law of a
tyrant, to oppose it. Thus had Parliament's act of banishment provided a
basis for the merger of the jury-right claim and the long-standing argument
against the very basis of the Rump's power. Whereas the 1649 trial had
produced a remarkable attack upon the judiciary, that of 1653 resulted in
an attack on Parliament. The theory of a jury right remained the same:
original power lay in the people; trial by jury assured protection against
the usurpation of that power, whether by King, Cromwell, or Parliament,
at least where it threatened to result in judgment of life and limb or in
forfeiture of estate.
A second anonymous tract, More Light to Mr. John Lilburnes Jury,1 56
published during the course of the trial, began with Coke's passage on
chapter 29 of Magna Carta and with the crimes of Empson and Dudley,
who (like the present judges) executed "unlawful Acts of Parliament. "1 57
Again, Parliament had usurped the role of the jury: "For they judge him
that are not by law his judges; that belonging only to juries . . . . " 158
Moreover, Parliament judged him without due process and for a fact
that was never before known, or declared by any law to be a crime,
whereby Mr. Lilburne or any other could be warned from the same.
And the reason is evident, for if there should be no firm, standing and
established unalterable law which Parliaments, juries and all people
were bound to maintain, no man could be certain of anything.159
Thus it was more than a question of an unjust law; even conceding its
justice, it had been applied to Lilburne after the fact, in a manner that he
could not have foreseen.
If the jury convicted Lilburne, according to More Light, it would "give
encouragement" to Parliament.16o Not only would the jurors condemn
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Idem.
More Light to Mr. John Lilburnes Jury (London, Aug. 16, 1653), [B.L.: E. 710(23)].
Ibid., p. 3.
Ibid., p. 4.
Ibid., p. 5.
Ibid., p. 6.
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Lilburne, they would condemn everyone, including themselves. The jury
was bound in conscience, therefore, "to try all laws made by Parliament,
by the fundamental laws." They could not "expect the direction of judges
and recorders in the case, who many of them lie under sore temptations
oflosing their honors and places of profit" to go against Parliament's will:
"[B]ut since it is evident to every one of your consciences, that [Lilburne]
is not charged with anything that in the true law of England is a felonious
crime, nor has in the least deserved to die, you can do no less than
pronounce him not guilty." 161 And this, on August 20, is what Lilburne's
jury did. "John Lilburne," the jury said, "is not guilty of any crime
worthy of death. "162
That Lilburne's jury, or at least that several of its members, took
themselves to be judges of law as well as fact is evidenced by statements
made to the Council of State, which examined the jurors closely on
August 23. 163 Some jurymen stated that they were dubious whether the
John Lilburne who was tried was the same John Lilburne who was
referred to in the Act, an obvious ploy . 164 It is clear from the examination
that the bench, in its charge to the jury, had stated that the jurors were
judges of fact only. One juror asserted that, notwithstanding the charge,
"the jury were otherwise persuaded from what they heard out of the law
books. " 165 This may refer to the long speech Lilburne addressed to the
jury toward the end of the trial. An account of what he said has been lost,
but we can infer that Lilburne challenged the validity of the Act, raised
questions regarding proof of his being the John Lilburne, and, citing
"relevant" authorities, exhorted the jury to find the law void and the
sentence unlawful in its relationship to the crime alleged.l66
Lilburne's aphorism regarding the jury as judges of the law had been
given new definition and effect. In one regard, though, the claim Lilburne
made in 1653 was more limited than his earlier one. Lilburne did not as a
general matter deny the authority of the bench; nor did he deny the right
of the bench to instruct jurors on the law.l67 Rather he invoked the jury as
a shield, adjuring them to reject "void" law and to act on behalf of the
161. Ibid., pp. 6, 8.
162. Gregg, Free-Born John, p. 332; State Trials, 5:446. See Thurloe, State Papers, 1:442.
163. State Trials, 5:445-50. Lilburne was held in prison pending the results of the
examination. See John Lilburne, An Hue and Cry after the Fundamental Lawes and
Liberties of England (London, Sept. 26, 1653), [B.L.: E. 714(1)]. He was thereafter ordered
to be held prisoner "for the peace of this nation." He remained a prisoner of State until his
death in 1657. See Gregg, Free-Born John, pp. 333-34.
164. E.g. Juror Emanuel Hunt (State Trials, 5:447).
165. Juror Gilbert Gayne (ibid., p. 450).
166. Lilburne, Trya/1 of L. Col. John Lilburn, pp. 4-6.
167. Lilburne, The Afflicted Mans Outcry (London, Aug. 19, 1653), [B.L.: E. 711(7*)],
pp. 1-9.
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people, whose powers of delegation of authority to true representatives
had been wrongfully usurped. His judges were not "Norman intruders";
they were, in a sense, weak and dependent, mere extensions of an
unlawful Parliament. Free elections and adherence to the fundamental
law of England were the proper correctives, not political decentralization
and adherence to local community mores.
As we have seen, Lilburne only hinted at the substance of his views on
the jury at his 1649 trial. He invoked the Leveller version of English
history without connecting it explicitly to his theory of jury right. Perhaps
he had not worked through in his own mind the problem of the origins of
the jury. Subsequently, the "logic" of his position was developed by John
Jones and others, though it is not clear how far Lilburne agreed with
them. In the event, the 1651 statute on which he was tried in the summer
of 1653 inspired a different argument concerning the jury's duty. The Act,
both in the procedures attending its passage and in its substance, was
easier to characterize as in conflict with the common law. Lilburne's 1653
defense strategy revealed how vulnerable Cromwell's new government
might be made to appear and resulted in a constitutional debate concerning the constituency of the Rump and the legal basis of its acts.
Moreover, the facts alleged to be criminal were less serious than those
for which English law had in the past exacted the penalty of death. It was
this aspect of the prosecution that came closest to reviving the concept of
"neighbors doing justice to neighbors." The jury was an instrument of
mercy, its verdict mandated just deserts. It was, therefore, of no small
importance that the jury found Lilburne "not guilty of any crime worthy
of death.'' Lilburne had effectively drawn upon this most ancient aspect
of the jury's role. He thus united his call to the jurors to resist tyranny
with the claims of the many Interregnum reform writers who opposed the
imposition of capital punishment for theft.l68 As we shall see, this
juxtaposition of ideas became a significant motif in eighteenth-century
writing on the criminal trial jury.
For the moment, however, the most significant aspect of Lilburne's
1653 claim was his invocation of the jury's duty to examine the charges
against the defendant and to reject them if it found that the facts cited did
not amount to a crime under English law. The claim was particularly well
suited to political cases, whether for crimes that were statutorily based or
for ones that depended upon judicial construction, that brought the
government into conflict with vocal opposition. Passed on to the next
generation of jury proponents, this claim dominated the Restoration
literature on the jury. In the mid-1650s the Quakers inherited both the soul
168. See above, n. 41.
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of Lilburne, who converted to their cause two years after his acquittal, 169
and his new concept of the right and duty of the true English criminal trial
jury.17o

169. Gregg, Free-Born John, p, 344.
170. See below, Chapter 6. For a different example of the influence of Lilbume's trial
tactics see Colonel Penruddock's "Directions for all my Fellow Prisoners, now to be tried
for their Lives by a Special Commission of Oyer and Terminer" (1655), in A Collection of
Scarce and Valuable Tracts (Somers' Tracts), vol. 6 (London, 1811), pp. 325-29.
Penruddock had taken part in an abortive Cavalier rising against Cromwell in 1655.
"Directions" refers to Li1burne and his "several juries" (p. 329). Penruddock, who wrote
the tract while awaiting his trial for treason, advises his codefendants to exercise their full
right of challenge, to "say we conceive the indictment is not sufficient in law," to ask for
counsel, etc. (p. 325). The defendants should put their "plea to the jury, and put it upon their
consciences, that God has made them over judges between us and the judge .... If the jury
seem fearful to clear us absolutely, tell them that it is safest for the jury to find a special
verdict, which gives the point in law to all the judges whether or not it is treason ... and
[places] all the bloodshed upon the judges" (p. 263). Penruddock addressed his ownjury in
these terms (State Trials, 2:261) but he was found guilty and beheaded. The device of a
special verdict, or a variation upon it wherein the jury returned a verdict of "guilty of
[certain specific facts]" without asking the bench to apply the law, was frequently employed
by the Quakers and by jurors in trials for seditious libel. See below, Chapters 6 and 8.

6

The Principle of Noncoercion:
The Contest over the Role of the
Jury in the Restoration

The principle of noncoercion of jurors was established in 1671 in Bushel's
Case. 1 Chief Justice Vaughan's opinion is now famous: a judge may not
punish or threaten to punish jurors for their verdict. Historians, however,
have not always agreed about either the basis for, or the meaning of,
Vaughan's opinion. What right did Vaughan intend to affirm? On which
tradition of jury right did he draw? And which tradition did his opinion
further? To answer these questions, we shall turn first to the background
of Bushel's Case, then to Vaughan's opinion, and, finally, to the interpretation that some contemporaries put upon that opinion. We shall be
tracing the development of the true law-finding, or nullifying, tradition.
As we shall see, this tradition, to which Lilburne's 1653 trial had pointed
the way, evolved almost accidentally out of different but related aspects
of the administration of the criminal law. Its relationship to the older
tradition of merciful application of the law in common-run felonies was
complex. The two law-finding traditions developed partly in tandem,
partly separately, each being pushed forward in a kind of chain reaction
of events. Although the true law-finding view was a dissident position, it
gained support on the eve of the Glorious Revolution from an important
segment of the political establishment. After 1689 Englishmen were left to
draw different conclusions about the legitimacy of the tradition, about its
relationship to merciful application of the law in routine cases, and about
its place in the evolving English constitution.
Section I of this chapter deals with the Quaker trials of the 1660s. Some
Quakers argued for a jury law-finding power like that urged by Lilburne at
his 1653 trial. While their arguments fell short of the most radical Leveller
notion of law-finding, they went well beyond the conventional and, for the
most part, accepted notion of jury-based application of law. Other
writers, however, conceived of the jury verdicts in the Quaker cases
simply as findings of fact. For them, judicial berating and fining of jurors
was an invasion of what everyone agreed was a fundamental aspect of the
trial jury's role. Their concern about the behavior of some members of the
bench was complemented by the concern of some parliamentarians and
lawyers about judicial badgering of jurors in common-run felonies. This
l. Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006.
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concern was manifested when the House of Commons censured Chief
Justice Kelyng, whose rough treatment of juries-mainly in homicide
cases-seemed to deny their traditional power of mitigation. I shall
consider this problem in section II.
The most famous of the Restoration Quaker trials, the prosecution of
William Penn and William~Mead, produced a tract literature in which the
various strands of jury argument that had been developing since
Lilburne's day converged. In section III I shall examine the trial and the
defendants' claims, both as to law-finding and fact-finding and as to the
fining of jurors for their verdicts in criminal cases. Against that background section IV considers Chief Justice Vaughan's opinion in Bushel's
Case. Vaughan, active in the parliamentary censure of Kelyng three years
before, chose to view the case solely in terms of the jury's age-old right
to find fact. He argued from that indisputable right to the conclusion that
the judge was never in a position to say with certainty that a jury had
found against either law or fact.
If Vaughan provided a lasting rationale for the jury's freedom from
coercion, he did not lay to rest the debate over the jury. His opinion failed
to confront the law-finding issues of the day and was thus vulnerable to
appropriation by those who favored jury law-finding, especially by those
who opposed the later Stuarts' treatment of defendants and juries in
treason and sedition cases. The tracts and issues of the late 1680s are the
subjects of the concluding section, V.
The principle of noncoercion by no means crippled the bench, nor even
greatly affected the daily administration of the criminal law. Many
institutional devices remained by which the bench could, if it chose,
influence the verdict of all but an intransigent jury. In most routine cases,
moreover, judge and jury agreed on standards of just application of the
law. As we shall see in Part III, although the administration of the
criminal law in the eighteenth century created even greater judicial
dependence than before upon jury mitigation of the law of sanctions, the
fact that the bench had lost the ultimate means of coercion scarcely
affected the processing of routine felony cases. In political cases, however, where from the government's point of view something more was at
stake, the principle of noncoercion represented a roadblock for authorities. The bench's approach to the allocation of judicial and jury duties in
the law of seditious libel may have reflected the government's frustration
with the principle of noncoercion. This problem, which is introduced in
section V, is also properly the subject of Part III.
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I
Bushel's Case brought to an end the legal proceedings that began with
the arrest and indictment of William Penn and William Mead.2 In the
course of his trial, Penn, a leading Quaker preacher, requested that the
court read his indictment to the jury, so that the jurors might "measure
the truth of the indictment" ;3 almost certainly, Bushel, and the three
other jurors who insisted that Penn had been guilty of "preaching only"
and refused to convict him for unlawful assembly and disturbance of the
peace, believed the indictment to be defective. They did not doubt the
truth of the facts alleged; that Penn preached, that a crowd formed, and
that a tumult resulted was certain. What these jurors doubted, however,
was that those facts amounted to the commission of the crime of taking
part in "an unlawful assembly" or of causing a "disturbance of the
peace" by a person who peacefully preached religious doctrine. In
acquitting Penn and in thereby implicitly rejecting the theory ,underlying
the indictment, Penn's jurors were responding not only to Penn's entreaties but also to those of Quaker writers since the early 1660s. Thus, the
refusal of Bushel and the others to accept the official legal theory
underlying the indictment did not mark the emergence of a new theory of
jury nullification. Indeed, by 1670 the argument that the petty jury had a
duty to scrutinize both the law and the indictment upon which the
prosecution was based had attained widespread currency.
Restoration persecution of the Quakers began with the 1662 Quaker
Act4 and reached its height in 1664, the year in which Parliament passed
the Conventicles Act, which made most nonconformist religious meetings
unlawful. 5 The Conventicles Act, part of the "Clarendon Code," played
a significant role in the enforcement of Anglicanism during the first decade
of the restored Stuart monarchy. 6 By the terms of the Act, which
elaborated upon the Act of 1662, those convicted of meeting in groups of
five or more persons under pretense of religion, but not according to the
forms of the Anglican Church, were to be imprisoned for three months
unless they paid a fine of five pounds. For conviction on a second offense
the penalty was more onerous, and those convicted of the third offense
would suffer seven years' transportation or a fine of 100 pounds.?
2. State Trials, 6:951 (1770). See below, sections III and IV.
3. Ibid., col. 958.
4. Stat. 14 Chas. 2, c. I (1662). See George Clark, The Later Stuarts (2nd ed., Oxford,
1955), p. 22.
5. Stat. 16 Chas. 2, c. 4 (1664).
6. On the Clarendon Code see e.g. David Ogg, England in the Reign of Charles II, 2 vols.
(2nd. ed., London, 1956), vol. I, pp. 206-7.
7. Stat. 16 Chas. 2, c. 4, sects. 1-3, 5.
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The Act to prevent and suppress seditious conventicles was literally
interpreted by the Stuart bench. The Act's preamble declared that
Parliament sought to suppress seditious conventicles, but the body of the
Act proscribed meetings, "under pretence or colour of religion" without
repeating the adjective "seditious." The bench concluded that the jury
must convict if there was manifest proof that the defendant had taken part
in what appeared to be such a meeting, unless the defendant showed
either that the meeting was not under pretense of religion or that it was
not nonconformist. Conviction did not require proof of seditious purpose.
That, the bench ruled, was presumed by law.s
The trials of Quakers in 1664 under the Act occasioned the first major
campaign in print since Lilburne's day regarding the powers of the
criminal trial jury. A considerable number of Quaker tracts described the
sect's travails before the law and exhorted prospective jurymen to apply
the Conventicles Act "lawfully"-by which was meant to require proof
of sedition. 9 The Quakers established an effective program of legal
education within their own ranks and perhaps also persuaded many
non-Quaker jurors to the Quaker view of the statute's meaning.JO The
Quakers' position, as it unfolded over the course of a year, mixed
moderate and radical claims regarding the jury's role in the application of
the Conventicles Act.
The most substantial analysis and discussion of the Conventicles Act
was embodied in The Jury-man charged, which was published late in
8. See e.g. William Smith, A True, Short, Impartial Relation of the Proceedings ...
August, 1664 (London, 1664), pp. 3-4.
9. E.g. A Declaration of the Present Suffering (London, 1664); The Liberty of the Subject
by Magna Charta; Or, Several weighty things to be considered (London, 1664); The
Jury-man charged; or, A Letter to a Citizen of London (London, 1664); William Smith,
Some Clear Truths (London, 1664); William Smith, The Innocency and Conscientiousness
of the Quakers (London, 1664); The Cry of the Innocent and Oppressed for Justice: Or A
briefRelation of the Late Proceedings ... London ... October 1664 (London, 1664); Smith,
A True, Short, Impartial Relation of the Proceedings ... August, 1664; William Smith, A
Second Relation from Hertford; containing the unjust proceedings . . . [October], 1664
(London, 1664); Another Cry of the Innocent and Oppressed . .. or, A Second Relation of
the unjust proceedings ... London ... December, 1664 (London, 1664); Another Cry ...
or a Third Relation of the unjust proceedings ... London ... February [1665] (London,
1665). Much of the discussion that follows is based upon an analysis of these tracts.
10. Most Quakers were convicted, but many jurors resisted finding the defendants guilty
until pressed to do so by the bench. See below, n. 17. It is evident that some jurors did not
believe Quakers ought to be punished for their worship, which they did not believe had been
proved seditious (or even against the true liturgy). It is difficult to determine whether they
believed the statute did not reach Quaker worship or believed that although it did, it ought
not to be enforced. For cases in which Quakers were acquitted, see Alfred W. Braithwaite,
"Early Friends' Experience with Juries," Journal of the Friends' Historical Society, vol. 50
(1962-64), pp. 217-27.
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1664. The tract was in part a commentary upon proceedings at the
Hertford summer assizes, perhaps the most significant episode in the
Quaker trials under the 1664 Act. Like most of the Quaker tracts on the
subject, The Jury-man charged argued that the Act had been incorrectly
applied by the Stuart bench:

[T]he intention of the Parliament is manifest from the title and preface
of the Act: the title, an Act to prevent and suppress seditious
conventicles: but what sedition in worshiping God erroneously? The
preface, for remedy against seditious sectaries and other disloyal
persons, who under pretence of tender consciences, do at their
meetings contrive insurrections, etc .... 11
Thus, the author concluded, Parliament sought to punish those who only
pretended to take part in religious exercise, but who in fact used their
meetings to further their seditious ends. Echoing Lilburne's 1653 defense,
the author asserted that the very nature of the punishment-banishment
for seven years-indicated that this was what Parliament had in mind:
"[F]ar be it from us to think so unworthily of an English Parliament" that
it would impose a "horrid banishment" for religious practice according to
an imagined "erroneous persuasion, ... for in all just laws the penalty is
not greater than the nature of the fault requires.'' 12
Finally, the author of The Jury-man charged criticized the bench's
attempt to make guilt or innocence turn mainly on the question of
presence at a religious exercise "in other manner than is allowed by the
liturgy or practice of the Church of England." 13 How were witnesses to
know whether the exercise was allowed or not? The bench's interpretation supposed either that witnesses were authorities on matters of
religion, or that witnesses would simply describe what they had seen and
the bench would inform the jury whether these practices were allowed.
The former notion was unrealistic; the latter course was totally unacceptable:
But will this satisfie you sir? Can you take a passionate and testy
judge's word as your infallible director in so many most difficult
controversies as must in this case be decided? Will you pin your faith
upon the judge's sleeve in matters of religion (of which perhaps he
knows no more than he can find in the statute book)?1 4
Must not the conscientious juror, if the question resolves itself to this
point, look to the Scripture rather than take his rule from the judge? The
11.
12.
13.
14.

Jury-man charged, p. 13.
Ibid., pp. 12-13.
Ibid., p. 7.
Ibid., p. 9.
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question at most of the hundreds of Quaker trials in the mid-1660s did not
resolve itself into this point, at least not overtly. Nevertheless, the appeal
to the jurors' understanding of the true religion, of the unity of sincere
worship, was a constant theme in the tracts, as one defense against the
strict judicial interpretation of the Act.
As The Jury-man charged suggests, there were two aspects of the
judicial interpretation of the Conventicles Act that Quakers opposed both
in their writings and at the trials: that proof of a meeting under color of
religion and contrary to the allowed liturgy sufficed for conviction; and
that proof of mere presence at a Quaker meeting cast upon the defendant
the burden of proving either that the meeting had not been for religious
worship, or that the worship had been according to the Anglican form.
Typically at the trials, there was little testimony about what had transpired at an alleged meeting; since the meetings were held in silence, the
witness could testify to the defendant's presence but little more. Their
religious nature had to be inferred, and the bench frequently pressed
witnesses in vain for evidence that the meeting involved prayers. Is Ifthe
jury believed that the meeting was under color of religion, evidence that
Anglican prayers had not been said aloud was held to be sufficient proof.
As Orlando Bridgeman, who presided at the Hertford summer assizes,
instructed the jury:
[You] are not to expect a plain, punctual evidence ... for [Quakers]
may speak to one another though not by or with auricular sound, but
by a cast of the eye, or a motion of the head or foot. ... [l]f you find,
or believe in your hearts that they were in the meeting, under colour of
religion in their way, though they sat still only, and looked upon each
other, seeing they cannot say what they did there: it was an unlawful
meeting. 16
Bridgeman's instructions became the model for most judges during the
ensuing months, as proof of presence at a Quaker meeting came to suffice
for conviction under the 1664 Act.
Juries, then, if they were not to follow the lead of the bench (although
most of them did),P naturally took their lead from the defendant. On
occasion defendants put to the task of showing that they had not been
15. E.g. The Cry of the Innocent, pp. 19 et seq.
16. Smith, A True, Short, Impartial Relation, p. 3.
17. E.g. Another Cry .. . or a Third Relation, p. 14: The jury first returned a verdict of

"guilty of meeting," but subsequently, apparently under some pressure, changed their
verdict to "guilty."; Another Cry ... or, A Second Relation, p. 14: At first eleven of twelve
were found guilty but doubt was expressed about the twelfth, then the twelfth was
convicted. The trial accounts were written by Quakers and may overstate the juries' original
reluctance to convict.
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engaged in religious exercise remained silent, but many invited the
inference that they had met to worship God. 18 If the defendant admitted
presence but not worship, the jury might acquit on insufficiency of proof
of contrary religious practices. If the defendant admitted presence and
worship, but denied seditiousness, his jury-if it sought to avoid finding
him guilty-found that there had been a meeting and worship, but that the
defendant had not broken any "true law. " 19
Thus it was that the tracts implored jurors to reject the judge's view of
the statute-to find law insofar as that involved finding the true meaning
of the statute. 20 As this exhortation was repeated during the fall and
winter of 1664-65, more and more defendants admitted to having been
present at religious meetings-i.e., they took their stand on what they
asserted was the "true law. " 21 Frequently, Quaker appeals to jurors to
find law as well as fact were only implicit: they were couched in the claim
regarding the jurors' duty to apply what the tract writer took to be the true
meaning of the statute.ZZ Indeed, these writers appear to have conceived
of the jurors' duty as one of mere fact-finding. Sometimes the writers
challenged the judges' ruling that mere presence at a Quaker meeting
sufficed for a guilty verdict, asking prospective jurors to find that worship
had not been proved. Or they beseeched jurors to find that there had not
been proof of seditious activity-again a finding offact.23 For a jury to find
these facts, of course, it had first to reject the bench's ruling as to the
question of what facts were to be found. But recognition of this level of
law-finding often remained submerged. For instance, Another Cry of the
Innocent and Oppressed, for the most part a description of the Old Bailey
18. E.g. Smith, A Second Relation from Hertford, pp. 1 et seq.; Another Cry ... or, A
Second Relation, p. 14 (first defendant remained silent; second defendant was not given an
opportunity to answer; third defendant denied being at a "seditious meeting or conventicle"; fourth defendant asserted that "there is nothing proved that the meeting I was at, is
unlawful"; fifth defendant: "I was at no unlawful meeting"; sixth defendant admitted
meeting "amongst the dear children of the Lord").
19. Joseph Besse, A Collection ofthe Sufferings of . .. Quakers ,from . .. [1650 to 1689],
2 vols. (London, 1753), vol. I, p. 401. The jury in the case Besse epitomizes brought in a
verdict of "guilty of meeting, but not of fact." The jurors said there was no evidence
concerning what was done at the meeting, but when asked whether they believed "in their
consciences, that [the defendants) were there under colour and pretense of worship,'' two
replied that they did, but the worship was "in truth." One of them said: "[l)f any man in the
world worship God in the spirit, he doth not worship contrary to the liturgy." [Several
jurors, presumably including these two were bound over to King's Bench "for their
misdemeanor" (Besse's phrase).)
20. E.g. Smith, A True, Short, Impartial Relation, p. 8.
21. E.g. Another Cry . .. or, a Second Relation, p. 17.
22. Jury-man charged (subtitle: "Wherein is shewed the true meaning of the Statute
... "); Smith, A True, Short, Impartial Relation, p. 8.
23. Jury-man charged, p. 13.
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Quaker trials before Justices Robert Hyde and John Kelyng in December,
1664, appealed to jurymen "to consult the law itself, which declares what
the fact is," and not to rely on the judge's statement of what the law
declares the facts to be. 24 Nevertheless, Another Cry describes this aspect
of the jurors' role as resulting from their duty as "sole and absolute judges
of matter of fact.' '25
The furthest reaching articulation of the Quaker position was set forth
in the closing pages of Some Clear Truths, a tract written by William
Smith in the fall of 1664. 26 In the "Postscript to all Honest, Sober and
Impartial Jurors," Smith asked his readers to consider, when hearing a
case, "whether it be properly and truly law that [the defendant] is tried
by"; and "whether the thing done be really an offense against the law. " 27
Law was based, Smith said (echoing early Leveller writings), on "mercy,
justice and equity. " 28 An interpretation that does not meet this standard
does not "unite with the body of the law," and thus such a law is void. 2 9
The Conventicles Act will "unite" only if it is interpreted to require
evidence of true seditiousness;jurors who convict on less evidence would
wrongfully condemn the defendant.3o In asking prospective jurors to
judge the law as stated by the bench in the light of general principles of
justice, Smith went beyond The Jury-man charged, and beyond nearly all
of the other significant tracts, which advised jurors to take the "intended
meaning" of the Act not from general principles, as such, but from the
wording of its preamble (which was particularly to be understood in the
light of the recent history of armed insurrection). Some Clear Truths was
one of the most radical of the Quaker writings, but in its very broad
implications for jury law-finding and in its explicit invocation of the jury's
duty generally to measure indictments against ''true law,'' it remained an
anomaly.
Thus, for the most part, the Quakers' appeal to jurors was narrow. The
Quaker writers made no assertion regarding the general duty of juries to
state the law for the community; certainly there is little indication that
they conceived of the English criminal law as merely a modern edition of
the Scriptures. While they implicitly carried forward Lilburne's appeal
not to find the defendant guilty of what they believed to be ''void law,''
24. Another Cry ... or, A Second Relation, p. 19.
25. Idem.

26. Smith, Some Clear Truths.
27. Ibid., p. Jl.
28. Ibid., p. 7.
29. Ibid., p. 12. See also p. 8: "And it is very clear and plain, that if there be no
wrong-doers, as the object of the law, that then the law in itself is silent, as having nothing
to operate upon that offends it."
30. Ibid., p. 12.

208

Transformations

they assumed the validity of the statute in question in order to address
instead the issue of its "true" meaning. Nonetheless, the Quakers
believed that no juror in good conscience could convict a person who
worshipped God according to the ''true religion.'' For the ''conscientious
Quaker," no statute that proscribed this form of worship-should Parliament ever create such a statute-could be valid. For the authority that
constituted the ultimate legal command imposed the ultimate claim upon
a man's conscience.
Thus, by the time Penn's case came to trial, the groundwork for his
appeal to the jury had been thoroughly prepared. Ultimately, Penn would
draw upon the example of John Lilburne. Yet the image of that figure of
earlier, more tumultuous times had been perpetuated, albeit in a slightly
different form, by the Quaker writers of the mid-1660s. Their calls to
jurors to consider the ''true law,'' although couched as appeals to jurors'
consciences, were modest in their implicit acceptance of traditional
common-law guideposts. The force of the Quakers' exhortations, however, was heightened by the special context in which they were raised, for
theirs was an argument mainly against persecution of peaceful spiritual
activity. The circumstances that gave rise to Penn's prosecution were
similar but at least one step removed. The charge against Penn was not
that a certain form of religious preaching or meeting was unlawful per se
but rather that his actions amounted, under the circumstances, to causing
an unlawful assembly and a disturbance of the peace. In Penn's Case the
question of what circumstances were in fact involved was as complex and
doubtful as the question of whether such circumstances amounted, in law,
to a disturbance of the peace. This additional factual matter complicated
both the nature of Penn's claim and the bench's reaction to his acquittal.
For, as we shall see, the issue of finality of verdict regarding fact was itself
very unsettled.

II
Though Penn's trial was the highpoint of the long line of Quaker
prosecutions, it should also be viewed as an important sequel to the
parliamentary censure of Lord Chief Justice John Kelyng for his menacing, fining, and imprisoning of jurors. That parliamentary incident, which
will be reconstructed below in some detail, resulted in what many
contemporaries must have taken to be sincere support for the principle of
noncoercion of jurors. Indeed, it quite possibly sent shocks through the
legal world in a way that the Quaker proceedings did not. The charges
against Kelyng related to trials at the Old Bailey and on the Western
Circuit between 1665 and 1667, proceedings involving both grand and trial
juries, one prosecution for violation of the Conventicles Act and several
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others for homicide. The manner in which Kelyng treated jurors was
probably an exaggeration of the practice rather than an exception to it. 31
We have seen that since the middle of the sixteenth century, if not earlier,
judges had at times imposed their views upon petty jurors-and even
fined and imprisoned them. However, the theory upon which the bench
acted had never been clearly articulated, and until the Restoration the
legality of coercion remained largely untested.
Though fining jurors did not begin with the Quaker cases of the early
1660s, the practice may have been accelerated by judicial reaction to jury
recalcitrance in those cases. As we have seen, the Quakers found
supporters among their jurors. Some juries, refusing to convict defendants prosecuted under the Conventicles Act, acquitted; others rendered
something akin to a partial verdict ("guilty of attending a meeting") that
took the form of a special verdict but, not being stipulated as such,
threatened to bring the proceedings to a stalemate. During (and shortly
after) Sir Robert Hyde's tenure as Chief Justice of King's Bench, at
sessions presided over by him or by his fellow justices-Twisden,
Bridgeman, or Kelyng-juries were frequently threatened, fined, and
ordered to remain in prison until the fines had been paid. 32
31. The assize records for the decade beginning with the Restoration reveal only two
instances of judicial fining of jurors in common-run cases, both in the years just preceding
Kelyng's conflicts with juries. In both cases Hyde fined jurors and bound them over until the
next assize (Shrewsbury Assizes, July 25, 1662, Oxford Circuit Crown Book, ASS! 2/1, fols.
83v-84, 93v; Gloucester Assizes, March 31, 1663, Oxford Circuit Crown Book, ASS! 2/1,
fols. 95v, 96v). In the first case (homicide), Hyde fined two jurors ten pounds apiece "in
regard they were most obstinate and did mislead the rest,'' and the other jurors four pounds
apiece. In the second case (burglary), Hyde fined all the jurors five pounds apiece.
There are no details regarding the acquittal of the defendant charged with burglary. In the
homicide case, the jury insisted on returning manslaughter se defendendo, despite the fact
that, according to the report, the defendant "did pursue [the deceased] with his rapier drawn
when the [deceased] ran from him and had no weapon but a stick in his hand and did
endeavour as much as he could to fly from [the defendant]." The defendant was the
deceased's master. It is impossible to tell whether the jury was acting "mercifully" or from
some other motive, or how the court viewed the jury's motive. According to the report, the
jury "did wilfully refuse to observe the directions of the court in point of law therein given
to alter the [verdict]" and the jurors "did go positively against full evidence and the
direction of the court in point of law."
The assize records are by no means a reliable guide to the frequency of the fining of jurors.
Those several cases involving fines cited as precedent in 1665 and 1670 and those charged
against Kelyng in Parliament do not appear on the assize records themselves.
32. See e.g. above, n. 19, and below, nn. 33-36. See also the contemporary accounts
listed above, n. 9. My discussion of the fining issue in the several years before the
proceedings against Kelyng in the Commons has benefited from access to the excellent and
far more detailed account in Alexander Scherr, "The Genesis of Bushell's Case: John
Vaughan and Legal Change," (unpublished paper, University of Michigan Law School,
1981), pp. 17-37.
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In some quarters there were doubts about the legality of fining,
especially when it was undertaken by an inferior court. Matthew Hale,
Chief Baron of the Exchequer, shared those doubts about what he termed
an "arbitrary practice." In his History of the Pleas of the Crown he
expressed his views as of the mid-1660s: "I have seen arbitrary practice
still go from one thing to another, the fine set upon grand inquests began,
then they set fines upon the petit-juries for not finding according to the
directions of the court.'' The practice, Hale thought, was both of recent
origin and on the increase. Significantly, it was not confined to the highest
courts, but it "was endeavored to bring the practice of the King's Bench
into use before justices of gaol delivery and oyer and terminer.' ' 33 It is not
surprising, then, that in two such cases where fines were estreated into
Exchequer, process was stayed "as being contrary to law. " 34
Fines set directly by King's Bench were less prone to attack. In several
1664 cases, including Rex v. Selby and Leech's Case, King's Bench
ordered an information against the offending jurors and fined them
substantial amounts. 35 Jurors who refused to pay the fines were imprisoned until they relented. There was no protection available from a
sympathetic Exchequer, and contest by means of a writ of habeas corpus
brought the jurors back before King's Bench. Thus, in Wagstaffe's Case,
which resulted from a trial before Kelyng in the summer of 1665, after
Hyde's death and before Kelyng rose to Chief Justice, King's Bench
tested and upheld the legality offining. 36 The decision, handed down after
Kelyng became Chief Justice, set the stage for conflict within governing
institutions over the question of coercion.
Wagstaffe's Case was typical of many Quaker prosecutions. It was
clear that there had been a meeting, but there was no direct evidence that
it had been held for religious purposes. Following common practice,
Kelyng had instructed the jurors that evidence of a meeting sufficed and
that it was for the defendants to prove that the meeting was not ''under
ptdense" of non-Anglican worship. Perhaps out of frustration, he fined
the recalcitrant jurors, not even bothering to order an information against
33. Sir Matthew Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown, 2 vols. (London, 1800), vol. 2,
p. 160. It appears that the bench had ruled in 1554 that judges could not fine on assize (but
presumably could in King's Bench). See above, Chapter 4, n. 150 and accompanying text.
See also Barnes, ed., Somerset Assize Orders, p. 32, for coercion of a coroner's jury.
34. Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown, 2:312.
35. Rex v. Selby, 1 Keble 769, 83 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1664); Leech's Case, Sir T. Raym. 98,
83 Eng. Rep. 53 (1664). Braithwaite ("Early Friends' Experience with Juries," p. 223)
accepts contemporary evidence that the jurors in Leech's Case were bound over but not
fined.
36. Rex v. Wagstaffe, 1 Keble 934, 83 Eng. Rep. 1328; 1 Keble 938, 83 Eng. Rep. 1331;
Sir T. Raym. 138, 83 Eng. Rep. 75; 1 Sid. 273, 82 Eng. Rep. 1101 (1665).
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them.37 The jurors turned first to Exchequer, certifying Kelyng's action as
error and requesting that the fines be removed from the record. Even Hale
concurred with his brethren that Exchequer could not review a sister
court in such a case. Though he doubted the legality of the fine, Hale
directed the petitioners to sue a habeas in King's Bench.38
The return to the jurors' writ asserted that the jurors had found ''contra
directionem curiae in materia legis et contra plenam evidentiam, " 39 the
form of return that would be employed five years later in Bushel's Case.
From what little is preserved in extant accounts, it appears that opposing
counsel established a pattern of argument that was to figure importantly in
the later case. Counsel for the Quakers asserted that the return failed to
state a legal basis for the fine, by which was meant that the return did not
(nor could not) restate the entire proceedings in a way that allowed for
review of the trial court's conclusion that the jury had found against fact
and law. Thus, counsel alleged, there could be no effective remedy
against the imposition of such a fine. The power to fine inevitably left
lower courts far too much discretion and must, ultimately, undermine the
fact-finding role of the trial jury. Maynard, in reply, sidestepped this
charge, focusing on the situation that would result if judges did not have
the power to fine. He stated Kelyng's views as of the summer of 1665:
because attaint did not lie in criminal cases, without the power to fine
there would be a failure of justice. A new trial, he asserted, would not be
appropriate. In the end, "[t]rust must be laid somewhere," and the law
presumed that it must reside in the wisdom and discretion of the judges of
King's Bench.4o
The various reports suggest that all of the judges agreed on several
rationales that both upheld the fines and provided some limits upon the
fining power. In theory, these unanimously held views might be said to
constitute the opinion of the court. 41 But in practice, Kelyng and Twisden
were in command, and they were determined to apply the furthest
reaching doctrine of the case. So far as they were concerned, there would
be no distinction between "superior" courts that could fine and "inferior" ones that might not. Nor would an information be necessary: the
fines might be applied directly. As Twisden had stated, "The judge is
entrusted with the liberties of the people. " 42 The bench would determine
whether jurors went against the evidence, for jurors "are not judges of
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

1 Sid. 273, 82 Eng. Rep. 1101; Hardres 409, 145 Eng. Rep. 522 (1665).
Idem.
I Sid. 273, 82 Eng. Rep. 1101 (1665).
1 Keble 938, 83 Eng. Rep. 1331; I Sid. 273,82 Eng. Rep. 1101.
See above, n. 36.
83 Eng. Rep. 75 (1665).
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fact so as to go clearly against it. " 43 The precedents that were cited (or
that can be found in Kelyng's reports or elsewhere) fall either in
Elizabeth's reign or very recently in King's Bench itself. 44 They are
surprisingly meager. Kelyng was persuaded by them, but apparently he
was moved most by the practical effect of an absence of power to fine.
Kelyng was possibly emboldened by the decision in Wagstaffe's Case,
for in 1666-67 he attempted openly to control grand and petty jury
verdicts, not merely in Quaker cases, where jurors practiced what most
observors took to be true nullification of the law, but also (perhaps
fatefully) in homicide trials, where jurors sought to exercise what had long
been treated as a quasi-legitimate form of discretion. It was Kelyng's
handling of a Western Circuit grand jury, and in particular of one of its
members, Sir Hugh Windham, that brought the charges against him in
Parliament. 4 5 Contemporaries identified Windham with the "country
party" and some of them seem to have regarded the attack on Kelyng as
in large part politically inspired. 46 Nonetheless, Kelyng's behavior in
several other cases was also at issue, and there appears to have been
strong sentiment against his treatment of juries and in favor of a bill
making menacing and fining illegalY
Proceedings against Kelyng commenced October 16, 1667, when the
Chief Justice "was complained of by some of the House for his severe and
illegal fining and imprisoning juries, both the grand and petty juries, for
their verdicts, and also for giving some worthy gentlemen that served
uncivil and insolent language.' ' 48 A committee was appointed to study the
matter and to report back to the House. 49 According to John Milward, a
43. Ibid., p. 1331.
44. See also below, n. 177 and accompanying text.
45. Cockburn, English Assizes, pp. 123-24, 166; Langbein, "The Criminal Trial before
the Lawyers," Chicago Law Review, vol. 45 (1978), pp. 298-99 and nn. 106-8. See below,
n. 57. For a recent review of what is known about Kelyng in the years leading up to his
confrontation with Windham, see Eric Stockdale, "Sir John Kelyng, Chief Justice of the
King's Bench, 1665-1671," Bedfordshire Historical Record Society, vol. 59 (1980), pp.
43-53.
46. Langbein ("Criminal Trial before the Lawyers," p. 299, n. 106) cites Roger North's
attribution to his brother Francis of the view that "changing the law" to disallow fining "was
popular" [Roger North, The Life of the Right Honourable Francis North, Baron of Guilford,
Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, under King Charles II and King James II (London, 1742),
pp. 66-67].
47. I draw this conclusion from the language of the resolution passed by the House of
Commons (see below, text at n. 51) and from the language of the parliamentary diaries. This
is not to deny that politics had a great deal to do with shaping attitudes; it is only to say that
those attitudes may have come to be sincerely held by some both in and out of Parliament.
48. The Diary of John Milward, ed. Caroline Robbins (Cambridge, 1938), p. 88.
49. Idem.; Journals of the House of Commons, 9:4, cols. 1-2; J. Hatsell, Precedents of
Proceedings in the House of Commons, 4 vols. (London, 1776-1818), vol. 4 (1796), p. 113.
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member of Parliament who kept a diary of Commons proceedings, the
disposition of the House in establishing the committee was ''to the intent
that a course may be taken that judges may not at their own wills and
pleasures impose fines and imprison or affront either grand juries or petty
juries for giving and adhering to the verdicts. "5o The committee set forth
its charges before the House on December ll, and concluded with a
resolution:
That the proceedings of the Lord Chief Justice, in cases now reported,
are innovations in the trial of men for their lives and liberties; and that
he hath used an arbitrary and illegal power, which is of dangerous
consequences to the lives and liberties of the people of England; and
tends to the introducing of an arbitrary govemment.5 1
The charges themselves fell under several heads but are beyond precise
reconstruction. Apparently, one case was a trial of Quakers at the Old
Bailey from the summer of 1665. The case seems to have preceded
Wagstaffe's Case by no more than a month and took largely the same
form. 5 2 On trial for their third offense, the defendants said they had come
together "[t]o seek God in the spirit." The jury refused to convict them,
according to Milward's version of the committee report, "because they
had no full proof that there was not any religious [Anglican] worship
performed.' '53 Kelyng, it was charged, told the jury that the evidence was
manifest and sent the jury out again, virtually ordering them to find the
defendants guilty. Because ''the jury would not alter from their verdict,''
Kelyng "imprisoned and fined some of them one hundred marks a piece,
which fine some of them paid. " 54 The committee report stated that Sir
William Wild, the Recorder of London, who sat with Kelyng, attempted
"to delay the fine" and to give the jury another opportunity to change
their minds, but Kelyng "answered that he would make them know
themselves, and said they were peremptory saucy fellows. " 55
50. Diary of John Milward, pp. 88-89.
51. Journals of the House of Commons, 9:35, col. 2.
52. Hatsell (Precedents of Proceedings, p. 114) understandably suggested that the case
was Wagstaffe's Case. Thomas Rudyard, who was convicted by a new jury shortly after
Penn's jury was sequestered, wrote from Newgate in early 1671 that Wagstaffe's Case was
at issue in the proceedings against Kelyng: "Appendix" to William Penn, Truth Rescued
from Imposture (London, 1671), in William Penn, A Collection of Works of William Penn,
2 vols. (London, 1726), vol. 1, pp. 511-20. This appears not to have been the case; the jurors
in Wagstaffe's Case were all fined in the same amount, which was not true in the case at
hand. See below, text at n. 156.
53. Diary of John Milward, p. 159.
54. Ibid., pp. 159-60.
55. Ibid., p. 160.
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The other matters charged against Kelyng involved homicide cases.
Clearly the most important was the incident that resulted in Windham's
Case.56 Sir Hugh had served on a Somerset grand jury that returned a
finding of manslaughter-possibly of death per infortunium-which "did
not agree with his Lordship's sense." When they refused to alter their
finding, Kelyng fined the grand jurors "and told Sir Hugh that he was the
head of a party.'' Windham replied that he was a member of Commons
and claimed his privilege, whereupon, according to Milward, "The Chief
Justice told him that he would make him know that he was now his
servant and that he would make him stoop. " 57 Two other cases involved
petty juries that refused to find murder. In one, a master's helper had
beaten a boy "about the head with a broomstaff" for doing careless work.
Kelyng would not accept a verdict of manslaughter and threatened the
jury with a fine. This produced the result he wanted: murder was found,
the defendant was hanged, in spite of the recommendation of "gentlemen''. of the county that he be spared. 58 Yet another petty jury responded
to Kelyng's threats by modifying their finding of self-defense to a verdict
of manslaughter. 59 There were also one or two other charges of insolent
language and arbitrary rulings,60 but the coercion of juries lay at the core
of the charges. Kelyng was said to have so "discouraged" grand and
petty jurors that they might refuse to "serve upon any future juries if he
be judge at that circuit." His behavior, the charges concluded, endangered lives and liberties and tended "to the introducing of an arbitrary
government. " 61
The Chief Justice was not without his supporters, several of whom
spoke in his defense. They portrayed Kelyng as essentially honest and in
the right (though perhaps indiscreet), and moved that the Chief Justice be
allowed to defend himself at the Bar of the House of Commons.62 The
56. Rex v. Windham, 2 Keble 180, 84 Eng. Rep. 113 (1667).
57. Diary of John Milward, pp. 162-63; See also Anchitell Grey, Debates of the House of
Commons From the Year 1667 to the Year 1694 (London, 1769), 1:62-63: "Sir Hugh
Wyndham (who first complained to the House of this business) [Kelyng] reproached for
being the head of a faction, for no other cause, than finding a bill according to his
conscience. He drew the verdict and made the jury find it. Sir Hugh said, he was the King's
servant and Member of Parliament (upon his reproaches). [Kelyng] told the grand jury they
were his servants, and he would make the best in England stoop."
58. Diary of John Milward, pp. 160, 163; Grey, Debates, p. 63.
59. Diary of John Milward, p. 160.
60. R. Latham and W. Matthews, eds., The Diary of Samuel Pepys, ll vols. (London,
1970-83), vol. 8 (1974), pp. 483-84; Hatsell, Precedents of Proceedings, pp. 113-14; Grey,
Debates, p. 63.
61. Diary of John Milward, p. 163; Grey, Debates, p. 63; Journals of the House of
Commons, 9:35, col. 2.
62. Diary of John Milward, p. 163: "Sir Thos. Higgins made an excellent speech in the
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motion was accepted. Kelyng's speech on his own behalf two months
later showed belated tact and careful planning. Though it failed by itself
to stem the movement for a bill against the fining of jurors, it largely
defused the attack against him.
Kelyng's most detailed reply was to the charge that he had fined a jury
for refusing to convict several Quakers. The case in question appears at
length in a manuscript of Kelyng's reports. 63 It was not included in the
printed Reports, perhaps because it had received rough treatment at the
hands of the Commons. In the Commons Kelyng claimed that the jury
''pretended that they had not full evidence,'' and he described how he had
questioned the jury on all of the facts that he considered dispositive. The
jurors had admitted that the defendants were at the Bull and Mouth, a
notorious Quaker meeting place, and that they were "worshipping of
God." But there was no direct evidence "that they were there under
pretence of religious worship in other manner than appointeth. "64 This
was clearly a ruse, the same one employed time after time at Hertford,
London, and other assizes. 65 Kelyng evidently did not explain to the
House that he had charged the jury that the defendants were required in
law to prove they were together for a lawful purpose. Nor did he state, as
he did in his report, that he told the jury that the defendants' claim of
privilege against self-incrimination was a "confession." But he did report
that the defendants had said the Church of England was not a true church
and that this, too, was before thejury.66 Kelyng must have been confident
about his ground: Wagstaffe's Case had upheld fining in just these
circumstances, and Kelyng reminded the House that "it is resolved, by all
the judges, that juries are fineable. "67 Surely the Commons was aware
that the jury in the case at hand had taken part in a widespread campaign
defense of the Chief Justice. That although his passions might lead him a little out of the way
sometimes, yet he was a very good and just judge, and had done nothing against the law."
Grey, Debates, p. 64: "[Higgins) says, Lord Kelyng [is) a man of choler and passionRight-handed faults his zeal for the laws, but no ill man of bribery or corruption." Others
who spoke on Kelyng's behalf were Sir Humphrey Winch, Sir Anthony Jerby, and Thomas
Street.
63. "Lord Chief Justice Kelyng's Reports," B.L. MS Hargrave (hereafter cited as Harg.)
103, fols. 34v-37.
64. Ibid., fol. 35v.
65. See above, text at nn. 20-23.
66. B.L. MS Harg. 103, fol. 35: "I told [the defendants] that they being indicted for an
unlawful meeting, the proof lay on their part to make it appear what they were doing, and
so to excuse, which they refused to do"; fol. 36: "I told [the jury) that [the defendants) being
asked what they were doing, they answered they were not bound to accuse themselves
which is a kind of confession that they were there under pretense of religious worship.'' See
Diary of John Milward, p. 166, for an account of Kelyng's "defense" of his behavior in this
case.
67. Grey, Debates, p. 67.
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to render an Act of Parliament (the Conventicles Act) ineffective. 68 Given
their responses under close questioning, there could be no credible claim
that the jurors had exculpatory knowledge of their own or that they did
not believe the witnesses. There was no true disagreement on the facts
proved but rather upon the question (always one for the bench) of what
facts were required to be proved. In reaching its own answer to this
question, the jury had taken the law into its own hands, or so it seemed
to Kelyng. If this case involved wrongfuljudicial behavior, it was because
threatening and fining were wrong as a matter of constitutional principle,
and in all cases short of outright corruption, not simply because jurors
might have knowledge of their own. 69
Kelyng turned next to the several homicide cases, beginning with the
fray that ended in a slaying the jurors found to have been self-defense. On
his view of the facts, Kelyng thought the case either murder or manslaughter, for the defendant had either commenced the fight or responded
to insult with a drawn sword before finding his life in danger and
retreating. Evidently, Kelyng charged the jury on a point of law and fined
them for their recalcitrance in returning self-defense. Kelyng apparently
had no reservation about reporting this case in Commons. The jury, he
thought, had clearly found against the facts, refusing to apply rules of the
law of homicide that had been settled for centuries.?o
68. According to Milward (Diary, p. 167) Kelyng told the Commons: "[I]fhe had not thus
far proceeded against the Quakers and the jurors he did assure himself that he had not
proceeded justly according to the act of Parliament.''
69. The jurors almost certainly did believe that they had knowledge of their own. From
their perspective, the defendants were innocent unless they had engaged in seditious
activity. They believed that Quaker worship, though outside the pale of the established
Church, was not seditious; their knowledge of the Quakers, of their loyalty to England, and
of their religious spirit was an important factor. Given the official interpretation of the
Conventicles Act, this did not constitute relevant evidence. The bench could be certain that
jurors did not have knowledge of their own that the defendants were engaged either in
Anglican worship or in peaceful nonreligious activity.
70. Diary of John Milward, pp. 160, 167. According to the charge against Kelyng,
"[T]here happened a fray in which one man was slain; it was proved that the man that killed
him was set upon and so did it in his own defense." Kelyng described the case in Parliament
as follows: "Two men fell out, had their swords drawn and were parted, and after a while
fell to fighting again. One of them was slain, but because it was said that he that killed the
other fled to the wall and afterward slew him therefore the jury would not find it murder."
It appears that this was a typical case of generous application of the law of self-defense. It
is difficult to see how Kelyng thought "murder" not only an appropriate but the preferred
verdict, but it is easy to understand the view that a verdict of manslaughter, not self-defense,
was called for: the slayer had engaged in the fight before retreating. Moreover, the evidence
of retreat probably was given in pro forma fashion, according to a tradition of which Kelyng
disapproved (but in which the bench had long acquiesced).
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Kelyng's Reports evidence great attention to the substantive law of
homicide and his insistence upon verdicts that were commanded by the
law .7 1 One ancient doctrine concerned the manner in which a master or
his helper might punish an apprentice, the subject of another of the cases
charged against him. In his defense to this charge in Commons, Kelyng
first cited a particularly gruesome case (as though it had been charged
against him in the Commons, though it had not) wherein "a smith struck
his prentice with a bar of iron [and] broke his skull." The jury, Kelyng
said, would not find murder until he threatened them. Subsequently, he
stated, "the judges in Westminster Hall gave their opinion that it was
murder," for one may not chastise with "any ... weapon or instrument
to kill them. " 72 According to Kelyng' s Reports, this case was tried in
London, not on the Western Circuit, and the jury returned a special
verdict, though it is possible they had been urged to do so. 73 The
Westminster bench ruled in this case that the facts amounted to murder.
It thus provided Kelyng with powerful precedent and, moreover, allowed
him to parade his generosity of spirit, for, as he stated in the Commons,
after the Westminster ruling the defendant (presumably with Kelyng's
leave) was pardoned due to his good reputation. 74 Kelyng appears to have
employed this case tactically in the Commons in order to buttress his
defense on the charge of inducing a murder verdict in the case actually
charged against him. Though in the case charged the "instrument" of
chastisement was less lethal (a broomstick), the master's servant, Kelyng
apparently said, "beat [the apprentice] about the head ... until the blood
gushed out of his nose, mouth and ears." Kelyng stated that he caused the
jury to "bring it in murder," for which the defendant was hanged.7 5
Again, Kelyng viewed the initial verdicts in the case of the fray and in
both of the master-servant cases as directly contrary to settled rules of
law. In this he was correct, but possibly on weaker ground, for these
cases could be assimilated to cases in which there was room for true
disagreement on the facts. Unlike Quaker trials, these were not cases in
which the bench was confronted with what could be read as systematic
appeals for jury nullification. Admittedly, it is unlikely that a true dispute
over either law or fact existed in cases that involved the line between
murder and manslaughter, or in ones that involved the line between
culpable homicide and self-defense. For example, in even the most
71. E.g. Kelyng 56, 58, 61-2, 84 Eng. Rep. 1080-83 (1666).
72. Diary of John Milward, pp. 167-68.
73. Kelyng 64-65, 84 Eng. Rep. 1084-85 (1666).
74. Diary of John Milward, p. 168: "But although this man was condemned yet because
he was very well spoken of (and for) by his neighbors he procured his pardon from the
king."
75. Idem.
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egregious case, that of the smith who struck his apprentice with an iron
bar, it is unlikely that the jury rejected the proposition that such
chastisement might constitute murder; as for the facts, probably so much
was proved. But there were other considerations, ones that applied as
much or more to the defendant who used a broomstick to chastise. Had
the defendant acted out of sudden anger? Did he intend to kill as opposed
seriously to hurt the deceased? Was the defendant of good reputation?
None of these factors altered the law: strictly speaking, only provocation
on the part of the deceased could reduce the crime to manslaughter.
Nonetheless, there was in practice room for play, especially where there
was no evidence either of true premeditatiorr Or of slaying in the course of
robbery or burglary. The concept of "deliberateness" could be viewed
differently in different cases that fell within the genre of those charged,
even, strictly speaking, "against the facts." This was part of the jury's
traditional de facto role-the merciful application of law to facts. At times
the bench acquiesced in the jury's exercise of such discretion, at times
not. The problem for contemporaries was, What might a nonacquiescing
bench do to a jury that applied the law to the facts in this way? Kelyng had
no doubts, and some precedent; but there was precedent (in the form of
practice) in the other direction as well.
Kelyng's handling of the Windham affair in Parliament shows him at his
most tactful. He asserted that the grand jury brought in a bill of death per
infortunium and that for this reason he had explained to them that they
must return either billa vera or ignoramus: "[I]fthey find the proofs to be
slight or not material, then to find it ignoramus, and if it be sufficiently
proved then to bring it in billa vera, and then to leave it to the trial of the
court. " 76 Kelyng told the grand jury, he now said, that it may not judge
''of point of law,'' by which he meant that it must find only the fact of the
killing by the accused and not the legal nature of the deed. Because the
grand jury persisted in its verdict, Kelyng admonished them ''better to
consider of it that night," but they did not change their minds. It was for
this behavior, Kelyng said, that he fined some ofthe grand jurors. He had
offered to withdraw the fine "if they would submit." When the matter
came to a hearing, "the judges with one consent said that I was in the
right." Afterward he nonetheless-so he now asserted-"caused the
clerk of the assize to remit their fines. "77
Kelyng made no reference to his interchange with Windham, and he
perhaps took more credit for the discharging of the fine than was his due. 7 8
76. Diary of John Milward, p. 68.
77. Ibid., p. 169.
78. For the alleged interchange with Wyndham, see above, n. 57. According to an
anonymous report of the subsequent proceedings before King's Bench, the grand jurors
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It appears that the grand jury returned a verdict of manslaughter, not of
per infortunium, an unimportant slip on Kelyng's part.79 Nonetheless,
Kelyng was correct on the law and must have felt confident about his
position so long as he could divert attention from his insults to Windham.
Perhaps significantly, Kelyng made no reference to his more extreme
view that in some cases of homicide the question of whether the slaying
had been murder or manslaughter was not even for the trial jury. On this
view, where the Crown produced evidence of deliberation and the
defendant failed to show provocation, the trial jury would merely find the
fact of the homicide; it was for the court to "imply" malice. If the jury in
such a case found a degree of homicide less than murder, it would incur
punishment. Indeed, in Rex v. Hood, Kelyng fined a petty jury on just
those grounds. 8o
According to Milward, the House debated Kelyng's behavior for four
hours or more before resolving that fining and imprisonment were illegal
and that a bill should be drafted to that effect, but that there should be "no
further prosecution or proceedings against the Chief Justice. "8t It is
were discharged without fine "because it was a mistake in their judgments rather than any
obstinacy." (B.L. MS Harg. 339, fol. 2). Keble [2 Keble 180-81, 84 Eng. Rep. 113 (1667)]
reported that the fine was not assessed "because they were gentlemen of repute in the
country."
79. B.L. MS Harg. 339, fol. 2. The bill proffered to the grand jury stipulated "murder."
80. Kelyng 50-51, 84 Eng. Rep. 1077-78 (1666). It appears that Kelyng believed it was for
the bench to determine whether the defendant had shown provocation: "[U]pon the
evidence it appeared that [Hood] killed him without any provocation, and thereupon I
directed the jury, that it was murder; for the law in that case intended malice; and I told them
they were judges of the matter of fact, viz. whether Newen died by the hand of Hood; but
whether it was murder or manslaughter, that was matter in law, in which they were to
observe the direction of the Court." Kelyng fined the jurors forty shillings apiece. Hatsell
(Precedents of Proceedings, p. 114) suggests that Hood's Case was among those charged
against Kelyng. Probably he confused this case with the one involving the fray (see above,
n. 70 and accompanying text). The more common (and the correct) practice was for the
judge to charge the jury that absence of provocation implied malice; that whether there had
been provocation was a question of fact for the jury to determine; that it was for the jury to
apply the law (of implied malice) to the facts the jury found; that the jury was to state in its
verdict whether the defendant was guilty of murder, manslaughter, homicide in self-defense,
or was not guilty. This practice, of course, enabled the jury to conceal a rejection of the law
of implied malice within its finding of fact, and it is this that Kelyng sought to prevent.
81. Diary ofJohn Milward, p. 170: "Many did aggravate, others did extenuate [Kelyng's]
failings." Pepys recorded: "Here I did also see their votes against my Lord Chief Justice
Keeling, that his proceedings were illegal and that he was a contemner of Magna Charta, the
great preserver of our lives, freedoms, and properties-and an introduction to arbitrary
government-which is very high language, and of the same sound with that in the year 1640"
(Diary, p. 577, under date: 12 Dec. 1667. Almost certainly this was the thirteenth of
December). According to Grey (Debates, p. 67), Wyndham moved "that since the Chief
Justice had forgot to answer the reproachful language he gave him, that the House would
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impossible to determine the precise reason for the House's decision on
the bill. Possibly it reflected concern about the Crown's use of the bench,
and about the strongly royalist tendency of some of the judges, as well as
fear that the bench might use its monitoring of judicial proceedings to fine
or imprison its political enemies. 82 Perhaps largely political concerns that
were readily translated into "constitutional" concerns fostered widespread doubts about the legality of fining and made acceptable the view
that, whatever one might make of the precedents, fining was, pure and
simple, unlawful. Had the main consideration been Kelyng's treatment of
recalcitrant juries in prosecutions of Quakers, the result might have been
very different, for most Parliamentarians believed that the Quakers posed
a threat both to public order and to respect for statute law. s3 But most of
the cases with which the House had had to grapple were homicides,
where something less was at stake. Kelyng's behavior-because it
touched the most routine area of the administration of the criminal lawmay have been taken to suggest how far the Stuart bench was prepared to
go to revise long-settled practices involving the criminal trial jury.
The bill to declare illegal the fining and imprisonment of jurors died in
committee. It had received two readings before the House in midFebruary, 1668, and among those who had spoken to the bill after its
second reading was John Vaughan, who would three years later write the
opinion in Bushel's Case. Vaughan appears to have adopted a middle
position, arguing that prohibition of "menacing" ought to be dropped
from the bill, "it being a word of too large extent." A judge ought to be
able to ''tell a corrupt jury of the danger of an attaint, in a case where they
shall proceed wittingly against both their oaths and duties." What
Vaughan meant by "corrupt" is unclear; nor can we know whether
Vaughan, as of 1668, would have endorsed the fining (as well as the
"menacing") of jurors had he believed an attaint was unavailing and that
likewise forget it, for he [Wyndham] did." See also, Journals of the House of Commons,
9:37, col. 2.
82. See A. F. Havighurst, "The Judiciary and Politics in the Reign of Charles II," Law
Quarterly Review, vol. 66 (1950), pp. 62, 229. See also Jennifer Carter, "Law, Courts and
Constitution," in J. R. Jones, ed., The Restored Monarchy (London, 1979), p. 86; J. P.
Kenyon, The Stuart Constitution (Cambridge, 1966), p. 420.
83. For the background to the renewal in 1670 of the Conventicles Act see Douglas
Lacey, Dissent and Parliamentary Politics in England, 1661-1689 (New Brunswick, 1969),
pp. 58-61; Grey, Debates, pp. 146, 174,220-22,226-28,230,245-47,254,263-64,295,300.
Vaughan spoke against the bill "because it crosses the fundamental laws of the nation"
(presumably because it did not provide jury trial in some contexts); Hansard, ed.,
Parliamentary Debates, iv:4l3, 421, 444-47; Journals of the House of Commons, 9:60-61,
66, 78, 87, 101-2, 104, 108-9, Ill, 113, 123, 128, 129-31, 135-36, 147, 150, 154; Journals of
the House of Lords 12:237, 260, 262, 305-6, 308-10; 312, 317-18, 320-21, 324-26, 333,
335-36, 338-40, 342, 349-50.
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a "failure of justice" was thus possible. 84 The bill was then committed to
the study of Vaughan and nearly three dozen others.ss That committee
was subsequently saddled with consideration of a bill regarding the
procuring of able and sufficientjurors.86 Debate resumed in the House in
early April, 1668, reviving the Committee's activity concerning judicial
treatment of jurors-new complaints, this time regarding Justice Tyrrell,
were aired-but the bill never received a final reading. 87 Largely in
response to concerns of London authorities about Quaker preaching, the
question of continuing the Act to prevent and suppress seditious Conventicles seems to have taken precedence, and, perhaps significantly, there
was substantial overlap between its members and those on the committee
for the jury bill. 88 By the end of the year Vaughan had been appointed
Chief Justice of Common Pleas, and complaints about treatment of jurors
had diminished. Kelyng, who had formerly been so active, soon passed
from the scene altogether. 89

III
The prosecution of William Penn and William Mead grew out of the
continuing struggle between the Quakers and City of London authorities.
Despite continued arrests and fines, Quaker leaders continued to preach
at large and well-publicized meetings. London officials had ordered that
traditional meeting places of the Friends be locked and guarded by
soldiers, but this only forced preaching out onto the streets where crowds
gathered and-as city authorities saw it-the public order was threat84. According to Milward (Diary, pp. 190-91), Vaughan concluded his comments with the
observation "that there ought also care to be taken to prevent miscarriage of juries as well
as the severity of judges."
85. Journals of the House of Commons, 9:51-53; Diary ofJohn Milward, pp. 187, 190-91;
Grey, Debates, p. 84.
86. Journals of the House of Commons, 9:65, 70-71. A total of fifteen more persons were
added to the committee (idem).
87. Ibid., 9:74-75, 77, 83-84. See Diary of John Milward, p. 243, for the complaint
"brought in against Judge Tyrell [for] forcing a jury to go out again upon a prisoner after he
had been tried before Chief Justice Kelyng, and had been acquitted by the jury ... Judge
Tyrell being present at the trial" (April 3, 1668). On that day Milward himself was added to
the Committee (Journals of the House of Commons, 9:74). See also B.L. MS Add, 38,336,
fol. 348, regarding activity in the House of Lords: "It was ordered that the Lord St. John
have leave to bring in a bill for declaring the fining and imprisoning of jurors illegal. This bill
was brought in but did not pass."
88. Journals of the House of Commons, 9:74, 84.
89. Kelyng died in May, 1671. He was still on the bench in 1670, but it appears from the
printed Reports that he was not present after Trinity Term of that year. See E. Foss, The
Judges of England, with sketches of their lives and notices connected with the Courts at
Westminster, 1066-1864, 9 vols. (London, 1848-64), vol. 7 (1864), p. 139.
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ened.9o On August 14, 1670, Penn addressed an especially large crowd in
Gracechurch Street. Shortly after he began to speak, constables
forearmed with warrants signed by the Lord Mayor, Sir Samuel Starling,
moved to arrest both him and his copreacher, Mead. According to the
document addressed formally to the keeper of Newgate, Penn was
arrested for ''preaching seditiously and causing a great tumult of people
... to be gathered together riotously and routously. "9 1 Despite the form
of this warrant both men were charged under the recently renewed
Conventicles Actn and might have obtained release sine die through
payment of fines. But they refused and instead demandedjury trial, as the
Act allowed. They thus remained in custody until the close of their
five-day trial, which began September 1 at the quarter sessions held at the
Old Bailey. 93
Neither Penn nor Mead was indicted for attendance at a meeting in
breach of the Conventicles Act. Rather, the government charged them
with causing an unlawful assembly and a disturbance of the peace,
charges that came close to an indictment for insurrection. The indictment
alleged that the two men agreed that Penn would preach and that Penn
"by abetment of ... Mead ... did preach and speak"; it also alleged that
"by reason" of the defendants' actions "a great concourse and tumult of
people in the street ... a long time did remain and continue, in contempt
of ... the King, and of his law, to the great disturbance of his peace. "94
At their trial the prisoners were brought forward, a jury was sworn and
the indictment read. Asked to plead, the defendants requested a copy of
the indictment, but the bench informed them of standard practice: they
must plead to the indictment before receiving a copy of it. After extracting
promises that "no advantage may be taken against" them, both pleaded
''not guilty in manner and form.' '95
The court recessed until September 3, when the Crown produced three
witnesses against the defendants. The first, James Cook, stated that he
had been sent for to disperse the meeting. He saw Penn speaking to the
people but "could not hear what [Penn] said because of the noise." He
could not approach Penn "for the crowd of people; upon which Capt.
90. Catherine Owens Peare, William Penn (Ann Arbor, 1956), pp. 107-8.
91. Arrest warrant, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, quoted in Peare, William Penn, p.
110.
92. Stat. 22 Chas. 2, c. 1 (1670).
93. Peare, William Penn, pp. 110-13.
94. State Trials, 6:954-55. This account was published originally by Penn and Mead as
The People's Antient and Just Liberties (London, 1670). It contains several appendixes
dealing with, inter alia, Magna Carta and the proceedings in Parliament against Chief Justice
Kelyng.
95. Ibid., p. 955.
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Mead came to me ... and desired me to let [Penn] go on, for when he had
done, he would bring Mr. Penn to me." A constable, Richard Read,
corroborated Cook's testimony. Read "found a great crowd of people,"
"heard Mr. Penn preach to them, " 96 and "endeavored with my watchmen
to get at Mr. Penn to pull him down, but ... could not, the people kicking
my watchmen and myself on the shins. "97 Read could hear neither Penn's
nor Mead's conversation with Cook because of the "great noise." A
witness named Whiting saw Penn but not Mead; he supposed Penn was
speaking but could not hear him.98
Penn and Mead occasionally challenged the witnesses, but clearly they
believed that any factual errors in the witnesses' testimony should prove
irrelevant, for both defendants admitted with pride that they had assembled to preach and to pray.99 Neither defendant believed that the
Crown's evidence, even if true, amounted to the breaking of any law. To
their demand that they be shown the law upon which the indictment was
based, the Recorder (Rowel) replied that the indictment was based ''upon
the common law" and that he could not "run up so many years, and over
so many adjudged cases, which we call common law. "Joo This drew
Penn's famous retort: "[I]f[the law] be common, it should not be so hard
to produce." Once again he returned to the indictment:
Shall I plead to an indictment that has no foundation in law? If it
contain that law you say I have broken, why should you decline to
produce that law, since it will be impossible for the jury to determine,
or agree to bring in their verdict, who have not the law produced, by
which they should measure the truth of the indictment, and the guilt, or
contrary of my fact? ... The question is not, whether I am guilty of this
indictment, but whether this indictment be legal. 10 1
96. Ibid., p. 957.
97. Sir Samuel Starling, An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet, entitled,
The Trial ofW. Penn and W. Mead (London, 1671), p. 15. This account, written by the Lord

Mayor of London, who presided at the trial, contains this testimony. The "official" account,
by Penn, does not. On this point, Starling's account seems credible.
98. State Trials, 6:957. The official account does not contain the name of this witness.
Starling's account does (p. 16).
99. Ibid., p. 958. Penn: "We confess ourselves to be so far from recanting, or declining
to vindicate the assembling of ourselves to preach, pray, or worship the Eternal, Holy, Just
God, that we declare to all the world, that we do believe it to be our indispensable duty."
Starling (An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet, p. 17) asserted that the
witnesses' testimony and defendants' "confessions" sufficed for conviction.
100. State Trials, 6:958.
101. Ibid., 6:958-59. Starling's account (p. 19) contains a paraphrase of this speech,
referring to it as though it had been added post hoc and never spoken in court. Starling also
records a comment of his own that he evidently made at about this point in the trial: "Now
the Common Law is Common Right, or Lex Rationis, imprinted in every man's understanding" (p. 17).
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Irritated by Penn's continued demands, the Recorder insisted that the
defendants "speak to the indictment," i.e., that they speak to the
evidence presented against them.
[Y]ou are now upon matter of fact, which fact you have heard proved
against you; you are to answer it: If the fact be found against you, you
may then speak to the matter of law, in arrest of judgment, and you
shall be heard. 102
Penn would have none of this. To make his "best defense" before the jury
he must have the Crown's statement of the law. At this point the
Recorder, supported by the mayor, ordered that Penn be removed to the
bale dock; it was in response to that order that Penn appealed to his jury
("my sole judges") to consider whether he was being tried in accordance
with the fundamentallaws.103 Mead soon followed Penn to the bale dock,
having stated to the jury ("who are my judges") that his indictment was
"a bundle of stuff, full of lies and falsehoods. "104 The Recorder then
charged the jury that the indictment was for "preaching ... and drawing
a tumultuous company." 10s From the distant bale dock, the full court
heard Penn's parting shot:
I appeal to the jury who are my judges, and this great assembly,
whether the proceedings of the court are not most arbitrary, and void
of all law, in offering to give the jury their charge in the absence of the
prisoners .... [A]nd you of the jury, take notice, that I have not been
heard, neither can you legally depart the court before I have been fully
heard, having at last ten or twelve material points to offer, in order to
invalidate their indictment.J06
In considering their verdict, the jurors agreed that Penn had preached
to an assembly of persons, but could agree to no more. They reported to
the Court that eight jurors were prepared to return a "guilty" verdict;
four were not. Displeased, the bench berated the four and sent the jury
102. Starling, An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet, p. 18.
103. State Trials, 6:959.
104. Ibid., p. 960. According to Penn and Mead's account, Mead also told the jury that
a "riot" involved three or more meeting together "to beat a man, or to enter forcibly into
another man's land, to cut down his grass, his wood, or break down his poles." Starling (p.
20) also records this speech and adds that the recorder replied: "[Y]es, and to do any other
unlawful act." This has reference to the Conventicles Act, breach of which under these
circumstances the Lord Mayor deemed constituted the holding of an unlawful assembly.
105. State Trials, 6:690.
106. Ibid., p. 961; Starling, An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet, p. 21.
The first half of this speech is in both Penn and Mead's account and Starling's account; the
second half is in only Penn and Mead's account.
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away to reconsider its decision. 107 When the jury returned, the foreman
reported that they had found Penn "guilty of speaking in Gracechurch
Street,'' to which the Recorder replied that they ''had as good say
nothing." The mayor questioned the jury: "Was it not an unlawful
assembly? You mean [Penn] was speaking to a tumult there?" But further
questioning availed the bench nothing; the jury was not prepared to
answer to the core of the indictment. Penn was guilty only of "speaking
or preaching to an assembly''; Mead was not guilty. Bushel and the others
who would not bring in a guilty verdict stood upon their ''conscience,'' as
Penn had exhorted them to do. It was, or so Penn contended, the
juryman's "right."JOs
In the end the jury abandoned the device of a truncated verdict and
rendered a definitive "not guilty. " 109 The trial was over, and the indictment was overturned. The bench was left to assess fines: Penn and Mead
for contempt, Bushel and the other jurors for their disobedient verdict.
The bench, because it viewed the evidence as manifest, came down
harshly on the jurors, fining them for finding contrary both to the evidence
("in matter of fact") and to the instructions ("in matter of law"). 110
Precisely how the jurors perceived the case against Penn is beyond
reconstruction. Penn had insisted that the court produce the law on which
the indictment was grounded so that jurors ''might measure the truth of
the indictment, and the guilt of the fact.'' The recalcitrant jurors may have
acceded to the court's view of the law, that preaching to a large and
tumultuous assembly in a manner that continued a disturbance of the
peace was a high misdemeanor, but doubted whether there was sufficient
evidence of a tumult and disturbance of the peace. More likely, however,
they both doubted the tumult and believed that the Crown had, in any
event, to prove an unlawful intent, especially where the law of criminal
trespass was being applied to a man of God preaching His Word to those
gathered to hear him.
For Penn the message of his acquittal was unmistakable: the jurors had
made their own assessment of the law, or at least had rejected that put
forth by the court. What was now awaited-and would surely come-was
exoneration of the jurors, who, by assessing the law themselves, had
rebuffed the tyranny of the judiciary and vindicated their own true
107. State Trials, 6:961; Starling, An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet,
p. 22.
108. State Trials, 6:961-65; Starling, An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous
Pamphlet, pp. 22-30.
109. State Trials. 6:966; Starling, An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet,
p. 30.
110. State Trials, 6:969; Starling, An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet,
pp. 30-31.
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historical and moral purpose. In the meantime, Penn would spend much
of his stay in prison publicizing his case in a series of tracts. These tracts,
written by Penn and the Quaker Thomas Rudyard, who was convicted of
obstructingjustice by ajury sworn in to replace Penn'sjury, 111 dealt both
with the duties of jurors and with the (alleged) right ofthe bench to punish
them. These tracts appeared between October, 1670 and March, 1671, the
period that saw as well the early stages of the legal contest over the fining
and imprisonment of Bushel and his cojurors. To what extent the legal
and rhetorical campaigns influenced each other we shall probably never
know-perhaps they proceeded independently of each other, drawing
primarily on a common pool of ideas. As we shall see, the central thrust
of Vaughan's opinion, handed down in the fall of 1671, 112 differed
significantly both from earlier legal arguments and from those in the
contemporary jury-tract literature.
In An Appendix by way of Defense, a tract he attached to his account
of the trial, Penn articulated his defense more clearly than he had at the
Old Bailey . 113 His position was analogous to the familiar Quaker argument that the jury must look behind the indictment to the law upon which
it was based lest the bench and the officials who framed indictments
significantly misinterpret the Conventicles Act. But Penn varied the
argument slightly. The crucial point of reference for his jury was not
statute but the common law regarding the requisites for unlawful assembly and disturbance of the peace. An unlawful assembly required at
most either assembling to commit an act that would, if committed,
constitute a riot, or refusing to disperse when part of the assembly was
threatening to commit such an act; it might also be charged where a large
number of persons met under circumstances that created fear of great
harm by either those who met or those who witnessed the meeting. 11 4 It
111. See below, n. 126.
112. The exact date upon which Vaughan issued his opinion is not known. Bushel had
sued out his writ in November, 1670. The arguments at bar ensued during the following
months. See Clark, The Later Stuarts, p. 108 (giving 1671 as the year of the decision).
Rudyard, in his "Appendix" to Penn's Truth Rescued, which was written in Feb.-March,
1671 (see below, n. 122), referred to the case as pending in Common Pleas.
113. State Trials, 6:970-1000.
114. William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, 2 vols. (London, 1716), vol.
I, p. 158: "An unlawful Assembly, according to the common opinion, is a disturbance of the
peace by persons barely assembling together, with an intention to do a thing, which if it were
executed would make them rioters, but neither actually executing it, nor making a motion
toward the execution of it; but this seems to be much too narrow a definition; for any
meeting whatsoever of great numbers of people with such circumstances of terror, as cannot
but endanger the public peace, and raise fears and jealousies among the King's subjects,
seems properly to be called an unlawful assembly; as where great numbers, complaining of
a common grievance, meet together, armed in a warlike manner, in order to consult together
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is unclear whether London authorities counted any assembly in breach of
the Conventicles Act as an unlawful assembly. Apparently, authorities
believed that a tumult had resulted, or at least had been highly likely to
occur. Such a tumult clearly constituted a disturbance of the peace and
made the assembly unlawful.
According to Penn, the government had to prove that the defendants
had met with an intent to do-or to plan-physical harm to person or
property, the traditional sphere in which common law crimes were
located. The intent to worship God in a manner and form contrary to
statute was clearly not such a design: "[T]hat dissenters meet with no such
intention, is manifest to the whole world, therefore their assemblies are
not unlawful. " 115 The authorities, Penn argued, had resorted to an evil
stratagem. The prosecution had "forged" a "romance-indictment" that
cited circumstances which did not, in law, amount to an unlawful
assembly or disturbance of the peace, but which included those phrases.
The hoped-for verdict would then attach to the entire indictment, so that
on the basis of evidence of religious assembly only, the jury would have,
in legal effect, found an unlawful assembly and disturbance of the peace.
Moreover, according to Penn, the indictment had been framed in such a
way as to induce a verdict of guilty. It was "swelled with malicious
scaring phrases'' to give the impression that the defendants were ''the
most dangerous persons." Precisely because there was so little evidence
against them the government had introduced fictitious testimony into the
indictment. In short, the indictment was intended to be self-proving. 116
The jury, applauded the Appendix, had not been fooled. It refused to do
more than to find those facts proven at trial and had stated its verdict
accordingly, thus comprehending its role as judge not only of fact, but of
the law upon which the indictment was based. The jury had responded to
the defendants' exhortation not to return a verdict of guilty unless it
believed that the facts proved amounted in law to the crime of unlawful
assembly. Nor could the jury have done otherwise: "For as well the jury
as prisoners, were denied to have any law produced, by which they might
concerning the most proper means for recovery of their interests; for no one can foresee
what may be the event of such an assembly."
115. State Trials, 6:971-72. Although Penn denied there had been a "tumult," except,
perhaps, in response to the "unlawful" acts of the officials who disrupted the lawful
assembly, Penn apparently did not believe that the mere fact of a tumult sufficed to make the
assembly (which met without the intent to cause such a tumult) unlawful. "In short, because
to worship God can never be a crime, no meeting or assembly, designing to worship God,
can be unlawful" (p. 971).
116. Ibid., pp. 973-74. Penn made good use of the historical lore concerning Empson and
Dudley in his denunciation of the authorities' approach to the indictment process (pp. 989 et
seq.).
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measure the truth of the indictment, and guilt of the fact. " 1 17 Thus, had
the bench "produced" the law, as the defendants had demanded, the jury
would then have been duty-bound to determine whether the indictment
and judicial charge conformed to the law regarding the facts required for
the alleged offense. Presumably this determination would have been
informed not only by their own understanding of the law but also by their
consideration of the defendants' arguments against the bench's interpretation of law.
This, then, was Penn's conception of due process in trials by jury-so
far as one can now reconstruct it. Penn's claim that his jurors were his
"sole judges" was not a claim that the bench played no role at all; the
bench was to "produce" the law and to charge juries upon it, and even to
monitor indictments for just the sort of abuses of which Penn and Mead
believed they had been made victims. The jury, one might suppose, would
give the bench's charge due weight. It operated as a shield where
necessary, and, for the Quakers, unusual events had created present
necessities.
Penn and Mead's views, and their behavior at their trial, were fiercely
attacked by Sir Samuel Starling, the Lord Mayor of London, in a tract
written in part as a reply to the defendants' trial account and the
Appendix. us Starling, who had presided at the trial, produced an account
of the proceedings that differed little in detail from that of the defendants
but one that-perhaps sincerely-misconceived the nature of the campaign on behalf of the jury. Starling characterized the defendants'
behavior as insulting attempts to undermine the law, and the jury's
"special" verdict as a nonverdict, an abuse of their duty. Starling never
doubted that the jurors merited the fines imposed upon them for their
outright nullification of the law: the Crown, he believed, had lawfully
charged and definitively proved an unlawful assembly.
Addressing the Westminster bench, Starling devoted much of his tract
to a denunciation of Penn's notion "[t]hat the jury were the proper judges
both of law and fact."119 Not surprisingly, he thought that Penn's
historical "precedents," reproduced in the Appendix, falsely demonstrated the jury's right to find the law. However, he wrongly interpreted
Penn's appeal to the jury as his "sole judges" as an entire renunciation of
117. Ibid., p. 974.
118. Starling, An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet.
119. Ibid., p. 2: "Now Gentlemen of the long robe look to your selves, and your
Westminster Hall: If these learned reformers of religion shall likewise reform your laws and
methods of proceedings (as doubtless they design it) and make twelve jurymen, eleven of
which it's possible can neither write nor read, to be the sole judges both of law and fact;
farewell then to your great acquisitions, your Year Books then will be out of date, and an
ouster will be put to your Books of Entries."
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the powers of the bench, a "claim" he rebutted as absurd and dangerous.
The Quakers, Starling asserted, would reduce the justices to "ciphers,"
a term he may have taken from Lilburne's well known 1649 appeal to his
jury.I 2o The defendants, he continued, misinterpreted Magna Carta's
most famous chapter. "By lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of
the land" did not guarantee trial by peers who acted as judges. As it was
in the "disjunctive," the Crown might employ the "law of the land,"
which must mean trial by both judge and jury ("peers"). Magna Carta
was entirely consistent with that well known legal maxim: "[T]he judges
respond to questions of law." In claiming trial solely by jurors, Starling
concluded, the Quakers aimed at a special sort of jury, not that employed
by the common law; they intended ultimately to "turn the judges and
juries also out of Westminster Hall and set up a High Court of Justice of
Saints.'' 121
Starling's tract provoked a retort from Penn. Truth Rescued from
Imposture was written during February and March of 1671, in Newgate,
where London authorities had imprisoned Penn anew, this time for
breach of the Five Mile Act. 122 Now forced to state more precisely his
pro-jury position, Penn defended his view that jurors are judges oflaw as
well as fact, pointing to the form ofthe traditional charge to the petty jury:
"to deliver their verdict or opinion, whether [the defendant] be guilty in
manner and form." Since the indictment "comprehends both law and
fact," the jury is judge of both, to determine "whether the fact proved be
obnoxious to the law. " 123 But how does the jury achieve its understanding
of the law? This question Penn now answered for the first time. The jurors
need not take the law solely from the bench; otherwise, the bench might
require a verdict of guilty for "the most lawful act imaginable, it being
such as he cannot deny, and which is proved by evidences." While
acknowledging that a jury might be so ignorant that ''there may be a
necessity to inform them of the law, by the better skill of the justices,''
Penn argued that even in such a case the law stood only as it is
understood, digested, and judiciously made the jury's, by their own
free will and acceptance, upon their conviction of the truth of things
reported by the bench: As a man may be educated in any religion; but
to make it his proper religion, it is requisite that he believe and embrace
120. Ibid., p. 3.
121. Idem.
122. Penn, Truth Rescued (see above, n. 52). For Penn's activities between September,
1670, and March, 1671, see Peare, William Penn. pp. 127-34. Truth Rescued appears to have
been written in February, 1671; Thomas Rudyard added an "Appendix" in that month and
Penn added a "Postscript" in March, 1671.
123. Penn, Truth Rescued, pp. 500, 504-5.
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it judiciously, not implicitly ,124
Penn thus conceded an important role to the bench, while marking out the
limits of its power and articulating his conception of the process by which
the jury "finds the law."
Penn's views found support in Thomas Rudyard's Dialogue, in a Plain
and Friendly Discourse between Student and Citizen. 125 The tract referred to Penn and Mead's trial, the Appendix, and to the trial of Rudyard,
Francis Moor, and several others, all of whom were convicted by a jury
that replaced the jury that had tried Penn and Mead. 126 In Dialogue, a
self-styled student of the common law explains the importance of jury
duty, the nature of the juror's role, and the unlawfulness of the punishment of jurors for finding according to their conscience. Echoing Penn
(and well-settled Quaker strategy), the Student advises the Citizen as
juror to observe the indictment closely so as to determine whether the
evidence offered proves the defendant guilty not only of the acts alleged
in the indictment but also of the "manner" ("which they call law"), for
''though a person be proved to be guilty of some fact or misdemeanor, yet
if it be not also proved to be done in such manner and form as the party
stands indicted, he is not guilty, and ought to be acquitted by you. " 127 To
the Citizen's query, "But is not there both law and fact in an indictment,
as those against W.P. and W.M. and the rest of the Quakers last sessions?
And how shall a jury deal in such cases?"tzs the Student replies that the
jury may return a special verdict, finding the fact and asking the Court to
apply the law.
Citizen: What's the reason then, that the Court will not accept of such
124. Ibid., p. 502.
125. Thomas Rudyard, An Appendix, by way of Dialogue, in a Plain and Friendly
Discourse between a Student in the Laws and Liberties of England, and a true Citizen of
London (London, 1670). This tract was appended to The Second Part of the Peoples Antient
and Just Liberties (London, 1670) that was itself part of an expanded edition of Penn's
account of his trial. The Second Part recounted the trial of Thomas Rudyard.
126. The Second Part of the Peoples Antient and Just Liberties Asserted. This account
was probably written by Penn and Rudyard. It states that after Penn's jury had been
incarcerated, a new jury was called to try Rudyard (who had taken part with Penn and Mead
in convoking the assembly in Gracechurch Street) and about a dozen others for obstructing
the prosecution for sedition of Samuel Allinbridge. To obtain the new jury, the account
alleges, the clerk "picked here and there such persons that were judged the most likely to
answer the malicious ends and horrid designs of [the] Bench, calling not the jury-men in
order and direct course, as is usual in all courts of justice, where right is impartially
administered; and withal, bidding the prisoners to look upon the jurors, and before they
were sworn to make their challenges" (p. 364).
127. Dialogue, in a Plain and Friendly Discourse, p. 396.
128. Ibid., p. 397.
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special verdicts, but frequently turn the jury back, till they bring in
general?
Student: Because then they have your oaths as well for law as fact;
and if the judgments be severe, it shall lie at your door. 129
This was, of course, a far riskier tactic than that of a simple statement of
the facts that had been found unaccompanied by a request to apply the
law . 13 0 Because it left the bench the legal right to enter a verdict of guilty,
however, it could prove much more embarrassing.
The Student goes on to charge, along the lines of Penn and Mead's
Appendix, that the authorities systematically loaded down indictments
with incriminating terms: verdicts of "guilty" on insufficient facts might
then be applied to the entire indictment. Moreover, the "City Magistrates" had a "further artifice." They indict persons "by the common
law, and waive intermeddling with any of the statutes in force against
such misdemeanors, as they pretend the persons indicted are guilty
of." 131 Thus, stated the author, in an obvious reference to Penn and
Mead's case, the bench, when asked to produce the law on which the
indictment is based, answers that it is "Lex non scripta."
By this means the prisoner is incapacitated to make his defence, and
the jury kept ignorant, whether the offence charged to be done by the
prisoner be innocency or guilt. . . . [T]hey might have framed an
indictment against a man for (viet armis) eating meat at his own table.
. . . Therefore it concerns you to have great care and regard to the
charge you undertake; which is, well and truly to try, and true
deliverance make, according to what is evidenced to your conscience.132
Conscience, then, required that jurors do one of two things: Either they
ought to return a special verdict and thereby force the bench openly to
wrench the law to its own ends, or taking it upon themselves to find the
law, they ought to find the defendant "not guilty."
Of course there were cases-Penn's Case was one-where the bench
would not tolerate either course of action, where the bench believed that
such jury behavior seriously threatened the social order. For what
officials took to be an outright and illegal nullification of the law, the jury
129. Idem.
130. In many Quaker cases, including Penn and Mead's trial, the jury merely stated the
facts it had found, omitting any finding whatsoever on what it knew to be the crucial facts.
Moreover, it did not request the bench to apply the law. For cases involving Quakers in
which jurors rendered such verdicts see e.g. Besse, A Collection of the Sufferings of . ..
Quakers, I: 48 (1663, Bristol), 634 (1683, Somersetshire), 730 (1684, Sussex). It is not clear
how the bench ought in law to have treated such truncated verdicts.
131. Dialogue, in a Plain and Friendly Discourse, p. 399.
132. Ibid., pp. 399-400.
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would be fined and imprisoned until the fines were paid. Inevitably, the
question of the legality of the fining and imprisonment of jurors for
acquitting in criminal cases "against manifest evidence" was central to
the tracts occasioned by the trial of Penn and Mead. In the Appendix and
the Dialogue, Penn and Rudyard dealt at length with this question. The
defendants had protested at their trial against the bench's treatment of
their jury, particularly against the court's refusal to accept the jury's first
several verdicts. Penn had asserted that judicial fining of jurors offended
the principle, set forth in Magna Carta, that no free man should be
amerced "but by the lawful judgment of his peers." Indeed, Penn had
made judicial behavior toward the jury a principal basis of his final appeal
to the jury that it should consider the entire course of the proceedings
against him illegal.133
In the Appendix, Penn developed more fully the question of jury
control, recounting both ancient and recent precedents relating to trial by
jury. He claimed that jury fining was an innovation, that the Court did
"most illegally, tyranically fine and imprison [the defendants] . . .
notwithstanding the late just resentment of the House of Commons, in
Judge Kelyng's Case, where they resolved, 'That the precedent and
practice of fining, and imprisoning of juries for their verdicts, were
illegal."' 13 4 Rudyard's Dialogue likewise recounted recent events in its
argument against the legality of fining jurors. It made effective use of the
Kelyng incident and, after summarizing Penn's Case, described the
"packing and enforcement" of the jury that convicted Rudyard, Moor,
and the others tried before it. The imprisonment of Penn and Mead's jury,
the Dialogue asserted, had been directly responsible for the new jury's
obsequious behavior .t3s
Not all of the arguments in the Dialogue were historically based or
reduced to mere aphorisms. Some of them went to the nature of the
criminal trial, arguing-as Vaughan was to argue-from the logic of the
trial to the unlawfulness of fining jurors. Rudyard devoted the opening
passages of the Dialogue to the jury's duty to find the fact-and to the
proposition that they were better equipped to do so than was the bench.
The jury, the Student explained, is drawn from the vicinage ''where the
fact is supposed to be done or acted" because "it's always presumed that
the neighborhood are best acquainted with the persons inhabiting, or the
actions and facts .... They may know the witness on the one side, or the
133. State Trials, 6:961-69. Penn argued that the proceedings were "most arbitrary and
void of all law" because the bench gave "the jury their charge in the absence of the
prisoners" (p. 961). Subsequently, he protested against the threatening of the jury by the
recorder (p. 965) and then the fining of the jurors for their verdict (pp. 968-69).
134. Ibid., p. 984.
135. Dialogue, in a Plain and Friendly Discourse, pp. 400-2.
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other, to be persons of no credit, or ... they may know the party accused
to be a man otherwise qualified or principled, than to do such an act. " 136
The Citizen was quick to see the point: it would be "very hard" if the jury
were fined, since it may be taking into account things it knows of its own.
Moreover, continued the Student, one ought to prefer the "knowledge of
twelve men, agreeing together" to the "single apprehension of any one
person whatsoever.'' 137
The Dialogue also confronted-as would Vaughan-the logic of concluding, in a particular case, that the jury had found "against the law."
The Student, quoting Coke, explained that since "the law grows out of
the root of the fact," if the jury does not find the fact, then the jury
"cannot be said to find against the law, which is no other than a
superstructure of fact.'' The Student conceded that if the jury openly find
the fact and then find against the law, ''the Court ought to give judgment
according to law."J3s Finally, the Dialogue produced an unusual argument regarding the problem of appellate review. Because no writ of error
lay in such a case, jurors would be "remediless of relief' if judges could
fine them, and thus they would be "in worse condition than the criminals
that are tried by them." If the bench moved by way of attaint, the first
jury would have some safeguard, as "the truth or falsehood of a juror's
verdict, in matters of fact, may be tried." But in a criminal case, "the
jurors are concluded, by reason that whether they have found with or
against their evidence, can never be tried." The Dialogue thus appears to
assume that attaint lay only in civil cases, and it employed this assumption in its argument against the fining of jurors . 139
Starling's reply to the Appendix had included a lengthy discourse on the
subject of fining. First Starling cited a string of cases, only one earlier than
1660, in which juries had been fined for verdicts unacceptable to the
courts. These cases, Wagstaffe's Case and Leech's Case among them,
were the backbone of the pro-fining argument, and Starling concluded
from them that "[t]he fining of jurors that find contrary to their evidence
is no innovation, but always practised.'' 140 Like Rudyard, Starling
concluded that attaint did not lie in criminal cases, but he drew from this
fact a very different conclusion. Not surprisingly he couched his argument
against attaint in legal rather than theoretical terms, for any philosophical
argument against attaint of juries could also cut against their being fined.
136. Ibid .• pp. 391-92.
137. Ibid., pp. 392, 394.
138. Ibid., p. 394.
139. Ibid., p. 393.
140. Starling, An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet, pp. 32-33.
Starling's statement that the jury in Leech's Case was fined (p. 33) was rebutted by Rudyard
in his "Appendix" to Truth Rescued at p. 514.
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Starling cited Coke and Fitzherbert for the proposition that "attaint lies
[for] ... false verdict ... against the Plaintiff or Defendant ... in a plea,
real or personal, sued out by writ or bill," but not in a criminal case. "It
is agreed by all sides, that an attaint lieth not in an indictment of treason,
murder or felony; much less in an indictment of trespass, which ... is far
lesser offence than them aforementioned.'' He relied on Brooke for the
maxim that "where the King is the sole party, attaint doth not lie."
Finally, he cited statutes establishing the remedy of attaint in certain
cases and argued from this that its nonexistence at common law must be
inferred. The strength of the government's case lay in the fact that,
without the power to fine, there would be no remedy for an acquittal
against manifest evidence; instead there would be, pure and simple, a
"failure of justice. " 141 Thus Starling, like counsel for the Crown who
were busily attempting to justify the imprisonment of Bushel, echoed
Chief Justice Hyde's admonition in 1665 that "jurors ought to be fined if
they ... take bit in mouth and go headstrong against the court ... seeing
the attaint is now fruitless. "142
Truth Rescued from Imposture, Penn's answer to Starling's tract,
contains an appendix by Thomas Rudyard which takes issue with the
claim implicit in the title of Starling's section on fining, "The Fining of
That Jury, that Gave Two Different Verdicts Justified."1 43 Although
Starling abandoned the charge in the body of the work, the implication of
peJjury is important, for such behavior might have justified the fines
imposed on Bushel and the other jurors. Rudyard sought to show that the
verdict rejected by the court, ''Guilty of speaking in Gracechurch
Street," and the general verdict of "not guilty" were not contradictory.
The jury had been forced to resolve its verdict one way or another;
Starling, Rudyard charged, has "a very treacherous memory, which is an
ill companion for a Liar." 144
Rudyard agreed with Starling on the technical aspects of the attaint
issue, but went on to make a broader claim that implicated fining as well.
"[We] not only grant to him that no attaint lies against such jurors, but
that it is horrid injustice and oppression to punish them by that, or any
other way. " 145 In a gloss on Starling's bald statement that where the king
141. Starling, An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet, pp. 31, 33-38. "As
nature abhors a vacuum in the universe, so it is the honour of our law, that it will not suffer
a failure of justice" (p. 31).
142. I Keble 864, 83 Eng. Rep. 1288 (1665).
143. Thomas Rudyard, "Appendix" (see above, nn. 52, 122).
144. Ibid., p. 512.
145. Rudyard cited Horn's Mirror on judicial abuses of juries, and the parliamentary
statutes on attaint, saying that if attaint lay in such a case, it would be clear from the
statutes. Ibid., p. 519 (emphasis added).
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is the sole party, there is no remedy of attaint, Rudyard asserted that an
element of corruption must be present before a verdict is punishable,
because although the indictment is prosecuted in the name of the King, he
is acting in the interests of the public. Cannot the public, Rudyard asked,
be entrusted with their own protection and safety?146 Thus did Rudyard
attempt to avoid Starling's (and the Crown lawyers') conclusion regarding
a "failure of Justice."
Continuing (more cogently) his attack on fining, Rudyard denied that
there was any, except recent, precedent for fining, and cited the censure
of Justice Kelyng as invalidating the post-Restoration cases cited by
Starling. Following the line of argument he had established in the
Dialogue, Rudyard asserted that the procedure used in fining denied
jurors the "due process of the common law," in that the jurors were
condemned without trial, with no possibility of review or appeal, and
without the lawful judgment of their peers. Rudyard cited Coke on the
common law of England, particularly on the maxim that Lex intendit
vicinum vicini facta scire, and claimed that, according to Coke's "ratio
legis," the law would have "left all controversies to [the judges'] sole
arbitrary determination" had judges been better equipped to hand down
verdicts.147 Two interests, Rudyard asserted, were represented by those
who argued against fining: the freedom of jurors, and the freedom of the
people of England. In the interests of these freedoms, all Englishmen on
trial should be judged by ''twelve honest men of the neighborhood,'' who
are presumed to be more fit to hand down a verdict than a judge, both by
their numbers, "since ... twelve men may neither be so easily corrupted
as one single person, nor their judgment of such fact ... so likely to be
erroneous" and because, being of the "neighborhood where the offence
was committed," they may be expected to have a fuller understanding of
the crime than the judge. In this way, "lives and liberties can be secured
against the lusts of ... petty prerogatives." 148
Rudyard's arguments against the practice of jury fining seem less an
extension of either the Quaker "law-finding" theory or the older notion of
the merciful verdict than elaborations upon the much more modest theory
that he set forth in the Dialogue . 149 This theory was more difficult for the
bench to refute, for it emphasized the inscrutability of fact that resulted
from the possibility that the jurors possessed personal knowledge. If
Rudyard's true claim was that, because the jury was judge of both law and
fact, it could not in any way be coerced or punished for its verdict, the
146.
147.
148.
149.

Idem.
Ibid., pp. 513-17.
Ibid., p. 516.
See above, n. 136 and accompanying text.
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claim was well hidden by the arguments that focused mainly on the
fact-finding aspect of the jury's role, its claims to superior knowledge.
Rudyard constructed a defense behind which the jury might effectively
act as independently of the bench as if they were judges both of fact and
law, but his view was bound to be much more acceptable to the bench, for
it largely avoided the overtones of insurrection which made the ''lawfinding" theory so unpalatable. In this respect, Rudyard's argument
against fining suggested the strategy that Vaughan was to follow, but
Rudyard's central argument, based on the proposition that jurors were
still self-informed, was to become only one-and perhaps the less
significant-element of the Chief Justice's famous opinion.

IV
Two and a half months after the final, tense day of Penn and Mead's
trial at the Old Bailey, Edward Bushel, who had been imprisoned in
Newgate for refusing to pay his fine of forty marks, sued a writ of habeas
corpus out of the Court of Common Pleas. He claimed that the fine had no
basis in law and that he was, therefore, being held without lawful cause.
Bushel's suit, in which three of his fellow jurors joined, brought to a head
the recent political and legal ferment over the issue of fining jurors. 150
Five years had passed since Wagstaffe's Case, when most of the bench
150. T. Jones 14, 84 Eng. Rep. 1123 (1670). The three who joined Bushel were John
Hammond, Charles Milson, and John Bailey, all "merchants and tradesmen" and citizens
and freemen of London. The other eight jurors ''paid their fines and were soon discharged.''
See The Case of Edward Bushel [et al.] ... stated and humbly presented to the Honourable
House of Commons assembled in Parliament (London, 1671 ?). This petition is in Lincoln's
Inn Library, Miscellaneous Pamphlets, vol. 104 at p. 37. The petition refers to the
successful resolution of the case, which occurred in late 1671, and states that the jurors were
discouraged by counsel "to seek [further] remedy or satisfaction in the courts of
Westminster." Hence the petition to Commons. Subsequently, Bushel and Hammond did
attempt to sue the mayor and recorder who had presided at Penn and Mead's trial, but their
suits were rejected. For Bushel v. Starling see 3 Keble 322, 84 Eng. Rep. 744 (1674): suit for
false imprisonment fails because "no writ of error lies . . . but he must be delivered by
certiorari or habeas corpus and no other ways." For Bushel v. Howell see 3 Keble 358, 84
Eng. Rep. 765 (1674): action upon the case fails because "this action will not lie against a
judge." See also Bushel's Case, 1 Mod. 119, 86 Eng. Rep. 777 (1674). For Hamond (sic) v.
Howell see 2 Mod. 218, 86 Eng. Rep. 1035 (1677): suit for false imprisonment fails because
"it was an error in [the judges']judgments for which no action will lie" (ibid., p. 1037). The
defendant may bring a certiorari; "the Barons of the Exchequer might refuse to issue
process upon" an erroneous judgment (idem). "[T]he whole court were of opinion, that the
bringing of this action was a greater offense than the fining of the plaintiff, and committing
of him for non-payment; and that it was a bold attempt both against the Government and
justice in general ... though the defendant here acted erroneously, yet the contrary opinion
carried great colour with it, because it might be supposed very inconvenient for the jury to
have such liberty as to give what verdicts they please" (ibid., pp. 1036-37).
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had concluded that such fining was indeed legal. Now, in a more
prominent case, the matter came again before the royal justices, this time
before the Court of Common Pleas. In a decision that definitively
overturned the ruling in Wagstaffe's Case, Chief Justice Vaughan finally
laid the problem to rest.
It is not entirely clear why Bushel's counsel turned to Common Pleas
rather than to the more appropriate forum, King's Bench. They may well
have believed that he would receive a friendlier hearing from the court
presided over by Vaughan, who had played a prominent (though ambiguous) role in the parliamentary proceedings involving Kelyng, than he
would from Kelyng's former associates on King's Bench. 15 1 Ironically,
Vaughan was opposed on jurisdictional grounds to granting the habeas
corpus but was outvoted by his fellow justices. 152 In the event, it would be
Vaughan who, in consultation with all the justices of the king's courts,
wrote the opinion that addressed the merits of the case.
With a few significant exceptions, Vaughan's opinion followed the
contours of the arguments made by Bushel's counsel and by Seijeants
Ellis and Baldwin. Those arguments largely rehearsed the case earlier
put, without success, on behalf of Wagstaffe: the return was too general;
it failed to state the legal standards laid down by the bench and rejected
by the jury as well as the facts that the jury had allegedly found against;
even if one conceded the sufficiency of the return, one need not concede
that it was demonstrable that the jurors had gone against the court. Some
of the arguments that went beyond those made in Wagstaffe's Case
paralleled those in the tract literature-just then appearing-that Penn
and Mead's trial had generated: e.g., the juror might have knowledge of
the "falsity" of evidence presented in court, and as a consequence,
because law arises from fact ("ex facto jus oritur" ), one could not
conclude that the jurors went against the law . 153
There were, however, several new arguments. Judges as well as jurors,
it was observed, might mistake the law; it would, therefore, be unreasonable to penalize the jury while the judges themselves were not subject to
!51. Kelyng was still Chief Justice of King's Bench, but his illness kept him from taking
part in judicial matters; technically, the other judges of King's Bench were current, not
former, associates. Possibly counsel for Bushel believed that Kelyng still exerted influence
over the bench; they might even have feared that the Chief Justice would feel his health
returning when presented with the opportunity to rule personally on the habeas!
152. T. Jones 14, 84 Eng. Rep. 1123 (1670). According to Vaughan: "This court has no
cognizance of crimes .... [The court may hear cases] between subject and subject, but in
a criminal case the plea is between the King and his prisoner." See also Vaughan's view that
Common Pleas was not the appropriate forum in a case a year later: Anonymous, Carter 222,
124 Eng. Rep. 928 (1671).
153. I Freeman 4-5, 89 Eng. Rep. 3-4 (1670); T. Jones 14-15, 84 Eng. Rep. 1124-25.
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penalty for error. In any case, one ought to assume the good faith of
jurors, as one did judges, for jurors were "judges" of the fact. Jurors, it
was urged, have "divisum imperium" with the judge. One of Bushel's
counsel addressed this issue with a phrase that anticipated the most
original part of Vaughan's opinion: jurors, Broome asserted, "are to
satisfy their own consciences. " 154
These last arguments, which went to the heart of the question of the
jury's duty, left open the problem of the possible "failure of justice" that
had seemingly determined the outcome of Wagstaffe's Case and that
counsel for the Crown relied upon heavily in the present case. Bushel's
counsel seemed by and large to accept the possibility with equanimity; it
was a part of the system, perhaps no greater a threat than that of judicial
error. Serjeants Ellis and Baldwin, in favor of Bushel, argued that there
was a remedy: an attaint would lie, they said, a view ultimately rejected
by Vaughan. Because attaint lay in this kind of case, if Bushel and his
fellow jurors might also be fined they would be subject to a double
penalty. In making this point Ellis distinguished between capital cases,
where, in favorem vitae, attaint did not lie, and the case at hand, one of
mere misdemeanor. Iss
Nudigate and Baldwin argued, as Vaughan later would, that according
to the precedents fining was appropriate only for true jury misdemeanor
(in the sense of outright corruption). Baldwin's handling of the two major
precedents put by counsel for the Crown may not have been entirely
honest. Wharton's Case, he asserted, was never cited as precedent but
had been passed sub silentio. As for Wagstaffe's Case, it had probably
involved "some [true] misdemeanors," for the jurors, Baldwin wrongly
claimed, were fined in unequal amounts: ten were held to pay 100 marks;
two were fined only five marks. It is possible that Baldwin (and subsequently Vaughan) was confused by the report of the case (very similar to
Wagstaffe's) that had been charged against Kelyng in the House of
Commons. In that case, the report of which Vaughan's committee (and
now Baldwin) may have had in hand, Kelyng had indeed fined the jurors
different amounts. Kelyng's report, however, makes clear that those fines
were assessed simply for finding against the direction of the court. Only
a very hurried and careless review of the report would have left a reader
in doubt on that score. More than likely, Baldwin (and perhaps Vaughan)
honestly mistook the case for that of Wagstaffe and wittingly misread it to
suit his own end.l56

154. 1 Freeman 3, 89 Eng. Rep. 3 (1670).
155. Ibid., p. 4, 89 Eng. Rep. 5; T. Jones 15, 84 Eng. Rep. 1124.
156. 1 Freeman 2, 4-5, 89 Eng. Rep. 2, 4 (1670). For reference to, and discussion of,
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For the Crown, Scroggs, Maynard, and Powis relied heavily upon
Wagstaffe's Case, hardly going beyond it to meet those arguments for
Bushel that might be deemed novel. Powis seems to have stressed the
possibility of a "failure of justice," the point that had so exercised Kelyng
and Twisden (and before them, Hyde). Maynard, presumably to the same
end, insisted that an attaint did not lie on an indictment. But for the most
part, the Crown's argument rested upon a defense of the generality of the
return, the assertion that Bushel's appropriate remedy was a writ of error
and the fact that the jury might have escaped their dilemma by returning
a special verdict. Scroggs came closest to meeting the opposition's stress
on the importance of maintaining some degree of jury independence.
There was, he said, a danger both ways: the jury might be overawed, but
then, too, the defendant might ''lose all he has by the wilfulness of the
jury and have no remedy.'' 157 This argument, which overlooked the
possibility of a judicial reprieve, apparently was in reply to Broome's
assertion that the power to fine would destroy the jury's independence of
mind. 158 It was this issue that Vaughan was to make central in his opinion
and for which he was to supply an as-yet-unstated rationale. In doing so,
he would sidestep the main argument of the Crown and, without condoning law-finding-either true nullification or merciful discretion-take the
case on behalf of the jurors a long step beyond the arguments both of
counsel and of the tract writers.
Vaughan's opinion, holding for the Court of Common Pleas (and indeed
for all the justices of England but one) that jurors may not be fined or
imprisoned for their verdicts, is remarkable for how little it addressed the
most volatile issues of the day. Vaughan's absolute conviction that jurors
were judges only of fact and not of law, was left largely implicit, despite
the fact that Penn and Mead had emphasized the issue of law-finding. The
opinion contains no hint of the struggle between bench and jury that
typified many Quaker prosecutions. It is an oddly and confusingly
organized opinion whose central theme is· difficult to discern. 159
Vaughan's contemporaries seem to have concluded that the decision
turned on the argument that jurors might in any given case have
knowledge of their own and thus could not be charged with finding either
against evidence or against law . 160 A close reading of the case suggests

Kelyng's report of the case actually charged against him in Parliament, see above, nn. 63-64,
66, and accompanying text.
157. Ibid., pp. 3, 5, 89 Eng. Rep. 3-5 (1670).
158. Ibid., p. 3.
159. Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006.
160. See below, text at nn. 213-32, for a discussion of tracts by John Hawles and Henry
Care, who claimed that Vaughan endorsed jury law-finding, but who seem also to have
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that there was more to it than that.
Vaughan divided his opinion into four principal sections: the sufficiency
of the return to the writ of habeas corpus; reasons against fining;
consideration of precedents regarding fining; and consideration of precedents regarding the power of Common Pleas to discharge, upon habeas,
persons imprisoned by other courts. This last matter need not detain us
beyond recitation of the argument that, Vaughan implied, convinced the
Court of its power to discharge the imprisoned jurors:
[W]hen a man is brought by habeas corpus to the Court, and upon
return of it, it appears to the Court, that he was against the law
imprisoned and detained, though there be no cause of privilege for him
in this Court, he shall never be by the act of the Court remanded to his
unlawful imprisonment, for then the Court should do an act of injustice
in imprisoning him, de novo, against the law, whereas the great charter
is, quod nullus tibet homo imprisonetur nisi per legem terrae.161
Vaughan had opposed issuing the writ of habeas corpus, but having been
outvoted by his brethren he was determined to see the case through to its
conclusion.
Vaughan's arguments regarding the sufficiency of the return of the writ
of habeas corpus dealt first with the allegation that the jury had found
"contra plenum et manifestam evidentiam" and then with the allegation
that the jury had found "contra directionam curiae in materia legis." On
the question of finding against the evidence, Vaughan observed: ''The
Court hath no knowledge by this return, whether the evidence given were
full and manifest, or doubtful, lame and dark, or indeed evidence at all
material to the issue .... " 162 How far, then, ought one to credit the bare
assertion of a court that the evidence given to the jury was full and
manifest? Laying an important foundation stone for the arguments that
were to follow, Vaughan firmly denied that the judgment of the bench was
beyond inquiry. Though ajudge's "ability, parts, fitness for his place, are
not to be reflected on," a judge is not to be presumed "unerring in [his]
place." No one with any interest by virtue of "the judgment, action, or
authority exercised upon his person or fortunes ... must submit ... to
the implied discretion and unerringness of his judge, without seeking such
redress as the law allows him." 163 Vaughan referred to the frequent
review and reversal of judicial judgments, whether of "inferior" or
"superior" courts, and concluded, perhaps gratuitously, that "corrupt
based their views of Vaughan's fact-finding argument mainly on Vaughan's references to the
jurors' possession of out-of-court evidence.
161. Vaughan 155, 124 Eng. Rep. 1016.
162. Ibid., p. 137, 124 Eng. Rep. 1007.
163. Ibid., p. 139, 124 Eng. Rep. 1008.
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and dishonest judgments ... have in all ages been complained of to the
King in Star Chamber, or to the Parliament.'' He made reference to such
instances down to the impeachment of the judges who ruled for the Crown
in the Case of Ship Money. 164 Kelyng was not mentioned, perhaps
because he was neither "corrupt" nor "dishonest." Perhaps (but not
likely) he had not even come to Vaughan's mind.
Vaughan's opening sally overrode the distinction between "superior"
and "inferior" courts, a distinction even Hale had conceded in his
grudging admission that King's Bench might not be reviewed by a
common-law court. In logic, Vaughan had established only that King's
Bench was reviewable by Parliament; in effect, however, given his refusal
to remand a person imprisoned "against the law," Vaughan had announced that once a habeas had issued, the power of review extended
even to the Court of Common Pleas. Vaughan's second argument on the
sufficiency of the return set forth a critical rule of law regarding ''fineable
fault" in jurors. Jurors, he asserted, may be fined only for finding against
their own view of the evidence. That amounted to perjury, in effect to a
true misdemeanoL The return was deficient for failing to state that the
jury had so found. Vaughan found support for this proposition in Bracton
and Fleta, but his own rationale is of greatest interest. People commonly
disagreed, he observed, about evidence in many contexts. Barristers and
judges deduced "contrary and opposite conclusions out of the same case.
And is there any difference that two men should infer distinct conclusions
from the same testimony?" By what logic, then, must "one ofthese merit
fine and imprisonment, because he doth that which he cannot otherwise
do, preserving his oath and integrity? And this often is the case of the
judge and jury." 165 Vaughan had gone well beyond claiming that the
return was insufficient. He had asserted that the bench could not fine a
jury unless it could prove bad faith out of the mouths of the jurors
themselves.
Vaughan made short work of the question of sufficiency of return
regarding acquittal "against the direction of the court in matter of law."
The allegation is meaningless, said Vaughan, unless it means that the
judge, having taken upon himself knowledge of the fact, directed the jury
on the law. But if the judge is to find the fact, why use ajury? Vaughan's
premise was:
Without a fact agreed, it is impossible for a judge, or any other, to
know the law relating to that fact or direct concerning it, as to know an
accident that hath no subject.

164. Idem.
165. Ibid., pp.141-42, 124 Eng. Rep. 1009.

242

Transformations

Hence it follows, that the judge in logic can never direct what the law
is in any matter controverted, without first knowing the fact; and then
it follows, that without his previous knowledge of the fact, the jury
cannot in logic go against his direction in law, for he could not direct. 166
Vaughan conceded that ajudge might nearly know how the jury has found
the fact before he directs them. In some "special trial," the judge might
ask the jurors how they found a certain fact or ''whether they find the
matter of fact to be as such a witness, or witnesses have deposed." But
even here the judge's direction ought to be "hypothetical, and upon
supposition, and not positive, and upon coercion," for "until a jury have
consummated their verdict . . . they have time still of deliberation."
Regardless of their previous reply to the judge on matters of fact, "they
may lawfully vary from it if they find cause. " 167
This last assertion, that the jury may "vary from" its answer if "they
find cause," was the weakest link in Vaughan's chain of reasoning. He
must have realized that in some cases the jury had revealed enough of its
findings on fact for the bench to conclude that the jury knowingly was
going against the evidence. Indeed, in what is clearly an earlier, tentative
draft of his opinion, Vaughan had conceded that where the verdict
contradicted the jury's announced findings, and the jury failed to correct
itself, the verdict was to be "set aside and a new trial ... directed."J6s
Presumably, where in such a case the jury refused to "correct itself," it
could be punished for perjury. Only subsequently-in the final (published)
version of his opinion-did Vaughan alter his views crucially and further
limit the scope of the judge's power to conclude that the jurors had
committed peJjury, asserting that, after they gave their in-court answers,
but before they pronounced their verdict, the jurors (or any one of them)
might have (honestly) changed their minds regarding the evidence.169
If Vaughan meant to suggest that jurors in such cases typically did
change their minds on the evidence, he was being insincere. His opinion
carries force only to the extent that it argues that a jury might have
honestly reassessed the evidence and that the judge could never be
certain it had not done so. Vaughan's opinion is least convincing
regarding prosecutions under the Conventicles Act where the defendants
admitted attending the meeting but failed to show that religious worship
166. Ibid., p. 147, 124 Eng. Rep. 1012.
167. Ibid., pp. 144-45, 124 Eng. Rep. 1010-11.
168. B.L. MS Lansd. 648.9, fol. 315v.
169. The new-trial remedy seems to have been a substitute for proceedings by way of
attaint, the remedy Vaughan had assumed existed in such cases only three years earlier. See
above, text preceding n. 84. If so, what Vaughan had meant by "corrupt" in his speech in
the Commons in 1668 was not limited to verdicts resulting from bribes but included those in
which the jury simply did not believe.
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(against Anglican form) was not involved. Acquittals in such cases (as in
later prosecutions for seditious libel) were clearly based on rejections of
the bench's view of the law. In other cases, including several of the
homicide cases that Kelyng addressed in Parliament and prosecutions for
unlawful assembly (the offense charged in Penn and Mead's case), the
possibility of honest reassessment was not automatically excludable. As
we shall see, Vaughan's failure to distinguish between those kinds of
cases made it possible for later writers to employ his language in their
justification of acquittals in cases of seditious libel.
Vaughan's listing of reasons against fining includes significant additions
to those he gave in his discussion of sufficiency of return. He began with
a reference to the argument for which the opinion is famous, that the
judge could not direct because ''he can never know what evidence the
jury have." 170 But before stating the reasons why the judge was in this
position, Vaughan returned to the most original premise of his opinion:
even were the jury to have no evidence other than that deposed in Court,
"even then the Judge and jury might honestly differ in the result from the
evidence, as well as two Judges may, which often happens." 171
The more famous arguments, concerning out-of-court evidence, head a
catchall list of points that appear to have been culled from arguments
made at bar. On the whole, they were unoriginal and routinely made.
Vaughan stated that jurors were supposed to have "sufficient knowledge"
to try a case in which no evidence on either side was produced in court.
Moreover, they might have "personal knowledge" that conflicted with
what was deposed in court. Finally, the "jury may know the witnesses to
be stigmatized and infamous." These curt observations were followed by
reference to jurors having the view of premises (''to this evidence
likewise the Judge is a stranger"), which affected civil but rarely criminal
cases; mention of the dilemma posed by the possibility of attaint (though
Vaughan no longer believed that attaint lay in criminal cases); 172 recapitulation of rules presupposing that juries were self-informed and
impartial (the vicinage rule, rules of challenge, the freehold requirement,
the view).m To what end, he summarized, once again moving back to the
true basis for his opinion,
must [juries] undergo the heavy punishment of the villanous judgment,
if after all this they implicitly must give a verdict by the dictates and
170. Vaughan 147, 124 Eng. Rep. 1012.
171. Idem.
172. This argument, which does not appear in the manuscript draft of Vaughan's opinion,
appears to have been added either carelessly or insincerely (as a makeweight).
173. Idem.

244

Transformations

authority of another man, under pain of fines and imprisonment, when
sworn to do it according to the best of their own knowledge:
A man cannot see by another's eye, nor hear by another's ear, no
more can a man conclude or infer the thing to be resolved by another's
understanding or reasoning; and though the verdict be right the jury
give, yet they being not assured it is so from their own understanding,
are foresworn, at least in foro conscientiae . 174
Vaughan thus turned away from standard arguments derived from jury
practices, some of which practices were becoming outmoded or pertained
mainly to civil cases, to restate the fundamental, and original,m element
of his discussion of the sufficiency of the return. Even if the judge had all
of the evidence before him, judge and jury might disagree, and jury trial
was premised on a preference for the jury's assessment of that evidence.
The remainder of this section of Vaughan's opinion reveals the extent
of his reliance on civil cases. It is not surprising that Vaughan drew his
examples from his own domain in Common Pleas. Most significantly, he
insisted that jury independence in criminal cases should be as great as in
civil cases, where judges could not fine. Nowhere in his opinion did
Vaughan give space to Kelyng's and Twisden's concern about a "failure
of justice.'' If in criminal cases there was liability neither to attaint nor to
fine, presumably it was because the defendant, not the Crown, had more
at stake. 176
Vaughan's discussion of precedents follows, in the main, that of
counsel at bar. He was fully prepared to sanction fining of a jury for
accepting a bribe or for committing any other true ministerial breachincluding, of course, giving a verdict provably against oath. Most of the
precedents that others had cited, he asserted, either certainly or at least
apparently fell into the class of legitimate impositions of fines. The two
most prominent criminal cases commonly thought to be precedents for
fining jurors who gave verdicts against the evidence were Wharton's Case
and Wagstaffe's Case. Vaughan stated that even those cases might have
involved true jury misdemeanor. Probably he allowed his reading of main
trends to influence his view of particular cases.m In any event, at several
174. Ibid., p. 148, 124 Eng. Rep. 1012-13.
175. The last twenty-seven words ("and though" ... conscientiae") do not even appear

in Vaughan's tentative manuscript draft.
176. Vaughan 146, 124 Eng. Rep. 1011: "If [the judge] could not [fine the jury] in civil
causes ... he could not in criminal causes upon indictments ... for the fault in both was
the same, namely, finding against the evidence and direction of the Court, and by the
common law; the reason being the same in both, the law is the same."
177. Vaughan appears to have followed Baldwin on these two precedents. See above,
text at n. 156. Vaughan evidently preferred to think that the best report of Wharton's Case
was Noy's, which suggested that the fine was imposed because "the judges conceived the
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points he commented on the absence of clear evidence that courts had
fined in accordance with the allegations in the return in Bushel's Case.
There was, he said, no evidence that the common-law bench or Star
Chamber had ever fined "only for (i.e., as the judge inferred) finding
against the evidence"; in civil cases, there was no evidence of fining at
common law before statutes of attaint, or thereafter, "until Popham's
time," when the fines were not clearly other than for jury misdemeanor.178
Taken at face value, Vaughan's opinion rested ultimately on two
propositions: the common law required trial by jury; in such trials,
without the confession of the jurors themselves, it could never be shown
that the jurors had gone against fact or, hence, that in applying the law the
jurors had rejected judicial instructions on how the law ought to be
applied. Further than this he did not go. Although jurors might "resolve
both law and fact complicately," presumably they were supposed to
follow instructions on the law. He cited no exception to the rule that
jurors were to adhere to the facts they had found. The word "mercy"
does not appear in his opinion.
Some of Vaughan's arguments based on the self-informing role of the
jury ring false, for they hark back to much earlier times; but others do not.
Jurors' knowledge of reputation was still sometimes an important evidentiary guide, both in criminal cases and in the civil trials from which
Vaughan took his lead. The rule that jurors must go only by evidence
produced in court had not yet been firmly settled in criminal cases, and
certainly it was not considered wrong for a jury to acquit on outside
evidence. But it remains unclear just how significant these arguments
were for Vaughan. As he stated, even if the judge did know all the
evidence, judge and jury might nevertheless disagree. The judge could not
assume peljury; the jury was bound to swear to what it believed, however
an outsider might have viewed the case, however wrong the jury might
be. Moreover, objective truth was not easily obtained in such matters:
Vaughan compared the assessment of witness testimony to the interpretajury had been unlawfully dealt with" (Vaughan 153, 124 Eng. Rep. 1015); he said of
Wagstaffe's Case that "by the record it is reasonable to think the jurors committed some
fault besides going against their evidence, for they were unequally fined" (idem). Vaughan
struck from his published opinion the view expressed in his manuscript draft (B.L. MS
Lansd. 648.9, fol. 315v) that "[Bushel's] case has been grounded upon many particular cases
which I think have been grossly mistaken, therefore it's fit to give it a plenary resolution at
this time." Vaughan did not deal with Leech's Case. Braithwaite ("Early Friends'
Experience with Juries," p. 223) conjectures that Vaughan's omission of Leech's Case
confirms Rudyard's assertion (''Appendix'' to Truth Rescued, p. 514) that the jurors in that
case were not in fact fined (see above, nn. 35, 140).
178. Vaughan 152, 124 Eng. Rep. 1014; ibid., p. 146, 124 Eng. Rep. 1012.
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tion of religious texts .1 79 Finally, no matter how wrong the jurors were in
their sincere belief, the law guaranteed resolution of guilt or innocence
according to their "understanding." Although the king might pardon a
defendant convicted against the fact, as it appeared to the judge, acquittal
by the jury was final.
It is useful to compare Vaughan's opinio,n with an anonymous (and
hitherto unnoticed) contemporary manuscript tract, or draft argument,
"Reasons against the Fine and Commitment of the Jurors."Jso "Reasons," which appears to pre-date Bushel's Case, almost certainly was
occasioned by the fining of jurors in a case involving the Quakers. It is
unlikely that the case was Wagstaffe or the very similar one charged
against Kelyng in the House of Commons, for here the jurors were
imprisoned until all of the 100 mark per juror fines (''imposed jointly and
severally") had been paid.1s1 The arguments in "Reasons" bear close
relationship to those made by SeJjeant Ellis in Wagstaffe's Case: great
emphasis is placed on the notion of a "divisum imperium" between judge
and jury and on the fact that judges are not punished for their errors. But
"Reasons" contains a religious motif all its own.tsz Though it takes the
form of a lawyer's brief, it might have been a lay tract designed to make
the strongest case for juror independence and for verdicts reached
according to conscience without the barest suggestion that jurors ought to
engage in law-finding.ts3
"Reasons" contained most of the arguments that Vaughan made in
support of the jury's right to be free from coercion. Like Vaughan, the
author of "Reasons" confines fineable wrongdoing to peJjury and other
true misdemeanors. "Reasons" implies that the precedents for fining
were actually cases involving some jury misdemeanor, but it relies
ultimately on the view that precedent ought not to be followed if it is
179. Ibid., p. 141, 124 Eng. Rep. 1009.
180. B.L. MS Sloane 827, fols. 35-42v. To my knowledge, this manuscript has never
before been discussed in print.
181. Ibid., fol. 42.
182. Ibid., fol. 36: "If not according to their consciences then they offend God and incur
punishments both temporal and eternal"; fol. 38v: "[N]either is it superfluous to consider
that this trial by a jury in criminal cases is said to be a trial by God and the country which
seems to imply the absoluteness of it, so that the acquittal by the country is an acquittal by
God and finding guilty by the country a finding guilty by God."
183. "Reasons" refers to the reign of Henry VIII as "perhaps . . . not beyond the
memory of some men living" (fol. 40v). It also refers to the Petition of Right (1628) (fol. 35);
a person born in the last year of Henry VIII's reign would have been eighty-one in 1628. The
author probably means that some living persons have heard or read about the time of Henry
VIII. Clearly, "Reasons" bears all the marks of the mid-to-late-1660sjury-right debates. In
my view, it was the work of Ellis or of someone influenced by his arguments in Wagstaffe's
Case.

The Principle of Noncoercion: Contest over the Jury Role

247

"against reason and the principles of justice." The tract makes the
increasingly commonplace arguments that jurors have knowledge of their
own and that, as law arises from fact, the judge cannot direct on the law
until the jurors have pronounced their verdict.184
"Reasons," like Vaughan's opinion, holds that attaint does not lie, but
it confronts the possibility of a failure of justice, as Vaughan did not do.
First, the author concedes that "the administration of the law must be
entrusted somewhere and there must be a ne plus ultra in all controversies." This trust had been distributed between judge and jury, both of
whom are on oath to do justice. There is little reason to think, the author
continues, that acquittals will cause a great deal of harm. That "one or
two juries in an age are mistaken" does not suggest that many more will
be, for "persons of their conditions" have more at risk than "persons of
greater rank" who "are perhaps better guarded." 185 Moreover, trial by
jury assumes jury independence. Here the author compares civil (i.e.,
Roman and canon) law with common law. In the latter system, evidence
is given viva voce and is not made part of a sworn record that remains for
later examination. Testimony given at common law, "upon a sudden
altogether," cannot be sifted in the same way, nor "so well observed or
remembered, for vox audita perit.'' It would be unreasonable ''that men's
lives, liberties and estates should be bound up in so narrow and dangerous
a compass as the direction of a judge against evidence seeming so to
him." 186 The author of "Reasons" thus supplied a more powerful version
than did Vaughan of the argument for relying upon twelve men's
memories. And it was not only a matter of accurate observation and
recall. The reason for using a form of trial to which jury independence was
integral was that ''no man if he be condemned can blame the King or the
nobles or the judges or men of power, the frequent objects of envy, but his
own peers and so every man rests content and his government secured." 187
Vaughan was content to take the jury as a given; it required no
justification beyond the comment that one man's memory is less accurate
than that of twelve men. It was enough to observe that the jury was on
oath to give a verdict according to its understanding. The problem for
Vaughan resided more in the realm of science than in the realm of politics.
Because people drew different conclusions from the same evidence, one
could not presume insincerity. It was a point that Ellis and his fellows had
not seen and that escaped the author of "Reasons." But it was also a
184.
185.
186.
187.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

fols. 40v, 38v, 40.
fol. 41.
fols. 38v-39.
fol. 39.
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point that begged the question, Why depend so heavily upon laymen's
"understanding"? Surely the answer could not be solely that they might
have knowledge of their own, for they could (and often did) report that
knowledge to the judge. As "Reasons" implied, the true answer to the
question, Why a "divisum imperium?" -i.e., Why use a jury in the first
place?-involved considerations of trust and politics which took account
of the fact that the judiciary was in reality, or in common supposition,
capable of exercising tyrannical powers. This was ground upon which
Vaughan would not unnecessarily tread.
Vaughan broke relatively little new ground in his opinion. Where he did
adduce novel arguments, he did so in a modest way. He denied that
attaint would lie in a criminal case, but he took his lead from the lack of
precedent rather than from the rights of Englishmen. He suggested that if
fines were not imposed in civil cases, a fortiori they ought not to be in
criminal cases. His language was softer than that of Hale. 188 If judge and
jury disagreed on questions of fact, the jury prevailed, according to
Vaughan, both because otherwise the institution would be a waste of time
and because it was unreasonable to make jurors swear to what they did
not believe. Preference for the jury's view was implicit in institutional
arrangements; for Vaughan, historical usage ipso facto suggested correct
practice.
Vaughan used extreme care to avoid any argument that smacked of the
politics of the day. His legal precedents were similarly uncontroversial,
drawn almost without exception from before the Interregnum and not
tainted by any recent political maneuvering or misuse of power; indeed,
he ignored the series of contemporary cases on which proponents of jury
fining relied as precedent, save for the most important one, Wagstaffe's
Case. Perhaps for this reason Vaughan did not rely on the proceedings
relating to the censure of Justice Kelyng, although as a party to the
proceedings he was certainly aware that many in Commons supported his
stand on fining. Nor, in his discussion of attaint, did he seek support from
Hyde, who had called attaint a "fruitless remedy." 189 Instead, without
endorsing either side in the Quakers' struggle with authorities, or even
acknowledging the turmoil, Vaughan attempted to settle this controversial question simply on the basis of "reason" and his own (perhaps
idealized) view of the old common law.
188. Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown, 2:311-12: "[I]t were impossible almost for
any judge or jury to convict a jury upon such an account, because [it is] impossible that all
the circumstances of the case, that might move the jury to acquit a prisoner, could be
brought in evidence; this therefore seems to me to be but in terrorem."
189. See above, nn. 31-32.
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It is difficult to tell from Vaughan's opinion the influence he expected it
would have on the jury law-finding debate. The opinion seemingly took
little notice of the real world: it was grounded in legal theory, and what
followed from that theory was not his concern. If Vaughan had any
thoughts about law-finding or the jury's right to apply law mercifully, he
kept them to himself. Penn's entreaties, as well as those of the Quakers
for nearly a decade, seem, in the light of Vaughan's opinion,
wrongheaded and irrelevant, and to have had little or no effect on the
outcome of Bushel's Case. And yet it is difficult to believe that Vaughan
failed to realize that the fact-finding role as he depicted it would be used
by the pro-jury elements to forward their cause. To Vaughan's mind, legal
reasoning and precedent followed the Quaker pro-jury arguments up to
but not including the point where they advocated jurors' control over the
law. Pro-jury interpreters of Bushel's Case, however, did not stop where
Vaughan did; instead, they glossed his opinion, employing it in their
forthright arguments for jurors as judges of law.

v
The ruling in Bushel's Case probably had little impact on proceedings
in most routine felony trials. In the great majority of such cases bench and
jury continued to function as before, in tandem and without open
conflict. 19o In those few cases where the bench found itself impatient with
a too merciful-or simply dishonest-jury, the judge employed mechanisms short of outright coercion that typically afforded the bench effective
control.J91 True jury intransigence, though now protected by law, was
probably very rare.
Political trials, such as those for treason, the unlicensed printing of
news, and seditious libel, presented a different situation. Since authorities
were more likely to take a strong interest, the risk of disagreement with a
resolute jury was substantially greater. In these and similar cases the
transition from the principle to the practice of noncoercion was probably
slow . 192 The nearly two decades between Bushel's Case and the Glorious
190. See below, Chapter 7, sections I and II, for discussion of the typical felony trial in
the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
191. See below, Chapter 7, text at nn. 36-39.
192. Joseph Besse (A Collection of the Sufferings of . .. Quakers, I) claimed that the
bench sometimes refused to accept acquittals in trials of Quakers [pp. 106 (1675, Cheshire),
110 (1683, Cheshire)]. When a jury that acquitted was ordered to go out again to reconsider,
one juryman objected, whereupon Peniston Whaley, one of the justices, was enraged and
said he hoped that the king would get rid of juries. He allegedly told another jury that "[i]f
they did not agree, they should be kept there till they died" and they complied [p. 560 (1676,
N ottinghamshire) ].
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Revolution were testing years for the bench and criminal juries, grand and
petty. The complicated and oft-described political trials of the most
tumultuous years, 1678-83 (the period of the Popish Plot and its aftermath) need not be retold in detail here. 193 Our immediate interest lies
mainly in one aspect of the legacy of those years, the fate of Vaughan's
opinion in the hands of a few publicists writing in 1680. For our purposes
a brief background of the political trials of the period will suffice.
The Popish Plot was the invention of Titus Oates, who convinced a
gullible court and a more gullible populace of Jesuit plans to kill the king,
massacre Protestants, and engineer the succession of Charles's Catholic
brother, James. As a result of ensuing arrests and prosecutions, between
1678 and 1681 some twenty people were either executed or died in
prison. 194 In the first two years of the crisis, the virulently anti-Papist
Chief Justice (King's Bench) Scroggs worked his relentless will on
defendants and took a strong lead with juries, who were for the most part
ready to follow. But as doubts about Oates (if not the Plot itself) set in,
Scroggs scrupulously and skillfully exposed false accusations, incurring
the wrath of anti-Papist mobs. 19 5 The Court, which had been thrown off
balance by Oates's accusations and the resultant move in Parliament for
exclusion of James from the order of succession, gradually recovered
maneuvering room. Already in 1680, there were prosecutions of Protestant publicists whose anti-Papist attacks were alleged to blame the crisis
on the Court's encouragement of Catholic hopes. 196 The following year
only the resistance of Protestant London grand juries frustrated royal
efforts to destroy Shaftesbury, the leader of the nascent Whig party .197
The pendulum soon swung fully against the most outspoken of the
pro-Exclusion Protestant Whig leaders. Stephen Colledge was convicted
by an Oxford shire jury on charges oftreason in 1681; Edward Fitz-Harris
was convicted and executed for treason later that year. The purge reached
its height two years later in the wake of the discovery of the Rye House
193. On the Popish Plot and the prosecutions it inspired see e.g. John Miller, Popery and
Politics in England, 1660-1688 (Cambridge, 1973); John Kenyon, The Popish Plot (London,
1972); J. R. Jones, The First Whigs. The Politics of the Exclusion Crisis, 1678-1683 (London,
1970), esp. ch. 2; John Pollock, The Popish Plot: A Study in the History of the Reign of
Charles II (London, 1903). For the ensuing attack on the Whigs see e.g. Michael Landon,
The Triumph of the Lawyers. Their Role in English Politics, 1678-1689 (University, Ala.,
1970), esp. ch. 5; G. W. Keeton, Lord Chancellor Jeffreys and the Stuart Cause (London,
1965), esp. ch. 10. See generally Clark, Later Stuarts, ch. 5.
194. Kenyon, Popish Plot, p. 205.
195. Ibid., pp. 175-78; Clark, Later Stuarts, p. 94. See also the detailed study of Scrogg's
behavior at the Wakeman trial, J.P. Kenyon, "The Acquittal of Sir George Wakeman: 18
July 1679," Historical Journal, vol. 14 (1971), pp. 693-708.
196. See below, text at nn. 207-8.
197. See below, n. 225 for recent discussions of the proceedings against Shaftesbury.
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Plot to seize the king. Among the victims were Lord Russell and Algernon
Sydney, though neither had in fact been part of the plot. Jeffreys's role in
the anti-Whig prosecutions as an implacable foe of opposition to authorities, first as Crown counsel and then as Lord Chief Justice, is now
famous. 198
The bullying tactics of the Stuart bench during this period should not
blind one to the fact that in many instances the prosecutions were
popular. Local officials returned juries sympathetic to the Crown as often
as they returned juries likely to engage in some resistance. Jury packing
was common and practiced on all sides. 199 The changing winds of local or
national politics determined whether such pretrial manipulation would
favor or disadvantage the defendant. Defendants in such cases were not
themselves strangers to tactics that might lawfully be employed in court
to secure favorable or at least open-minded jurors: in some cases
challenges were frequent. The bench played both ways the rule that jurors
must be freeholders, sometimes challenging jurors as nonfreeholders,
sometimes denying that the rule grounded a challenge for cause. zoo Some
juries were harangued and berated by the prosecution or bench; otherswhere the bench was confident that the jurors could be trusted to convict
the "guilty"-were told that they must determine the truth according to
their own consciences. 2o1 Conscience might thus be invoked in the
apparently magnanimous spirit of encouraging jury independence of
mind. Yet <>,gain, invocation to "conscience" might reflect judicial doubts
about the evidence for the Crown. In late 1679 Scroggs, standing against
the tide of anti-Jesuit feeling, urged Wakeman's jury to regard the
evidence, not public feelings: "Never care what the world says, follow
your consciences. "zoz The courageous jury found Wakeman not guilty.
For Scroggs, of course, the claim to conscience was a claim upon the
jurors' honest assessment of fact. No hint of law-finding was intended.
And like Vaughan, Scroggs recognized that factual assessment was not an
198. F. Keeton, Lord Chancellor Jeffreys, chs. 9-10.
199. Ibid., p. 97; Ogg, England in the Reign of Charles II, 2:520. See Kenyon's comments
on the composition of juries in the Popish Plot trials. "Acquittal of Sir George Wakeman,"
p. 702.
200. See Sir John Rawles, "Remarks on FitzHarris's Trial," in State Trials, 8:435.
201. E.g. Rex v. Green, Berry and Hill, State Trials, 7:220. Scroggs made it clear that he
believed the defendants were guilty and then told the jury: "So I leave it to your
consideration upon the whole matter, whether the evidence of the fact does not satisfy your
consciences, that these men are guilty. And I know you will do like honest men on both
sides."
202. State Trials, 7:686. See also Rex v. Langham, State Trials, 7:484, where a doubtful
Scroggs told the jury: "Follow your own consciences; do wisely; do honestly; and consider
what is to be done." See Kenyon, "Acquittal of Sir George Wakeman," pp. 701-2.

252

Transformations

infallible science. 20 3 The juror was sworn to say what he believed was
true, not to achieve objective truth. Scroggs made this point in his charge
to Henry Care's jury in 1680 in an effort to forestall a verdict of not guilty
on grounds the evidence did not yield an absolute certainty of guilt.
You must take evidence in this case, as you do all year long, that is, in
other cases, where you know so: for human frailty must be allowed;
that is, you may be mistaken. For you do not swear, nor are you bound
to swear here, that [Care] was the publisher of this book; but if you find
him guilty, you only swear you believe it so. God help juries, if so be
in matter of fact they should promise otherwise. They cannot swear to
it. 204
The uses to which the claim upon conscience might be put were many.
Vaughan's language seems to reverberate in the Reports of Restoration
political trials. It clearly reverberates-but to very different effect-in the
jury tract literature of the day. John Rawles, whose Englishman's Right
was published in 1680 and enjoyed wide readership, many successive
reprints, and unending quotation, drew so heavily upon Vaughan's
arguments as virtually to be a gloss upon the opinion. 205 Rawles set the
tone for many pro-jury writers down to Fox's Libel Act. His characterization of Vaughan's opinion also became the accepted pro-jury view in
America, though the influence of his tract there was insubstantial until
Zenger's Case in 1735.206
Rawles's tract, as well as large portions of a book by Henry Care,207
were occasioned by the spate of prosecutions for unlicensed printing of
news, seditious libel, and treason during the first years of the Popish Plot.
Although neither tract mentions the prosecutions in 1680 of Benjamin
Harris and of Care himself, it seems likely that those trials, and what
Rawles and Care took to be judicial rulings on the law of seditious libel
203. This is not to deny, however, that the Restoration bench approached fact-finding in
a more "scientific" manner than had earlier jurists. It is only to say that the political cases
(and the problem of coercion) of the period resulted in emphasis on the juror's "conscience"
and understanding, and in assertions that the juror's sworn "belief" be respected whether
or not it accorded with objective truth. Perhaps increasing confidence in the (relatively)
"scientific" aspect of jury fact-finding made it easier to adopt such a stance. For an
important discussion of contemporary notions about the science of fact-finding see Barbara
J. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, 1983).
And see below, Chapter 7, text at nn. 15-17.
204. State Trials, 7:1128. (Alternatively spelled: Carr.)
205. John Rawles, The Englishman's Right (London, 1680).
206. Stanley N. Katz, ed., A Brief Narrative of the Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger,
by James Alexander (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 15-16.
207. Henry Care, English Liberties: or, the Free-Born Subject's Inheritance (London,
1680).
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(rather than the treason trials of alleged Catholic plotters), revived the
claim to the jury's right to decide law.zos
The law of seditious libel was still taking shape during the first two
decades of the Restoration. Its roots lay in Star Chamber practice, 209 and
certain rules of law-e.g., that truth was no defense-might be expected
to have been inherited and reaffirmed by the common law bench. But
questions regarding the allocation of duties between judge and jury,
concerning, i.e., what was law and what was fact, were less clearly
questions to be answered by reference to Star Chamber practice. Whether
a writing was seditious might fairly be claimed a matter of fact for the jury
to decide; it might also be insisted that criminal intent should not be
implied by the bench but should be determined instead by the jury. The
settlement of the Stuart doctrine of seditious libel was not in any simple
way a result of the ruling in Bushel's Case. It may be that the principal
basis for the practice in seditious libel cases-that the jury was to find
only whether the defendant "published" (wrote, printed, or published)
the words in question whereas seditiousness and intent were matters of
law for the bench-was the fact that a record of the allegedly offensive
words existed, so that those words were, unlike all other criminal "acts,"
available for judicial inspection. 2 10 Nonetheless, it seems likely that the
208. Rex v. Harris, State Trials, 7:926-32; Rex v. Care, Ibid., 1111-30. See Philip
Hamburger, "The Origins of the Law of Seditious Libel" (ms. pp. 32-37), Stanford Law
Review (forthcoming). All Hamburger pp. herein referred to are from ms. When published,
Hamburger's study will importantly modify all earlier work on the pre-1730 law of seditious
libel. Hamburger argues, inter alia, that Harris's prosecution was for "a strange combination of seditious libel and Scandalum Magnatum" (p. 32) and that Care's prosecution was,
strictly speaking, for unlicensed printing (pp. 34-37). The defendants, states Hamburger,
were charged with, among other things, publication of "seditious libels"; Hawles "professed to think" that such cases "were but poorly conducted common law seditious libel
prosecutions." He complained, "with uncertain ingenuousness, that traditional powers of
juries in libel trials were being abused" (p. 36, n. 73). Whether or not Hawles was
"ingenuous," I believe his writings were taken seriously, especially as prosecutions that
were clearly for seditious libel became common.
209. Holdsworth, History of English Law, 8:336--42, esp. 339. But note that Hamburger
("Origins of the Law of Seditious Libel," Part III) provides an important reassessment of
the early development of seditious libel. Hamburger argues that Star Chamber was
concerned not with seditious libel broadly defined but with that form of seditious libel that
involved defamation of public officials.
210. See Holdsworth, History of English Law, 8:343; see also Thomas A. Green, "The
Jury, Seditious Libel, and the Criminal Law," in Green and Richard H. Helmholz, Juries,
Libel, and Justice: The Role of English Juries in 17th-18th Century Trials for Libel and
Slander (Los Angeles, 1984). Hamburger ("Origins of the Law of Seditious Libel") has
reassessed the applications of these doctrines in the period 1660-95. His work rests on only
a few cases, partly because he has excluded those cases that he believes were in fact
prosecutions for unlicensed printing. As to the issue of "libelous ness," Hamburger
concludes: "In the seventeenth century, the bench determined in practice whether a
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tensions between judge and jury that the Quaker trials occasioned and
that culminated in Bushel's Case affected the development of the law of
seditious libel.
The Quakers' opposition to the Conventicles Act of 1664, and especially their assertion that jurors ought to determine the meaning of the
Act, pushed the bench to declare that jurors were to determine only the
question of whether the defendant had attended the alleged meeting. The
bench would decide whether such attendance at the alleged meeting
implied unlawful religious worship. (This was so, at least, if the defendants did not show that the purpose of the meeting was not religious or, if
religious, not contrary to Anglican forms.) We have also seen that Chief
Justice Kelyng attempted to reduce the jury's scope of fact-finding in
homicide. Where murder was alleged, and no provocation was shown, the
jury was to find whether the defendant intentionally slew the deceased; if
so, the court would determine whether the act implied malice.zu Thus
judge-jury conflicts in the early 1660s led the bench to reserve to itself as
questions of law matters that had traditionally been left to the jury as
questions of fact.
Bushel's Case increased the importance of placing limitations upon the
scope of fact-finding. It may have encouraged the bench to reserve to
itself-where it could-the kinds of determinations within which jury
law-finding or merciful verdicts might otherwise be concealed. As we
shall see, only in seditious libel did the bench succeed in restricting the
jury to largely stipulated facts and thus force a jury that did not want to
convict to return a verdict that was flagrantly contrary to the evidence.
Although some juries adopted a ruse analogous to that employed in
Quaker prosecutions, and returned a verdict of "guilty of publishing
writing's content was defamatory or libelous." He implies that juries could have (though
they rarely dared to do so) disagreed with the bench (pp. 53-54). As to intent, Hamburger
states (pp. 55-60) that the bench followed the law of homicide, wherein murder was
presumed unless the defendant produced evidence of provocation, accident, etc., in which
case intent became a matter for the jury. In seditious libel, the defendant might similarly
produce evidence that he lacked knowledge or malice. Hamburger concedes that the
defendant's task was not easy: "In the 1680s, judges and Crown lawyers disparagingly
referred to questions of knowledge and malice as mere formalities, in order to remove such
issues from the control of the jury" (p. 59). Apparently,judicial treatment of the defendant's
exculpatory evidence depended upon the judge's view of the publication-whether it was
sufficiently or "insufficiently defamatory to imply malice." Even on Hamburger's analysis,
then, in practice, in most seditious libel cases, libelousness and intent were implied or not
by the bench, not by the jury. In homicide, it should be pointed out, defendants might claim
provocation almost as a matter of course. They (or their witnesses) were not embarrassed
by an act that lived on for judicial inspection. They might be countered by witnesses for the
Crown, but the testimony of witnesses was always open to attack, and the question of
credibility of all witnesses was conceded to be a jury question.
211. See above, n. 80 and accompanying text.
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only," given the establishment of the principle of noncoercion, the Stuart
doctrine of seditious libel was particularly advantageous to the Crown.
The application of that doctrine in the prominent trials of 1680 thus
provoked Hawles and others to come to the defense of the jury and,
specifically, to "find" in the principle of noncoercion support for very
far-reaching propositions about the right to find law as well as fact.
Rawles's Englishman's Right is cast as a dialogue between a barrister
and a juryman. The barrister stresses the importance of the duty to serve
on juries and instructs the juryman regarding his proper function. The
juryman, for his part, asks all the "right questions." Whether Hawles was
concerned with the increasing use of packed juries, the rate at which
Englishmen avoided jury service, or the ignorance and timidity of jurors
in the face of the Stuart bench, his message was the same: "[T]he office
of a juryman is, conscientiously to judge his neighbour; and he needs no
more law than is easily learnt to direct him therein.' '212
Hawles adopted virtually all of Vaughan's language. All discourses by
the judge to the jury on the law "ought to be hypothetical, not coercive."
The judge should so charge juries because "ex facto jus oritur, all matter
of law arises out of matter of fact, so that until the fact is settled there is
no room for law." Hawles also endorsed Vaughan's view of the impenetrability of the fact-resolving role of the jury. He followed Vaughan
closely in saying that since the jurors were drawn from the neighborhood,
they might be supposed to have knowledge of their own touching the facts
of the situation and the credibility of witnesses. The jury's verdict,
formed in good conscience, was determinative. The judges, said Hawles,
"do often recapitulate and sum up the heads of the evidence; but the
jurors are still to consider whether it be done truly, fully and impartially
(for one man's memory may sooner fail than twelve's)."2J3 In the end,
Hawles repeated Vaughan's effective formulation, "A man cannot see by
another's eye";Z 14 if judges andjury disagreed, so be it. Trial by jury was
trial by peers, not by judges.
At a crucial point in the dialogue the juryman asks whether juries are
restricted entirely to the finding of fact. Through the response of the
barrister, Hawles developed the law-finding argument that was to be for
more than a century the lodestar of many of the opponents of the seditious
libel doctrine. Hawles implied that he had derived the argument from
Vaughan, but in fact he simply attached it to one of Vaughan's most
conventional statements. The jury, Hawles noted (quoting Vaughan),
must deal with law "as it arises out of, or is complicated with, and
212. Hawles, Englishman's Right, p. I.
213. Ibid., p. 9.
214. Ibid., p. 27.
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influences the fact. " 215 Vaughan meant-but failed explicitly to statethat the jury must take the law from the bench and must apply it in the
manner that the bench has ruled it should. Rawles drew an opposite
inference which deserves close study. Rawles's barrister begins by
conceding that matters of fact constitute the jury's "proper province"
and "chief business." But this, he states, does not determine the matter:
For to say, [the jury] are not at all to meddle with, or have respect to
law in giving their verdicts, is not only a false position, and contradicted by every day's experience; but also a very dangerous and
pernicious one, tending to defeat the principal end of the institution of
juries, and so subtlety to undermine that which was too strong to be
battered down.216
The jury must "apply matter of fact and law together; and from their
consideration of, and a right judgment upon both, bring forth their
verdict." The barrister's examples, borrowed from Vaughan, are not
startling: the general issue in trespass, breach of the peace, felony, and
seditious libel. In homicide, e.g., the jury is free to return "murder,
manslaughter, per infortunium, or se defendendo, as they see cause." Did
this mean for Rawles, as it did for Vaughan, only that the jury must apply
the law, as stated to them by the bench, or did "right judgment" mean
something more?ZJ7
Clearly Rawles meant more, but he could find no further support in
Vaughan's opinion. Thus he turned to other sources. Apparently borrowing from a tract on Penn and Mead's case, Rawles has the barrister ask,
"[T]o what end is it, that when any person is prosecuted upon any statute,
the statute itself is usually read to the jurors, but only that they may judge,
whether or not the matter be within that statute?" 218 This appears to go
beyond Vaughan, but its full meaning remains ambiguous. Read in the
light of Quaker prosecutions under the Conventicles Act, it seems to
adopt a far-reaching position: the jury must not feel bound to "apply" the
statute as interpreted by the bench. Then, perhaps taking his lead from an
account of Lilburne's dispute with the bench in 1649, Rawles drew upon
the passage from Littleton, stating "[t]hat if a jury will take upon them the
knowledge of the law upon the matter, they may." 21 9 This, Rawles
suggested, was conclusive. We have seen how weak a reed this passage
was, and Rawles, a trained barrister, must also have known it proved less
Ibid .. p. 10.
Ibid., pp. 10-11.
Ibid., p. II.
Idem.
Idem. For Lilburne's use of Littleton see State Trials, 4:1381 and above, Chapter 5,
text at nn. 70-76.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
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than he asserted for it. But the position of juries in seditious libel cases
seemed to him untenable; juries, he said, might be turned into "engine[s]
of oppression.' ' 220 Their right, and duty, to judge the law was self-evident.
Thus, the heart of Rawles's argument dealt not with the problem of
judicial directions on the law but with the problem of defective indictments. Here it was that Rawles grafted the claims of Lilburne, Penn, and
opponents of the seditious libel doctrine in his own day onto the opinion
in Bushel's Case:
And ... it is false to say that the jury hath not power, or does not use
frequently to apply the fact to the law; and thence taking their
measures, judge of, and determine the crime or issue by their verdict.
As juries have ever been vested with such power by law, so to
exclude them from, or disseize them of the same, were utterly to defeat
the end of their institution. For then if a person should be indicted for
doing any common innocent act, if it be but clothed and disguised in the
indictment with the name of treason, or. some other high crime, and
proved by witnesses to have been done by him, the jury, though
satisfied in conscience, that the fact is not any such offence as it is
called, yet because (according to this fond opinion) they have no power
to judge of law and the fact charged is fully proved, they should at this
rate be bound to find him guilty.22I
Hence, the central point of the tract and the core of the juryman's right
and duty was this: the jury, to render a guilty verdict, must be satisfied in
conscience not only that the fact has been proved but also that the fact
constitutes an offense under the law. There can be little doubt that Rawles
held the same views regarding judicial charges. The argument was not
new; Quaker writers had made it since the Restoration. Now, however, it
was made with reference to indictments for treason and seditious libel,
and it was clothed in and accorded the respectability of the words and
(seemingly, though not really) the logic of the opinion in Bushel's Case.
Rawles's law-finding argument comes in the middle of his tract. It is
followed by lengthy borrowings from Vaughan's arguments against the
fining and imprisonment of jurors and is thus made to seem an integral
part of Vaughan's opinion. The barrister comments that the recent
appearance of Vaughan's Reports is an important event; all prospective
jurymen ought to read it, along with Magna Carta, the Petition of Right,
and other fundamental statements of Englishmen's rights. Jury trial, as
defended by Vaughan and defined by Rawles, was central to those rights.
As the barrister concludes (in what were in fact Lilburne's words):
220. Rawles, Englishman's Right, p. 12.
221. Ibid., pp. ll-12.
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[T]he law of England has not placed trials by juries to stand between
men and death or destruction to so little purpose, as to pronounce men
guilty without regard to the nature of the offence, or to what is to be
inflicted thereupon.zzz
Rawles's gloss upon Bushel's Case was adopted by Henry Care, who
published English Liberties: or the Free Born Subject's Inheritance
shortly after his trial in 1680 for printing unlicensed (and seditious) news.
Care lifted whole passages from Hawles, including Rawles's commentary
on indictments. Elaborating on Rawles's argument, Care asserted that if
the indictment put words of law wrongly in apposition to the facts
it is an apparent trap at once to perjure ignorant juries, and render them
so far from being of good use, as to be only tools of oppression, to ruin
and murder their innocent neighbors with the greater formality: for
though it be true, that matter of fact is the most common and proper
objective of a jury's determination, and matter of law that of the
judges, yet as law arises out of, and is complicated with fact it cannot
but fall under the jury's consideration. 223
Once again, Vaughan's words appear: No allegation "contra materia
legis" will be heard, for "ex facto jus oritur"; law is "complicated with
fact." These phrases, which had become code words for the pro-jury
writers, were harnessed to the arguments developed by Hawles. For
many, the meaning that Hawles and Care read into those words would
quickly come to stand for the essence ofthe Englishman's right to trial by
jury.zz4
The petty jury was only the final bastion of opposition to allegedly
tyrannical prosecutions. Grand juries might (and sometimes did) refuse to
return a true bill, whether the charge was homicide, theft, or a political
crime.m In the years following Bushel's Case, the Crown fought a
two-tiered struggle in some political cases, first to secure an indictment
222. Ibid., pp. 38-39. See Lilburne, Jury-man's Judgement (1653), p. 6 (above, Chapter
5, text at n. 141).
223. Care, English Liberties, p. 259.
224. See e.g. A Guide to Juries, setting forth their Antiquity, Power and Duty (London,
1699; first published as A Guide to English Juries, London, 1682), pp. 17, 25; Lord John
Somers, The Security of Englishmen's Lives, or the Trust, Power and Duty of the Grand
Jurys of England (London, 1681), pp. 10-11.
225. For the grand jury in routine cases see Zachary Babington, Advice to Grand Jurors
in Cases of Blood (London, 1680; orig. published 1677). The problem of grand jury
"recalcitrance" in political cases has received a great deal of attention, esp. regarding
Shaftesbury's Case and Colledge's Case in 1681. See e.g. Havighurst, "Judiciary and
Politics," pp. 241-43; Helene E. Schwartz, "Demythologizing the Historic Role of the
Grand Jury," American Criminal Law Review, vol. 10 (1972), pp. 712-21. See also K. H. D.
Haley, The First Earl of Shaftesbury (Oxford, 1968), ch. 28.
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and then to obtain a trial jury conviction. At either stage, Crown officials
might be hard pressed to convince jurymen that the official characterization of an offense coincided with the law. Rawles's The Grand-JuryMan's Oath and Office Explained, which appeared in the same year as
Englishman's Right, argued that grand juries ought to return an ignoramus if they believed that the offense alleged was not a crime. The grand
jury, according to Hawles, must look to facts, not to words of form
inserted by zealous prosecutors:
Here lies the knot, the pinch of the business, which rightly understood,
would silence this controversy for ever. You must note therefore, that
sometimes these words are only of course, or matter of form, raised by
a just and reasonable implication of law; but sometimes they may be
thrust in to raise .a pretence or colour of crime, where there is really
none. 226
Hawles therefore asked the grand jury to distinguish two kinds of case. In
one, the act charged is itself criminal, whether or not it is "malicious" or
"seditious," etc. If the jury is satisfied that the act is criminal and that the
person charged probably is guilty of the act, it must return a true bill. In
the other case, however, the act is innocent or indifferent unless it is
undertaken with a "malicious" or "seditious" intent. In this instance, the
jury must be satisfied that the "words of form" are proved, or else it must
reject the indictment. Since they judge fact, grand juries must find the
facts which make an act criminal; they ought not to find noncriminal facts
and then leave to the bench, under the rubric of law, the determination of
criminality. If they do so, said Hawles, they might indict for treason one
charged with "looking on the tombs at Westminster" or for high
misdemeanor one charged with printing the Bible.227
For a grand jury to reject a bill because the act charged was neither
criminal nor committed with criminal intent it had, of course, "to take
upon [itself] the knowledge of the law."
[Grand] jurors are to consider both law and fact or else they will never
deliver just and lawful verdicts. To what purpose does the law provide,
that jurors should be so well qualified as to estate, understanding and
sufficiency, and so strictly sworn, but only to detect offenders and
preserve the innocent from needless vexation and trouble? How far
juries are judges of law as well as of fact is pretty well set forth in a
small treatise lately published, entitled, The Englishman's Right .228
226. John Rawles, The Grand-Jury-Man's Oath and Office Explained: and the Rights of
English-Men Asserted (London, 1680), pp. 16-17.
227. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
228. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
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With this allusion, Rawles united his argument for a true shield at the
grand jury stage with his claim that the trial jury possessed the power to
decide law as well as fact, a strategy that Care and the author of The
Guide also subsequently adopted.229
In the period we have reviewed, the pro-jury position became, in fact,
several different positions. The tract writers moved easily from one
argument to another, sometimes confusing them but always uniting all of
them under the rubric of the Englishman's right to trial by jury. 23 0 At
times the assertion that juries ought to decide law was inseparable from
claims to control over fact. To understand the entire complex of pro-jury
arguments, therefore, it is necessary to separate the various strands of
jury theory and to view them in relation to earlier thinking.
The basis of the jury's power was, of course, the right to resolve issues
of fact. Following Vaughan's logic, this implied the right to apply the law
to the facts. Because "law arose from fact," unless the jury rendered a
special verdict, no one other than the jurors had an opportunity to play
this role. This concept of "application oflaw" was the most limited of the
contemporary theories of law-deciding. It presumed, for many (certainly
for Vaughan), jury adherence to the judicial interpretation of the law. The
judge could do no more than put hypotheticals, but that was because he
could not be sure of the fact. Once the jury found the fact and determined
to which hypothetical it corresponded, application of the law could follow
automatically. 231
229. Care, English Liberties, p. 261; A Guide to Juries, pp. 59-62, 68. See also
Twenty-four Sober Queries Humbly Offered to be seriously considered by all juries in city
and country (London, 1680, printed for Benjamin Harris).
230. See e.g. John Somers, The Security of Englishmen's Lives, pp. 9-11. Somers's tract
was occasioned by the proceedings against Shaftesbury. Somers drew upon Vaughan for the
proposition that juries (grand and petty) "determine the law in all matters where issue is
joined" (p. 10). For an analysis of the influence on Somers of Fortescue's De Laudibus
Regum Angliae see Caroline A. J. Skeel, "The Influence of the Writings of Sir John
Fortescue," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 3rd ser., vol. 10 (1916), pp.
77-114.
231. Some tract writers who were not explicit about the jury's right to render merciful
verdicts, or who even opposed such verdicts, nonetheless described the jury's role in terms
that may have seemed to leave room for such discretion. See [Giles Duncombe] Tryals Per
Pais: or the Law of.England Concerning Juries by Nisi Prius, etc., By S. E. (2nd ed., rev.,
London, 1682). The first edition of this tract, signed S. E. [Samson Euer] contains little
commentary on the scope of the criminal trial jury's power. In Duncombe's 1682 edition
there is a commentary on Bushel's Case at pp. 441 et seq.: "[A]nd that question which has
made such a noise, viz. whether a jury is fineable for going against their evidence in court,
or the direction of the judge? I look upon that question, as dead and buried, since Bushel's
case, in my Lord Vaughan's reports" (p. 443). Duncombe then accurately deals with
Vaughan's opinion (pp. 444-45). He subsequently notes that juries may take the law unto
themselves where law and fact are joined, but concludes (unlike Vaughan) that if they
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Some, perhaps most, would have agreed that the jury's method of
applying the law was not always required to be absolutely mechanical.
Indeed, judges had long encouraged jury leniency in many cases involving
homicide or minor theft, a practice that continued, perhaps even increased, after the Restoration. It became commonplace to assert that the
jury ought to apply the law mercifully. Although in theory juries were to
apply the law as it was stated for them, in practice they applied the law to
conform to their own rough sense of justice. Only when, in a given case,
the bench deemed jury leniency inappropriate was the issue of jury
deviance raised. Vaughan's opinion in Bushel's Case, which Hawles and
Care took to address Kelyng's behavior in homicide cases as well as the
treatment of the jury in the case of Penn and Mead, thus strengthened the
jury's hand. Among the tract writers this right of merciful application of
the law became the most common "proof" of the jury's right to decide
law and fact "complicately."
At the other extreme was the most pronounced form of law deciding:
the right of the jury to determine whether the act with which a person was
charged constituted a crime. Here, according to some tract writers, the
jury's power and right were definitive. Neither the language of the
indictment nor the judge's direction should divert the jury's attention
from this duty. To pronounce guilt when one believed in conscience that
no true crime had been charged was to commit "murder." This argument
was also extended to grand juries where, in the light of the proceedings
against Shaftesbury, it was absorbed into the historical myth of the grand
jury as a shield against, rather than a sword of, the Crown. It merged also
with the older attack on the use of informations. Right to jury was right to
judgment by two lay bodies, mainly to provide a double check on fact but
also to prevent prosecutions for activity that was not truly criminal.
As we have seen, the tract writers urged juries to assess the words used
in indictments that made otherwise innocent acts criminal. Without
evidence of criminal malice or seditiousness there should be neither
indictment nor conviction. In the case of the petty jury, this argument is
complex; the series of propositions (which were never spelled out as
such) runs as follows. First, the jury was to decide law; i.e., it was to
decide whether as a general matter the act charged was criminal. Second,
the jury would decide fact; i.e., if the act was criminal, the jury would
mistake the law they run the danger of an attaint. Finally, Duncombe states that juries
"determine the law in all matters where issue is joined and tried, but [not] where the verdict
is special. ... [l]n such cases, the judge cannot of himself answer, or determine one particle
of the fact, but must leave it to the jury, with whom let it rest and continue forever, as the
best kind of trial in the world for finding out the truth, and the greatest safety of the just
prerogatives of the Crown, and the just liberties of the subject; and he who desires more for
either of them is an enemy to both" (pp. 447-48).
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determine whether the defendant had committed it. If (as the jury saw it)
the act charged was criminal only when committed with a certain intent,
the jury would determine whether the defendant had committed it with
that intent. This second, fact-finding stage, of course, could involve a
degree oflaw-finding. For, as stated above, in reaching its verdict the jury
would apply to the facts it had found the law as stated by the bench, but
in a manner dictated by considerations of mercy. So long as the bench
approved of the (merciful) verdict, this last form of law-finding was
assimilated to the mechanical application of the law as stated by the
bench.
The Stuart bench conceded, at least in theory, that it could not coerce
convictions. As of 1671, it conceded both in theory and in practice jury
finality concerning fact and concerning the application of the law to factwith one important proviso: that the jury apply the law as stipulated by
the bench. It would not tolerate, as a general matter, jury determination
of criminality; nor would the bench tolerate a "merciful" verdict if it
thought that the verdict disguised a rejection of the law as stated by the
bench. Instead, as we have seen, the bench retreated, where it could (and
where it felt it imperative), to the device of reserving to itself certain
"questions of law." And thus it was that in cases of seditious libel the
bench hoped by severely restricting the scope and nature of the facts to be
found to eliminate the jury's power to conceal law-finding within factfinding.
It was at just this point, however, that the Stuart bench suffered a major
setback, one that ensured that the Restoration legacy of the criminal trial
jury would be complex, confusing, and even contradictory, and that the
contest over the true meaning of Vaughan's opinion in Bushel's Case
would continue into the eighteenth century. This setback occurred on the
eve of the Glorious Revolution in the prosecution of the seven bishops
who refused to read James II's second Declaration of Indulgence. 232
When the bishops petitioned the Crown, stating their reasons for refusing
to read the Declaration, they were indicted for publishing a seditious
libel. Their trial focused the growing opposition-an opposition that
reached far into the political establishment-to James II's policies and
religion, and to the behavior of the Stuart bench during the preceding
decade.233 At the trial the bench badly divided on the question of whether
the bishops' petition was libelous and, hence, whether it implied mal232. Kenyon, Stuart Constitution, pp. 454-55; J. R. Jones, Country and Court: England,
1658-1714 (Cambridge, Mass., 1979), pp. 238-40; Clark, The Later Stuarts, p. 126; Hill,
Century of Revolution, pp. 198-99, 238-39.
233. State Trials, 12:183-434 (1688).
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ice. 234 In the end the jury was left to decide the issues of intent and
libelousness in the most highly charged political context possible. The
subsequent acquittal of the bishops was greeted with great celebrations,
and was taken to signal the victory of the jury as a bulwark of the
constitution against executive and judicial tyranny. It perhaps rekindled
memories of the appeals of the hapless Colledge and Fitz-Harris, seven
years before, to their juries as judges ''of law and fact.' ' 235 Momentarily,
at least, the Stuart regime had worked a fusion of the proponents of the<
radical law-finding position and much of the Whig establishment.
As we shall see, this final Restoration episode became a central event
for eighteenth-century constitutional and legal theorists. But it was an
event from which different persons could draw very different conclusions.
It perhaps reinforced the almost universally held view that jury verdicts
were final, but it in no way settled the question of the legitimacy of judicial
steering of juries that might otherwise find against manifest evidence:
most eighteenth-century observers believed that the jury had found the
facts correctly. Nor did the Seven Bishops' Case settle the question of the
doctrine of seditious libel. Virtually all commentators deemed that
doctrine dangerous, even illegitimate, when exercised by a "dependent"
bench, as, from the perspective afforded by the watershed of the Glorious
Revolution and the Act of Settlement of 1701, the Stuart bench seemed to
have been. But was the doctrine inherently wrong? Could not an
independent judiciary be entrusted to apply it fairly? 23 6 For many the jury
had proved itself a vital element during one stage in the development of
the constitution. Jury intervention, they concluded, had been a crucial
defense against tyranny; true it was that the jury might again play that
role, should England ever suffer at the hands of a tyrannical Crown and
bench, but such a retrograde development was (so they thought) unlikely
ever to recur.
For others, however, the right to jury trial meant the right to a jury
verdict on all the facts, including intent and seditiousness. A bench that
withheld that right was per se tyrannical. If the post-1689 bench pronounced the law of seditious libel in its original form, the jury ought to
reject that judicial pronouncement, for in such circumstances-and
possibly in some others-the jury had the right to decide law as well as
234. For a discussion of the Seven Bishops' Case, see below, Chapter 8, text at nn. 8-10.
235. Rex v. Colledge, State Trials, 8:694; Rex v. Fitzharris, State Trials, 8:377.
236. Hamburger (''Origins of the Law of Seditious Libel,'' pp. 88 et seq<) has shown that
the doctrine of seditious libel not only survived the Glorious Revolution but was thereafter
substantially broadened (to include "seditious" criticism of the government, not merely of
specific government officials; to include mere writing, whether or not publication was
intended); moreover, the de facto control of the bench over the question of libelousness
became de jure.
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fact. The legacy of the Restoration was thus severalfold. Though, as we
shall see, there emerged a settled division of authority between judge and
jury in routine cases, that division remained unresolved and problematic
in many political contests. Nor could these two kinds of cases remain
entirely separate. The two traditions of jury law-finding that passed on
into eighteenth-century thought and practice influenced each other in
important ways. Most significantly, the merciful discretion that survived
the Tudor transformation in criminal administration and that was safely
left to juries in common-run felonies (though it clearly went beyond
Vaughan's identification of "conscience" with a good-faith belief regarding fact) was bound to affect views regarding the legitimacy of true
nullification in prosecutions for seditious libel. 237

237. See below, Chapter 8.
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Jury Trial and Its Critics in the
Eighteenth Century

Between Bushel's Case and the late eighteenth century the English
criminal jury trial underwent little significant change. The first great
watershed in the history of trial practice was the development in Tudor
times of a formal prosecution; the second was the increasing recourse to
counsel and the development of a true law of evidence in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Perhaps the modern trial took
shape only in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the point at
which our present story ends. But if one searches in vain for dramatic
change in trial procedure, the eighteenth century does reveal developments both in the role of the criminal trial and the way in which
contemporaries thought about the jury. These two developments were
related, and it is mainly the history of that relationship that Part III
addresses. There are many strands to the history of jury trial, 1689-1800,
too many certainly to outline here. But the main ones can be set forth
briefly.
The eighteenth century saw a consolidation and rationalization of the
age-old practices that characterized the administration of the criminal law
generally and the role of the trial jury in particular. Building on developments of the preceding century, authorities brought jury practices further
under control even as they conceded the principle of the inviolability of
the general verdict. Although jury trial itself changed little, the context of
the trial altered significantly as authorities elaborated on the practical
approach to penology that had emerged almost accidentally in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The "selection" of offenders by
Crown, bench, and jury for one or another level of punishment became a
complex and, at times, an awe-inspiring ritual. Authorities were all the
readier to share the power of mitigation with juries in a system in which
most of the beneficiaries of mitigation suffered some substantial punishment.
As the jury's role in this evolving system of mitigation became
formalized, and in a sense tamed, that role expanded accordingly; but the
jury was now more than ever just one part of the system, and the scope
of its role in practice depended increasingly upon surrounding institutions
and procedures. So intrinsic was the jury to the officially sponsored
process of mitigation that many contemporary observers were either
267
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confused as to whether the judge or jury was in control or wrongly
concluded that the latter was the dominant of the two. As we shall see,
what contemporaries-especially those who wrote about the law or took
an active part in political debate-thought about the jury was of great
importance. We cannot always tell when they are exaggerating to make a
point or are simply seeing what they want to see, but it would be wrong
to dismiss their depiction of the jury as purely polemical. They provide
evidence of the contemporary understanding of the role and power of the
criminal trial jury.
Largely as a result of the reception of the Enlightenment tradition of
penology, some jurists and publicists began to criticize (albeit, often in
terms long employed in England) the prevailing administration of the
criminal law. Their writings reveal certain distinctively English habits of
thought that may have blunted the force of the reformers' message:
English reformers attempted to combine criticism of what they perceived
as ad hoc jury-based mitigation with endorsement of the long-standing
constitutional role of the jury as a bulwark against tyranny.
Moreover, as we shall see in Chapter 8, about the same time that doubts
arose concemingjury mitigation in common felonies, the jury emerged as
central in the debate over the law of seditious libel. In this important
noncapital, political offense the jury's role had been limited by legal
construction, and this limitation was attacked by pro-jury writers as
contrary to the English constitution and to the purpose of jury trial as a
protector of fundamental liberties. Authorities who had accepted and
encouraged jury-based mitigation in common-run felonies were hard
pressed to explain limitations upon the jury in political cases. In 1792, the
limitations were removed by a statute guaranteeing the general verdict in
seditious libel cases, but stating little in express terms about how juries
ought to employ the powers the general verdict conferred.
In the long run, the tradition of jury adherence to the letter of the law
was a product of the mounting campaign for legal reform. That campaign,
briefly surveyed by way of conclusion in Chapter 9, saw the repeal of
many of the capital felony statutes and the development of notions oflegal
certainty and of theories of deterrence that undermined the arguments for
jury-based mitigation. Not that such jury behavior came to a sudden and
complete termination. It remained (and still remains), but was practiced
far less frequently. When legal reform through a (perceived) democratic
process dismantled much of the capital law of felony that had been
created seven centuries before, jury deference to the letter of the law in
criminal cases became standard practice for the first time in English
history.
The eighteenth-century criminal trial has recently been described so
thoroughly and so well that only a brisk and derivative summary will be
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necessary in this chapter. 1 Of course there were, as there had always
been, many different kinds of crimes and, hence, many different contexts
for criminal trials in the eighteenth century. We shall pay most attention
to theft, by far the most common offense tried at the eighteenth-century
assizes. Not only was theft common, but mitigation of the capital sanction
for theft was both commonplace and the subject of commentary in trial
accounts, pardon records, and the professional and lay literature of the
day. Mitigation of the law of homicide continued, though it was less often
commented upon. As we shall see in the following chapter, much of the
attention to jury behavior in the diminishing number of homicide trials
arose from the political offense of seditious libel, not out of routine
felonies. Suffice it to say that we are here mainly concerned with
extremely common and open mitigation of the law, practices whichjuries
by and large did not hide from themselves, the bench, or society at large.
These instances of mitigation were easily separated from cases in which
there was substantial doubt about the level of offense that had been
proved in court, for they were quite evidently simple rejections of the
prescribed sanction.
We shall also leave aside such obvious instances of nullification (even
where the facts were clear) as that practiced in prosecutions for rape and
infanticide. These cases, though important, were relatively rare and had
little visible impact upon widespread attitudes toward jury practices.
However, the attitudes toward jury behavior that were shaped by trials
for property crimes may have influenced social views toward such
practices in other kinds of cases. In this sense, I am dealing very broadly
with the phenomenon of jury intervention. But this suggestion remains
tentative; the important differences among offenses, and among attitudes
toward them, require much further study.
1. See generally Langbein, "Criminal Trial before the Lawyers" and "Shaping the
Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: The View from the Ryder Sources," Chicago Law
Review, vol. 50 (1983), pp. 1-136. Langbein's studies provide the most comprehensive and
trenchant analyses in print of the relationship between criminal procedure, the law of
evidence, and jury control. See also Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedure"; Beattie,
"Crime and the Courts in Surrey," in Cockburn, ed., Crime in England, pp. 164-74; and see
Beattie's forthcoming book on the administration of the criminal law in the eighteenth
century, Crime and the Courts in England, 1660-1800 (Princeton, 1985). My own account
draws heavily on Langbein, Baker, and Beattie. I have cited them for statements regarding
procedural details that my own research on eighteenth-century trial accounts have borne
out. I am grateful to Professor Beattie for allowing me to read, cite, and comment upon his
forthcoming book. Citations (to manuscript chapters only) appear in the footnotes to this
study. In the main, I have cited Professor Beattie's published articles. For an account of
Restoration London and Middlesex criminal-trial resolutions see Valerie C. Edwards,
"Criminal Equity in Restoration London and Middlesex" (paper presented at the Sixth
British Legal History Conference, University of East Anglia, Norwich, July, 1983).
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The phenomenon of jury-based mitigation that I discuss was of particular importance because of its visibility, especially to those who commented upon jury behavior. It framed the issue for later generations who
depended upon the works of London reformers and polemicists. In the
countryside there were, doubtless, other traditions. Jury repudiation of
the law as it applied to poachers and the like was an important aspect of
contemporary culture, as were attempts by the government to pack and
influence juries before whom such offenders were brought to trial. Many
common-run cases thus took on the form of "political" prosecutions, at
least in the understanding of much of the population. The impact of these
prosecutions on contemporary views regarding the jury is difficult to
trace, though some historians have made important headway. Suffice it to
say that the absence of these episodes from my account in part reflects the
fact that the attitudes they engendered were infrequently assimilated into
contemporary accounts of the jury and in part reflects the limitations of
my study.
Section I of this chapter summarizes the changes in criminal administration that variously affected the continuing practice of jury-based
intervention in felony cases. In section II, I elaborate upon the jury's role,
but mainly upon the contemporary understanding of that role. Those
topics are further discussed from a different angle in section III, which
analyzes the criticism of selective enforcement by some reform-minded
publicists in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Section IV puts the
developments discussed in this essay in perspective and suggests the
ways in which one might interpret both the acquiescence of authorities in
the prevailing system of criminal administration and the mounting attack
on that system.

I
Trial procedure in the eighteenth century still bore a close resemblance
to the model sketched in the sixteenth century by Thomas Smith. The
most distinctive aspects of trial were the defendant's self-representation
in full sight of the jury and the presentation of witness testimony largely
ungoverned by rules of admissibility. The most dramatic moments of trial
were those of relatively unmediated confrontation between the accuser,
who still bore the expense and responsibility of setting forth the case for
the prosecution, and the accused, who, until late in the century only
occasionally had the advantage of counsel.Z The judge remained in the
2. As late as 1771, William Eden could still say of the trial: "[T]he whole examination is
rather in the nature of a discussion between the parties, than of a prosecution against an
undefended, oppressed individual." Principles of Penal Law (London, 1771), p. 219. For
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foreground, putting his own questions; he had no reservations about
revealing his point of view. As in the past, the judge's directions to the
jury were brief, but pointed and leading, if not coercive.3 Also as in the
past, the jurors, drawn mainly from the artisans, tradesmen, and small
farmers who composed the lower-middling ranks of society, deliberated
briefly and reached verdicts that largely accorded with the views of the
bench. 4
There were of course some changes which, although mostly minor, may
have influenced the outcome of some cases. Thus, it appears the Crown
set out its entire case through the private prosecutor and his witnesses
before the defendant spoke, so that any argument between accused and
accusers came relatively late in the trial. 5 Moreover, in the early eighteenth century the judge played an even more active role than before in
questioning the defendant on the basis of evidence presented in open
court. The bench also gave increasingly more complex instructions, as
rudiments of the law of evidence took shape and as the increasing use of
witnesses produced more evidence upon which to comment. 6 Finally,
development of rules of evidence see Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 8. For discussion
of the emergence of defense counsel in routine felony cases see idem; Langbein, "Criminal
Trial before the Lawyers," pp. 307-14.
3. Langbein, "Criminal Trial before the Lawyers," p. 284.
4. Beattie (Crime and the Courts, ch. 8) analyzed the social and economic status of jurors
at the Surrey assizes. I have drawn here upon his study, which is the only analysis of
eighteenth-century jury composition I have seen. ·Other studies of this sort are now being
undertaken; they are, I believe, unlikely to alter Beattie's conclusions significantly.
Beattie's findings suggest that jury composition-which is not to say jury attitudes or the
judge-jury relationship-had not substantially changed since the late seventeenth century.
Beattie also argues, however (idem), that the jury qualification statute of 1730 (Stat. 3 Geo.
2, c. 25) was intended to insure a steadier flow of jurors from the lower-middling groups in ·
society. Jury service became a more respectable activity (a response, perhaps, to the
upgrading of the grand jury); the Crown relied on fewer, hence more experienced persons,
individuals drawn from the higher ranks of the very large class of persons that remained the
target of summons for trial jury service.
5. Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedure," p. 38. Although the olderform of altercation
continued in some instances, the characterization here represents the main trend. This is
reflected in the trial accounts known as The Old Bailey Sessions Papers (O.B.S.P.). For
most of the eighteenth century, these accounts were formally entitled, The Proceedings of
the Sessions of the Peace, and Oyer and Terminer, for the City of London and the County
of Middlesex. Nearly complete runs of the O.B.S.P. are in the British Library and the
Library of the Guildhall, London. Langbein, "Criminal Trial before the Lawyers," pp.
267-72, describes these trial accounts. Similar patterns are evidenced in the records of
Surrey assizes for this period. See Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 8. Practice in and near
London may in some respects have differed from practice elsewhere, but it is likely that the
changes I have noted fairly rapidly became general throughout England.
6. I base this statement on a review of the O.B.S.P. for the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. Langbein is now working on the rise of the law of evidence and its
effects on trial procedure and on judge-jury relations.
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juries in the late decades of the seventeenth century heard a large number
of cases before retiring; thereafter, at least on some circuits, they
deliberated after each case, and often they did not actually retire.?
Some of these developments may have made the jurors' task more
difficult. Although the production of evidence was more organized, the
separation of accusation and denial meant that testimony that went
unanswered may have been either forgotten or given too much weight. s
Then, too, the open "altercation" of an earlier day, while putting some
defendants so much on the defensive that their nervousness counted too
heavily against them, may have at least revealed telling emotions that now
remained hidden. And though the increasing diffuseness of testimony may
have been mitigated by the judge's commentary,9 judges had for long
commented upon the evidence; more witness testimony meant more
commentary for the jury to digest. By the same token some jurors
obviously had trouble keeping straight the complex array of defendants,
evidence, rebuttals, and commentary put before them. 1o As a result the
most experienced jurors, probably including the foreman, exercised
significant influence over their fellow jurors in the brief discussion of each
case. 11 But these differences in practice were subtle; there is no reason to
believe that they initiated or reflected a new era in the history of trial by
jury.Jz
If the eighteenth-century felony trial differed from that of two centuries
before, it was because changes external to trial procedure had a palpable
7. Beattie, "Crime and the Courts in Surrey," p. 174. Beattie concluded that in Surrey
juries "do not appear to have found it necessary to withdraw very often." See Beattie,
Crime and the Courts in England, ch. 8.
8. For a description of standard trial practice see The Complete Juryman: or, A
Compendium of the Laws relating to Jurors (London, 1752), p. 158. The prosecutors first
examined the witnesses produced against the defendant, then the defendant cross-examined
them; the defendant next examined his own witnesses and the prosecutors cross-examined
them.
9. See M. Grosley, A Tour to London; or, New Observations on England, and Its
Inhabitants (London, trans. 1772; orig. published 1765), p. 145. Grosley attended a trial in
King's Bench. His account, which must be used with caution, states that the judge
"summed up to the jury the whole charge, and the result of the depositions"; see also
Francois de Ia Rochefoucauld, A Frenchman in England, 1784 (1784; trans. and annot. by
S. C. Roberts, London, 1933), p. 126.
10. Beattie found that in Surrey although the same jury heard a half dozen (or so) cases,
verdicts were rendered after each case. Crime and the Courts, ch. 8.
11. Beattie (idem) states that typically one panel of about fifteen jurors handled all the
cases at eighteenth century Surrey assizes. Several members of each dozen sworn to sit on
a given case had served at a previous assize. One must consider, too, that jurors became
"experienced" in the course of a single assize, after serving in many cases.
12. This view must remain tentative until the extant trial reports have been fully
analyzed.
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impact on the ways in which that procedure was employed and on the
patterns of resolution that emerged from it. It is necessary to identify
these changes before asking, in the following section, how the criminal
trial jury functioned (and was thought to function) in practice.
Although the development of a formal law of evidence in criminal cases
is difficult to discern before the late eighteenth century, judicial notions
regarding both the nature of evidence and the appropriate standard for
proof of guilt may have been changing in important ways over the course
of the seventeenth century. It has been argued that seventeenth-century
transformations in scientific theory affected juristic modes of thought, and
these new conceptions are reflected not only in legal writings but also in
judicial charges. 13 These developments paralleled or followed the decline
of the self-informingjury. It was the practice of judicial summing up of the
evidence proffered by witnesses that provided the opportunity for the
bench to comment upon the degree of certainty or probability that jurors
must accord certain elements of testimony before finding the defendant
guilty. More often than not the bench mainly stressed the weight that it
itself accorded testimony, but its reasoning in this regard often was
revealed in judicial recommendations to the jury . 14
We have seen that the Restoration bench sometimes invoked the
principle of verdict according to conscience. 15 This principle took a
variety of forms. It is hard to discern in it reference to a specific standard
of proof, but clearly it carried the implications that jurors must act upon
their own beliefs and that they must be fully satisfied that their beliefs
were supported by the great weight of the testimony. Scroggs invoked the
principle when he himself doubted the evidence; Rawles invoked it in the
course of exhorting jurors to assess all the evidence, not just those
elements or facts that the bench ruled appropriate for determination by
the jury. These were special circumstances, of course, but they contrib13. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England, ch. 5; see also·
Shapiro, "Theories of Knowledge and English Juries" (paper read at the American
Historical Association Convention, Dec., 1984). I am grateful to Professor Shapiro for
allowing me to cite her paper. Shapiro argues: "The traditional 'satisfied conscience'
standard had initially been a rather vague notion employed because the jury was on oath. It
became the vessel into which was poured the new learning about criteria for evaluating facts
and testimony. 'Satisfied conscience' gradually became synonymous with rational belief"
(p. 8). Shapiro identifies the new standard ("satisfied belief") with the "beyond reasonable
doubt" standard (p. 12) that was frequently employed in the late eighteenth century; "[i]ts
introduction caused no comment, precisely because it was consistent with notions of
'belief,' 'satisfied conscience,' and 'moral certainty' as employed in and out of the
courtroom" since the seventeenth century (p. 13).
14. Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 8.
15. See above, Chapter 6, text at nn. 201-4.
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uted to a perspective on fact-finding that eighteenth-century concern with
rules of evidence-hearsay and the like-greatly enhanced.
We cannot know the impact of these developments on jury fact-finding
in routine cases. Probably they counted for something in important
political cases, especially in the light of statutory reference to "credible"
testimony in cases of treason. 16 But the concern among jurists with
scientific assessment of evidence may have made itself felt more generally. Judges as well as juries had long been inclined to mitigate the law of
sanctions in many capital cases. As we shall see, eighteenth-century
legislation greatly increased the scope of offenses for which death was at
least a potential sanction, thereby expanding the universe of cases subject
to the process of selection of the worst offenders. Eighteenth-century
commentators often remarked upon the tendency of the bench to advise
jurors that conviction of capital felony required something close to
absolute certainty of guilt. 17 An extremely high standard of proof (which
was a very important source of the traditional presumption of innocence)
was one-though only one-of the devices that were central to the regime
of mitigation.
There were, then, several sources for the increasing concern with the
standard of proof, the last-mentioned being the oldest and the most
significant. Restoration advances in scientific theory can't be discounted,
but they should be seen as having provided a more modern intellectual
approach to longstanding practice. Their impact upon the emerging law of
evidence is palpable, but it was nonetheless indirect, making itself felt via
the catalysts of politics and, most important, the administration of a
criminal law based upon mercy as well as terror.
From 1671, judges were precluded from actually coercing jurors to
return a conviction. For a time some judges may have broken the spirit,
if not the letter, of the ruling in Bushel's Case, but for the most part
straightforward coercion disappeared from the English courts. 18 Strictly
speaking, the ruling directly altered trial practice in only a negative
sense-something only occasionally done, or even threatened, was no
longer allowed. Indirectly, however, the constraints imposed by Bushel's
Case may have altered practice by intensifying the bench's inclination to
apply more subtle forms of influence at every point in the trial.J9
Although the petty jury remained relatively uncontrolled, the grand
jury did not. By the mid-eighteenth century it was finding true bills in 85
16.
17.
18.
19.

Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England, p. 190.
See below, nn. 58-59 and accompanying text.
See above, Chapter 6, section IV.
See Langbein, "Criminal Trial before the Lawyers," passim.
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to 90 percent of all capital cases. 2o These figures no doubt reflected the
development of the prosecution and especially of pretrial examinations. 21
The evidence that a case existed against the accused was usually too
strong for the grand jury to return an ignoramus; the commotion over the
packing of grand juries during the Restoration represented a momentary
turnabout in highly charged political cases long after the grand jury had,
from the Crown's point of view, come to be "reliable" in common-run
felonies. 22 The benefit of the doubt went to the prosecution at the
grand jury stage. Lay prosecutors possessed greater powers than before,
once their complaints were moved before the justices. A sinceresounding accusation was bound to go a long way. False accusations,
whether malicious or merely mistaken, were now less effectively filtered.23 Although the grand jury might undervalue goods in order to indict
a suspect for only petty larceny, in general it is fair to say that if the
community was going to play a significant role, increasingly it would have
to play it at a later stage.
At the very moment that relatively pro forma grand jury proceedings
were placing greater strain on postindictment institutions of mitigation,
the scope of capital felony was expanding.24 Most of the new laws
concerned the taking or destruction of property;z5 many of them did little
more than remove the right to benefit of clergy for offenses that had long
before been capital at common law. The genesis ofthis legislation is little
understood, 26 but some of its effects are well known. The capital statutes
empowered property owners, small as well as large, to put at risk the lives
of ever greater numbers of Englishmen. These laws may have increased
20. Beattie, "Crime and the Courts in Surrey," p. 163; Baker, "Criminal Courts and
Procedure," p. 20. See Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 7. Beattie found that Surrey grand
juries (1660-1800) rejected 11.5 percent of capital property crime accusations and 15 percent
of homicide accusations.
21. For an important study of developments in mid-eighteenth-century pretrial policing
and prosecutorial practices see Langbein, "Shaping the Eighteenth Century Criminal
Trial."
22. See above, Chapter 6, n. 225 and accompanying text. Beattie (Crime and the Courts,
ch. 8) shows that this episode had the effect of upgrading the status of grand jurors.
23. Accusations made under oath had to go forward from the magistrate for grand jury
consideration; by the mid-eighteenth century, magistrates exercised discretion regarding
accusations not made under oath. See Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 2.
24. This development has its roots in the sixteenth-century statutes limiting eligibility for
benefit of clergy. See above, Chapter 4, text at nn. 42-50.
25. See e.g. E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters (New York, 1975), for a study of one
such act, The Waltham Black Act [Stat. 9 Geo. I, c. 22 (1723)).
26. See John Styles, "Criminal Records," Historical Journal, vol. 20, (1977), p. 980;
G. R. Elton, "Introduction: Crime and the Historian," in Cockburn, ed., Crime in England,
pp. 4-5; John H. Langbein, "Albion's Fatal Flaws," Past and Present, no. 98 (1983), pp.
115-19. See also Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 5.
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the problems of enforcement by further burdening already overbusy
courts and swelling the numbers of those who were ultimately punished at
less than the prescribed level of sanction. Also, in a more subtle way, the
new statutes occasionally influenced the criminal trial: judges were
required to interpret the statutes, and this was sometimes reflected in the
length and technicality ofjudicial charges. Frequently the bench sought to
confine the statutes, so that narrow construction of the criminal law
became a common form of mitigation.27
Even more pronounced was the rapid increase in the practice of
undervaluation of stolen property. Medieval in origin, and common
enough in Tudor-Stuart times, undervaluation became a major form of
resolution during the eighteenth century.zs Its prominence resulted from
the coincidence of the multiplication of capital statutes for property
offenses, many of which precluded clergy except in cases of minor theft,
and the creation of a new lesser sanction, transportation. Transportation
had been in use episodically from around 1600, but not until the early
eighteenth century was it statutorily prescribed for a wide range of
offenses. 29 Very soon it became a catchall for most of those defendants
who had committed capital theft but whom the Crown, bench, or jury
desired to spare. In effect, transportation had come largely to replace
clergy (in the form of branding and discharge), serving both as a
prescribed sanction and as a safety valve where mercy was deemed
appropriate. 30
27. Douglas Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law," in D. Hay et al., eds.,
Albion's Fatal Tree (New York, 1975), p. 32; Leon Radzinowicz, A History of Criminal Law
and Its Administration from 1750, 4 vols. (London, 1948-68), vol. 1, pp. 25-28, 83-91,
97-103.
28. See the figures in Beattie, "Crime and the Courts in Surrey," pp. 175-79. "Partial
verdicts," where a verdict of guilty on the indictment as framed would have meant death
unless bench or Crown interceded, involved characterizing the value of the goods stolen as
less than twelve pence (petty larceny) or as more than twelve pence but less than whatever
amount the relevant statute prescribed as the threshold for capital felony. (It might also
involve characterizing the circumstances of the offense in such a way as, e.g., to convert a
burglary into clergyable larceny). See also Jerome Hall, Theft, Law and Society (2nd ed.,
New York, 1952), pp. 139-41; Radzinowicz, History of Criminal Law, 1:94-97.
29. Stat. 4 Geo. 1. c. 11 (1718). The statute allowed the bench to sentence convicts to
transportation for seven years in cases of clergyable felony and petty larceny. See Beattie,
"Crime and the Courts," p. !58; Cockburn, History of English Assizes, p. 130; Langbein,
Torture and the Law of Proof(Chicago, 1977), pp. 39-44, and works cited in accompanying
notes. See also Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 10, for an excellent account of the
pre-1718 experiments with transportation and the legislative history of the statute. Beattie's
work on the history of punishment, 1660-1800, constitutes a major step forward in the
history of the administration of the criminal law.
30. Beattie (Crime and the Courts, ch. 10) points out that before transportation came into
general use juries were urged to convict of petty larceny, for which the punishment was
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By the middle decades of the eighteenth century the apparatus for
sifting defendants tried on capital charges-a process that Beattie aptly
characterizes as one of "selection" 31 -had become fairly complex. Some
defendants were acquitted outright; others were convicted, condemned,
and hanged because of the seriousness of their offenses and "as a terror
to others. " 32 Many capital defendants were saved by undervaluation or a
"finding" of simple larceny instead of burglary (either on the jury's own
action or because of judicial advice to the jury), and thus were convicted
of an offense for which transportation or whipping were the prescribed
sanctions. Still others, having been convicted of a capital offense, looked
to the bench for relief. Of these, a very few were saved by appeal and
retrial, or by a legal ruling, the verdict notwithstanding, by King's Bench
or by the trial court itself. 33 Many more were granted judicial reprieves,
thus securing time to petition the king for mercy in the form either of
pardon on condition of transportation or of outright pardon. The bench
played an important role regarding these posttrial petitions. At the close
of every session the judges sent to the Council or Home Office letters
containing the names of those they thought ought to be spared.3 4
whipping, rather than simple grand larceny, which was clergyable. Thus what appears to be
greater mercy was in fact conviction of the lesser offense that carried the harsher
punishment. After passage of the 1718 transportation statute, recourse to petty larceny
declined and conviction for simple grand larceny became more common.
31. Beattie, "Crime and the Courts in Surrey," p. 171.
32. See e.g. SP 37/5, fols. 98v-99 (1766), Mr. Justice Perrott's letter to the Council
recommending a convict not be saved: "I beg leave to certify that the law upon which this
man was indicted had for its object the protection and security of the industrious poor who
are obliged to labour for their bread abroad and are therefore daily liable to be stripped of
all their honest labour has furnished them with and once stripped of that are little able to
replace it. An act founded upon such principles I thought should not become a dead letter
but that an example should be made as a terror to others and to give a very valuable part of
his majesty's subjects that protection and security intended by the law." See also Bernard
de Mandeville, An Enquiry into the Causes of the Frequent Executions at Tyburn (London,
1725), p. 36: "[I]t is not the death of those poor souls that is chiefly aimed at in executions,
but the terror we would have it strike in others of the same loose principles"; Henry
Fielding, An Enquiry into the Causes of the late increase of Robbers, etc. (London, 1751),
p. 264: "The terror of the example is the only thing proposed, and one man is sacrificed to
the preservation of thousands .... If therefore the terror of this example is removed (as it
certainly is by frequent pardons) the design of the law is rendered totally ineffectual"; Sir
Samuel Romilly, below, n. 120 and accompanying text.
33. Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedure," pp. 45-48.
34. This was a continuation, and expansion, of a procedure that dates from at least the
sixteenth century. In the eighteenth century, judges are mentioned frequently in State
Papers (e.g. SP 36/113, fols. 5, 15, 78). After the mid-1780s, these circuit letters are grouped
in the Home Office records (e.g. HO 6, 2/23; 4/23; 7/15; 12/58). For discussion of judicial
requests for pardons see below, nn. 48-53 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion
of pardon procedure and practice see Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 9.
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Frequently the judges received requests from the Council or Home Office
for supporting data, both in the cases that the judges had moved and in
others moved by the defendant or by his employer, friends, or kin. 35 In
many of these latter cases, the trial judge recommended against clemency, which presumably doomed the defendant.
The jury was only one of several sources of mitigation, and even then
many of its merciful verdicts were encouraged-practically commanded-by the bench. But it was more active in this regard than it had
been since medieval times, and much of the mitigation it practiced had
taken on a kind of legitimacy it had not possessed before. There was now
more law and more prosecution, and thus greater reliance on jury or
postverdict determination of whether someone who had committed a
nominally capital offense actually ought to hang. The trend was not new,
but frequency of practice conditioned concepts of legitimacy, and these
concepts in turn shaped society's understanding of the eighteenth-century
criminal trial.

II
Although there can be no doubt that the jury was one of many
institutions of mitigation, it is difficult to determine the degree of
independence jurors had, or believed they had, in reaching verdicts of a
discretionary nature. Langbein has shown that long after Bushel's Case
the bench retained a number of devices that assured it control over the
jury. The bench commented on the evidence and embodied such commentary in instructions that sometimes read like recommendations. 36 The
bench could withdraw a case before it went to the jury in order to allow
time for the gathering of more and better evidence;37 its sense of timing in
this regard was relatively acute because there was now more frequent
exchange between judge and jury, or between jury and trial participants,
that revealed the jury's view of the case. 38 The jury might be made to
disclose its reasons for finding for or against the defendant, and the judge
could send the jury back for further discussion if he thought the reasons
insufficiently grounded on the evidence presented. 39 Thus the bench
35. See e.g. SP 36/115, fol. 24; SP 36/116, fol. 105.
36. Langbein, "Criminal Trial before the Lawyers," pp. 284-87. See also H. Misson,
Memoirs and Observations in his Travels over England (London, trans. 1719; written 1698),
p. 328: "[O]ne of the judges makes a discourse upon all that has been said, recapitulates the
discourses pro and con, weighs and considers all things, draws his conclusions, and declares
to the jury, that conformably to the laws of the country they ought to bring it in so and so."
37. Langbein, "Criminal Trial before the Lawyers," pp. 287-89.
38. See O.B.S.P., passim.
39. Langbein, "Criminal Trial before the Lawyers," pp. 289-96. In a few early modem
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possessed the means for achieving practical control of juries. Had judges
employed those means frequently, the tradition of jury independence in
common-run felonies would have diminished substantially. In fact, as
Langbein would agree, only the first device-comment on the evidence,
containing strong hints of the judge's view of the appropriate outcomewas a common feature of eighteenth-century criminal trials. To a significant degree, however, judicial comment allowed the bench to achieve
the modest control it felt necessary and appropriate to exercise. For there
was, in any case, little area of real disagreement between judge and jury
over the outcome of most trials.
In light of the power that the bench possessed to control the jury, it is
striking to consider the actual fate of defendants. Acquittal and conviction
rates varied from decade to decade and from place to place, but Beattie's
figures for Surrey, 1736-53, would seem a typical set of jury verdicts. 4o
Beattie found that defendants charged with capital property crimes were
treated, in roughly equal numbers, in one of three ways. One third were
found guilty of the capital charge; one third were acquitted; and one third
were convicted on a lesser, or ''partial,'' charge, e.g., either petty larceny
or simple (noncapital) grand larceny. Of those found guilty of the capital
charge, only one half were hanged; the remainder were pardoned on
condition of being transported. Of those granted partial verdicts, 85
percent were transported. The remainder were whipped or imprisoned, or
were discharged after successfully claiming benefit of clergy. Thus, of the
total tried for capital property offenses, some 15-20 percent were hanged,
at least 40 percent were ordered to be transported, and perhaps 40 percent
were not punished at all beyond pretrial incarceration and any posttrial
stigma that might have attached.
If there was a trend across the entire period, it was toward fewer actual
executions, fewer outright acquittals, and more transportations (followed
later in the century by more terms of imprisonment at hard labor). The
assumption that offenders ought to be punished and reformed became
more general; the willingness to take life long remained constant, then
trials the judges accepted the jury's verdict of acquittal and urged a surviving kinsman to
appeal the suspect. See Ernst, "Moribund Appeal of Death," pp. 177-80.
40. Beattie, "Crime and the Courts in Surrey," pp. 179-81. See also Beattie's Crime and
the Courts, which contains far more complete statistical tables than those he has previously
published. In his book, Beattie details the fluctuations and long-term changes in the patterns
of resolutions. He links these to specific events, prevailing social perceptions of crime, and
changes in attitudes toward treatment of human beings. Beattie also demonstrates that the
figures varied substantially as between the "old" (more serious) capital offenses and the
"new" (less serious ones). See Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 9 and table 9.4.
Langbein's figures for mid-century Old Bailey cases are similar ("Albion's Fatal Flaws," p.
106).
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dramatically receded. Although in percentage terms no more individuals
were executed in the early eighteenth century than in earlier times-the
20 percent figure remains the typical figure across the half-dozen centuries
we have studied-the alternative sanction, transportation, was considerably more punishing than the alternative sanctions resorted to in the past,
pardons and clergy.
The new regime of mitigation must be distinguished in yet another way
from its predecessors. In the medieval period, property crimes at the
capital level might be reported as petty larceny by the grand jury,
pardoned before trial, or mitigated through acquittal by the trialjury.4 1 It
is difficult to determine what percentage of the many trial jury acquittals
were in the nature of merciful verdicts. There is little indication that the
medieval bench encouraged merciful acquittals; such verdicts remained
hidden and, at most, tolerated. In the later Middle Ages, the grand jury
was brought under greater control, but pretrial pardons were plentiful and
benefit of clergy was extended to an ever larger number of persons,
reducing the number of cases in which the jury's verdict was of great
importance. The sixteenth-century statutes removing many property
crimes from benefit of clergy brought the jury once again to the fore: the
practice of undervaluing goods or of convicting the defendant of a form of
theft that was still clergyable became far more common than it had been
in the medieval period. The jury could preclude capital punishment
without granting a full acquittal, though not entirely at will since the
bench might still exercise its power to deny that the defendant was truly
literate. As we have seen, the bench often encouraged jury undervaluations (and other forms of ''partial'' verdicts) and thus helped to initiate the
practice that came to dominate jury trials by the eighteenth century. 42
Although this practice had increased in the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries, it was the statutory provision for transportation in
many property offenses that made it standard form after 1718. The
novelty, of course, lay in the creation of a largely jury-administered
scheme of mitigation that was legitimated both by the complicity of the
bench and by the reality of some substantial punishment for those who
were its beneficiaries.
Within this evolving scheme of mitigation numerous factors induced
acquittals and partial verdicts. Judicial recommendations to the jury
often, though by no means always, were based on the quantum of
evidence against the accused. The bench demanded that proof be virtually
absolute before the jury convicted at a capital level. 43 Where such proof
41. See above, Chapter 2, section II.
42. See above, Chapter 4, text at n. 176.
43. See below, nn. 58-59 and accompanying text. Judges frequently reprieved defendants
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was lacking the bench recommended a form of mitigation that was
"principled," i.e., in accordance with the evidence that had been
adduced, but its recommendations in this regard were virtually always
also conditioned by prevailing notions regarding the seriousness of the
offense or its assessment of the character of the defendant. 44 In many
instances, neither judge nor jury was disposed to give full expression to a
newly minted capitallaw. 45 In others, the law itself was not nullified, but
a defendant who had stolen only marginally more than the threshold
amount was treated in the same way as one who had stolen just a little
less. The circumstances surrounding the defendant's act were also taken
into account. Although the earliest statutes precluding clergy singled out
accompanying circumstances that society had long considered especially
heinous, many later ones did not; some of these latter statutes merely
lowered the capital amount in offenses that did not involve physical threat
or assault. In prosecutions under such statutes evidence regarding surrounding circumstances became critical-not for the purpose of exonerating the defendant entirely, but for treating him mercifully.
Almost inevitably many partial verdicts were the result of a combination of circumstantial considerations and considerations touching the
defendant's background and character~ Character witnesses played a
complicated and significant role. At trial their purpose was to exonerate
the defendant, to testify that he was of such good reputation that he could
not be presumed to have committed the offense with which he was
charged. 46 In their charges to juries, judges may have treated such
testimony mainly in this regard, but witnesses served also to support the
defendant's plea for mercy after conviction. Juries may have had difficulty keeping these different roles separate, and it is even possible that
the behavior of the bench encouraged the jury to confuse them. Judges
counseled partial verdicts on the basis of such testimony even when it was
clear that the defendant had committed the act in question. Moreover, the
bench did so not only where the offense was trivial but also in more
serious cases where the witnesses testified that the defendant was of good
they believed ought not to have been convicted on the evidence. And see e.g. SP 36/113, fol.
121: because "the whole [case] depending upon one single witness," the judge recommended commutation to transportation for fourteen years (1751); SP 36/115, fol. 34:
"because the evidence was not sufficient in law to convict him of the offence," the judge
recommended transportation for fourteen years (1751); see also HO 47/5, no. 5: because of
the "great doubt thrown on this case ... perhaps [the defendants] should be transported to
some place with a more favorable climate than their present destination of Africa" (1786).
I am grateful to Elizabeth Clark for this last reference.
44. See Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 9; Langbein, "Shaping the EighteenthCentury Criminal Trial," pp. 26--30.
45. Beattie, "Crime and the Courts in Surrey," p. 172.
46. See Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law," p. 42.
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character or had been in straitened circumstances or misled by others.47
Although juries sometimes convicted with a recommendation for mercy ,48
the bench did not always attempt entirely to sever the question of guilt
from the matter of appropriate sanction by first securing a conviction and
then undertaking to exercise mercy judicially. In practice, the bench did
not seek a monopoly over the practice of mitigation. Rather, it tolerated
and implicitly legitimated the age-old jury practice of mitigation without
always setting clear standards for the jury regarding the weight to be given
to any of a number of considerations that paraded as evidence. 4 9
Assessment of guilt by the jury, as well as consideration of postsentence
reprieve by the bench, was frequently made into a test, in the most
general sense, of the defendant's just deserts.
The specific considerations upon which a given jury acted when it
acquitted a defendant or rendered a partial verdict on other than strictly
legally prescribed grounds are seldom revealed to the reader of extant
trial accounts. Some conclusions about typical reasons for mitigation can
of course be drawn. Mitigation was common, for instance, where the
evidence was not "absolute," or where the defendant had stolen little
more than the capital amount. (Some offenses were so systematically
treated as though they were not capital that the interesting question is not,
Why were most such offenders spared? but, Why were the very few
unlucky ones singled out?) The details of mitigating circumstances and
the constituents of "good character," however, often remain unclear.
One is forced to extrapolate from letters and petitions in cases where the
defendant had been condemned, but where judge, jury, or others urged
47. Beattie, "Crime and the Courts in Surrey," pp. 171-73. In his excellent synopsis
Beattie does not focus on the jury's perspective and perhaps understates the degree to which
jury acquittals and partial verdicts were impressionistic and based on a mixture of motives
that not even the jurors themselves. were pressed to sort out.
48. See e.g. SP 36/113, fol. 76 (1750): Mr. Justice Burnet's report to Council: "The jury
found the prisoner guilty; but at the same time desired that I would represent him as an
object of mercy upon condition of transportation"; SP 36/113, fol. 78: Michael Foster wrote:
"The jury recommended [the convict] to mercy, and I reprieved him"; SP 36/116, fol. 150
(1751): "The jury after the business of the day was over came in a body to the bar and
recommended the prisoner to mercy, out of regard to his youth."
49. The intermixing of different kinds of reasons for extending mercy at the postconviction stage is reflected in a letter to the Council from Mr. Newton Ikin, recommending mercy
for a convict who foiled a conspiracy to murder his gaoler [evidently while waiting for a
reprieve after being sentenced to hang]: "These facts may possibly have some weight if Mr.
Perrott [Baron and Judge] which it is expected he will, should make an unfavorable report
to his majesty, for he refused the sheriff the favor of a reprieve for [the defendant]. His
sentence I find to be generally thought severe, as the burglary was not positively proved, and
the felony he was convicted of was no more than a cotton handkerchief of a very small
value." SP 37/5, fol. 88 (1766). (Perrott did recommend carrying out the sentence,
apparently without knowing these additional details. See SP 37/5, fols. 98v-99).
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commutation and/or pardon. It is necessary to proceed with caution, for
matters thought relevant to postconviction clemency were not necessarily
persuasive with juries charged with finding the truth (or the just resolution) in the first place.
Although most of the extant petitions for pardons and commutations
date from the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, they were
abundant enough by the 1550s to indicate that the range of reasons for
which pardons were granted remained fairly constant from the midsixteenth to the mid-nineteenth century. 50 Judges' letters in support of
pardons often cite the petitions of the defendant's minister or substantial
neighbors.si To have the support of respectable members of the community to which the convict would ultimately return must have counted
for a great deal. It is not possible to determine how often the jurors had
known the views of such persons at the time of their deliberation. Drawn
from the county, though not necessarily from the hundred where the
offense occurred, some jurors may have known of the defendant's
reputation, and we must assume that juries took this kind of knowledge
into account in at least some cases resulting in mitigated verdicts. 52
From judges' letters it is apparent that in addition to the nature of the
offense itself, good character and previous behavior, youthfulness, submissiveness upon arrest, and evident remorsefulness weighed ·heavily
both with them and with juries. 5 3 The sentence that most beneficiaries of
50. See above, Chapter 4, n. 163 and accompanying text. This subject requires further
study. Although the stated reasons for pardons remained relatively constant, social attitudes
toward mercy must have changed over time. For a study of the Puritan ideas that informed
much social thinking about the role of mercy see Herrup, "Common Peace," ch. 6. See also
my comments below, Chapter 9.
51. E.g. SP 36/ll3, fol. 5 (1750): Thomas Birch, J., requested a free pardon for one
convicted of stealing a calf, because of "favorable circumstances" at the trial and because
he received a petition from the "minister, church wardens, overseers and principal
inhabitants of the parish wherein he resided"; SP 36/ll3, fol. 15 (1750): Mr. Baron Legge
seeks a free pardon for a defendant on whose behalf he "received a petition for principal
inhabitants of the parish wherein she resided"; SP 36/ll6, fol. 32 (1750): Mr. William Noel,
Chief Justice of Chester, sought commutation for a defendant for whom the prosecutor and
many of the defendant's neighbors spoke; SP 36/116, fol. 306: Sir Martin Wright (judge of
King's Bench) received a petition from "diverse of the better sort of the inhabitants of
Drayton, in Shropshire" that the defendant "may dwell amongst her neighbours again."
52. See above, Chapter 6, section IV, for discussion of the role of out-of-court
information. The argument for the jury's right to a noncoerced verdict was based in part on
out-of-court knowledge of the defendant's reputation. Although those making the argument
probably meant that this kind of knowledge was relevant to the question of guilt or
innocence, we have seen that the trial process confused this question with the question of
the appropriate punishment.
53. E.g. SP 36/113, fol. 9 (1750): youth "and other favourable circumstances," including
stealing goods "of no considerable value," making no resistance, confessing immediately;
HO 47/6, nos. I (1787): youth, and because prosecutor had recovered his sheep; 2 (1787):
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jury-based mitigation received was transportation for seven years (in lieu
of execution or transportation for fourteen years); substantial evidence of
good character and of likelihood of reform must have seemed sufficient
justification for one of the standard lesser sanctions. Perhaps it was the
moderate quality of mitigation that led the bench to accept what was in
any case inevitable, and to share openly its power of commutation with
the jury. Whatever the reasons, the acceptance of shared powers of
mitigation was of the greatest importance. It demonstrates that the
criminal trial jury was still a social morality play over which officials
exercised only a partial control. It also revealed that judge and jury,
though they may have represented different social strata and different
attitudes toward criminal behavior, generally acted in tandem, not one
against the other. 54 In the administration of the law regarding common-

youth, inexperience, penitence; 3 (1787): good reason to believe the defendant was
instigated to commit the offense by some of those persons admitted to testify against him;
5 (1787): appeared "to us" (six "freeholder-neighbors") to be sober and industrious, no
earlier offences "we know of," has wife and three children "whom he has hitherto
supported by his industry"; 10 (1787): good behavior during confinement, first offence; 11
(1787): good behavior, repentance; 20 (1787): first offence, employable; HO 47/15, no. 39
(1792): of former good reputation, husband a bad man who misused her. Hay, "Property,
Authority and the Criminal Law," pp. 42-46, argues that judicial recommendations for
mercy reflect class-based attitudes wherein "respectability" played a leading role. Hay has
understated the role of other considerations, e.g., the problem of unsafe verdicts, reputation, repentance, etc. [On this point see Peter King, "Decision-Makers and DecisionMaking in the English Criminal Law, 1750-1820," Historical Journal, vol. 27 (1984), pp.
25-58. King's article provides an excellent analysis of prosecution and pardon. On the
whole, we are in agreement.] It is possible that judicial attitudes regarding all of these
factors were characterized by condescension and that, whatever the stated rationale,
judicial mercy was proffered to obtain the deference of the lower classes. That remains
unclear. It cannot be assumed, however, that jury attitudes were the same as those of the
bench, even where juries extended mercy on the recommendation of the bench. From their
own perspective, however, defendants may have been led by the apparent agreement
between judge and jury to the conclusion that the jurors' attitudes and motives were the
same as those of the bench. It does indeed seem plausible, as I believe Hay would argue,
that merciful verdicts reinforced the view among all participants (defendants, jurors,
observers) that the administration of law (and law itselt) was just. This almost certainly
engendered a certain degree of deference to authorities, to one's social betters, and even to
one's social equals where the latter had been part of the process that had resulted in merciful
treatment. For further discussion of Hay's views as they pertain to the role of the jury see
below, n. 156.
54. This is evidenced also by jury verdicts in cases where no partial verdict was possible
(e.g., sheep stealing). The jury had either to convict of the capital offense or acquit
altogether. In such cases, juries convicted with great frequency, probably knowing in many
such cases that the bench was going to reprieve the defendant and recommend a pardon on
condition of transportation. Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 9. In some cases, however,
the jury ignored judicial recommendations for mercy. The judge felt bound to honor their
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run felonies, everything conspired to the creation of an integrated
fact-finding, law-applying, and sentencing process.
Contemporary observers depicted the role of the criminal trial jury
largely in the terms we have set forth. Professional and lay writers on the
law and legal institutions well understood the importance of the element
of mitigation in the administration of the criminal law. They were not,
however, wholly in agreement either on the factors that most often led
juries to mitigate or on the degree to which juries acted on their own
rather than taking their lead from the bench. Moreover, some of them did
not view the process of mitigation as a carefully managed "selection" but
viewed it rather as an unruly flight from the horrors of the sentence to the
gallows. For this reason, among others, many observers doubted that a
system of jury-based mitigation was a virtue; indeed, as we shall see,
beginning early in the eighteenth century there was increasing criticism of
a system of criminal administration that depended heavily upon this
aspect of the jury's role.
In most eighteenth-century descriptions of the routine felony trial the
judge looms large. Even foreign observers, who were mainly curious
about the role of the English jury, were impressed by the care that the
bench took in questioning witnesses and the defendant, in taking notes on
all testimony, and in summing up the evidence for the jury .55 Contemporary accounts confirm the impression left by the Old Bailey Sessions
Papers that the bench dominated proceedings, but they do not suggest
that judges frequently brought pressure to bear on the jury. Rather, the
judge reviewed the evidence thoroughly in open court, leaving little doubt
of his own conclusions and making recommendations to the jury. 56
Observors thought that these recommendations carried great weight,
partly because of the intrinsic authority of the bench and partly because
of the reasonableness and thoroughness of judicial summations. Some
contemporaries, especially foreign observers, who tended to idealize the
English criminal trial, asserted that the jury remained free to reach its own
conclusions, implying that the bench rarely questioned jurors closely or
sent them back to reconsider their first verdict. But even they conceded
that juries typically agreed with the bench. The routine felony trial in very
nearly all accounts was characterized by a harmonious judge-jury relaverdict but reprieved the defendant and recommended him to the Crown for commutation.
E.g. HO 47/6, no. 12 (1787).
55. Misson, Memoirs and Observations, p. 328; Grosley, A Tour to London, p. 145; de Ia
Rochefoucauld, A Frenchman in England, pp. 124-26; J. H. Meister, Letters Written
During a Residence in England (London, trans. 1799; orig. published 1789), pp. 36-37.
56. Misson, Memoirs and Observations, p. 328. See also above, n. 9 and accompanying
text. For an important study of one (probably typical) judge's practice see Langbein,
"Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial," pp. 26-30 and accompanying notes.

286

Resolutions

tionship. Neither the judge nor the jury was a nullity; both were active
and central institutions despite the fact that the judge was the partner that
led .57
We have seen that most defendants were either acquitted or awarded a
partial verdict. Judicial leadership, it appears, involved frequent recommendations that the jury not convict the defendant of a capital offense.
Although it is clear that judges and juries took the kind of offense
committed into account, contemporary writers have surprisingly little to
say about judicial treatment of different kinds of offenses. For lay writers
especially, the most important factor in acquittals and partial verdicts was
the very high threshold of proof that the court required for conviction of
a capital offense. 5 s The bench, it was asserted, seized upon every possible
weakness in the testimony against the accused, even mere technicalities,
to save the defendant's life. 59 The jury was urged to take the greatest care
in assessing testimony where life was at stake, and, according to
contemporaries, this is precisely what juries did. All parties to the system
of justice, often including the complainant, strained to find some pretext
on which to avoid the ultimate sanction of capital punishment.
It is ironic that many contemporaries counted close and impartial
scrutiny by judge andjury as a hallmark ofEnglishjustice, for there were
as yet few formal rules of evidence. In much the same way, the frequent
recourse to judicial reprieves hid the absence of a formal system of
appeal. 6o The death penalty drove the bench and jury to find informal
substitutes for what the legal system lacked and perhaps thus delayed the
57. Misson, Memoirs and Observations, p. 329: "[W)ithout being under the least restraint
to keep to the conclusions of the judge that has harrangued them''; de Ia Rochefoucauld, A
Frenchman in England, p. 126. But see Grosley, A Tour to London, p. 146, who concluded
that the judge thinks he dominates and the jury thinks it does: "The juries, on the contrary,
maintain that the whole procedure in all its branches is referred to them; that the judge
assists merely that his presence may awe the witnesses and the prisoner with respect, and
to assist the jury by his experience and knowledge of the law. This competition, and the
rivalship which it occasions, rendering both judges and juries equally alert, put the law in the
place of man."
58. William Paley, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (London, 1785), pp.
550-51. See also B. L. Muralt, Letters describing the Characters and Customs of the
English and French (London, trans. 1726; written 1694, published 1725), p. 71. Muralt noted
that some people were "condemned for small matters, and others are easily acquitted at the
same time that seem to be much more guilty" (i.e., are suspected of a more serious offense).
This, he said, was because the English "don't determine anything but on the clearest proofs,
without any regard to probability."
59. F. Lacombe, Observations sur Londres et ses Environs (London, 1777), p. 69.
60. See A Treatise on the Right of Juries (London, 1771), p. 42: "The good sense and
liberal feeling of the law ... cannot be enough admired: It impowers juries to acquit
absolutely, but reduces and softens their power to convict, by enabling the Crown in its
mercy to withhold punishment."
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development of formal institutions. As a result of the way things worked
in practice, some observers underestimated the degree to which the
framework of protections surrounding the defendant was manipulated in
accordance with the defendant's offense, bearing, and background.
English criminal justice was not mainly a matter of the application of
abstract rules. The threshold of proof required for capital punishment was
flexible, subject to being heightened in given instances.
It is possible that in many instances where the defendant's character or
offense was the real reason for the extension of mercy, judge and jury
rationalized the verdict in terms of the ''weakness'' of evidence adduced
against the defendant, of the possibility that the testimony against him
was inspired by hope of reward, or of a real or alleged departure by
authorities from the formal requirements of the law. 61 Authorities may
thus have hidden both from themselves as well as from some contemporaries the degree to which mercy resulted from abhorrence of the death
penalty or from considerations of character or offense. 62 But these
nonformal considerations were, in fact, both significant and noticed. 63
Moreover, they were understood as requiring a substantial degree of
discretion on the part of the jury. Judicial recommendations were not seen
as "directions"; even when the jury was following the lead of the bench
it was seen as assimilating the judicial inclination to mitigate the rigors of
the law to its own independent process of deliberation.
At one level this process of deliberation had been purged largely of
out-of-court evidence: by the eighteenth century, if not earlier, it may
have been deemed inappropriate for jurors to take such knowledge into
account.64 At another level, however, consideration of the defendant's
reputation and character involved an assessment that might be thought of
as community based. At the very moment that the jury was losing its right
to be self-informing, authorities were continuing to acquiesce in the jury's
right to apply standards that could be characterized as not entirely
accessible to the bench. As we shall see, the persistence even in this
truncated form of the tradition of the self-informing jury strengthened the
61. On the matter of technical defects in indictments see J. H. Baker, "The Refinement
of English Criminal Jurisprudence, 1500-1848," in Knafla, ed., Crime and Criminal Justice
in Europe and Canada, pp. 19-24.'
62. Misson (Memoirs and Observations, p. 329) thought the judicial recommendations for
commutation were based on whether the defendant was "more or less guilty."
63. English law reform writers were especially attentive to the role of these factors in the
mitigation of the law. See below, section III.
64. Beattie (Crime and the Courts, ch. 8) notes that jurors at Surrey assizes sometimes
had actual knowledge of events and were allowed to make use of it. See also Langbein,
"Criminal Trial before the Lawyers," pp. 298-99, n. 105.
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hand of jury proponents in the late-eighteenth-century debate over the
law of seditious libel.
Although contemporaries understood that trial juries frequently intervened to save the defendant's life, their discussion of jury behavior
reveals the complexity of the system of trial by jury and the varying
conclusions that might be drawn regarding the way in which that system
worked. Some writers viewed the jury as an -appendage of the bench, but
most saw it as far more independent. Most writers thought that jury
verdicts were influenced mainly by the evidence, but many understood
the importance of the offense, and the defendant's character and reputation. All of these considerations were influential, given the general
resistance to convict at a capital level all but the worst offenders.
Although most contemporaries understood this, they did not always take
care to separate these factors. Even when juries did convict, they often
did so with (perhaps because of) the knowledge that the defendant's life
would or might be spared. Many contemporaries may have missed this
point and thus failed to consider whether the jury in such cases doubted
that it had the right to intervene or simply preferred to leave the ultimate
decision to the bench.
The general impression that the lay and professional writings of the
eighteenth century convey is that juries were willing to punish but not
often to condemn men and women who came from walks of life that were
different, but not totally removed from their own. Jurors may have
identified with the perspective of authorities, but, as many contemporaries saw it, they often also identified with the defendant. Observers did not
see jurors as constantly drawn in one direction or the other, perhaps
because the bench was similarly disinclined to enforce the law to its
fullest and at least appeared to adopt standards close to those of persons
from the ranks from which jurors were drawn. Judge and jury, it was
widely believed, shared both point of view and the age-old right and duty
to mitigate the law.

III
The practical approach to penology that we have described was the end
product of a dialectical process set in motion centuries before. The trial
jury's systematic nullification of the law of capital sanctions was gradually
accommodated by authorities through doctrinal and institutional changes,
some-though only some-of which were conscious responses to the
relatively benign sort of jury-based intervention that we have been tracing
in this chapter. As authorities tightened their control of juries in cases
where they felt something substantial was at stake and developed a set of
relatively severe noncapital sanctions for the general run of cases, they
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not only acquiesced in, but even encouraged, jury participation in the
selection of offenders for one or another level of punishment.
The result of this historical development was a scheme of selective
enforcement in which the jury played a significant role. Had juries,
however, adhered from the outset to the rules of law, a system of
selective enforcement might nonetheless have resulted. Given the needs
of politics, the attack on capital punishment, and the recognition that the
able-bodied could be put to good use, the English might have adopted a
Crown-based Continental-style system of pardon and commutation. As it
in fact evolved, the English system of penology, wherein the jury was an
important participant, was more visible, more complex, and perhaps less
consistent in its resolutions than its French or Italian counterparts. But it
probably reflected the attitudes of a larger part of society and induced a
more widespread belief that the entire system of criminal administration
was just.
Whatever degree of public support the English scheme of selective
enforcement enjoyed, it nonetheless met with significant criticism over
the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The criticism
intensified in the last decades of the century due largely to the influence
of Cesare Beccaria's work, On Crimes and Punishments, first published
in English in 1767. 65 The central principles of Beccaria's attack on
Continental systems of criminal justice are too familiar to require detailed
discussion. Popularizing the ideas of earlier and more original Continental
writers, 66 Beccaria argued for moderate and proportional punishments
that were both humane and capable of being systematically enforced.
Certainty of punishment, he held, was the best deterrent to crime:67
prospective offenders should not be encouraged to suppose they could
escape punishment through the extension of mercy. Beccaria took an
absolutist position, leaving virtually no room for the power of pardon. 6s
Punishment, he believed, ought to be prompt69 and ought to bear a
rational relationship to the nature of the offense, 70 but in no case was it to
be capital.7 1 Though on this last point some Continental reformers
65. Cesare Beccaria, Essay on Crimes and Punishments (London, 1767). References
hereafter are to the J. A. Farrar translation (London, 1880).
66. See e.g. Coleman Phillipson, Three Criminal Law Reformers: Beccaria, Bentham,
Romilly (London, 1923), p. 84; Radzinowicz, History of English Criminal Law, 1:268-80,
esp. nn. 36 and 42.
67. Beccaria, Crimes and Punishments, p. 168.
68. Ibid., pp. 190-91.
69. Ibid., p. 186.
70. Ibid., pp. 213-14.
71. Ibid., p. 169.
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disagreed with Beccaria, his tract, generally speaking, fairly captured and
transmitted their views to English shores.
Continental penological views of the late eighteenth century influenced
but were not perfectly replicated in the emerging critique of the English
system. For some English reformers, the Continental principles were
especially attractive because of the open and seemingly ad hoc character
of selective enforcement in their own country. At the same time,
however, these reformers held a conception of justice to which some
degree of jury discretion was integral. The English version of the new
penology reveals just how complicated a role the jury had come to play in
English legal and political culture. In what follows I shall examine the
initial English reception of the new penology and suggest the ways in
which longstanding English practices affected that reception. I shall also
contrast the English reformers to the principal defenders of the status
quo, who agreed with the reformers only in their criticism of prevailing
jury practices, and in their view that whatever mitigation was to be
practiced ought to be centered mainly in the Crown.
The reformers to whose work we shall pay greatest attention were not
necessarily typical in their criticism of the jury. Their understanding of
jury practices, and of the impact of those practices on the administration
of the criminal law, rested mainly on their familiarity with the trials at
urban assizes of a seemingly endless parade of suspected thieves and
slayers.72 They were influenced by their perception of a rising crime rate
and a growing criminal class. Their view, in short, was a view from the
center. The reformers' criticism was blunted, however, by their adherence to two positions that enjoyed wide social agreement. First, many
reformers believed that the severity of the law of sanctions was a principal
source of the problems afflicting the administration of the criminal law.
Jury mitigation, they perceived, was an inevitable response to that
severity; until sanctions were reformed mitigation would be both common
and in accord with humane principles. It proved difficult for reformers to
write about the prevailing system without giving support, pro tern, to
some of the practices to which they were in fact opposed. Second, for
most reformers there was an important conflict between their belief that
jury mitigation played havoc with a rational system of criminal law and
their faith in residual powers of nullification as a safeguard against
72. Hay ("Property, Authority and the Criminal Law," pp. 54-55) has pointed out that
London "had a highly transient population, and a large body of disorderly and parasitic
poor," and that "instruments of control there were weaker, in part because the class
relationships that fostered deference were [weaker] .... Equally, judicial mercy in London
was more often a bureaucratic lottery than a convincing expression of paternalism." This
may help account for the reformers' criticism of what seemed to some of them a nearly
random process of selection.
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executive and judicial tyranny. (It is the exploration of these jury-related
themes that distinguishes my treatment of the eighteenth-century reform
tradition from that of earlier scholars, e.g., Sir Leon Radzinowicz.) As we
shall see in this chapter and the one that follows, the contradictions
inherent in both politics and the administration of criminal law in the
eighteenth century were mirrored in the academic legal literature of the
period.
The major reform writings and the responses to them may be aligned as
follows. In the years around 1770, William Blackstone, William Eden, and
Henry Dagge produced pioneering works on penal reform. All of these
writers were influenced by Beccaria, whose concern had been with the
law regarding common-run felonies. Though all three reflected some
understanding of the constitutional-safeguard role of the jury, only Dagge
clearly (and favorably) responded to the uproar over the jury in seditious
libel cases and to the agitation of the Wilkites in the late 1760s. A decade
later Manasseh Dawes, influenced by both Blackstone and the philosophical writings of Joseph Priestley that appeared in the late 1770s, added a
variation on the Beccarian themes. Dawes argued for reform of the law of
sanctions, urging that death be replaced by imprisonment at useful labor.
He dwelled on the causes of criminal behavior, striking at points a modern
note. Interestingly, his work showed no attention to the seditious libel
crisis and to the defense of the jury in that context that he was to make
two years later (1784) in the wake of the trial of the Dean of St. Asaph. In
the mid-1780s William Paley and Martin Madan published very different
defenses of the law of sanctions that criticized jury-based mitigation of the
law in common-run felonies. Taken together, these two works challenged
the early penal reform movement. The voice of the future, however, was
heard in the first work of Samuel Romilly, who replied in 1786 to Madan's
discourse. Romilly called for reform of the kind for which the adherents
of Beccaria had called. Like most of the other reform writers, Romilly
devoted nearly all his attention to the traditional felonies, and little to the
problem of the jury in political cases, this despite the fact that just two
years earlier Romilly had written a powerful defense of the role of the jury
in seditious libel cases.
Although all of these writers-proponents and opponents of reformopposed jury mitigation, at least at its contemporary levels, they nonetheless reflected widely divergent perspectives on the system of criminal law
in general. Because these commentators on jury practices built upon one
another, we shall examine them separately and chronologically, even at
the risk of repetition on points where they were in substantial accord.
Before turning to these seven important late-eighteenth-century legal
writers, however, we must take account of Henry Fielding's two mid-
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century tracts. Fielding foreshadowed the later writers, especially in his
ambivalence about the role of the criminal trial jury.
Fielding's 1751 Enquiry into the causes of what he perceived to be a
recent increase in criminal activity attacked jury mitigation of "two
excellent Acts of Parliament" regarding pilfering and like offenses.73 By
valuing goods at less than a shilling, the jury leaves the thief "ordinarily
to be whipped," so that he returns immediately to his trade. As a result,
"the jury are perjured, the public highly injured ... that two miscreants
[principal and accessory] may laugh at their prosecutors, and at the
law. "74 Criminals thus "are ever lying in wait to destroy and ensnare the
honest part of mankind, and to betray them by means of their own
goodness." They take advantage of the "passion of love or benevolence," the "only human passion that is in itself simply and absolutely
good. " 75 Fielding preached against naivete, against what he took to be a
misplaced generosity of spirit; he extolled the virtues of mercy in the
abstract, but scorned the sudden accesses of compassion that blinded
men to the real effects of merciful verdicts in criminal cases. 76
The tone of the Enquiry is harsh and angry. It has the feel of a complaint
from the front lines, penned by a magistrate attempting to deal with what
he took to be a national crime wave. In only the narrowest sense was it a
penal reform tract. Far from criticizing capital sanctions, Fielding insisted
upon adherence to the rules of the system. Though Fielding's endorsement of the ''terror of examples' '77 to deter would-be offenders seems to
sanction some degree of selective enforcement, the principal argument of
the Enquiry is that failure to prosecute and refusal to convict were both
unlawful and unwise. To the extent that the tract foreshadowed later
commentary on the jury, it bore a closer resemblance to Madan's call for
rigorous enforcement of existing laws than to the writings of Beccaria's
73. Henry Fielding, An Enquiry into the Causes of the Late Increase of Robbers
(London, 1751), p. 73. For a recent study of the contribution of Henry Fielding and his
brother John to pretrial investigation see Langbein, "Shaping the Eighteenth-Century
Criminal Trial," pp. 49 et seq. See also Pat Rogers, Henry Fielding: A Biography (New
York, 1979), ch. 6.
74. Fielding, An Enquiry, p. 73.
75. Ibid., pp. 106-8. Fielding refers here to too-merciful prosecutors, but he clearly
means also to characterize too-merciful jurors.
76. See also Samuel Johnson, The Rambler, no. 114 (London, April, 20, 1751): "[I]t may
be observed, that all but murderers have, at their last hour, the common sensations of
mankind pleading in their favour" (p. 4). "This scheme of invigorating the laws by
relaxation, and exploiting wickedness by lenity, is so remote from common practice, that I
might reasonably fear to expose it to the public, could it be supported only by my own
observations" (p. 7).
77. Ibid., p. 120.
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disciples or to Paley's defense of the regime of selective enforcement of
the criminal law.
Fielding's 1753 Proposal was written in an altogether different vein. 78 It
was an original reform tract, reminiscent of Interregnum reform writings,
and a significant addition to the eady eighteenth-century English literature that counseled use of the workhouse for persons convicted of petty
theft.7 9 Though limited in scope by its attention to petty theft, and to first
offenders at that, Fielding's argument was informed by a series of insights
that were shared by the later reformers. His central purpose was to argue
for sentences to the workhouse, instead of gaol, for first offenders. 80 In
the main, his tract was frankly utilitarian. Like mid-seventeenth-century
reform writers, Fielding saw little purpose in simple and brutal incarceration. He portrayed the prospective defendant as one who awaits trial in
the worst of circumstances, unable to support himself and his family, prey
to the wretches of society.s1 Sentencing the convict to gaol only made
matters worse. Fielding believed that the existing system produced
hardened criminals and induced juries to acquit defendants who deserved
some punishment and who required-to use a modern term-rehabilitation.
The themes of mercy, fairness, deterrence, and social utility were
woven into a logical and compelling argument. The accused, Fielding
observed, must await trial in gaol no matter how "trifling" his offense or
how much he is an "object of mercy." "If he be acquitted on his trial, as
he often is by the mercy of the jury, against clear and positive evidence,
he is again turned loose among the community with all the disadvantages
I have mentioned above." If he is convicted, whipped, and gaoled, so
much the worse: "What must be the situation of this wretch I need not
mention; such in truth it is, that his second theft is in reality less criminal
than the first. This was perhaps choice; but that will be necessity. "sz
Transportation of pilferers, made possible by a recent Act, offered little
improvement:
78. Henry Fielding, A Proposal for Making an Effectual Provision for the Poor (London,
1753).
79. See above, Chapter 5, text at nn. 124-31, for a discussion of Interregnum law reform
writing on penology. For early eighteenth century works that continued the seventeenthcentury tradition see e.g. Thomas Coke, Work-houses the best Charity, A Sermon, preached
at the Cathedral Church of Worcester (London, 1702); Sollom Emlyn, "Preface" to A
Complete Collection of State Trials, 6 vols. (2nd ed., London, 1730), vol. 1, p. ix. Emlyn
recommended "hard labour at home." For an excellent discussion of early eighteenthcentury reform ideas regarding use of workhouses and the "reformation of manners," see
Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 10.
80. Fielding, A Proposal, p. 71.
81. Idem.
82. Ibid., pp. 71-72.
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[T]his, though probably it may be real mercy, has such an appearance
of extreme severity, that few judges are willing to inflict such a
punishment on such an offense. But if it should be in the interest of a
wretch in these circumstances, to be banished from a country where he
must steal or starve, it is scarce the interest of the public to lose every
year a great number of such able hands. By the means I have proposed,
it seems to me, that the offender will receive a punishment proportionable to his offence; he and his family may be preserved from utter ruin,
and an able member, instead of being entirely lost to the public, will be
rendered more useful to it than he was before.s3
Fielding's prescription for reform was clear enough, but what were his
views regarding mitigation in the unreformed present? Were judges and
juries to apply the letter of the law to the "wretches" and "objects of
mercy" who came before them? One might suppose that the Fielding who
in 1751 opposed merciful verdicts in capital cases opposed them in
noncapital cases of petty larceny in 1753. This is not necessarily so.
Fielding might have believed that perpetrators of more serious offenses
deserved the strongest possible punishment but that those who committed
"trifling" ones deserved very little punishment at all. All one can say is
that the Proposal reflects recognition that such verdicts were inevitable in
"trifling" cases and that Fielding found it difficult to deny that they were
just. Fielding's tracts signaled a revival of English penal reform writing.
They carried forward Interregnum ideas, adding to them the insights of an
experienced London magistrate. But they also revealed the tensions that
characterized the late-eighteenth-century English reform tracts.
Blackstone's final volume of his Commentaries on the Laws of England, Of Public Wrongs, contained the first analysis of the administration of the criminal law written after the publication in England of
Beccaria's influential work.s4 Blackstone admired the Continental reform
tradition, and Of Public Wrongs attempts to assimilate that tradition to
the common-law world, sometimes pretending that English institutions
already conformed to the reformist ideal and sometimes justifying the
obvious and seemingly important dissimilarities between them.
Blackstone accepted Beccaria's principles of justice and deterrence based
upon a law of sanctions that was humane and applied with certainty. 85
Blackstone also understood the role that English juries played in common- ·
run felonies. He simultaneously acquiesced in a substantial amount of
jury-based mitigation of the criminal law and counseled reforms that
83. Ibid., p. 72.
84. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 vols. (1765-69;
reprinted, Chicago, 1979), vol. 4: Of Public Wrongs.
85. Ibid., pp. 1&-17.
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would greatly lessen the need for such practices.86
The great bulk of jury mitigation practice involved the rendering of
partial verdicts in offenses against property. Blackstone argued that
undervaluation was largely a response to inflation, which had brought
more and more goods within the scope of capital felony statutes. This was
a kind of ''pious perjury'' that achieved justice by preventing unforeseen
economic forces from condemning to death persons whom the legislature
had not specifically said ought to be hanged.87 Blackstone knew, however, that juries went beyond this form of mitigation, that they were
merciful in a far wider range of cases; he was more cautious in his
condonation of these practices, but it is clear that he believed they
accorded with natural justice. Much of the law of capital sanctions was
wrong as a matter of justice and policy; reform-in the form of repealwas required, and until it came about one had both to understand and to
accept the mitigating role of legal institutions. 88
But as an advocate of reform Blackstone did not go so far as Beccaria,
who argued that a rational law of sanctions would dissolve the necessity
for a power of pardon. Blackstone believed that there would always be a
need for that power; moreover, he inherited a view of monarchy from
which the pardon power was inseparable. For Blackstone, the goal was
partly to reduce the frequency with which pardons were granted, but
mainly to centralize the pardon power in the Crown. Blackstone understood Beccaria's argument regarding deterrence, but seems not to have
accepted the notion that any decrease in certainty of punishment,
whatever its source, had to be paid for in decreased deterrence.
Blackstone focused on a distinctively English problem that Beccaria
did not have to address: the dangers inherent in dispersed powers of
mitigation.89 For Beccaria, the villain was mitigation itself, not a particular institution of mitigation. While necessarily more complicated than that
of the Continental reformer, Blackstone's argument was also internally
contradictory. He sought to justify the English system even as he called
for its reform. Thus he sought at times to argue that all power of
mitigation was in fact centered in the Crown. 90 But he was well aware of
the truth: political control, certainty of the law, consistency of treatment
of offenders were all sacrificed under an English administration of law that
86. Ibid., 18-19, 239, 354.
87. Ibid., p. 239.
88. Thomas A. Green, "Introduction" to ibid., pp. ix-xi.
89. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
90. Ibid., p. 390. Blackstone asserted that "the exclusion of pardons must necessarily
introduce a very dangerous power in the judge or jury, that of construing the criminal law
by the spirit instead of the letter." Blackstone knew that such practices were common
despite the possibility of royal pardon. See above, n. 88.
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corrected for its potential inhumanity through ad hoc and variously
situated institutions of mitigation.
Blackstone understood that the problems besetting English criminal
justice could be resolved only through fundamental change in the manner
in which all the institutions of the criminal law functioned. Change could
not come piecemeal; it would have to begin with the law of sanctions, but
the effects of that change would have to radiate throughout the entire
system. Until sanctions were reformed the jury would remain an institution of mitigation, playing a role akin to the one it had historically played
in the English constitution of accommodating the rules of law to the
Englishman's sense of natural justice. The jury was a guardian against
inhumanity as well as against tyranny. As a corollary, whatever reforms
were undertaken regarding sanctions for common-run felonies, the jury
would have to retain the ultimate power in order to guard against episodes
of legal abuse in more overtly political cases. 91 There were, of course,
costs involved in the use of juries, but these Blackstone characterized as
''inconveniences.' '92 Better to educate Englishmen to serve as jurors in a
system that required of them wisdom and some knowledge of the law,
restraint but a sense of justice, than to eliminate the jury in order to avoid
potential or even present abuses.
Blackstone shared his contemporaries' view that much criminal activity
resulted from social conditions,93 and he was prominent among the early
proponents of prison reform who argued that current incarceration
practices only made offenders more dangerous. 94 Characteristically,
however, he shied away from the conclusion that poverty or exposure to
vice and to evil companions stripped one of a truly free will. That
conclusion (for which he provided no logical rebuttal) he regarded as
dangerous to the public order. Poverty, he asserted, ought not to ground
a defense of involuntarism or of necessity, especially in cases of theft of
food or clothing, for property would then be rendered insecure by the
alleged wants of others, "of which wants no man can possibly be an
adequate judge, but the party himself who pleads them. "95 Blackstone
resolved the problem by invoking the power of the Crown ''to soften the
91. Ibid., pp. 343-44: "[S]ince in times of difficulty and danger, more is to be apprehended from the violence and partiality of judges appointed by the Crown, in suits
between the king and the subject, than in disputes between one individual and another. ...
So that the liberties of England cannot but subsist, so long as this palladium remains sacred
and inviolate."
92. Ibid., p. 344.
93. See Green, "Introduction" to Blackstone, Commentaries, 4: iv-v.
94. For Blackstone's contribution to the movement for imprisonment at hard labor see
Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 11.
95. Blackstone, Commentaries, 4:32.
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law, and to extend mercy in cases of peculiar hardship. "96 But as he
doubtless realized, in practice juries daily served to help resolve this very
dilemma.
William Eden also recognized the complexity of the role of the criminal
trial jury. 97 Like Beccaria, he focused clearly on the problem of deterrence, echoing the Italian's message through his borrowings from
Blackstone's terminology. Eden's analysis of the property-crime problem
that afflicted late-eighteenth-century England is a classic formulation of
the Continental reform theory. The source of the problem was, he said,
"national prosperity." "Sensibility sleeps in the lap of luxury; and the
legislator is contented to secure his own selfish enjoyments, by subjecting
his fellow citizens to the miseries of a dungeon, and the horrors of an
ignominious death. " 98 Increased wealth brought increased selfishness and
increasingly harsh laws to protect that wealth; it magnified one aspect of
human nature, but it did not transform human nature entirely: "Still
however [the legislator] feels a tacit disapprobation of the laws, which he
has enacted; and even, when injured, [he] hesitates to bring the offender
to justice. He knows that the punishment is disproportionate to the
offense. "99 Nor did it blind the propertied to reality: "[O]r at least, if
humanity be obliterated by interest, [the legislator] foresees, that the
punishment cannot be inflicted, without raising the indignation of society
against the accuser." The result, then, follows Beccaria's diagnosis
closely:
The delinquent therefore is discharged without prosecution; he repeats
the crime under the expectation of repeated mercy .... It is a property
inseparable from harsh laws, that they are neither regular, nor expeditious in their execution; consequently, that they flatter the hope of
impunity, and, equally injurious to the society and the criminal, tend to
the fatal multiplication both of crimes and of punishments.too
Eden argued that the existing system of criminal law emerged fortuitously, for the anger that generated new capital legislation gave way to the
natural instincts of compassion when it came time to apply the law to
96. Idem. Blackstone was at his most internally inconsistent on this issue. After asserting
that a defense of necessity would be unmanageable and dangerous, Blackstone stated: "In
this country especially, there would be a peculiar impropriety in admitting so dubious an
excuse: for by our laws suth sufficient provision is made for the poor by the power of the
civil magistrate, that it is impossible that the most needy stranger should ever be reduced to
the necessity of thieving to support nature." Subsequently, he pointed to the power of
pardon, which he suggested gave relief in rare instances.
97. William Eden, Principles of Penal Law (London, 1771).
98. Ibid., p. 266.
99. Ibid., pp. 266-67.
100. Ibid., p. 267.
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individual suspects. As a result, the system of penology actually encouraged criminal behavior. There are hints of this in Blackstone, but
Eden made the point with force. Thereafter, virtually all reform writers
charged that mitigation, though preferable to mass executions, was partly
responsible for the crisis in criminal law.
The role of the jury as a mitigator of the law raised a number of
problems, and the more Eden pursued them the more he shifted his
attention from the question of deterrence to other considerations of
justice. First, he criticized the practice of basing capital felony on the
monetary value of stolen goods. Since money was "in its nature ... of
fluctuating value," to base punishment ofthe offender on such value is to
make "adjudication of the law ... vague and uncertain. " 101 Turning to
the jury's role, Eden observed that "the impulses of benevolence are
opposed to the obligations of religion": jurors were "taught to trifle with
their oaths, and to call such trifling 'a kind of pious peljury."'
In fact, upon trials oflarcenies so limited, it is commonly found to be
the chief anxiety both of judges and of jurors, to reduce the crime
below its real predicament, by reducing the conviction below the value
affixed by law. Such an anxiety is the natural consequences of laws,
which, by an absurd distinction, make a trivial difference between two
sums the criterion of capital crime.wz
Unlike Blackstone, who placed the emphasis on "pious" rather than on
''perjury,'' Eden criticized the practice of mitigation for the confusion it
produced in the minds of the mitigators. He, too, was concerned with a
kind of incoherence, but not so much a legal or political as a moral
incoherence.
Trifling with laws and lives: the business of sorting out those who
deserved to hang from those who did not appeared very different to Eden
than it did to many of his contemporaries. Nevertheless, Eden took a
liberal view of jury fact-finding in some kinds of cases. He defended the
jury's
indisputable, unquestionable right to acquit the person accused, if, in
their private opinions, they disbelieve the accusers; or if in their
consciences, they think, however erroneously, that the fact partakes
not of that degree, or species of criminality, with which it is charged in
the indictment.103
The first instance mentioned-if the jurors "disbelieve the accusers "-is
in line with all contemporary analysis and comes as no surprise. The
101. Ibid., p. 268.
102. Ibid., pp. 268-69.
103. Ibid., p. 153.
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second basis for acquittal is of greater interest. Eden's formulation is
ambiguous. He might have meant: if the jurors find that the fact required
by law was not committed; if so he stated no more than a commonplace.
But more likely he meant: if the jurors decide that the fact the law
considers criminal is not really criminal, for, he continued, jury trial is a
nullity unless jurors may determine ''the criminality or innocence of the
intention, the legality or illegality of the fact. " 104
Eden was aware that the jury's power to go outside judicial instructions
had long been the subject of debate, especially in the context of cases
wherein the government had a political interest. He cited the relevant
passages in Blackstone, Hale, and Foster, and concluded: "When wise
and good men differ upon points of great constitutional importance,''
humbler folk like himself should await the outcome. But, he added
(bringing the discussion back to his own central concern), it was
a certain truth, that the political liberty of every individual bears a
proportion to the security given by the laws to the innocency of his
conduct; which security decreases, in proportion to the multiplication
of penalties, the uncertainty of penal laws, and the irregularity of
trials. 105
Thus Eden remained ambiguous regarding the limits of fact-finding. He
attempted to treat jury law-finding as appropriate only in exceptional
cases and to minimize the conflict between traditional English jury
law-finding theory and the overriding principles of the new penology.
Certainty, he believed, was not only crucial to deterrence but was
indispensable for justice. All members of society had a right to know what
was criminal and to what degree it was so. To announce that certain
crimes were capital but then to punish various commissions of them at
different levels was to invite injustice. No one would be certain beforehand what his punishment would be; arbitrary decisions would abound.
Eden apparently believed that reform of the penal laws would so reduce
the need for jury mitigation that one might approve of occasional
instances of jury-based intervention without endorsing principles that
interfered with human liberty. Eden thus bridged Beccaria and
Blackstone in a particularly effective way. And it would be to his
Principles of the Criminal Law perhaps more than to the Commentaries
that early nineteenth-century reformers would look for guidance. 106
Nearly forgotten, on the other hand, was Henry Dagge, whose Considerations on Criminal Law was published in 1772, one year after Eden's
104. Ibid., p. 154.
105. Ibid., p. 158.
106. See below, Chapter 9, section I.
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work and three after Blackstone's.J07 Reflecting the growing concern over
the political role of juries, Dagge's book does not directly confront the
problem of jury mitigation in common-run felonies. But Dagge was not
unaware of the issue: he began by lauding Eden, who dwelled upon it, and
he supported Eden's reform ideas. His main contribution was his strong
support for the establishment of penal institutions that would inculcate
moral virtues. 1os Dagge repeated Eden's-and through Eden,
Beccaria's-argument that men will shrink from enforcing a strict law and
that the end result will be an increase in crime and criminals. Legislators,
he asserted, ought not to forget that "criminals are their
fellow-creatures," the products of social inequality and degradation. 1o9
Laws ought to be aimed at improving man's lot, and so improving man,
not at doing away with men led astray. But this social determinism theme,
which had surfaced in Fielding's Proposal, remained largely buried in
Dagge's work. Like Blackstone, Dagge entertained a vision of human
behavior that differed perhaps from earlier more strictly moral approaches, but in the end he resisted the ideas that a later, more scientific
age could not. Others, like Dawes, were to develop them further in the
next few decades. For Dagge it was an important but subordinate
argument: one ought to encourage compassion for the offender, who was
often the product of his environment, and take account of that fact in the
criminal law.
Dagge' s work reveals the dilemma implicit in the work of other reform
writers. Dagge did not criticize jury mitigation in common-run felonies,
but his endorsement of Eden suggests that he saw the dangers in such
practices. At the same time the thrust of Dagge's section on juries was a
forceful statement favoring substantial jury law-finding powers. 11o
Blackstone and Eden had recognized the virtues of the jury's power to
nullify political prosecutions should there be a return to tyranny. Dagge
made the point with far greater emphasis, drawing upon the history of
civil society and English legal institutions to establish the advantages of
the judgment of a jury of twelve common men over that of one man of the
robe.lll For him, the threat of intentional or unintentional judicial
misreading of the law was the overriding concern: juries, he argued, must
supply constant vigilance. As the seditious libel controversy heightened,
the problems of jury mitigation, law reform, and the constitutional and
legal balance of powers drew closer together. Dagge perhaps saw the
107. Henry Dagge, Considerations on Criminal Law (London, 1772).
108. Ibid., p. xix.
109. Ibid., p. xxvi.
110. Ibid., pp. 123-36.
lll. See below, Chapter 8, text at nn. 72-74.
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larger constitutional issues more clearly than Blackstone or Eden, but he
failed to explain how the jury would play a more modest role in one area
while remaining the dominant constitutional safeguard in the other.
Dagge's concern with the social origins of criminal behavior reflected
an insight that virtually all reformers shared. 112 At some level, the view
that social conditions bred or at least encouraged criminal behavior was
commonplace in the eighteenth century. Not a few of the petitions for
pardons stressed the conditions that led the convict astray; if these
notions were current among the secular and religious officials who drafted
the petitions, they were no doubt current among those who, in their role
as jurors, mitigated the severity of the law. Then as now, nearly all who
held such views also believed that men freely willed their own actions. By
and large the reformers shared this dualistic view of human behavior.m
Manasseh Dawes was among the more single-minded and eloquent of
the deterministic reformers. In An Essay on Crimes and Punishments,
published in 1782, Dawes castigated lawyers for their failure to understand the most basic principles of human behavior and heaped scorn upon
the prevailing concepts of punishment.ll 4 Lawyers, wrote Dawes, "talk
of the necessity of punishment, while they know little of the cause of
those actions for which they would have it inflicted." "Criminals do not
offend so much from choice, as from misery and want of sentiment." 115
Dawes adhered to "the principles of philosophical necessity," according
to which:
[A]ll actions are effects of some cause in the mind; and man being free,
he has a self-determining power governed by consideration and judgment, which precede his volition, and direct it; all actions necessarily
follow their causes, or volitions; and as they cannot be otherwise than
they are, when committed, it ought to be, and is the duty of society to
form the minds of individuals, so that they may detest what is
constituted bad by law.II6

112. E.g. Fielding, A Proposal, pp. 71-72. See also Jonas Hanway, Distributive Justice
and Mercy (London, 1781), p. xii. Hanway favored true reform of convicts and thought that
merciful acquittals were not helpful in this regard. He preferred reform of the law of
sanctions and prison reform.
113. See Michael Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial
Revolution, 1750-1850 (New York, 1978), pp. 71-76. For further discussion of this matter
see below, Chapter 9, section III.
114. Manasseh Dawes, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments (London, 1782).
115. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
116. Ibid., p. 40. See also ibid., p. 155. "[The] principle of philosophical necessity ...
admits, that although the actions of men, when committed, cannot be otherwise than they
are, yet ... their future may.'' A possible effect of a certain act may be to punish the actor;
this, in turn, may deter others who would otherwise have committed the same act.
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Dawes contrasted the theory of "philosophical necessity" to "fatalism or
predestination, which supposes all things come to pass in spite of
man.'' 1 17 Man possesses a will, and his actions flow from that will, though
that will is shaped by forces (ultimately by God) external to man.
Although Dawes's theory of human freedom was murky, 11 8 his analysis of
the cause of criminal behavior was clear enough:
[C]riminals suffer eventually for the inevitable effects of certain causes
which influence their moral conduct: let a gang of thieves, for example,
teach an ignorant boy, that by certain methods of breaking a house, or
personal robberies, he will succeed in his end, and be undiscovered,
and he will listen to the instruction, and turn thief, in the hope of
escaping detection, not being convicted if taken or tried; the mitigation
of his sentence, the death of his prosecutor, a flaw in his indictment, or
a pardon: the crime to him appears harmless; his study is to avoid the
laws, which with him is the only iniquity .119
Dawes's program of reform involved moral instruction. But by implication it also countenanced reform of the administration ofthe criminal law.
Although mercy was an appropriate response owing to the ultimate
blamelessness of criminal offenders, it was also one of the conditions that
engendered criminal behavior. In his own way, Dawes associated himself
with the critique of the administration of criminal law that Blackstone,
Eden, and Dagge set forth and that derived, ultimately, from the reception
of Beccaria's work. And like the English writers who preceded him,
Dawes argued that, pending reform either of human nature or of the law
of sanctions, mercy-whatever its contributory costs-was appropriate.
117. Idem.
118. Dawes seems to have adopted a view of free will similar to that defended by
Jonathan Edwards thirty years before in A Careful and Strict Enquiry into the Modern
Prevailing Notions of that Freedom of Will, which is supposed to be essential to Moral
Agency, Virtue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame (Boston, 1754). But
Dawes at times took a more sombre view: "[I]s it not a hardship to inflict a punishment for
what must and will happen? or is it a justifiable effect of our living in society, that some of
us should be cut off from it, because we cannot be otherwise than we are?" In his earlier
work, Philosophical Considerations (London, 1780), Dawes asserted that "nature punishes
us ... by conferring the power of punishment upon us, at the moment of our creation, in the
faculty of reflection. Thus man may be a free agent respecting himself, but not so in respect
to the great author of nature .... If [man is] ignorant and bad, the cause may be traced in
the faults of his education, productive of moral actions, injurious to himself and others. The
future actions of one moral agent, may be made wise and virtuous, from an abhorrence of
the perils attendant on the past actions of another." Thus the purpose and virtues of
punishment (pp. 38-39). And again, in his An Essay on Intellectual Liberty (London, 1780),
Dawes spoke of "the sacrifice of moral criminals, who became victims to laws for the
welfare of society" (p. 10).
119. Dawes, Essay on Crimes and Punishments, p. 42.
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Men of sense will compassionate all human and social offenders,
lament their offences, and sigh over the unhappy cause ofthem;-they
will look upon the wretched prisoner, perhaps half naked and starved,
amputated or maimed, ill educated or destitute of taste, and grieve over
his condition; regretting some hidden defect in the criminal constitution
or civil government, and reluctantly give him up to a punishment,
which vagrant liberty had prepared him for, against the inmost desire
of his heart; they will not be contented that he has offended, but they
will examine why; and tracing the cause, be disposed to forgive an
effect, which it was impossible to avoid; and thus feeling the force and
power of the mind, they will sparingly punish the man for what the
mind only was deficient in producing. 12o
Unlike his predecessors, however, Dawes did not dwell on the question of
which institution was the most appropriate mitigator. More philosopher
than lawyer, Dawes commented on human nature and the responses to it
of ''men of sense,'' be they prosecutors, grand jurors, trial jurors, judges,
or monarchs. His readers cannot have doubted that jurors, like the others
who possessed the power to dispense mercy, were not only part of the
problem but for the time being part of its solution.
William Paley's famous defense of the English system of criminal
justice was no more supportive of jury-based mitigation than were the
reformers' tracts. 12 1 Indeed, the jury was virtually the only aspect of the
status quo that Paley criticized. Paley argued in favor of both capital
statutes and very selective enforcement, but he believed that enforcement
ought to be exclusively in the Crown. 122 Like Blackstone, Paley saw the
dangers of dispersed powers of mitigation. The two differed on the reform
issue: for Blackstone, the need for mercy ought to be reduced to a
minimum; for Paley, the need for mercy was an important aspect of a just
and rational criminal law.
Paley praised the English system as one that "assigns capital punishment to many kinds of offenses, but inflicts it only upon a few examples
of each kind. " 123 He rejected, however, the view of Eden that this system
of penology was unpremeditated. The laws, Paley believed, were designed to be enforced selectively; the ends of deterrence and rational
decision making dictated the form of penology that actually prevailed.
120. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
121. Paley, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785). The substance of this
work was drawn from lectures given at Cambridge at least as early as 1770. Paley may have
been responding in part to Beccaria and Blackstone. See Radzinowicz, History of English
Criminal Law, 1:248, n. 63. Beattie (Crime and the Courts, ch. 12) argues persuasively that
Paley's work represents a response to the critics of the late 1760s and early 1770s rather than
a response to the post-American Revolution crime wave of the mid-1780s.
122. Paley, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 535.
123. Ibid., p. 531.
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The pardoning system saved nine of every ten who had been convicted.
This was as it should be, for
the selection of proper objects for capital punishment principally
depends upon circumstances, which, however easy to perceive in each
particular case, after the crime is committed, it is impossible to
enumerate or define beforehand.J24
Paley challenged every claim of the new penology. He agreed that English
law "sweeps into the net every crime," and that, of those swept in, "a
small proportion of each class are singled out." The law makes "examples," he said: "By this expedient few actually suffer death, whilst the
dread and danger of it hang over the crimes of many. " 125 Everything that
Beccaria and his followers asserted was wrong with the English system
Paley asserted was right. Everything, that is, save for jury discretion.
Juries, Paley asserted, were too cautious, gave too many too much
benefit of the doubt:
I apprehend much harm to have been done to the community, by the
over-strained scrupulousness, or weak timidity of juries, which demands often such proof of a prisoner's guilt as the nature and secrecy
of his crime scarce possibly admit of; and which holds it part of a safe
conscience not to condemn any man, whilst there exists the minutest
possibility of his innocence. Any story they may happen to have heard
or read ... is enough, in their minds, to found an acquittal upon ....
[T]o reject such proof, from an insinuation of uncertainty that belongs
to all human affairs ... counteracts the case, and damps the activity of
government: it holds out public encouragement to villany, by confessing the impossibility of bringing villains to justice; and that species of
encouragement, which, as has been just now observed, the minds of
such men are most apt to entertain and dwell upon. 126
Paley understated the degree to which jurors were actually motivated by
the character of the defendant or the nature of his act. In fact, jurors took
into account the very considerations that Paley thought the Crown ought
to take into account. Paley's real complaint was that jury-based mitigation
resulted from consideration at the verdict stage of matters relevant to the
question of the appropriate sentence. The jury, he believed, created the
problem of inconsistent treatment of offenders: not only assessment of
guilt but also degree of punishment depended in each case on the
sympathies and inclinations of a new jury.
124. Ibid., p. 532.
125. Ibid., p. 533.
126. Ibid., pp. 550-51.
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Paley, however, agreed with the reformers on the end of punishmentthe prevention of crime. Indeed, he considered himself a reformer who
sought to make a good system work even more efficiently. Paley's stress
on prevention led him to conclude that severity of punishment ought to be
determined by difficulty of discovery and conviction, not by elusive
notions of the defendant's guilt. Crimes that were common, hard to
prevent, and equally difficult to prosecute ought to be very severely
punished-that the offender had taken a small amount surreptitiously,
rather than openly robbed his victim of a large sum, suggested he ought to
be punished more, not less, severely. Paley left questions of conscience
and guilt to God's judgment: man lacked the omniscience required to see
into the defendant's mind. 127 Small wonder that Paley had little patience
with jury discretion and instead took great pains to found his discretionary system on a regularized, formal, and consistent procedure of Crownbased mitigation.
If Paley shared with the anti-discretion reformers reservations about
the jury in common-run felony cases, he also shared with them strong
approbation of the jury's ultimate constitutional independence. Like
Dagge, Paley viewed the judge and jury as checks upon one another; the
judge instructs the jury, but the jury applies law to fact according to its
understanding.
In proportion to the acknowledged excellency of this mode of trial,
every deviation from it ought to be watched with vigilance, and
adopted by the legislature with caution. Summary convictions before
justices of the peace, especially for offenses against the game laws;
courts of conscience; extending the jurisdiction of courts of equity;
urging too far the distinction between questions of law and questions of
fact, are all so many infringements upon this great charter of public
safety. 128
Paley appears to have seen the contradictions inherent in the different
roles that he thought the jury ought to be called upon to play. He may
even have understood that a jury with secured powers of nullification of
tyrannous laws was a jury that could not be controlled easily in commonrun cases. There were, however, some risks he believed worth running,
for in his view definitions of institutional roles could never be precise in
a just political system.
The second major defense of the English law of crimes was embodied
in Martin Madan's Thoughts on Executive Justice, a tract that reflected
concern with the increase of crime in the mid-1780s and impatience with
127. Ibid., pp. 527-31.
128. Ibid., pp. 504-5.
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the penal reform writers of the preceding decade. 129 Madan openly
criticized the ethic of merciful verdicts, judgments, and sentences, and
exhorted judges and juries to apply the law as it stood. It was "fashionable with many, to find great fault with the number or severity of'' the
criminal laws; for his part, however, he deemed that the country had been
served well by them:
I may say, that the legislature has from time to time been assiduous in
meeting crimes, as they have arisen, with wholesome laws; but those,
whose duty and office it is to administer the laws, have now, for many
years, been preferring their own feelings as men, to the duty which
they owe the public as magistrates. J3o
Madan likened judicial reprieves to the hated and abandoned suspending
power exercised by the later Stuarts. The pardon power was in the Crown
and was intended to be used judiciously, not wantonly. There were cases
wherein the bench could reprieve: where it thought the jury was malicious, or the evidence insufficient, or where postconviction testimony
warranted a reversal.131 In most cases, however, the judge should invoke,
not vitiate, the rigors of the law.
Madan's famous description ofthejudge doing his awesome duty bears
repeating:
[The judge] then, in the most pathetic terms, exhorts the unhappy
convicts, to consider well how best to employ the little space that yet
remains between that moment and the grave-he acquaints them with
the certainty of speedy death, and consequently with the necessity of
speedy repentance-and on this theme he may so deliver himself, as
not only to melt the wretches at the bar into contrition, but the whole
auditory into the deepest concern. Tears express their feelings-and
many of the most thoughtless among them may, for the rest of their
lives, be preserved from thinking lightly of the first steps to vice ....
The dreadful sentence is now pronounced-every heart shakes with
terror. The almost fainting criminals are taken from the bar-the crowd
retires-each to his several home ... the day of execution arrives-the
wretches are led forth to suffer, and exhibit a spectacle ... the whole
country feels a lasting benefit. 13 2
129. Martin Madan, Thoughts on Executive Justice (2nd ed., London, 1785; orig.
published 1784). Madan's work was published a year before Paley's, but Paley's was
probably conceived substantially earlier than it was published. See above, n. 121. For a
pathbreaking analysis of the relationship between the reform tradition and the fluctuations
in real (and perceived) rates of crime, 1750-1800, see Beattie, Crime and the Courts, chs.
11-12.
130. Madan, Thoughts on Executive Justice, p. 13.
131. Ibid., p. 48.
132. Ibid., pp. 28-30. For a remarkable insight into the "day of execution" and some
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Equally imposing is Madan's description of what typically happens at
trial, and how in his view the ends of justice are frustrated by misplaced
sentiment:
But perhaps [the defendant] happens to be young-it appears to be his
first offense-he has, before the fact which is proved against him, had
a good character-he was drawn in by others-was in liquor-or some
other circumstances of the like kind strikes the minds of the jury; they
forget their oath ... and take upon themselves to acquit the prisoner,
against all fact and truth. This I have so often seen, that I cannot
forbear the mention of it. The judge, on this occasion, usually takes
little further notice of the matter, than to congratulate the prisoner on
his "narrow escape" and to tell him that "he has had a very merciful
jury. ''133
Such juries, Madan concluded, found "according to their feelings, but
against their oath. " 134 And if they could falsely acquit they might also
falsely convict-Madan did not repeat at this point that the bench might
in the latter case reprieve the defendant and recommend that he receive
a royal pardon.
Madan was not entirely opposed to reform of the law. He recognized
that laws that were too severe-i.e., undermined the principle of deterrence-required revision. 135 The problem, of course, was to design an
appropriate test of enforceability. Madan refused to accept the practices
current among bench and jurors in his own day as the proper test. He
sought instead to convince those who served in these institutions of their
duty, but "duty" was an ambiguous concept. At what point did unwillingness to convict of a capital offense or carry out the sentence not conflict
with duty? Why were not all statutes that were seldom enforced ipso facto
in need of reform? Madan sought to avoid this problem by vesting mercy
in the Crown. Judge and jury, he believed, were too close to the
condemned, whose pitiful condition overwhelmed the imagination and
left no room for the rational administration of justice. The novelty and
power of Madan's approach lay in its royalism and its indifference to the
balance of power between judge and jury, either in common-run or in
political cases. Having disregarded the need for safeguards against a
tyrannical bench, Madan was virtually the only writer of his time who did
not advert to the dilemma posed by the jury's duty to preserve the
fundamental liberties.
aspects of the "lasting benefit" that it confers see Peter Linebaugh, "The Ordinary of
Newgate and His Account," in Cockburn, ed., Crime in England, pp. 246-69.
133. Madan, Thoughts on Executive Justice, pp. 137-38.
134. Ibid., p. 138.
135. Ibid., pp. 132-33.
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Madan's tract provoked Samuel Romilly to write his first work on
reform of sanctions, Observations on ... Thoughts on Executive Justice,
a tract that brought the reformist position back into clear focus. 136
According to Romilly, Madan's theory failed on a number of grounds,
beginning with its avoidance of reality: prevention of crime could not
"possibly be attained by the mere terror of punishment"; 137 more
executions would lead to fewer convictions. One might call for enforcement, but it could not be had, "for jurors would easily quiet their
consciences upon a perjury which was the means of preventing murder." 13 8 Moreover, Madan's assumption that the legislature intended
fuller enforcement was unproven and intuitively wrong:
And indeed it is hardly possible to doubt, that the parliament had the
clemency of the crown in its contemplation, when it passed all those
modern statutes, by which new felonies are created; for that the
legislators of an enlightened age, and of a nation boastful of its
humanity, should punish the slightest offences with death, is not to be
accounted for, but upon the supposition, that those punishments are
only held out as a terror, and never intended to be inflicted but in the
most aggravated cases.J39
Romilly was far from an admirer of this legislative policy, which perhaps
thanks to Paley's defense of existing penology 140 he saw more clearly than
had Blackstone or Eden. The law, he said, was supposed to be reasonable
in order that it could be known. Clearly those most likely to commit
offenses were among those least likely to know the laws for which they
might lose their lives. Unless law accorded with justice and morality, one
could not hold all men to know it: "[N]o authority, however great, will
136. Observations on a Late Publication [by Martin Madan], intituled Thoughts on
Executive Justice [by Sir Samuel Romilly, but published anonymously] (London, 1786).
Romilly stated in his memoirs that Lord Lansdowne, who was among those "dazzled" by
Madan's book, recommended that he "write something on the same subject. This, of
course, induced me to look into the book; but I was so much shocked by the folly and
inhumanity of it, that instead of enforcing the same arguments, I sat down to refute them."
Lansdowne, Romilly stated, "highly approved" the result, but the tract "had so little
success with the public, that not more than a hundred copies were sold." Sir Samuel
Romilly, Memoirs of the Life of Sir Samuel Romil/y, 3 vols. (London, 1840), vol. I, pp.
89-90.
137. Ibid., p. 2.
138. Ibid., pp. 89-90.
139. Ibid., p. 82. See also Romilly, Memoirs, 1:370. Romilly asserted, in a letter toM.
Dumont, that the Riot Act "was certainly never meant to be executed against all who should
expose themselves to it; the only object was to hold out a terror; although it ought to have
been foreseen that the circumstance of the law not being executed would prevent its
inspiring terror." (Oct. 23, 1789).
140. Observations on a Late Publication, pp. 73-78.
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ever be able to persuade mankind, that penal laws ought to constitute a
science merely of memory, and not of reason.'' 141 Thus Romilly bitterly
attacked Madan's attempt to dress his theory of enforcement in the garb
of certainty to which Beccaria and his English adherents had appealed.1 42
Romilly suggested that tpe rich, or society at large, bore some responsibility for the crimes of the poor. Perhaps punishment ought to fall on the
better endowed in society; they, after all, were the "natural fathers and
guardians" of the poor.1 43 Not surprisingly, then, Romilly's condemnation of the law of sanctions was coupled with a plea for an expanded and
enlightened use of incarceration to reform criminal offenders. He noted
that Blackstone and Eden had drafted a ''plan for the punishment of
criminals" that was "wholly unobjectionable," characterizing it as "a
kind of asylum to that very large description of offenders, who are
rendered such by the defects of education, by pernicious connections, by
indigence, or by despair. " 144 Romilly also carried forward Fielding's
utilitarian argument for such an institution:
[W]hat it is that retards the execution of this excellent plan, it is not
easy to conjecture; for, though the expense of erecting the penitentiary
houses would be considerable, yet that is surely but a trifling object,
compared with the benefit which, as it should seem, must necessarily
result to the country from such an institution. And according to the
calculations which have been made upon the subject, when the houses
were once erected, the annual expense of maintaining them would be
more than defrayed by the earnings of the convicts. 145
Although it left little of Madan's tract unscathed, Romilly's argument
held little support for the tradition of merciful jury verdicts. Such verdicts
were inevitable, Romilly conceded, so long as the law of sanctions
remained unreformed.1 46 But with reform, jury mitigation would be
largely unnecessary and generally unwise. Conviction would lead to a
form of punishment that was both rational and humane. That was,
141. Ibid., p. 38.
142. Ibid., pp. 84-85.
143. Ibid., p. 95.
144. Ibid .• pp. 59-60.
145. Ibid., p. 61.
146. Ibid., p. 90. Romilly's remarks were addressed to Madan's argument concerning full
execution of the law. That, said Romilly, would lead juries to "take upon themselves to
judge the policy and justice of the law." It would multiply the "evils which [Madan] so well
discusses." I infer from this that Romilly agreed with Madan that, under existing circumstances, judges and juries mitigated the law. Romilly sought the opposite remedy from that
for which Madan campaigned, and it seems a fair inference that Romilly believed jury
mitigation was inevitable and just until reform came about. He characterized such mitigation
as "peJjury which was the means of preventing murder" (idem).
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however, the argument of the future. For the time being the problem of
the jury's role as a constitutional safeguard remained to be worked out. A
systematic solution to the problem of the jury in common-run felonies
might have received the attention it deserved had the problem of such
cases not been entangled with the larger constitutional crises in which,
even in the eyes of its severest critics, the jury also played an important
and controversial role. This is clear in the writings of Romilly who, two
years before publication of the critique of Madan, had himself contributed
to the debate over seditious libel:
Rigid, however, and I will add, tyrannical, as the law of libels is,
nothing is to be dreaded from it while it is administered by the paternal
hand of juries, who though they will never suffer it to be relaxed to the
encourage111ent of defamation and licentiousness, will refrain and
temper its harshness by their discretion and humanity .1 47

IV
We are still far from understanding how the criminal trial jury operated
in the eighteenth century. The process by which juries reached agreement, the degree to which jurors followed the lead of the bench, and the
extent to which jurors actually believed they were acting autonomously,
all remain beyond our ken. But the history of jury trial is in part the
history of contemporaries' perceptions of the institution. We do know
that many learned contemporaries believed that the jury was a powerful
and at least semi-autonomous institution of mitigation. And more significantly, we can reasonably infer that most laymen believed that jury-based
mitigation was a legitimate part of the administration of the criminal law.
Authorities themselves seem to have encouraged this view of the jury.
Even those jurists and lay publicists who questioned the wisdom of
existing jury practices endorsed those practices so long as the prevailing
law of sanctions remained intact. It remains, by way of conclusion, to
reconsider how this view of the jury had come to be accepted and
assimilated in a fashion that made it resistant to change.
From one perspective, the administration of the English criminal law,
of which the jury was but one element, appears to have been a calculated
and manipulated expression of the authority of what might be called the
ruling classes. 148 This view helps one to understand what has seemed a
147. Sir Samuel Romilly, A Fragment on the Constitutional Power and Duty of Juries
upon Trials for Libels (London, 1784), p. 3. Romilly comments upon the tract in his
Memoirs, 1:86-87. I have used the copy of Fragment that is in Houghton Library, Harvard
University.
148. See Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law." Hay does not argue that the
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paradox in the criminal law of the eighteenth century: the multiplication
of capital statutes alongside their fairly general nonenforcement. The
argument holds that these statutes expressed the interests of the propertied classes and provided them with tools for protection of those interests.
But it also recognizes the political and social difficulties that would have
ensued from strict enforcement of the statutes and argues that the ruling
elites had more to gain from only selective enforcement. These groups
administered a program that combined terror with mercy. N onenforcement was thus made to seem an aspect of justice and majesty, and it
therefore also created a debt: England's rulers continued to reap a harvest
of deference from those they ruled. In those cases in which the law was
applied to the fullest, the thesis runs, there was attention to justification:
enforcement was characterized by "circumspection" and "delicacy." 149
How accurate a view of the administration of the criminal law does this
perspective afford? Certainly some contemporaries analyzed the administration of the law in these terms; 15° for them this selective-enforcement
theme became a rationalization for maintaining the status quo in the face
of growing pressures for legal, and especially penal, reform. But their
perspective was limited by their own social position; they perhaps failed
to appreciate fully the point of view of those below them. No doubt the
administration of the criminal law, and especially the practice of selective
enforcement, emphasized the majesty of the law and engendered deference toward those who administered it. But these were incidents of a
system that involved far more complex processes than solely the machination of a ruling class or classes.
As we have seen, the selective enforcement of the law of felony
resulted from the circumstances of the origins of that law. The Crown had
always had to struggle to make its legal mandate effective. It had
frequently complained about nonenforcement, announcing its own weakness while pleading for obedience. lSI At the same time, English rulers had
attempted to convert this weakness into strength through the use of
pardons, benefit of clergy, and the pragmatic acceptance and even
encouragement of merciful jury verdicts. If these devices underscored the
beneficence and majesty of the law, they did not conceal from contemlaw was devised with these ends in mind or that all aspects of law enforcement were
designed to take advantage of the class power inherent in the law. He is mainly concerned
with the reasons for the reluctance of some of the ruling groups to reform the law.
149. Idem.
150. E.g. Paley, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, above, nn. 103 et seq. and
accompanying text. See also above, n. 32 and contemporary writings cited therein. Some
observers (e.g. Fielding) opposed pardons but favored the use of executions to strike terror.
They were not clearly endorsing selective enforcement.
151. See above, Chapter 3.
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poraries the fact that literal enforcement of capital felony laws lay beyond
the power of the Crown. In practice, enforcement was a matter of an
accommodation in which, at one stage or another, many parties played
important roles .152
If some property owners failed to prosecute their thieving tenants in
hopes of strengthening the bonds of affection that flowed upward, others
looked the other way knowing that prosecution, if it succeeded, would
destroy those bonds and increase the numbers of the unemployed and of
professional thieves.t 53 Still others may have doubted the success of
prosecution altogether, for even propertied jurors could not be counted
on to hang, or even to punish with severity, perpetrators of relatively
minor offenses. We cannot be certain that grand juries would have
followed the lead of prosecutors had capital punishment been resorted to
with substantially greater frequency. For one thing, the testimony of
witnesses might have been far harder to come by. Indeed, those suspected and captured in the first place were only a fraction of the total
number who had broken a capital law, and that fraction might have been
smaller still in a world of strict enforcement against all those taken and
indicted. 154
Mainly, of course, it was a matter of jury behavior that the Crown and
bench had to accommodate. We have considered the circumstances that
152. This theme runs through much of the recent literature on the social history of the
English criminal law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. I have elsewhere
suggested the importance of this approach to law enforcement-one often manifested in
practices regarding enforcement at the county or more local level-for jury behavior (and
officials' reactions toward that behavior) at the assizes. See my review of Cockburn, ed.,
Crime in England, in American Journal of Legal History, vol. 23 (1979), pp. 357-62. For
relevant studies of criminal law enforcement see e.g. Samaha, "Hanging for Felony";
Herrup, "Common Peace"; J. A. Sharpe, "Crime and Delinquency in an Essex Parish
1600--1640," in Cockburn, ed., Crime in England, pp. 90--109; M. J. Ingram, "Communities
and Courts: Law and Disorder in Early-Seventeenth-Century Wiltshire," in ibid., pp.
110--34; Keith Wrightson, "Two Concepts of Order: Justices, Constables, and Jurymen in
Seventeenth-Century England," in Brewer and Styles, eds., An Ungovernable People, pp.
21-46; T. C. Curtis, "Quarter Sessions Appearances and their Background: A SeventeenthCentury Regional Study," in ibid., pp. 135-54; P. B. Munsche, "The Game Laws in
Wiltshire 1750--1800," in ibid., pp. 210--28; Cal Winslow, "Sussex Smugglers," in Hay et al.,
eds,, Albion's Fatal Tree, pp. 119-66; John G. Rule, "Wrecking and Coastal Plunder," in
ibid., pp. 167-88; Douglas Hay, "Poaching and the Game Laws on Cannock Chase," in
ibid., pp. 189-253; Thompson, Whigs and Hunters; Timothy Curtis, "Explaining Crime in
Early Modern England," in Criminal Justice History, vol. 1 (1980), pp. 117-37; Lenman and
Parker, "The State, the Community and the Criminal Law in Early Modern Europe," in
Gatrell et al., eds., Crime and the Law, pp. 11-48; Sharpe, "Enforcing the Law in the
Seventeenth-Century English Village," in ibid., pp. 97-119.
153. See Munsche, "The Game Laws in Wiltshire," pp. 222-23.
154. See generally Beattie, Crime and the Courts. Beattie's findings contain at least
implicit support for the overall argument I am making.
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made accommodation-with both loss of face and enhanced majestymore attractive than literal enforcement through coercion of juries. There
had always been a significant number of false accusations. Before the
sixteenth century, authorities lacked the means to separate these from the
cases involving trumped up verdicts. As the means of monitoring jury
behavior developed, the bench employed its powers-usually, if not
always, with success-to ensure the outcome of what it considered
egregious cases. But pressures of time, the development of an enforceable, yet relatively severe lesser sanction (transportation), and the
by-then powerful social expectations regarding both the role of the jury
and the appropriate use of the gallows dissuaded legal officials from
inducing capital verdicts much more often than they had in the past.
Although by the eighteenth century the increase in property crimes and
the sense of insecurity felt by the urban rich and rural propertied may
have contributed to passage of legislation making more offenses capital,
or making common-law mandates more explicit, there is little reason to
believe that legislators imagined they were any more capable than their
predecessors of strictly enforcing the law.
More than any other institution within the administration of criminal
law, the trial jury reflected the limits of the power that authorities could
bring to bear on those they ruled. Some juries could be effectively
manipulated, or depended upon to deal harshly with property violations,
but most jurors in most cases could be relied upon only insofar as
authorities expected them to apply the law strictly in the cases that most
of society itself thought especially serious. Authorities might derive
benefit (in the form of respect for the law as well as outright deference)
from jury-based intervention, perhaps the most prevalent form of selective enforcement, but the standards governing that process of selection
were not theirs to set at will.
The choices were obvious. Law could be administered in summary
fashion by a magistrate or according to the traditional mode of trial by
judge and jury. Although Parliament increased the scope of offenses
summarily triable by justices of the peace sitting without a jury, 155 jury
trial was maintained in all felonies, as much for widely shared notions of
justice as for narrowly conceived reasons of politics. Of those brought to
trial only some-by virtue of background, reputation, attitude toward
authority, or the nature of the offense itself-deserved to die. That
decision did not have to be made-and perhaps ought not to be madeunilaterally by a judge. The judge might steer the process when it reached
the trial stage, leading the jurors, who, given the standards the bench
155. Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law," p. 59; Baker, "Criminal Courts
and Procedure," pp. 22, 24.
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itself adopted, typically desired judicial leadership. The judge might
comment upon the virtues of mercy and even, in some instances, go
significantly beyond the jury in extending it. So far did the ruling elites
adopt the posture of merciful law givers; so effectively did they make
what may have been the best of a system in which enforcement was not
commanded by the simple fiat of those elites, but depended upon and
suited the views and interests of society generally.
From one perspective, the propertied classes created a network of laws
they had no intention of fully enforcing; nonenforcement was itself a tool
worth forging. From another, the law, at least at the capital level, was in
fact "enforced," for the process of enforcement involved a multistage
examination of the character and behavior of persons suspected of acts
denominated felonies by common law or legislation. To state the law
regarding capital offenses one had really to talk in terms of processes and
resolutions. Not all felons deserved to be executed, but all (save for petty
larcenists) were subject to a determination of whether they numbered
among those who did. From this perspective, the law was not really
mitigated, it was simply applied in the appropriate fashion. It was as
though capital legislation read: persons who act in such a way are subject
to death, transportation, imprisonment, or whipping, by determination of
Crown, judge, and jury. The legal system as it was in fact devised, with
its superabundant claims upon the lives of men, would have been
intolerable had it not in practice accommodated the realities of contemporary social life, had it not reflected how far England's rulers, both in
their brutality and their leniency, had adopted the standards and approaches to law enforcement of those they ruled.I56
156. Hay ("Property, Authority and the Criminal Law," p. 61) asserts that "when we ask
who controlled the criminal law, we see a familiar constellation: monarchy, aristocracy,
gentry and, to a lesser extent, the great merchants. In numbers they were no more than 3
percent of the population.'' Hay says relatively little about juries. His argument is more
plausible with respect to the summary powers of justices of the peace, the attitudes of
members of Parliament, the disposition of those who administered the granting of royal
pardons, and the language employed by judges when sentencing convicts to the gallows than
it is with regard to either the behavior of trial jurors or the attitudes of the bench and the
aristocracy generally toward that behavior. What Hay does say indicates he has mainly in
mind juries in cases involving poaching and related offenses, where often landed jurors faced
unpropertied defendants (See Langbein, "Albion's Fatal Flaws," pp. 107-08), though his
remarks in "Poaching and the Game Laws in Cannock Chase" suggest that even in those
cases jurors were not truly aligned with the propertied classes (pp. 189, 211). Hay might
believe that those who "controlled the criminal law" controlled juries, or that juries
typically sought to please (or at any rate not to displease) their social betters on the bench
or in Parliament. [For an emphatic statement of this view see Peter Linebaugh, "(Marxist)
Social History and (Conservative) Legal History: A Reply to Professor Langbein,"
unpublished paper (1984). I am grateful to Professor Linebaugh for allowing me to see his
essay.] I have argued that while this was doubtless true in many cases, the standards that the
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Maintaining the form of mitigation-of suspension of a blanket capital
law-no doubt enhanced the authority and prestige of the ruling classes.
It was a solution produced by history, both forced upon those classes and
turned by them to their best advantage. But it was not without its costs.
Sharing powers of mitigation meant defining jury trial in a certain way.
Authorities first inherited and then enhanced an ethic of jury application
of the law that they would not always find it easy to contain. The
perpetuation of that ethic reflected the acquiescence of authorities in
general social standards in common-run felony cases-so long, i.e., as
those standards wore the stamp and ritual of official decision making-but
it did not reflect a concurrence of opinion in other, more "political"
cases. This, as we shall see, was to prove a critical problem in English
governance. Moreover, there were other signs of unhappiness with the
administration of a criminal law based upon dispersed powers of mitigation. There were some contemporaries who had begun to ask whether,
after all, such an administration of law accorded with the best interests of
society generally and of the propertied classes in particular.
The reform literature of the eighteenth century provides an important
commentary upon the system. Read in conjunction with the trial descriptions of the more casual observers of the day, this literature suggests that
many contemporaries viewed the criminal trial jury as relatively autonomous but not engaged in a struggle with the bench. But it also suggests
that learned Englishmen exaggerated the degree of jury latitude that
characterized everyday practice and underestimated the degree to which
verdicts must have fit fairly settled and predictable patterns, patterns that
mirrored not only the attitudes of the bench and of the common
Englishmen who served as jurors but the expectations of most offenders.
small ruling elite adopted were themselves in part a reflection of the attitudes of a very large
part of society. This was true both with regard to substantive standards and with regard to
the matter of who was permitted to apply those standards. One of the most powerful
techniques of rulership was to allow even relatively lower-class juries to sort out (within
limits) cases according to their own sense of justice. With regard to the administration of the
criminal law in the eighteenth century, the concept of "control" (as I believe Hay would
agree) must allow for this dialectical interplay of attitudes. At some point, certainly with
regard to the use of the criminal trial jury, one might want to replace the word "control"
with the word "management'' -the management of the administration of criminal justice in
a fashion that redounded to the benefit of both managers and managed. Very possibly, the
managers enhanced their control over the managed as a by-product of the managers'
acquiescence in such a system of criminal law. I elaborate upon this point in Chapter 9. See
"Introduction," in Brewer and Styles, eds., An Ungovernable People, p. 19. The editors
make the related point that society at large had access to use or to challenge many aspects
of the legal system; this fact helped to convince society of the existence of the rule of law
and "helped humbler men to reach a grudging accommodation with the more egregious
aspects of the criminal process." I have stressed direct access to the system of criminal law
itself.
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Both the reformers and their critics failed to appreciate the extent to
which judge and jury conditioned each other's perspective and behavior
within a legal culture that developed and applied its own informal rules of
law in a relatively consistent fashion.
The reform literature also reveals several important contradictions
inherent in prevailing attitudes toward crime, criminals, and the administration of the criminal law. First, as we have seen, contemporaries who
favored reform of the law of capital sanctions and a concomitant
reduction of the need for jury intervention tended to regard such
intervention as both inevitable and just in the unreformed present. Their
writings thus offered support to those seeking to justify jury-based
intervention.
Moreover (and, ultimately, perhaps more important), many of the
reform writers viewed criminal behavior as a product of social conditions,
including among those conditions the existing administration of the
criminal law. They coupled their support for reform of the law of
sanctions with a call for rehabilitation. Reformers thus accepted one of
the ideas implicit in contemporary social thought and in the prevailing
system of commutation-the notion that much crime was socially
caused-and, carrying that idea part way to its logical conclusion, they
rejected both the manner in which the sentencing procedure was implemented and the principal form of treatment (transportation) of those
offenders who were spared. But these writers also clung to a notion of free
will and suggested by implication that it was for existing institutions to
sort out the truly guilty from the great mass of relatively unfree offenders.
Once again, in the decades preceding reform, the reformers provided a
justification for age-old jury practices.
Finally, few reformers supposed that reform of sanctions would entirely remove the need for an ultimate right of jury intervention. Romilly
had already written in defense of the jury in seditious libel cases when he
turned his attention to the problem of sanctions in common-run felonies;I57 Dawes produced a similar tract on seditious libel two years after
the publication of his Essay on Crimes and Punishments. 158 We shall see
that Blackstone and others also-though in more moderate languageglorified the historical role of juries in political cases and suggested that
the jury might again someday have to play a similar role. Though most of
these later writers believed that the settlement of 1689 rendered unlikely
a return to executive and judicial tyranny, they too offered a powerful
argument for true nullification of the law to those contemporaries who
thought such a turn of events had already come to pass. Perhaps as a
157. See above, n. 147 and accompanying text.
158. See below, Chapter 8, text at n. 58.
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result, reform would come only after a political and legal crisis in which
the virtues of an ultimate (though rarely resorted to) right of true jury lawfinding were openly debated and widely accepted.

8

The Jury, Seditious Libel, and the
Criminal Law

The seditious libel trials of the eighteenth century constitute an important
chapter in the history of freedom of the press and the growth of
democratic government. While much has been written about them and
about the administration of the criminal law in eighteenth-century England, little has been said about the relationship between the libel
prosecutions and the more pervasive and longstanding problems of the
criminal law. 1 We have perhaps gone too far in positing-or simply
assuming-a separation between political high misdemeanors and
common-run felony cases such as homicide and theft. There were,
however, points of contact between the two; most notably, the trial jury
was employed in both. This conjunction raises the question of whether
the use of the jury in the one kind of case influenced thinking about how
it ought to be used in the other. I shall explore this subject in light of the
tract literature of the seditious libel crisis. I hope thereby to elucidate the
oft-repeated arguments concerning the jury's right to decide law as well as
fact, and to characterize the kinds of knowledge that pro-jury writers
thought jurors were to bring to their task. Finally, I shall set forth some
tentative conclusions concerning the place of the seditious libel episode
and its resolution in the history of the jury and the administration of
criminal law.
At the time of the seditious libel crisis the two strands of jury
law-finding theory that we have traced remained intact, one still active,
the other largely historical. The tradition of merciful acquittals and partial
1. E.g. Holdsworth, History of English Law, 10:672-96. (Much of Holdsworth's account
of the seditious libel law, its interpretation by Mansfield and others in the major trials, and
Fox's Libel Act and its aftermath remains adequate. I sketch in the necessary details but do
not replicate Holdsworth's lengthy account. I stress those details essential for my own
purpose, which is to assess the manner in which those contemporaries who commented on
the matter thought about the problem of the jury's role in seditious libel cases.) See also e.g.
Leonard W. Levy, Legacy of Suppression (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), pp. 88-175; Frederick
Seaton Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England, 1447-1776 (Urbana, Ill., 1965), pp.
269-75, 380-92; H. M. Lubasz, "Public Opinion Comes of Age: Reform of the Libel Law in
the Eighteenth Century," History Today, vol. 8 (1958), pp. 453-61; Robert Rea, The English
Press and Politics: 1760-1774 (Lincoln, Nebr., 1963); John Brewer, "The Wilkites and the
Law, 1763-1774," in Brewer and Styles, eds., An Ungovernable People (New Brunswick,
N.J., 1980), pp. 128-71; Patrick Devlin, The Judge (Oxford, 1981), pp. 119-26.
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verdicts in common-run cases continued apace with something close to
official acquiescence. Although true nullification of judicial instructions
was not officially approved, some very respectable jurists not only lauded
the nullifying behavior of juries in certain pre-1689 political cases, but,
more significantly, could be read as suggesting that there might be
occasions on which juries would once again be duty-bound to play that
role.
The seditious libel tracts reflect the influence of these strands of thought
in a variety of ways. Especially, they reveal both the extent to which the
radical jury proponents were able to build upon the views of the more
conventional, establishment writers and the importance of the interplay
between notions of true nullification in political prosecutions and the
tradition of merciful verdicts in common-run cases. After briefly describing the seditious libel controversy (section I) I shall examine these and
other themes in the course of considering varying views of the constitutional role of the criminal trial jury (section II) and the tract writers'
approach to finding law (section III), finding fact (section IV), and
applying law to fact (section V). My conclusion (section VI) puts the
seditious libel controversy into historical perspective regarding social,
political, and constitutional aspects of the institution of trial by jury.

I
The common law crime of seditious libel can be broadly characterized
as the intentional publication of a writing that ''scandalized'' the government, i.e., tended to bring it into disesteem. Although indictments for
seditious libel generally alleged that the accused had acted ''falsely,
seditiously, maliciously and factiously," the jury was to render what
amounted to a special verdict in the form of a general verdict of "guilty"
if it found that the accused intentionally published the writing and if it
found that the writing bore the meaning alleged by the prosecution. The
origins of the seditious libel doctrine lay in Star Chamber practice, but the
doctrine was given final form early in the eighteenth century by Chief
Justice Holt.2 Significantly, the law did not recognize truth as a defense.3
Moreover, as we have seen, it assigned to the court as matters oflaw two
questions that had the appearance of questions of fact: whether the act
was done with criminal intent, and whether the writing was seditious or
defamatory. It was perhaps plausible to consider the latter question one of
2. Hamburger, "Origins of the Law of Seditious Libel," passim. See above, Chapter 6,
nn. 208-10 and accompanying text, for discussion of seditious libel in the seventeenth
century. On Holt's modification of that doctrine see Hamburger, ibid., pp. 85-115.
3. Holdsworth, History of English Law, 8:336-42, esp., 339.
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law because the nature of the crime typically meant that the entire record
of the allegedly criminal act was embodied in a physical specimen that
survived for judicial inspection. It was less plausible to cast the question
of criminal intent as one oflaw to be inferred by the court. On both counts
the doctrine
was strongly resisted, from the Restoration trials of Care 4 and
/
Harris 5 in 1680 and the great case of the Seven Bishops6 on the eve of the
Glorious Revolution down to the reform of the doctrine by means of
Fox's Libel Act in 1792.7
We may note briefly the major phases of the seditious libel debate in the
eighteenth century. From the perspective of nearly all the participants in
that debate, the Seven Bishops' Case had taken on the garb of hallowed
precedent. Most writers saw that great courtroom drama as an act by
which the people paved the way for the constitutional settlement that
followed the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89, wherein Englishmen consigned the law to its rightful place-the protective arms of an independent
judiciary.s The case, which was tried in a highly charged political
atmosphere, involved the prosecution of seven bishops who refused to
read James II's Declaration of Indulgence in their churches. Because the
bench divided on the question of whether the petition constituted a libel,
that question was left, de facto, to the jury.9 The acquittal of the bishops
was taken to be both a rejection of James's pro-Catholic policies and a
vindication, against the views of the bench, of the jury's right to
determine the questions of intent and libelousness. The case became a
precedent for opposition to tyranny, an act of last resort: jury nullification
of the official doctrine of seditious libel, on which the bench had not una
voce insisted, had saved the constitution. Yet for some, this did not
require rejection of the Stuart doctrine of seditious libel. An independent
and impartial bench could be trusted (or so the theory ran) to assign and
4. State Trials, 7:1111-30 (1680). (Alternatively spelled: Carr.)
5. Ibid., pp. 926-32 (1680).
6. Ibid., 12:183-434 (1688).
7. 32 Geo. 3, c. 60 (1792). Technically, criminal intent was not at issue in seditious libel.
If the court found that the writing was seditious, it held that the defendant constructively
intended the consequences of the act of publication. Fox's Act left the jury in a position
where it could apply the judge's instructions on seditiousness; in the course of doing so, the
jury was supposed to imply the requisite intent if it found the publication seditious. The jury
was thus in a position to consider whether in fact there had been actual defaming intentonly in that sense had the issue been "left" to the jury-though to do so was to go against
the instructions and, hence, against the Act. See below, text at nn. 62-64.
8. Act of Settlement (1701), in E. N. Williams, comp. and trans., The Eighteenth Century
Constitution (Cambridge, 1965), p. 59: "[J]udges commissions be made quamdiu se bene
gesserint and their salaries ascertained and established; but upon the address of both houses
of parliament it may be lawful to remove them."
9. See above, Chapter 6, text at nn. 232-34.
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determine all questions of law. Thus, in the century after the Glorious
Revolution, much of the legal establishment both accepted the constitutional settlement and adhered to the essential elements of the Stuart law
oflibel. 10 For many others, however, the Seven Bishops' Case stood for
more. It was a vindication of the integrity of the general verdict. For some
this meant only that the traditional role ofthe trial jury, the finding of fact
and the application to fact of the law as given by the bench, was
preserved. Others, as we shall see, envisioned the general verdict as
including not merely application of the law but also true law-finding.
From the outset the eighteenth-century debate concerning the seditious
libel doctrine was couched largely in Restoration terms. 11 Chief Justice
Raymond succinctly restated Holt's formulation of the Stuart doctrine in
Rex v. Franklin in 1731, setting forth a division of judge-jury responsibilities that the courts would attempt to enforce until the passage of Fox's
Libel Act. 12 His opinion, in turn, revived the Restoration defense of the
criminal trial jury. Late in 1732, John Rawles's 1680 tract, The
Englishman's Right, was reprinted for the first time. The new preface,
signed by one J. K., warned of developments that threatened to destroy
all that had been won in the Glorious Revolution and commended the
tract "in which the original design, duty and power of jurors are so clearly
10. Mansfield, in St. Asaph's Case (State Trials, 21:1040) espoused the commonly held
point of view as follows: "Jealousy of leaving the law to the Court, as in other cases, so in
the case of libels, is now, in the present state of things, puerile rant and declamation. The
judges are totally independent of the ministers that may happen to be, and of the King
himself." (Emphasis added.) Mansfield took the view that the opponents of the official
doctrine sought to make an exception of the law of libel: in that case alone the jury would
find law as well as fact. A similar view can be found in an unpublished manuscript, "Sketch
of an answer to a Pamphlet, entitled 'Letter concerning Libels, Warrants and Seizures of
Papers,' "(B.L. MS Add. 35, 887, fols. 171 et seq.), probably written in 1765 in reply to the
second edition of "Father of Candor's" famous work (see below, n. 117). As the present
study makes clear, most pro-jury writers took the view that the jury was to find law as well
as fact in libel, as in other cases. From their perspective, libel was currently an exception
under the official doctrine, and ought not to be so.
II. Hamburger ("Origins of the Law of Seditious Libel," see above, Chapter 6, nn. 210,
238) argues that the doctrine was still loosely formulated at the time of the Harris and Care
prosecutions (1680) and that it received its crystallization between 1696 and 1706, mainly at
the hands of Chief Justice Holt. What I refer to as the "Stuart law of libel" is the set of
doctrines that I believe were emerging in the period before the Seven Bishops' Case and that
some Restoration tract writers understood (perhaps wrongly) to be the settled official
doctrine. As Hamburger demonstrates, Holt's modification of these doctrines toward the
end of the Stuart period was of great importance, but these changes concerned the definition
of libel, not the allocation-of-powers question. Holt did not place greater restrictions on the
jury's fact-finding responsibilities than the major Restoration critics of seditious libel
assumed were already part of the law. The response to the Seven Bishops' Case must be
understood, at least in part, in the light of the assumptions made by earlier critics.
12. State Trials, 17:625-76 (1731).
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explained, that it will be sufficient to instruct all those, who shall, on these
occasions, have the lives and properties of their fellow subjects in their
hands."l3 In the tract itself Rawles argued that in all cases, including
libel, juries were the true judges of law as well as of fact, not simply that
in libel cases seditiousness and intent were matters of fact for the jury . 14
The reprinting of Rawles was closely followed by the publication in
England of the report of Zenger's Case (1735). Defense counsel for the
New York printer, Zenger, had drawn upon Rawles, and in England the
combination of the tract and the trial (Zenger had been acquitted) now
helped to launch a half-century-long attack on the law of libel and the
abuse of trial by jury it allegedly involved.
After Franklin's trial the contest over the doctrine of seditious libel falls
into three principal stages. In 1752, the Crown tried by special jury
(frequently the practice in seditious libel cases) a bookseller named
William Owen for the sale of a tract critical of the House of Commons.Is
Chief Justice Lee, on the urging of the solicitor general, William Murray
(the future Lord Mansfield), charged the jury in accordance with
Raymond's statement of the law. The jury, after hearing testimony
regarding Owen's character and loyalty to the Crown and Camden's
argument that the right to criticize Parliament was fundamental, acquitted
the defendant. Underlying Camden's argument for the defense was the
principle that, notwithstanding the bench's view of the law of seditious
libel, the jury, unless it was convinced that the allegations of falsity and
13. Rawles, Englishman's Right (London, 1732), pp. iv-vii.
14. Ibid., pp. 10-18.
15. State Trials, 18:1203-30 (1752). The special jury was employed in a wide range of civil
and criminal cases, though not in felonies. Typically, in seditious libel prosecutions, special
juries were drawn from a panel of persons of higher social and economic status than those
on panels for ordinary juries. Their rank was by no means exalted. The jurors who tried
Owen were described as follows: merchant, sugar-baker, linen-draper, draper, draper,
grocer, hosier, grocer, oilman, merchant, merchant, grocer. No doubt authorities attempted
to secure a jury that would defer to the bench on rulings oflaw, but authorities met with little
success in seditious libel. Owen's jury was hardly alone in resisting strict application of the
seditious libel doctrine. Contemporaries occasionally criticized the use of special juries in
seditious libel cases, but surprisingly little attention was paid to the matter, perhaps because
many defendants fared well at the hands of the middling sort who sat on special juries.
Indeed, at least one defendant complained that summons for special jurors had not issued
sufficiently early to ensure a full complement, with the result that talesmen had to be used
to fill out nearly half of the jury. [John Miller, the publisher, tried in 1770. See The
Freeholder's Magazine (London), vol. 2 (July, 1770), pp. 252 et seq.]. The Freeholder's
Magazine (ibid., p. 195) ended its report of Woodfall's trial with the comment that the jury
(which found the defendant "guilty of printing and publishing only") was composed of seven
special jurors and five "tales or common jurymen." For the background to the special jury
see generally the excellent account in Oldham, "Origins of the Special Jury."

The Jury, Seditious Libel, and the Criminal Law

323

scandalous intent in the indictment had been proved, must acquit.t 6
Two anonymously authored, strongly pro-jury tracts followed immediately upon the prosecution of Owen. The tracts reflect the two quite
different approaches that opponents of the seditious libel doctrine
adopted over the course of the eighteenth century. An Address to the
Jurymen of London 17 drew heavily upon Rawles, arguing that the jury
must acquit if it is convinced that the facts charged in the indictment do
not amount to a crime. Attached to the tract was a "Letter to be read to
all Jurymen," signed: "Britannicus," which also drew upon the Restoration tracts and Zenger's Case and which asserted that the jury must be
convinced of the "crime of the fact. " 18 On the other hand, The Doctrine
of Libels and the Duty of Juries fairly Statedt9 at once conceded that
juries were judges of fact only and insisted that the jury must consider all
the "circumstances," (e.g., truth, intent) involved.2o The author thus
seems to have adopted Camden's strategy, and, like Camden, made much
of the analogy to the jury's fact-finding role in cases of homicide.
Inflammatory rhetoric about "law-finding" had no place in this style of
argument.
The second stage in the English government's use of seditious libel laws
to silence criticism of its policies began in 1763 with the prosecution of
John Wilkes for his famous No. 45 of The North Briton,2 1 and climaxed in
1770 with the prosecution, on informations ex officio, of those who
published and sold the "Junius" letter protesting the official policy on the
American colonies. Mansfield, as Chief Justice of King's Bench, enunciated what had become the established law of seditious libel in the trials of
the bookseller John Almon, 22 and the publishers Henry Woodfall2 3 and
16. State Trials, 18:1227-28. "Then, gentlemen, to show you how necessary it is to prove
the intention; if there is an indictment preferred against a man for an assault, with an
intention to ravish; the intention must be proved, or else the jury cannot find him guilty. The
same of an assault with an intention to kill, if the intention is not proved, he must be
. acquitted. If he kills, and the intention is not proved, that is, if it is not proved that he killed
premeditatedly and of forethought, it is but manslaughter. Therefore in the case before us,
if that part of the information is not proved, that he published maliciously, etc., you must
acquit him."
17. An Address to the Jurymen of London. By a Citizen (2nd ed., London, 1755, orig.
published 1752).
18. Ibid., p. 22.
19. The Doctrine of Libels and the Duties of Juries fairly Stated (London, 1752).
20. Ibid., pp. 14-15, 29-30.
21. State Trials, 19:982-1002, 1075-1138 (1763-70).
22. Ibid., 20:803-68 (1770).
23. Ibid., pp. 895-922 (1770). See also the account in The Freeholder's Magazine, vol. 2
(June, 1770), pp. 192 et seq., esp. p. 195 .
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John Miller.24 Glynn, who defended all three, followed Camden's arguments in Rex v. Owen, at times verbatim. The Crown obtained a
conviction in the case of Almon. The Woodfalljury, however, returned a
verdict of "Guilty of printing and publishing only," which resulted in a
judicial order for a new trial that was never held, and at the close of
Miller's trial the jury returned a verdict of "not guilty" despite clear
evidence of publication. These widely publicized "Junius" trials, together with Mansfield's consistent refusal to charge the jury that it should
consider the question of criminal intent, provoked debate in Parliament
over the seditious libel law. Glynn introduced the question of reform in
the Commons;zs Camden and Chatham supported him in the Lords.26
They could not, however, agree on a new formulation. On the other side,
opponents of an enquiry into the matter voiced their complete trust in the
judges, including Mansfield. Solicitor General Thurlow may have spoken
for many when he raised the specter of jury control over the law and of
the dissolution of judicial authority .27 Some twenty years would elapse
before sufficient support could be mustered to pass a bill giving the jury
the right to return a true general verdict in cases of seditious libel.
The period 1764-70 produced a spate of major seditious libel tracts.
These tracts fall into two groups: the first in the wake of Wilkes's arrest
and prosecution in the mid-1760s; the second around 1770, when the
Wilkites and proponents of Almon furiously attacked Mansfield. The first
series of tracts was composed of attacks on the official doctrine and
replies to those attacks; it is not always possible to determine to which
pro-jury tract a defender of the prevailing doctrine meant to reply.
Possibly the earliest of the dissident tracts was Joseph Towers's Enquiry
into the Question, Whether Juries are, or not, Judges of Law as Well as
of Fact. 2 s Like the writings of the preceding decade, Enquiry seems very
dependent upon Rawles and recites as well from the Guide to Juries of
1682 "that all that the judges do is but advice. " 29 Towers analogized to
homicide, but he chose to characterize his description of the jury's role in
such cases as determining law as well as fact. Perhaps the most important
24. State Trials, 20:869-96 (1770). See also The Freeholder's Magazine, vol. 2 (July,
1770), pp. 252 et seq.
25. The Parliamentary History of England (hereafter cited as Parliamentary History),
ed. W. Cobbett (vols.l-12) and T. C. Hansard (vols. 13-36) (London, 1806-20), vol. 16, cols.
1212-15. The ensuing debate in the Commons runs from col. 1215 to col. 1301. The issue had
already arisen in the course of the debate over informations ex officio. See cols. 1124-90.
26. Ibid., cols. 1302-6, 1312 et seq.
27. For Thurlow's speeches see ibid., cols. 1146, 1290-93.
28. Joseph Towers, An Enquiry into the Question, Whether Juries are, or not, Judges of
Law as Well as of Fact; With a particular Reference to the Case of Libels (London, 1764).
29. Ibid., p. 54.
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early pro-Administration tract was the Letter from Candor to the Public
Advertiser (1764).30 According to "Candor," there was nothing new about
the prevailing doctrine: Mansfield applied the law largely as it had been
applied by Jeffreys, a point that most critics of Mansfield were willing
(even anxious) to concede.3I In defending the law against the claims of the
pro-jury writers, "Candor" recognized that there might be mitigating
circumstances. But these, he said, were for consideration by the judge
after the jury convicted, as it must do if it found that the defendant had
published the alleged libel.3 2 "Candor" understood how defendants were
relieved from overly harsh sanctions in criminal cases generally, but he
strongly denied that it was appropriate for the jury to undertake such
mercy.
In reply to "Candor" came An Enquiry into the Doctrine . . .
concerning Libels, Warrants, and the Seizure of Papers by "Father of
Candor,"33 and in counterpoint to "Father of Candor," the famous
Considerations on the Legality of General Warrants, to which was added
"A Postscript on a late pamphlet concerningjuries, libels, etc. " 34 "Father
of Candor" characterized intent and seditiousness as questions of fact,
thus matters for the jury, and proceeded to discuss how ajury ought to go
about deciding whether a writing was libelous. "Father of Candor"
suggested that, simply put, "plain truth and fact, and common sense"
were at issue. 35 He thus opened up discussion of what was required of
jurors and of the competence of the average jury, issues that loomed large
in the debate over the next several decades. The "Postscript" to
Considerations contained a particularly trenchant attack on the pro-jury
position, one that referred to jurors as "illiterate" and "unused to legal
ideas. " 36 While conceding that jurors played a full role in homicide, the
"Postscript" insisted that they merely found the facts and were bound to
follow the judge's direction upon the law. If the jurors had any doubt
about the law, they were to return a special verdict summarizing the facts
they had found and to leave pronouncement of the general verdict to the
30. A Letter from Candor to the Public Advertiser (3rd. ed., London, 1770, orig.
published 1764).
31. Ibid., p. 5.
32. Ibid., p. 18.
33. An Enquiry into the Doctrine, Lately Propagated, concerning Libels, Warrants, and
the Seizure of Papers ... in a Letter to Mr. Almon from the Father of Candor (London,
1764).

34. Considerations on the Legality of General Warrants, and the propriety of a
Parliamentary regulation of the same. To which is added "A Postscript on a late pamphlet
concerning juries, libels, etc." (2nd ed., London, 1765, orig. published 1765).
35. Enquiry into the Doctrine, p. ll.
36. "Postscript" to Considerations, pp. 42-43.
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judge.37 (This, according to the author of "Postscript," is what the jury
ought to have done in the Seven Bishops' Case.)3 8 In libel more than in
other cases, the jury was likely "to be under the influence of popular
passions, "39 and thus ought to hold closely to finding fact.
"Postscript" to Considerations drew its own reply, Postscript to the
Letter, on Libels . .. In Answer to a Postscript in Defence of the Majority,
and . . . Considerations . . . ,40 which asserted that in libels it was
particularly important that the jury play its historic role, for the Court in
such cases was not likely to be impartial.4I That role, the tract stated, was
set forth by Lilburne at the end of his 1649 trial. 42 Thus, the tract
suggested a far-reaching interpretation of law-finding, though it is not
entirely clear that the author understood what Lilburne had been getting
at. Postscript ... In Answer charged that the author of the "Postscript"
to Considerations took a view of the jury that was "much too lowly and
contemptuous, owing I presume to his education on the Northern side of
the Tweed, where very little use is made of them. " 4 3
The positions rehearsed in these and other tracts were repeated by
proponents and critics of the prevailing doctrine in the heated political
atmosphere of 1770. 44 Virtually all of the London papers carried news
stories, editorial comments, book reviews, and letters to the editor
dealing with the trials of Almon, Miller, and Woodfall, with important
jury tracts and with the progress of the jury debate in the Commons. 45
Among the most interesting of the second series of tracts were those
produced in 1770 by the Wilkites Robert Morris and George Rous.
Morris's Letter to Sir Robert Aston46 and Rous's Letter to the Jurors of
37. Ibid., pp. 41, 44.
38. Ibid., p. 45.
39. Ibid., p. 47.
40. A Postscript to the Letter, on Libels, Warrants, etc. In Answer to a Postscript in the
Defence of the Majority, and another Pamphlet, entitled Considerations on the Legality of
General Warrants (2nd ed., London, 1765, orig. published 1765).
41. Ibid., p. 24.
42. Ibid., p. 19.
43. Idem.
44. For an excellent discussion of the political strife of this period and of the sources of
the "radicalism" that forms a background to the major seditious libel trials see the works by
John Brewer cited below, n. 50.
45. On the 1770 debates see e.g. The Political Register (London), vol. 8, no. 47 (Jan.,
1771), pp. 31-36.
46. Robert Morris, A Letter to Sir Richard Aston, . . . Containing a reply to his
scandalous abuse [of R.M.]; and some thoughts on the modern doctrine of Libels (London,
1770). This work was reviewed in The Political Register, vol. 8, no. 47 (Jan., 1771), p. 56.
See the anonymous reply to Morris's tract, A Letter to Robert Morris, Esq. (London, 1771),
reviewed in The Political Register, vol. 8, no. 49 (March, 1771), pp. 184-90.
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Great Britain47 dwelled at length upon the place of trial by jury in the
English constitution. By now Rawles, though still quoted, played a less
significant role, and Wilkite arguments concerning the susceptibility of
the bench-especially of Mansfield-to bias in cases involving allegations
of seditiousness came to the fore.
The agitation over the jury was, of course, only a small part of the
political turmoil of the day. Wilkes's followers, middling men of some
property who came largely from merchant communities of the country,
focused on the criminal trial jury only fleetingly. Their main efforts
concerned issues of more general significance: criticism of the
government's foreign and domestic financial policies; impurities of the
political process; private law, with its inequities for the small businessman; and the movement for speech and press, to which the jury debate
was significantly but rather loosely attached. Nonetheless, the Wilkites
were acutely aware of the importance of the jury as an element in the
constitution4 8 (especially as a necessary surrogate for what they viewed as
a corrupt and unrepresentative parliament) and as an investigative as well
as a protective body. 4 9 In this last capacity the jury, whose members were
frequently drawn from their own social groups, was particularly crucial to
their embattled movement, and they made certain that jurors in important
political cases were apprised of their "rights." This campaign caused the
administration to view the jury as all the more likely to act out of political
bias. 50

47. George Rous, A Letter to the Jurors of Great Britain (London, 1771), p. 50. This work
was reviewed in The Political Register, vol. 8, no. 48 (Feb., 1771), p. 105.
48. See below, text at nn. 76 et seq.
49. See e.g. The Political Register, vol. 9, no. 50 (Sept., 1771), pp. 128-29. "Whatever
twelve good men and true do in their consciences think to be against the peace ... they are
bound by their oath to present and to bring to justice .... [A] jury is sworn to do this, not
only on information, but of their own knowledge" (editorial, p. 129).
50. On the Wilkite movement see Brewer, "The Wilkites and the Law," esp. pp. 153-64;
John Brewer, "English Radicalism in the Age of George III," in J. G. A. Pocock, ed., Three
British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776 (Princeton, 1980), pp. 323-67, esp. 342-54; John
Brewer, "Commercialization and Politics," in Neil McKendrick, John Brewer, and J. H.
Plumb, eds., The Birth of a Consumer Society: The Commercialization of EighteenthCentury England (London, 1980), pp. 197-262. For a particularly trenchant attack on
judicial browbeating of jurors see The North Briton (London), no. 64 (Sept. 3, 1768), p. 184.
On jurors "true" duty see e.g. The North Briton, no. 168 (June 16, 1770), p. 426. Prospective
jurors no doubt took note of the fact that London newspapers of Wilkite persuasion
frequently printed the names of jurors. They could not expect to convict a defendant in a
seditious libel case and remain anonymous. See e.g. The Freeholder's Magazine, vol. 2
(July, 1770), pp. 252-53. See Brewer, "Commercialization and Politics," p. 236. For a
balanced letter (from "A Whig"), critical both of the government and of the tone and
substance of Wilkite criticism (including the subversion of the judicial process by "jurors,
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Throughout the entire period 1763-70 the jury debate remained several
different debates. Some jury proponents opposed what was now called
Mansfield's law/fact distinction in seditious libel, insisting instead that
seditiousness and intent were matters of fact for the jury. In this, they
drew support from the arguments of Glynn and Camden at the major
trials. The more interesting debate, however, still concerned the jury's
right to "find law," especially since the law-finding argument involved the
confusing concession by jury proponents that the questions of intent and
seditiousness were indeed "matter oflaw." Having accepted the bench's
characterization, these publicists concluded that because these questions
were of a sort that were traditionally in all other cases questions for the
jury, the jury must therefore be a law-finding body. 51 This, in turn,
intensified the squabble over the competence of jurors, who now had to
be defended as law finders, a proposition that authorities, thrown on the
defensive by the size and force of the Wilkite movement, regarded as both
preposterous and dangerous. 52
The third stage of the seditious libel controversy commenced with the
trial in 1783 of William Shipley, Dean of St. Asaph.s3 Unquestionably,
Shipley's case was the most important seditious libel prosecution since·
the Seven Bishops' Case. Shipley had published a tract by his brotherin-law, Sir William Jones, that allegedly incited to rebellion; 54 after the
trial judge entered a conviction upon a verdict of "guilty of publishing
only," a new trial was refused despite Thomas Erskine's ringing defense
on Shipley's behalf. Yet after carrying the day on the law of libel, the
bench set the conviction aside for a defect in the indictment. 55
The tracts that followed upon St. Asaph's Case made use of Erskine's
defense, some taking a narrow line and others going beyond Erskine's
men of rank, character and fortune"), see The Political Register, vol. 8, no. 49 (March,
1771), pp. 169-70.
51. E.g. Thomas Leach, Considerations on the Matter of Libel. Suggested by Mr. Fox's
Notice in Parliament of an intended motion on that subject (London, 1791). See also the
speeches by Mr. Cornwall and Mr. Dunning in the Commons in 1770. Hansard, ed.,
Parliamentary History, 16: cols. 1135, 1160.
52. See the speeches of attorney general De Grey and solicitor general Thurlow in the
Commons in 1770. Hansard, ed., Parliamentary History, 16: cols. 1146, 1185-86.
53. State Trials, 21:874-1046 (1883-84). See Devlin, The Judge, pp. 119-31 for an
interesting summary and commentary on this case.
54. William Jones, Dialogue between a Scholar and a Peasant (London, 1782), republished by William Shipley as A Dialogue between a Gentleman and a Farmer (London,
1783).
55. State Trials, 21:1041-44. "The Court ... [said] there were no averments to point the
application of the paper as a libel on the king and his government." Willes, J., thought that
"if the indictment had been properly drawn, it might have been supported." Mansfield, C.
J., and Buller, J., did not give an opinion on that hypothetical (ibid., p. 1044).
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relatively controlled arguments to reiterate the vaguer law-finding claims
that had now become a part of the tradition.s 6 Joseph Towers's Observations on the rights and duty of Juries in trials for Libels revived Rawles's
strong claims and based its endorsement of broad jury powers in part on
the view that the bench could not be trusted to determine the proper limits
of judicial power.57 Perhaps the most ringing defense of the jury was
Manasseh Dawes's England's Alarm! On the Prevailing Doctrine of
Libels, which appeared in 1785. Dawes retreated to a historical perspective in making the case that juries had for so long been entrusted with
plenary power to determine cases that it was no longer appropriate to
claim they were incompetent to vindicate that duty. 58 Six years later
Thomas Leach, who was himself trained in law, produced a still different
defense of the jury, Considerations on the Matter of Libel. 59 Through
juxtaposing the issues for determination in homicide and libel, Leach
made the case for the jury and against the official doctrine in a way that
must have put the proponents of Mansfield's position on the defensive.
Despite the outpouring of pro-jury writings, the debate was by no
means entirely one-sided. Authorities drew the conclusion from years of
jury resistance to the law of seditious libel that juries could not be trusted
in such cases to return verdicts that accorded even loosely with the
government's interpretation of facts. Juries, they believed with some
justice, were open to political pressures; verdicts could, and sometimes
did, depend upon the heat of the political passions of the day. The
anonymously authored An Examination into the rights and duties of
Jurors (1785), which was a response to Joseph Towers's law-finding tract,
drove home the point against a position that had, to be sure, been
carelessly overstated:

When we see this position, that juries are to judge all the criminality of
a libel, as well as the truth of the fact of publication, supported, not by
arguments drawn from the peculiarity of the case, which may require
an exception to the general rule, but by general assertions, that jurors
are complete and uncontrollable judges of the law in every instance, it
56. Levy, Legacy of Suppression, pp. 249 et seq.; Holdsworth, History of English Law,
10:688-96. See also Rex v. Stockdale, State Trials, 22:237-308, to which some tracts

referred.
57. Joseph Towers, Observations on the rights and duty of Juries, in trials for Libels
(London, 1784), pp. 5, 15-20, 29.
58. Manasseh Dawes, England's Alarm! On the Prevailing Doctrine of Libels as laid
down by the Earl of Mansfield (London, 1785), pp. 8 et seq. For discussion of Dawes's
writings urging reform of the law of sanctions in common-run cases see above, Chapter 7,
text at nn. 114-20.
59. Leach, Considerations on the Matter of Libel.
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is time for every honest man to oppose an innovation of the most
dangerous tendency. 6o
Some of Mansfield's defenders responded to the law-finding argument in
a more legalistic manner. For them, the argument for a narrow scope of
fact proceeded along the lines of an argument for certainty of the law.
John Bowles's tracts, written on the eve of passage of Fox's Libel Act,
pressed that point effectively, at least at the level of debate. 61 They were
among the most cogent writings of the half-century of debate, and they
lent great rhetorical (if no practical political) force to Mansfield's opinion
in St. Asaph's Case.
Mansfield had won the battle but he soon lost the war. The campaign
against the seditious libel law culminated in 1792 with the passage of
Fox's Libel Act. The Act did not explicitly convert the questions of intent
or seditiousness into questions of fact but did state that in trials for
seditious libel
[the] jury sworn to try the issues may give a general verdict of guilty or
not guilty upon the whole matter put in issue . . . and shall not be
required or directed . . . to find the defendant or defendants guilty,
merely of the proof of the publication ... and of the sense ascribed to
the same. 62
The ''whole matter'' included the question of criminal intent, which might
or might not have to depend solely upon inferences drawn from the
publication itself, and the question of whether the writing was seditious.
The statute affirmed the jury's right to return a general verdict. It was
clear that in doing so the jury would necessarily have the right-and
duty-to apply the law regarding criminal intent and seditiousness as
stated by the bench. 63 But in the Commons at least it was neither stated
nor implied that the jury possessed any more right in libel than in other
60. An Examination into the rights and duties of Jurors; with some strictures on the Law
of Libels. By a gentleman of the Inner Temple (London, 1785), p. 8.
61. E.g. John Bowles, Considerations on the Respective Rights of Judge and Jury:
particularly upon Trials for Libel, occasioned by an expected motion of the Right Hon.
Charles James Fox (London, 1791).
62. 32 Geo. 3, c. 60 (1792). For the debates on the form that the Act ought to take, see
Hansard, ed., Parliamentary History, 29: cols. 551-602 (Commons), 726--42 (Lords),
1036-47 (Lords), 1293-1300 (Lords), 1361-71 (Opinions of the Judges), 1404-31 (Lords),
1534-38 (Lords). The Act began: "Whereas doubts have arisen whether ... it be competent
to the jury ... ; be it therefore declared and enacted ... '' Holdsworth (History of English
Law, 10:690) accepts the view that the Act was couched in declaratory form in order to
suggest that the courts had been mistaken in their view of the law.
63. The second section of the Act states that the judge shall "according to his discretion
give ... his opinion and directions to the jury on the matter in issue ... in like manner as
in other cases."

The Jury, Seditious Libel, and the Criminal Law

331

cases to reject the law as stated by the bench. 64 That the jury might do so
in a concealed fashion was undoubtedly understood-and feared.

II
The post-1750 discussion of the constitutional role of the criminal trial
jury was pervaded by arguments that drew upon history. Virtually all
commentators were convinced of the pre-Conquest origins of the jury. A
few writers searched for its prototype in the classical world;65 some traced
the jury to the Goths ;66 most posited a Saxon origin, identifying the early
64. Erskine openly addressed the jury's right to reject the judge's instructions in the
debate in 1791 in the Commons, stating that "[I]fajury, in despite oflaw and evidence, were
to acquit a felon, he was immediately discharged; such was the wisdom of the constitution
in the interposition and augmentation of the powers of a jury, lest the Crown should bear too
hard on the life of a subject; nor could a jury be amerced or imprisoned for their verdict."
This was true in felony and, Erskine argued, ought to be true in libel. Hansard, ed.,
Parliamentary History, 29: col. 598. His remarks were not adverted to by others. Fox had
spoken more ambiguously. He asserted that in all trials the judge could give his ''opinion and
advice." The bill, he said, would not prevent the judge from doing so in libel; it only "put
the case oflibels on a footing with all other cases." Ibid., cols. 597-98. Pitt stated that juries
were bound in libel (under the bill) as much as in other cases. Ibid., cols. 601-2. In the
Lords, Camden in 1791 came close to stating that the jury ought to have more leeway to
decide the law in seditious libel than in other cases. His remarks can be read as in agreement
with those of Erskine. Ibid., cols. 728-32. Lansdowne thought libel was an anomaly: in libel
"law and fact were but one thing .... [W]here, in God's name, could it be so safely entrusted
as to twelve men, and how much better was it for the judge to be freed from such a critical
duty, in all cases of libel, whether it were a public or a private libel." Nonetheless, the
reporter recorded his next remarks as: "When judges confined themselves to their own
province, to aid the jury by their advice, experience, and authority, without attempting to
influence their decision, they should then have his best wishes." Ibid., cols. 738-39. See also
his remarks in 1792. Ibid., cols. 1417-23. Presumably, in libel cases juries were to have more
leeway than in other cases; i.e., they were not bound to follow the bench in any case, but
the bench might exert greater influence in other cases. Stanhope took the strongest
law-finding position, but he viewed the jury's power as unlimited in all criminal cases. Ibid.,
col. 1409 (1792). Loughborough is reported to have said that "[e]xperience had convinced
him, if the judge did his duty by explaining the law with care, juries would decide with
perfect justice." Ibid., col. 1296 (1792). The bill was silent on the matter. In the House of
Lords, six opponents of the Act signed a protest against its passage, predicting "confusion
and destruction." Hansard, ed., Parliamentary History, 29: cols. 1537-38. As it happened,
juries proved relatively inclined to convict in seditious libel cases in the years following
passage of the Libel Act. See below, n. 150 and accompanying text.
65. E.g. John Pettingal, Enquiry into the use and practice ofJuries among the Greeks and
Romans; from whence the origin of the English jury may probably be deduced (London,
1769), pp. iv-ix. See also Manasseh Dawes, England's Alarm! On the Prevailing Doctrine
of Libels, p. 12.
66. E.g. Historical sketches of civil liberty From Henry VII to the accession of the house
of Stuart, with an account of the antiquity, use, and duty of juries (London, 1788), pp.
96-97.
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laggamanni as combining the roles of judge andjury. 67 For the most part,
however, this fascination with the origins of the jury remained an
antiquarian exercise.6s It is true that eighteenth-century jury proponents
thought that the jury's antiquity bolstered its place in the constitution, but
no one disputed that the jury deserved some place. Exactly what place the
jury ought to have was the question on which contemporaries disagreed.
Here the eighteenth-century theorists had little in common with their midseventeenth-century forerunners. Few of the later writers contended, as
had some Levellers, that historically the jury had preceded the judiciary
or that the law flowed forth from the community through the jury.
Whatever their perspective on the law-finding power of the jury, the
eighteenth-century writers implicitly accepted the Lockeian view of the
origins of civil society. They took for granted the quasi-balance of powers
created by the settlement of 1689 and the dominant role of Parliament in
the making of law. The jury, even in the view of most of those who
favored jury law-finding, was supposed to guarantee that English law,
whether common law or statutory law, was fairly stated and fairly
applied.
For some eighteenth-century jury proponents the jury was not so much
a part of the constitution as a symbol of the source of power that created
civil government and the constitution itself. Henry Burtenshaw maintained that juries are not

the creatures, even of the constitution, but coeval with it-with the
constitution which declares all power to be in the people, and which
has survived and remained unviolated through many revolutions of
state government: they are themselves a government in miniature, and
a symbol of that general democracy in which resides, and through
which, under various modifications, is dispersed, all the functions of
power, of justice and of policy. 69
But even Burtenshaw recognized that laws were made in Parliament or
"abroad, by [the people's] habits of life and usages," so that the jury, in
his view, was to "interpret those laws when made. " 70 Most commentators took an even more frankly instrumental view of the jury: the jury was
67. E.g. James Astry, A General Charge to all Grand Juries ... to which is prefixed a
Discourse of the antiquity, power and duty of juries (London, 1703), p. 4; John FortescueAland, ed., The Difference between an absolute and limited monarchy, by John Fortescue
(London, 1719), p. 56. See also Blackstone, Commentaries, 3:349-50.
68. But see The Political Register, vol. 9, no. 51 (Oct., 1771), pp. 191-92 ("On the
Perversions of Law from its Constitutional Course") for a tract strongly reminiscent of
Leveller historico-legal writings.
69. Henry Burtenshaw, Letters to the Right Hon. The Earl of Mansfield (London, 1781),
p. viii.
70. Ibid., p. 79.
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a part of the constitution, established in order to fill a gap or to balance lay
against official influence. Blackstone lent important support to this
watchdog theory of the criminal trial jury. He cautioned against creation
of more "convenient" procedures; the "delays, and little inconveniences
in the forms of justice, are the price that all free nations must pay for their
liberty in more substantial matters. " 71 Despite ambiguity in its characterization of the jury's role, Blackstone's theory strongly implied that the
jury remained a safeguard against some future recurrence of executive or
judicial tyranny.
Blackstone's contemporary Henry Dagge traced the origins of civil
society in terms familiar to eighteenth-century political theorists. He
began with a discussion of man in his natural state and with a depiction of
his resolution of disputes by private revenge; this period of continual
strife, he asserted, gave way to government and, eventually, to the
creation of distinctive elements of government: legislative, executive, and
judicial. Even at this stage, "after the three powers were divided,"
difficulties remained:
The judicial power being entrusted with the exposition of the law, and
as it depended on their judgment whether the case or fact sub lite, was
or was not within the description of the law, there was evidently a great
latitude still left for the exercise of partiality or oppression. 72
The "remedy," he concluded, was "the invention of juries. " 73 Dagge
assured his readers that it seldom happened that juries rejected the
judge's instructions: "The opinion of the bench has generally its due
weight. " 74 For the most part, the jury was to find fact and no more, and
the better the primary institutions of government worked the less the jury
would be needed as a safeguard of the liberti~s those institutions were
designed to protect. This view of the jury was adumbrated even by
William Paley, who exhibited tolerance for a complex, sometimes unpredictable, legal process. In his view, there would and ought to be
countervailing pressures, from which an equitable solution would
emerge. The jury's role could not be given clearly defined limits; thus
Paley cautioned against ''urging too far the distinction between ques71. Blackstone, Commentaries, 4:344.
72. Dagge, Considerations on Criminal Law, pp. 123-24.
73. Ibid., p. 125. See also "A Sketch of the British Constitution" in The Court
Miscellany, or Gentleman and Lady's New Magazine (London)(June, 1768), pp. 315-18 and
361-63. This unsigned article, which gives the jury a prominent role in the constitution,
seems to reflect Wilkite views, but it is careful to employ standard propositions in its
creation of a powerful place for the jury.
74. Dagge, Considerations on Criminal Law, p. 135.
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tions of law and questions of fact. " 75
None of these prominent academic legal writers directed his attention
specifically to the debate resulting from trials for seditious libel. Indeed,
none set out to write mainly about the jury. Rather each developed a
distinctive approach to the legal system generally, fitting the jury into the
larger scheme of things. None subscribed to a far-reaching theory of
endemic jury law-deciding, but all believed-or strongly implied-that for
the legal system to operate fairly, recourse to the jury-monitoring of
judicial instructions on the law would sometimes be necessary. This
conception of the jury was of course shared-and fruitfully used-by
most writers who wrote in response to the government's doctrine of
seditious libel. For these latter writers, however, the jury was not
incidentally, but rather in the main, a safeguard against oppression.
Robert Morris, the Wilkite barrister and secretary of the Society for
Supporters of the Bill of Rights, sounded a theme to which many of
Mansfield's opponents rallied when he wrote: "The great province of a
jury in criminal matters is to make true deliverance of the subject from
false accusation, and especially from oppressive prosecutions of the
Crown.' '76 The jury, Glynn was quoted as stating at the trial in 1770 of the
publisher John Miller, are "in times of danger the asylum of the
people. "77 It was to protect "every subject of the state, from the abuse of
executive power," wrote Thomas Leach, that the English constitution
required "the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals. " 78 Judges, who
were still dependent upon the Crown for "pensions" and "places, which
they hold at the mere pleasure of their minister, " 79 were not above
"crafty distinctions and ensnaring eloquence"; they "throw dust in the
eyes, and confound the sense of a well-meaning jury. "so Such invective
became a commonplace in the years between the Wilkes affair and the
Dean of St. Asaph's trial.s 1
The encomiums of the more radical supporters of the jury typically
began with generalities from Hale or Blackstone and went on to the limits
75. Paley, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 505.
76. Robert Morris, A Letter to Sir Richard Aston, . . . Containing a reply to his
scandalous abuse [of R. M.]; and some thoughts on the modern doctrine of Libels (London,
1770), p. 40.
77. Paraphrase of Glynn's speech in Bingley's Journal (London) (July 21, 1770), p. 3, col.
3. Glynn appears actually to have said (State Trials, 20:880): "For we all know, that in all
times, the honest, intrepid, upright conduct of a jury must be the refuge of the people of this
kingdom .... They must and will, in the natural course and evolution of things, flee again
to the same asylum."
78. Leach, Considerations on the Matter of Libel, p. 9.
79. Morris, Letter to ... Aston, p. 56.
80. Bingley's Journal (June 30, 1770), p. I, col. 2.
81. See Brewer, "Wilkites and the Law," pp. 153-59.
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of their authors' imaginations. Jury trial was, e.g., central to "the grand
or principal law of this land, on which the justice of all the rest depend.' '8 2
It was through the jury that subjects judged ''when the fundamental laws
are violated; when an attempt is made to subvert the constitution. " 83
Even the charges that jurors lacked legal training, were just plain
ignorant, or were subject to popular passions became occasions for
praise, albeit at times with a defensive tone. Jurors, it was frequently said,
did not lack the natural capacity for the role they were being asked to
play. They have, wrote Manasseh Dawes, "generally ajust sense of right
or wrong. ''84 ''Juries have not a knowledge of the technical niceties of the
law, as a profession," Capel Lofft conceded, "but the Constitution
presumes them to understand it as a rule of civil rights in a general
sense. "8 5 "Thanks be to God!" Anthony Highmore exclaimed, "there
lives in mankind a sense of right and wrong that compels them to form the
most impartial judgment they can. " 86 All three of these writers were
trained in law; all opposed one or another Crown policy; and all resented
use of the libel laws to silence criticism.
To find law a general sense of civil rights and a sense of right and wrong
were required, but not deep grounding in Scripture, custom, or the
common law. For some, this was the irreducible core which law-finding
theory had reached by the late eighteenth century ,87 So long as lawdeciding was linked to "pious perjury" or to egregious cases where the
jury was required to stand as a bulwark against judicial overreach, even
the moderate, bench-oriented Blackstone could be put to some use.
George Rous, yet another Wilkite barrister, quoted Blackstone's admonition to subjects that they learn the law; their lack of such learning,
Blackstone had written, ''has unavoidably thrown more power into the
hands of the judges, to direct, control, and even reverse their verdicts,
than perhaps the constitution intended. "88
Some who supported the law-finding jury conceded that juries might
make too much of their powers or misunderstand how they ought to be
employed. Rous, e.g., wrote: "Jurors, like judges, may err through
82. "Letter to be Read by all Jurymen" (Signed: "Brittanicus"), printed with An Address
to the Jurymen of London, p. 19.
83. Rous, A Letter to the Jurors of Great Britain, p. 50.
84. Manasseh Dawes, England's Alarm!, p. 8.
85. Capel Lofft, An Essay on the Law of Libels (London, 1785), p. 96.
86. Anthony Highmore, Reflections on the distinction usually adopted in Criminal
Prosecutions for Libel (London, 1791), p. 33.
87. An editorial in The Political Register, vol. 9, no. 50 (Sept., 1771), p. 129, commented:
"The wise institution of juries has contrived to make the conscience of every man a minister
of the law to the utmost extent."
88. Rous, Letter to the Jurors, p. 10. See Blackstone, Commentaries, 1:8.
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ignorance, or be misled by passion. "89 But the constitution wisely
contained a remedy-where, i.e., a jury wrongly convicted the defendant.
Drawing, as did many other tract writers, upon practice in common-run
felonies, Rous asserted that "grace is always extended to the prisoner
upon a proper representation from the judge. A refusal would be contrary
to the duty of a sovereign, who swears, at his coronation, to execute
justice in mercy. "90 In the case of seditious libel, however-at least
before 1792-the government feared what it viewed as unwarranted
acquittals, not unwarranted convictions. Those radical jury writers willing to face this problem manipulated the language of the moderates Dagge
and Blackstone, characterizing truly unwarranted acquittals as a "lesser
inconvenience"9 1 and retreating to the well-worn maxim that it was better
that many guilty went free than that one innocent man was convicted.
However tolerable this maxim may have been in cases of manslaughter or
petty theft, it was unlikely that authorities would be content to apply it to
cases involving government critics.

HI
Only a minority of pro-jury writers who addressed the problem of
seditious libel dealt openly and at length with true law-finding: the jury's
right to reject an indictment, regardless of the judge's instructions, on the
grounds that it failed to charge the defendant with a crime. Those who
advanced this theory drew directly upon the late-seventeenth-century
tracts by Rawles and Care, and the anonymous author of A Guide to
Juries, all ofwhom had, in turn, drawn upon claims made by Lilburne and
Penn. Perhaps the strongest version of this argument was the statement of
the printer and bookseller Joseph Towers:
It cannot be supposed ... that any jury should be arbitrarily directed
to bring any man in guilty, when they are not convinced in their own
minds, whether the action the accused person is charged with be a
crime or not . . . not only whether he has been guilty of the action
alleged against him, but whether he has been guilty of a crime.92
89. Rous, Letter to the Jurors, p. 60.
90. Ibid., p. 61.
91. Dagge, Considerations on Criminal Law, p. 135. See Blackstone, Commentaries,
4:344: [T]he "delays, and little inconveniences in the forms of justice, are the price that all
free nations must pay for their liberty in more substantial matters."
92. Joseph Towers, An Enquiry into the Question, Whether Juries are, or are not, Judges
of Law, as well as of Fact; With a particular Reference to the case of Libels (London, 1764),
p. 52.
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The most offensive aspect of the seditious libel doctrine-so far as
pro-jury writers were concerned-was that truth was not a defense;
moreover, the prosecution did not have to convince a jury that a libel in
fact brought the government into disrepute or created a threat to public
order, even though indictments for seditious libel alleged that the defendant had published certain statements "seditiously" and "factiously."
Thus one writer, who reproduced some ten pages of Rawles's famous
tract, concluded in his own terms:
From all which it is evident, that however heinous a fact may be
represented by hard work and artful innuendoes in an indictment or
information, the jury may with impunity, and ought in conscience to
bring in the general verdict, not guilty, not only when they think the
fact has not been proved by sufficient witnesses, but also when they
think the fact is not such a heinous fact as is charged in the indictment
or information.93
Another writer made the point in his comments upon the Penn-Mead trial
of a century earlier:
[A]s the jury were not convinced, that the fact, with which Penn and
Mead were charged was in itself a crime, they were unwilling to
condemn them; though, attending to the matter offact only, they could
not avoid it, because the fact was fully proved .... [I]t is plain, the jury
had respect, in their last verdict, entirely to the matter of law. For as
they were convinced, that Penn and Mead had not been guilty of any
criminal or illegal action, they could not honestly and conscientiously
do any thing but acquit them.94
In their arguments for true law-finding powers, jury proponents looked
for support to the rules of criminal procedure and to the nature of the
substantive criminal law. Most of the arguments devolving from procedure touched upon the supposed theoretical liability of the jury to an
attaint. Although this ancient procedure had probably never been applied
in criminal cases, 95 most eighteenth-century jury proponents referred only
to its "disuse," drawing the conclusion (perhaps from Restoration tracts)
93. Address to the Jurymen of London, p. 16. See also The North Briton, no. 168 (June
16, 1770), p. 426 (Letter from "Cato"); The Freeholder's Magazine, vol. I (Jan., 1770), p.
236 (anonymous tract, asserting that the jury, which applies law to fact, acquits where
someone is indicted for "fact that is no crime"); The Political Register, vol. 9, no. 51 (Oct.,
1771), p. 189 ("On the Perversions of Law from its Constitutional Course," asserting, "The
judges may advise, and if their arguments convince a jury, the jury is conscience bound to
find as they advise; but it is the finding of the jury which is the determination and
intepretation of the law").
94. Bingley's Journal (June 23, 1770), p. 2, col. I.
95. See above, Chapter 6, section IV.
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that attaint, like the fining of jurors, had once been but was no longer
permitted by English law. The original law of attaint, they asserted, must
have assumed the right of juries to decide law as well as fact, for attaint
had applied only in those cases where the jury had found "bad" law.96 A
Treatise on the Right of Juries (1771) carried this analysis one step
further: the fact that since Bushel's Case the law had supplied no certain
means of controlling jury verdicts in the case of an acquittal proved not
only that the jury had the power but also that it had the right to find law .97
Even Justice Willes, who voted with the majority in St. Asaph' s Case,
found this argument persuasive.9s His views were rephrased on the eve of
Parliament's consideration of the Libel Act by Thomas Leach, a barrister
and police magistrate, who wrote:
In the institutions of civil government, power and right, are, and
must be, convertible terms. Civil power, and civil right, are the mere
creatures of the law and know no other limits, than the law imposes
upon them. The law speaks the language of prohibition, not of
admonition. What it permits to be done, uncensured, and confirms,
when it is done, it has delegated the power to do, and the exercise of
that power, is of right.99
Similarly, jury writers argued that the theory of the special verdict
presumed that juries had a valid law-finding role. A jury could render a
special verdict in a case if it doubted the validity of a certain application
of the law to the facts. 10o If the jury had no such doubts, it was therefore
said, the jury might find law as well as fact.IOI This argument, however,
established nothing more than that juries applied law to fact. The law
might still be said to have been taken from the bench, a point that many
tract writers well understood. 102 Finally, many writers cited the practice
of defense counsel in seditious libel cases for the proposition that juries
96. A Treatise on the Right of Juries (London, 1771), pp. 16, 25, 39.
97. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
98. 4 Douglas 171, 99 Eng. Rep. 824-25: "Where a civil power of this sort has been
exercised without control, it presumes, nay, by continual usage, it gives the right."
99. Leach, Considerations on the Matter of Libel, p. 8. See also Charles, Earl Stanhope,
The Rights of Juries defended, and the objections to Mr. Fox's Libel Bill refuted (London,
1792), pp. 98-99. Fox himself made this argument in introducing his bill in 1791. See
Hansard, ed., Parliamentary History, 29: cols. 564-65.
100. Blackstone, Cummentaries, 4:354.
101. Morris, Letter to ... Aston, p. 48: "[W]here they are certain [of the "operation of
law"], they may and ought to take the determination upon themselves. The power juries
most undoubtedly have, of determining, upon the general issue, both the fact and the law
which arises out of that fact." Rous, Letter to the Jurors, p. 9; Dagge, Considerations on
Criminal Law, p. 131.
102. See e.g. Romilly, Fragment on the Constitutional Power and Duty of Juries upon
Trials for Libels, p. 8.
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had the right to consider questions of law. The bench frequently allowed
counsel to argue points of law to the jury, or even to question the validity
of the official doctrine of seditious libel in their summations.J03
Yet arguments that relied upon the nature of criminal procedure and
trial practice were entirely too fragile to support a far-reaching claim to
jury law-finding. The attaint issue was dead (indeed, it had never been a
live consideration in criminal cases); the existence of special verdicts, it
could be countered, proved only that in some cases the jury had doubts
concerning a very restricted "law-applying" role. As for the leeway
allowed counsel in their summations, such judicial leniency was hardly a
sound foundation for the construction of a matter of jury right. Few
laymen sufficiently understood criminal procedure to appreciate what
were, in any case, tepid rejoinders to Mansfield's dissertations on the ever
growing body of precedent.
Of greater importance, though equally limited in logic, were arguments
based upon the nature of the substantive criminal law, not only in political
cases but in common-run cases as well. The criminal law, it was stated,
was "within reach of the plainest understanding. "I04 Such claims, it is
true, were only a pale reminder of mid-seventeenth-century assertions
concerning the relationship between criminal law and the Scriptures; nor
was it the point that the common man could know the law merely by
examining his heart. But the criminal law was knowable. The entire
system of criminal justice assumed as much:
To say the truth, one could hardly imagine a more extravagant
absurdity, than to hold, that a criminal shall not remove the imputation
of guilt by pleading ignorance of the law; and yet, that a jury who try
him have no capacities to judge of that law .105
The logical conclusion of the argument that only the bench and bar
possessed the ability to understand the law, it was said, was that "we may
daily transgress without being wilfully guilty. " 106 The robber, the sneak
thief, the slayer: they knew the law as it applied to them. The point was
frequently repeated, always with a certain tone of astonishment: if the
jury was not to decide law because men of their station lacked the
necessary understanding, then the rationale for the official doctrine of
seditious libel was inconsistent with the common understanding of mens
103. London Evening Post (London) (June 21, 1770), p. 3, col. 3; Stanhope, Rights of
Juries defended, pp. 128 et seq.
104. Treatise on the Right of Juries, p. 15.
105. Idem. See also Loughborough's remarks to the same effect in the Lords. Hansard,
ed., Parliamentary History, 29: cols. 1297 (1792).
106. The Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser (London) (Dec. 6, 1784), p. 2, col. 2.
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rea. 107 The analogy to common-run cases-to the common suspect, the
"daily transgressor"-lent force to the point, but at the same time the line
of argument here involved did not ground a true law-finding theory. To
say that the jury possessed the ability to apply the law was not to say that
the law they were to apply was to be "found" by them rather than to be
set forth by the bench.

IV
For many commentators the issues of freedom of the press and, more
generally, of the subject's right to criticize the government were more
important than the jury question. The jury was significant not as an end in
itself but as a safeguard against what were seen as the government's
self-interested and abusive prosecutions.
Arguments asserting that the jury was the protector of liberty were
made both by those who conceived of the jury primarily as a fact-finder
and by those who adhered to one or another variant oflaw-finding theory.
Distrust of the government did not commit one to any particular conception of the jury. Yet the doctrine of seditious libel posed a special sort of
problem. By drastically reducing the scope for factual determinations, the
doctrine placed the defendant's fate almost wholly in official hands. 108 To
assert the jury's right to play its traditional fact-finding role required an
attack on the libel doctrine itself. Hence, all appeals to the jury necessarily contained an express or implied demand that the jury reject the
bench's instructions regarding the allocation of duties between judge and
jury. Only a few writers bothered to focus on the problem-it seemed to
go without saying. Of the pro-jury writers, Joseph Towers most effectively .united the themes of distrust of government and the jury's right
to decide the allocation-of-duties question raised by the seditious libel
doctrine:
It would, perhaps, be as unreasonable, that kings should be suffered
themselves to determine the bounds of their own prerogative, as that
judges should be permitted finally to decide, when the point in contest
107. Joseph Towers, Observations on the rights and duty of Juries, in trials for Libels
(London, 1784), p. 42. But see the anonymously authored reply to Towers, An Examination
into the rights and duties of Jurors; with some strictures on the Law of Libels. (By a
Gentleman of the Inner Temple) (London, 1785). The author admitted that the promulgation
of comprehensible laws was a necessary reform project. But in the meantime: "The end of
the laws is obedience: but who will obey them farther than it shall please himself, if every
man be allowed to plead an ignorance, almost impossible to be disproved?" (p. 61).
108. A Second Postscript to a Late Pamphlet, entitled A Letter to Mr. Almon, in Matter
of Libel. By the Author of that letter (London, 1770), p. 15.
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is, what is the extent of their own jurisdiction, and what is the extent
of that of juries.Jo9
Thus, much, if not most, of the literature proclaiming the jury's right to
find law as well as fact was concerned with the problem of the allocation
of duties between judge and jury. Though many tract writers seem not to
have realized it, this conceptualization of the problem hid important
disagreements on the law itself. For many writers assigned as facts for the
jury matters that the bench did not consider at all relevant. Nonetheless,
for many opponents of the official doctrine the claim regarding jury
law-finding was simply an exhortation to jurors that they insist that
certain questions were matters of fact rather than matters of law. Once
the jury had claimed the questions for its own it would merely find the
fact, in seditious libel as in other cases.
In the years following Rex v. Frankfinuo the assertion that seditiousness was purely a question of fact became quite common. Pro-jury writers
argued that, at one level, the question of the seditiousness of the writing
could be reduced to the question, Had the writing "scandalized" the
government? But what test should the jury apply when making this
assessment? The proponents of free speech and press and of the trialjury
insisted that mere evidence of negative criticism was not sufficient, that a
writing was not criminal unless, at the very least, measurable harm was its
probable result.ll 1 Some characterized the test as more complex still.
Robert Morris thought it should be "[t]he purport of expressions, the
tendency to sedition, the infamy, the reproach oflanguage"; that, he said,
"can never so well be decided as by the common class of mortals to
whom the publication is made. Who [is] more interested than juries (for
juries are composed of the people) to preserve the peace and order of the
state? ... Juries are a tribunal ever changing as the times; they judge of
men's writings and actions by what they see and feel. "m The decider of
fact, George Rous asserted, sounding a theme dear to the hearts of all
Wilkites, "must enter into common life ... must attend to the politics of
the day ... must imbibe the sentiments of the people .... Juries taken by
lot . . . are peculiarly the proper judges in cases of libel. " 113 The
109. Towers, Observations on the rights and duty of Juries, p. 29. In his reply to Towers,
the author of An Examination into the rights and duties of Jurors asserted: "Where else
shall we seek the boundaries, by which authority of different courts is restrained, but in the
solemn adjudication of the superior courts of justice?" (p. 69).
110. See above, n. 12.
111. Highmore, Reflections on the distinction usually adopted, pp. 8 et seq. See also the
letter from "B. L." in The Freeholder's Magazine, vol. 2 (June, 1770), p. 203: "tendency to
subvert ... liberty."
112. Morris, A Letter to ... Aston, pp. 42-43.
113. Rous, Letter to the Jurors, p. 51.
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determination that must be made, wrote Joseph Towers, required practically no knowledge of the law; the allegedly seditious publications were
"generally addressed to men of all professions, and such of them as can
be understood only by lawyers, are not very likely to produce tumults or
insurrections. " 11 4 Highmore developed the same theme: if one argues that
a libel is dangerous because it might arouse the common people, then one
assumes that the people understand the writing and therefore must be
qualified to be jurors, to determine whether a writing is, in fact, likely to
arouse. "No man ever wrote, or read, sedition, but he knew that it was
so: and this, without a little more knowledge of the law than is amply
sufficient to answer all the purposes of his civil capacity as a citizen." m
Here, where pro-jury writers referred specifically to the kind of factfinding they believed relevant to the matter of seditious libel, they
frequently drew attention to the jury's traditional assessment of the
element of provocation in cases of homicide.116 It is possible that some
pro-jury tract writers, in their attempts to portray seditiousness as a
question of fact (as in other cases), were induced to concede more than
they otherwise might have. They were led to define seditiousness in terms
of a writing's tendency to arouse people, especially that class of common
people from which jurors were typically drawn. Some writers seem at
times to have turned their attention from the question of the truth or of the
intrinsic value of the criticism, matters that were less easily portrayed as
facts within the competence of the average jury . 117
At yet a second level, most writers insisted that proof of scandal did not
suffice to establish true seditiousness. There had also to be a finding of
intent to scandalize-true criminal intent-indeed, true malice. us This,
114. Towers, Observations on the rights and duty of Juries, p. 33.
115. Highmore, Reflections on the distinction usually adopted, p. 35.

116. See below, text at n. 126.
117. It is possible that most writers thought that three separate tests ought to be applied:
the writing must be false; it must have a tendency to "arouse"; the defendant must have
intended that the writing ''arouse.'' Indeed, a fourth test may be implied: the defendant must
have known that the writing was false. Few authors approached these questions systematically; the highly polemical characters of the tracts leaves the impression that their authors
would have required any or all of these tests, although they sometimes addressed one of
them as though it were the "true" test. For an excellent discussion of "Father of Candor's"
near rejection of the "bad tendency" test see Levy, Legacy of Suppression, pp. 149-54.
"Father of Candor" [An Enquiry into the Doctrine, Lately Propagated, concerning Libels,
Warrants and the Seizure of Papers . .. in a Letter to Mr. Almon from the Father of Candor
(London, 1764)] implied that true harm or injury ought to be required. This position went
beyond that taken by other writers, but it seems that (to the extent "Father of Candor"
actually espoused it) it did not include statements that were "wilfully false" (pp. 48, 160).
This tract has been reprinted (New York: Da Capo Press, 1970).
118. E.g. Another Letter to Mr. Almon, in matter of Libel (London, 1770), p. 31. The
author states that the jury ought to acquit if the defendant acted "without any wicked
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too, was at times portrayed as a matter of pure fact-finding in terms with
which we are now familiar. What words were intended to mean, said
Morris, was a factual, hence a jury question. 119 Though establishing that
meaning, as Francis Maseres argued, required the jury to draw inferences
from facts, those inferences were "secondary" facts, which required
"common sense, not technical learning. " 120 Juries were especially qualified in cases of libel since they knew "street talk"121 and could draw the
proper inferences. As another writer put it: a "jury of common coffeehouse politicians in London" was best qualified to determine the fact of
whether words were meant to be scandalous. 122
In most tracts, however, the discussion of criminal intent moved well
beyond the immediate issue of seditious libel. Here, more than at any
other point, writers looked to the role of juries in common-run felonies.
Traditionally, juries assessed guilt or innocence largely on the basis of the
intent with which an act had been committed. It was within this
assessment that the jury, consciously or otherwise, had always applied its
own standards of justice, weighing intent and conduct (and perhaps
reputation) against the prescribed sanction. By ruling that criminal intent
would be inferred by the bench from the writing itself, the bench
threatened the more modest but ancient law-finding tradition and, hence,
the values that the right to jury trial had long epitomized.
The pro-jury writers' failure to maintain consistently the idea-ought
one say, the tactical stance?-that the question of intent could be reduced
to a purely factual matter is reflected in their constant analogizing to the
jury's role in homicide cases. In homicide cases, as many tract writers
pointed out, the bench drew the jury's attention to the differences among
malice aforethought, sudden deliberateness, unintentional homicide, and
intentional but justifiable homicide, and thereupon left the matter to the
jury .123 The homicide analogy was in fact cited to prove that juries had the

intent.'' He analogizes this to a finding that a defendant in homicide slew ''without malice,''
and then continues: "[I)f the jury are convinced, that although [the defendant] wrote or
printed and published it, he did so without any traitorous, seditious, scandalous, or
malicious intent, they ought to find him ... not guilty.'' (idem). See also A Dialogue between
a. Country Farmer and a Juryman (London, 1770), p. 8.
119. Morris, Letter to ... Aston, p. 42.
120. Francis Maseres, An Enquiry into the extent of the power of juries on trials of
indictments or informations (2nd ed., London, 1785; orig. published 1776), pp. 30-31.
121. Idem.
122. Another Letter to Mr. Almon, p. 48.
123. E.g. The Doctrine of Libels and the Duty of Juries fairly stated (London, 1752), pp.
14-15; Another Letter to Mr. Almon, p. 31; Towers, Observations on the rights and duty of
Juries, p. 21. Standard treatment of the jury's role in homicide encouraged this understanding. See e.g. Readings upon the Statute Law, by a Gentleman of the Middle Temple
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right to apply law to the facts. It was this traditional law-applying role that
the bench was attempting to remove in seditious libel cases, or so many
pro-jury writers charged. 124 Thomas Leach, extrapolating from homicide
to "all other cases of crime"-by which he meant seditious libeldeclared:
On indictment for murder, the jury decide, not only that the person,
charged to have been murdered, did die, in consequence of the act of
the defendant, and that such act resulted from a design to kill; which
are matters of fact: But they also decide, whether from the particular
circumstances, attending the homicide, it is to be ranked in that class,
which the law justifies or excuses; or whether from the degree of
criminal intention in the defendant it comes within the legal definition
of the crime of manslaughter; or amounts to murder, which, if the
intention of the libeller be matter of law, are evidently also matters of
law.Jzs
For Leach, as for so many others across the half-century of active
debate, the homicide analogy provided the basic model. Did the defendant strike (did he publish); did the blow cause death (did the writing
scandalize); were the blow and death (or the scandal) intended and, if so,
was there true malice or was the act justified or excusable? There was
bound to be occasional disagreement between judge and jury on what
constituted one or another degree of malice, on the limits of justification
and excuse, or on their application to a given case. That was often true in
homicide and it was certain to be true in seditious libel. The centurieslong tradition of allowing the jury leeway in its application of the law of
homicide appears to have colored assumptions about the appropriate
judge-jury role in seditious libel. And just as disagreements between judge
and jury on the law of homicide were conceptualized as disagreements
merely about application of law to fact, so were such disagreements
conceptualized by many opponents of the official doctrine of seditious
libel.
It is not surprising pro-jury writers drew primarily upon common
practices in cases of homicide, a shrinking category, 126 rather than upon
such practices in prosecutions for theft, which accounted for most of the
business of the assize courts. In the case of theft, mitigation operated
(London, 1725), pp. 97, 102; Giles Jacob, The Student's Companion: or, The Reason of the
Law of England (London, 1725), p. 106.
124. E.g. Doctrine of Libels, pp. 14-15; Romilly, Fragment on the Constitutional Power
and Duty of Juries, pp. 6 et seq.
125. Leach, Considerations on the Matter of Libel, p. 7.
126. See Lawrence Stone, "Interpersonal Violence in English Society 1300-1980," Past
and Present (1983), pp. 22-33; Langbein, "Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial,"
pp. 44-46.
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typically as an open means of commuting the death sentence for many
defendants who had clearly committed the act with which they had been
charged. Although it was also employed where the evidence was doubtful, we have seen that in this context the concept of "safe" evidence was
itself a function of the desire to use execution only sparingly. The thief's
behavior was viewed as premeditated and insidious, virtually always as
reprehensible, rarely as excusable. It is true that in most cases, especially
where there had not been physical violence, the act itself was deemed by
many as not meriting capital punishment. Moreover the thief's behavior
was often seen as in part the product of social conditions; it was hoped
that the thief might be reformed. But the thief's behavior was viewed
nonetheless as intrinsically evil.
Homicide presented a more complex problem. The taking of a life had
always been viewed as a particularly serious matter. But the defendant's
intent could be very evil or fully justified, or something in between. It
might be (and often was) excusable under the law. In many cases, verdicts
of self defense, accident, or manslaughter served to mitigate the law of
sanctions in favor of defendants whose acts (like those perpetrated by
thieves) were nonetheless viewed socially as evil. But in other cases, such
verdicts reflected a very different social response. The behavior of the
true self-defender was fully accepted. And like the true self-defender, the
true ''public defender'' deserved at least vindication, if not approbation.
The homicide analogy was also attractive because the process of the
jury's resolution was often hidden from view, perhaps from the conscious
understanding of the jurors themselves. It was a process around which
myths might grow. Eighteenth-century commentators could suppose that
jurors in homicide trials were engaged mainly in a subtle assessment of
the defendant's intent at the time he committed the homicide in question.
To the observor, the jurors' consideration of the defendant's reputation
and character might be assimilated to their determination of the
defendant's intent. This consideration need not be understood as the
largely separate matter that all contemporaries knew it was in theft cases,
where more often than not it influenced the jury only in its "sentencing"
role.
Finally, opponents of the official doctrine of seditious libel were greatly
influenced by Rawles, who had cited the jury's right to decide among the
various kinds of homicide verdicts as evidence of their right to decide law
as well as fact. Through Rawles eighteenth-century writers-perhaps
without realizing it-reached back to the parliamentary censure of Chief
Justice Kelyng and, ultimately, to de facto practices of medieval juries.
The daily practice in cases involving theft conditioned attitudes regarding
the role of mercy and the right of the jury to share assessment of just
deserts. But it was the jury's role in homicide cases that allowed the
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strongest, most attractive, and best documented argument for the jury's
right to "apply" the law within the "factual" assessment of whether the
defendant had acted with a truly criminal intent.

v
The claim that the jury's inalienable role was that which it played daily
in routine felonies-the application of the law that had been set forth by
the bench-lay close to the core of the attack on the law of seditious libel.
The true law-finding issues of the debate-the jury's capacity to comprehend the law sufficiently to determine whether the judge had chosen apt
precedents or had interpreted the r~levant common law or statutes
correctly-would continue to attract great attention, but the more routine
discussion of whether the jury had the right merely to apply the law in
seditious libel "as in other cases" was perhaps an equally important
aspect of the debate. When the jury writers addressed this most basic
level of law-finding they revealed something of their conception of the
nature and purpose of the jury trial in all criminal cases.
We have seen that in practice the criminal trial had always been
person-as well as act-oriented. Assessment of the defendant's character had traditionally affected the jury's view of his just deserts. 127
Character and credibility of course bore on the question of whether the
defendant had committed the act alleged in the indictment, and in that
sense the jury found the fact that it was charged to find. This observation
was contained in The Doctrine of Libels and the Duty of Juries fairly
stated, published in 1752:
[I]f from the character of the person libelled they think they have
reason to believe, that he has been guilty of those facts, and that from
the character of the person accused of libelling they have reason to
believe [the defendant] would not have charged any man with such
facts unless he had known him to be guilty, they ought to bring their
verdict Not Guilty. . . . This is a latitude which every jury ought to
take, and a latitude which will be of great importance for every man to
endeavor to preserve a good character in his neighborhood.12s
127. See Beattie, "Crime and the Courts," pp. 173-74, 179, for a discussion of the impact
of reputation and character on verdicts in the eighteenth century. These considerations were
influential also at the reprieve and pardoning stages. See above, Chapter 7, nn. 50-54 and
accompanying text. It is likely that judicial and royal attitudes influenced those of trial
jurors, and vice versa. Indeed, this dialectical pattern of influence was probably present
from the beginning of trial by jury.
128. Doctrine of Libels, p. 10.
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This "latitude" was implicit in every jury trial. Thus George Stanhope
in his sermon entitled The Duty of Juries, which was delivered in 1701 at
the Lent Assizes, conceded that in close cases
[w]e may allow some abatements for a criminal action alleged against
a person unblameable for the main, and impute it to ignorance, or
sudden transport or passion, or misadventure, rather than to malice
and wicked design; which abatements cannot fairly be allowed to those
abandoned wretches, who are scandalous for mischievious dispositions
and a profligate conversation.I29
The problem was how to delineate between appropriate and inappropriate "abatements." That depended upon the sufficiency of the proof
offered at trial, of which juries were without dispute the final judges. The
official doctrine of seditious libel avoided this assessment entirely. The
only facts left to the jury were so fully proved as to be virtually
undeniable, and there was in any case nothing to balance against them,
since intent was "implied" as a matter of law. What the opponents of the
official law were demanding was the return to the jury, as a question of
fact, or of application of law to fact, of the complicated, intensely social
question of criminal intent.
The seditious libel literature often assigned to the jury an even more
open-ended role than the above discussion of criminal intent suggests.
Fundamentally, according to jury writers, whether in prosecutions for
seditious libel, homicide, theft, or any other criminal offense, the defense
of the general verdict amounted to the defense of the defendant's right to
a "merciful" judgment by peers. And "mercy" might be appropriate
even in cases where the defendant was guilty under the law. The core of
the power to decide "law as well as fact" was the jury's right to nullify the
law in particular cases without rejecting it as a general matter.
That the English criminal law was a "merciful" law was a cliche in the
eighteenth-century literature.Bo The identification of the jury with mercy
operated on two levels. Most writers, referring to the fact-finding process,
asserted that, as Towers put it: "Where the matter is doubtful, in criminal
prosecutions, an acquittal is always most consonant to the spirit of the
129. George Stanhope, The Duty of Juries (London, 1701), p. 12. Stanhope added: "But
still ... these are but probabilities and presumptions and must come in their proper place.
For where they are admitted to overbalance credible and full peremptory proof, there we
offend against the Text (i.e., Levit. XIX, 15) and have respect of persons in judgment"
(idem).
130. E.g. An Inquiry into the Doctrine Lately Propagated, concerning Attachments of
Contempt (London, 1769), pp. 40-41; Treatise on the Right ofJuries, p. 42; Paley, Principles
of Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 522.
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law of England. "131 Hinting at a yet broader role for the granting of
mercy, Highmore observed: "[T]hejury know that by their verdict alone,
and not by the knowledge oflaw in the judge, the prisoner at the Bar must
be acquitted or suffer death." m As in the capital felonies of murder or
theft, he implied, so in the noncapital high misdemeanor of seditious libel.
Morris drew an analogy to the royal power of pardon: "Like the king in
the extension of mercy [the jury] make so noble a use of their power when
their consciences permit them to acquit. " 133 The anonymous author of A
Treatise on the Right of Juries (1771) introduced his discussion of
seditious libel with a conventional encomium of the merciful quality of the
law in common felony cases:
Mercy is the characteristic and leading feature of an English jury. They
are apt now and then to err upon the favourable side: but let us consult
the gentle spirit of our law, and we shall find it would rather dispense
with the punishment of a hundred guilty persons, than permit a single
innocent man to suffer. If on the other hand the jury should happen to
be vindictive, the King's pardon interferes, to counteract them. The
good sense and liberal feelings of the law in this well tempered
regulation cannot be enough admired: It impowers juries to acquit
absolutely, but reduces and softens their power to convict by enabling
the Crown in its mercy to withhold punishment. 134
In his Address to the People of Scotland, William Smellie described this
commonplace but significant aspect of the jury's application of mercy.
Commenting upon the statutory extension of jury trial to Scotland, and
borrowing the terminology of the English seditious libel debate, he
asserted:
If, therefore, the power of judging of the law as well as the fact, were
annihilated, the very intention of the legislature would be defeated;
because the courts, and not the jury, would then be the sole judges.
Intention is the essence of crimes. The facts [charged] may be
distinctly proved. But, if from particular circumstances, the jury are
convinced in their own minds, that the [defendant] either had no
intention to commit a crime, or that the crime is not of so heinous a
nature as to merit the punishment concluded for in the indictment, in all
cases of this kind, the jury have not only a right, but they are bound,
131. Towers, Observations on the rights and duty of Juries, pp. 109-10. See also Romilly,
Fragment on the Constitutional Power and Duty of Juries, p. 3.
132. Highmore, Reflections on the distinction usually adopted, p. 26.
133. Morris, Letter to . . . Aston, p. 40. Morris and other Wilkites opposed the
widespread use of discretion in the courts, seeing it as a device by which authorities
extended or withdrew the subjects' rights almost at will. They appear to have made an
exception of the jury. See Brewer, "Wilkites and the Law," pp. 16()....61.
134. Treatise on the Right of Juries, p. 42.
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by the spirit of their oaths, and by the laws of God and man, to find the
[defendant] Not Guilty of the crime .... They consider the nature of
the crime, and the punishment that ought or ought not to be inflicted.
In all such cases, the jury must necessarily determine both the law and
the fact. m
Finding law as well as fact, applying law to fact, or rendering a
"merciful verdict," amounted to assessing the nature of both the
defendant's intent and his act in the light of the punishment that would
follow upon his conviction. The jury might approve of the defendant's
behavior, as in some political cases, or might disapprove of it but deem
the prescribed punishment too severe, as in some common-run felonies.
Very different underlying motives, to be sure, but nonetheless, at least
within the confines of some jury tracts, the fusion of jury theories was
complete . 136

VI
Fox's Libel Act marked a triumph for those whose concept of the
English constitution was grounded in history. It vindicated the historic
role of the jury as the last line of defense against executive tyranny.
Although precedent could be found for treating seditious libel as an
anomaly, the prior official doctrine nonetheless seemed to many a
dangerous departure from deeply held assumptions about English governance. At one level Parliament's concern was with the law. Fox's Act was
couched as a declaration of the common law, resting not on precedent but
on general principles of that law .m Parliament looked first to the law
regarding criminal trials generally. That law was assumed to govern;
exceptions would be tolerated only where that law itself provided
compelling reasons for them. Parliament's solution to the seditious libel
problem was also the result both of politics and of the nearly irresistible
force of broad constitutional principles. The pressures for the expansion
135. William Smellie, An Address to the People of Scotland on the Nature, Powers and
Privileges of Juries (Edinburgh, 1815; orig. published 1784), pp. 13-15.
136. But see Maseres, An Enquiry into the extent of the power ofjuries. Maseres argued
that consideration of the seriousness of an offense found by the jury was a matter for the
court: "For if it shall be made to appear by just and legal reasonings at the bar, that the
writing and publishing the paper in question, though it was done deliberately, and has the
tendency ascribed to it in the information [as found by the jury], yet it is not an offense of
such great and public consequence as to have been an object of legal punishment, it will be
the duty of the court to forebear giving judgment. ... But this ... is a matter which judges
only have a right to determine, either upon a motion made before them on behalf of the
defendant in arrest of judgment, or of their own accord" (p. 34).
137. See above, n. 62 and accompanying text.

350

Resolutions

of rights of speech and press were enormous. 138 Those rights might still be
limited (few questioned punishing truly seditious writings), but they could
not be reined in through what appeared to society at large to be a drastic
revision of the historically vindicated balance of power between judge and
jury. Retreat to the technical high ground of "questions of law" served
only further to expose the government to attack by the opposition. In
manipulating the balance of authority at trial, the government was seen to
be manipulating one of the institutions through which it had historically
ruled and on which it rested its claim to legitimacy. Having administered
the law largely with the aid of the jury (one is tempted to conclude), the
Crown and courts found they could not now govern mainly through the
bench. 139
To appreciate the way in which the government was captured by its
own administrative history, we must recognize how little England's rulers
controlled the circumstances that made law-finding, or discretionary
fact-finding, a dominant element in the administration of the criminal law.
For the most part, prosecution for felony proceeded in accordance with
the attitudes of society at large. The alliance between authority and
mercy-granting juries reflected a mixture of wise policy, acquiescence in
the inevitable, and shared assumptions about justice.I 4 o We have seen
that we must be cautious about extending the argument that authorities
manipulated the selective enforcement of the criminal law in order to
secure the deference of those they ruled to the problem of the use of the
criminal trialjury. 141 If we focus too narrowly on the administration of the
criminal law in the eighteenth century, we obscure the question of the
roots of the system of mitigation. These practices were historically the
138. Holdsworth, History of English Law, 10:672-74. Holdsworth took the view that the
judges were right in their statement of the law, but that "it was clear that the law as laid
down by the judges was quite out of harmony with the practical ideas and public opinion of
the time" (p. 674). Levy (Legacy of Suppression, pp. 249-52) briefly discusses the tract
campaign that preceded the passage of Fox'.s Libel Act. I discuss some aspects of the
debates concerning the Act above, n. 64. Much remains to be said concerning those debates
and the political views and interests of those in Parliament. Relatively few members of the
Commons and the Lords spoke on the bill. Their views cannot be taken as the views of all,
or even most, members. A true legislative history of the Act is badly needed; its results
might lead to reconsideration of my analysis of the meanings of law- and fact-finding in the
extraparliamentary debate concerning seditious libel in the period 1732-92.
139. This conclusion is necessarily tentative. I have stated the point broadly, and mean
it to say as much, but it may be that it applies mainly to the disparity between the treatment
of routine cases on the one hand and seditious libel on the other and that contemporaries
viewed that disparity as an isolated phenomenon.
140. See above, Chapter 7, section IV.
141. Hay ("Property, Authority and the Criminal Law") makes the argument with
respect to Parliament's refusal to reform the law of sanctions. He makes little reference to
the role of the jury. For discussion of Hay's views on the jury see above, Chapter 7, n. 156.
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by-product of the criminal law in theft and homicide cases where
complainant, defendant, and jury had frequently been (and often still
were), relatively speaking, members of the same class. 142 The Crown and
the bench and their attendant officials had an interest in overseeing the
maintenance of order, but frequently they played the role of referees who
lacked the resources, time, or stake in the outcome to prevent the jury
from reaching a verdict according to its own sense of justice. Moreover,
these practices, which long predated the eighteenth century, reflected
social attitudes that were not easily managed or always willingly tolerated. This is not to say that authorities failed to capitalize on these
sources of potential weakness, consciously or otherwise. It is to say that
to the extent authorities reaped the benefits of governing through merciful
justice, the interaction of rulers and ruled was complex and two-sided. In
important ways, authorities prevailed at the behest of those they sought to
rule.
Our study of the seditious libel debate suggests that in yet another,
related respect we must modify our understanding of the political and
social implications of eighteenth-century law enforcement. The two
strands of theory regarding the jury's rightful role could not forever
remain separate. Jury law-finding in political cases could not be kept
distinct from jury resolution in common-run felonies. In the popular mind
at least, the strength and reach of the arguments against the seditious libel
doctrine were almost certainly influenced by the nature of jury practice in
common-run cases. Might it be that the same authorities who allowed
juries to share the powers of mitigation in common-run cases found
themselves by virtue of that policy on the defensive in prosecutions for
seditious libel? If so, we must recognize that authorities sometimes
reaped not deference but a bitter harvest largely of their own making. The
irony is less striking than might at first appear: the policy of sharing
powers of mitigation was, as we have seen, little more than acquiescence
in practices authorities could not have eliminated easily. Having (over the
142. See Beattie, Crime and the Courts, chs. 5, 6; Langbein, "Albion's Fatal Flaws," p.
107. But see Douglas Hay, "War, Dearth, and Theft in the Eighteenth Century," Past and
Present, no. 95 (1982), p. 154, n. 100. There is need for more research on this matter. My
essential point is that, whatever the status difference between suspects and their accusers
(and jurors), the status difference between accusers (and jurors) and the bench was
frequently far greater. Moreover, accusers and accused were sometimes from the same
locale, nearly always from the same county; judges oversaw resolution of local disputes to
which they were themselves outsiders, both geographically and socially. This was probably
as much or even more the case in earlier centuries. So long as jurors typically took their lead
from the bench, the bench countenanced substantial leeway in less serious cases. And even
when jurors took their lead from the bench, they were responding to judicial attitudes that
were themselves in part the reflection of long-held and widely shared community standards.
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centuries) converted great weaknesses into moderate strength, England's
rulers found that that strength had, after all, its naturallimits. 143
It has been wisely observed that English authorities came to accept as
binding certain concepts of due process in which they had cloaked their
exercise of pure power .1 44 Something akin to this phenomenon seems to
have been at work in Parliament's resolution of the seditious libel crisis.
The Libel Act debates reflected a consensus on one principle only, that
the criminal trial jury should have a right to return a general verdict on all
facts in issue. That principle was recognized as having long constitutional
standing. To deny it (or seem to deny it) in trials for seditious libel was not
only to offend that principle but to risk political fire for offending it
precisely in those circumstances that suggested the worst sort of motives.145
Many in Parliament as of 1770 were persuaded by Mansfield's defense
of the official doctrine of seditious libel. 146 Precedent and the uniqueness
of seditious libel seemed to ground an exception to the general rule.1 47
What, then, doomed the exception? Constitutionalism and politics are
rarely separable. Parliament responded to both without being able to
isolate either. The principle of a right to a general verdict in all cases had
come to be identified socially with the prevailing theories regarding the
purposes of the criminal trial jury. The principle was accepted by some
143. I have made this argument in the present essay with regard to the administration of
criminal law in the eighteenth century. I believe that it applies as well to earlier periods.
Judges in the medieval period may have sensed that their relaxed treatment of juries in most
cases made it difficult for them to control juries in those few cases in which they took a real
interest. The early modern bench may have analyzed the resistance to fining jurors in similar
terms. The phenomena I am describing were present from the outset of the jury-trial
experience. The contest over the doctrine of seditious libel was of special importance
because it involved widespread political debate and revealed the limits of authority during
the very period in which authority was (ostensibly) corning to have relatively substantial
control over the administration of criminal law. I shall return to this point in the conclusion
to this book (Chapter 9).
144. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, pp. 258-69. "And the rulers were, in serious senses,
whether willingly or unwillingly, the prisoners of their own rhetoric; they played the games
of power according to rules which suited them, but they could not break those rules or the
whole game would be thrown away." See also Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal
Law," pp. 32 et seq.; "Introduction," in Brewer and Styles, eds., An Ungovernable People,
p. 20: "[T]he imprimatur of the law conferred only limited power on those who were its
beneficiaries. Both the modus operandi of the law and the ideology that lay behind it served
to constrain authority and to limit those who tried to manipulate the legal process."
145. For references to the Libel Act debates see above, n. 64.
146. See above, n. 25.
147. But see the speech of Sir Thomas Townshend, who refused to make an exception in
the case oflibel. Hansard, ed., Parliamentary History, 16: cols. 1162-63. "He whom nature
or education has not qualified for determining the guilt of a libel, is unqualified to sit as judge
in cases of life and death" (col. 1162).
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because they believed its rejection would appear (wrongly) to be a
rejection of more general principles that all in fact accepted. It was
accepted by others who would themselves have viewed a rejection in that
way. At base in seditious libel was the historic role of the jury as a
safeguard against tyranny. So long as that issue could be kept from being
entangled with others, the sides might be clearly drawn; much would
depend upon whether one viewed the settlement of 1689 as having
rendered the safeguard unnecessary. But it could not be kept separate. So
long as there were many in society who distrusted the role of authorities
in seditious libel cases, the settlement would never be solely a matter of
institutional framework as such. It would of course be a matter of the
movement for free speech and of the liberties of subjects generally. No
doubt that is how most members of Parliament saw the issue. But it would
also be a matter of how society regarded the practice of institutions, of the
very real importance of de facto powers, such as those of the jury in
common-run felony cases. The idea that discretionary lay fact-finding was
central to the administration of justice had taken on a life of its own, and
no part of that administration could be shielded from it. Authorities could
not, as it were, "bifurcate" the practice of trial by jury. The same judges
who tolerated, or even encouraged, mitigated verdicts in homicide or
theft could not easily explain why juries ought to play so limited a role in
seditious libel. Notions of consistency and coherence were integral to the
late eighteenth-century conception of justice. Nothing could gainsay
them, not even the attendant risk of more subtle forms of inconsistency
and incoherence-i.e., inconsistent jury verdicts-as the price of seditious libel law reform.I48
148. Mansfield in St. Asaph's Case (State Trials, 21:1040) stressed the problem of
inconsistent verdicts: "To be free, is to live under a government by law .... Miserable is
the condition of individuals, dangerous is the condition of the state, if there is no certain law,
or, which is the same thing, no certain administration of the law to protect individuals, or to
guard the state .... In opposition to this, what is contended for? That the law shall be in
every particular cause what any twelve men . . . shall be inclined to think, liable to no
review, and subject to no control. ... Under such an administration of law, no man could
tell, no counsel could advise, whether a paper was or was not punishable." See also John
Bowles, Considerations on the Respective Rights of Judge and Jury: particularly upon
Trials for Libel, occasioned by an expected motion of the Right Hon. Charles-James Fox
(London, 1791), p. 4: "It would be next to impossible that their [i.e., the jurors'] decision
should accord with any uniform and fixed principles. The consequence would be, the
prevalence of confusion and uncertainty in all legal proceedings where intervention of a jury
takes place. A total loss of freedom must of course ensue; for the essence of freedom
consists in the certainty of law." These considerations surfaced in Parliament both in 1770
[e.g. Hansard, ed., Parliamentary History, 16: col. 1146 (Thurlow); col. 1186 (De Grey)] and
1792 [e.g. ibid., 29: col. 1297 (The Lord Chancellor)].
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The recognition of the right of the criminal trial jury to return a general
verdict resolved one immediate political problem, but it contributed little
to the resolution of some other longstanding problems of the criminal law.
One of the important side effects of the seditious libel controversy was its
intensification of the prevailing social conceptions of the criminal trial
jury. The magnification of those conceptions and their translation to the
sphere of political misdemeanors may have affected the administration of
the law generally and delayed the movement for reform of the law of
sanctions .t49
It is possible, of course, that the seditious libel problem and its
resolution only temporarily delayed and then ultimately accelerated the
movement for reform of the law of sanctions. The penal reformers'
argumeat against jury law-finding-i.e., against merciful fact-finding in
common-run cases-lost some of its appeal when the integrity of the jury
system seemed to be threatened in political misdemeanors. Resistance to
the bench involved a glorification of jury independence; criticism of juries
on all fronts may have become unfashionable. But in the years following
passage of the Libel Act, juries, as is well known, convicted more often
than they had before in cases of seditious libel. 150 The general verdict
allowed the tenor of the times to take its toll, and perhaps reminded
observers of the volatility of jury attitudes. In those years, the warnings
of Mansfield, John Bowles, and others might have seemed well taken: 151
the defendant's security was at risk; no one could be certain how juries
would "apply" the law. One obvious solution to the problem of the jury
that convicted against the law was a fuller right of appeal. 152 But for the
149. This is, of course, a matter of speculation. Doubtless, many factors delayed the
impact of the criticisms of the late-eighteenth-century reformers. See below, Chapter 9,
section I.
150. Holdsworth, History of English Law, 10:693. Levy, Legacy of Suppression, pp.
252-54. Both Holdsworth and Levy rely heavily on Stephen's account of the aftermath of
the Act. See Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, 2:362-63. See also May,
Constitutional History, 2:34 et seq.
151. See above, n. 148.
152. The Act itself (32 Geo. 3, c. 60, sect. IV) provided "[t)hat in case the jury shall find
the defendant or defendants guilty, it shall or may be lawful for the said defendant or
defendants to move in arrest of judgment, on such grounds and in such manner as by law he
or they might have done before the passing of this act." See Holdsworth, History of English
Law, 10:691-92. Holdsworth takes a view of the act that is perhaps too sanguine. He
correctly stated that the question for the court was "whether the prosecution has satisfied
the onus of proving that [the writing) is libellous." Whether "the settlement made by Fox's
Act [was] very favourable to the accused" rests to some extent on one's view of the legal
standards (including the relevance of truth) then existing that the court were always ready
to apply and that juries might or might not apply depending upon the political climate. It
rests also as a practical matter, on the way in which trial courts typically assessed the
prosecution's case in seditious libel cases. Until a thorough study has been made of the
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time being, the uncertainty of the law produced by the general verdict in
seditious libel cases may have made it easier for penal reformers to
resume criticizing jury discretion in common-run cases. The solution
there was not to do away with the general verdict-that matter had been
placed beyond reach-but rather to achieve certainty of law and punishment through the unmitigated imposition of humane and moderate sanctions.
The constitutionalization of the general verdict perhaps raised the
stakes for the penal reformers. Having reidentified the jury as the
quintessential democratic institution in English society, Parliament would
have to demonstrate definitively what eighteenth-century reform proponents had only suggested: that the prevailing practice of jury-based
mitigation in routine felonies had grown to such proportions that it was
making a mockery of the law. Nothing less would suffice before Parliament could reduce the jury's role in common-run cases. Changes injury
trial would follow, rather than precede, changes in English attitudes
toward the entire problem of the administration of the criminallaw.l53

treatment by the post-1792 bench of motions in arrest of judgment-in the light of the
evidence proffered at trial by prosecution and defense in seditious libel cases-our own
judgment must be reserved.
153. See below, Chapter 9.
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Epilogue and Conclusion

This concluding chapter falls into two principal parts, an epilogue and a
summary, to each of which I have devoted two sections. In section I, I
shall deal briefly and selectively with the background to the Victorian
reform of the law of sanctions. I shall stress those developments that
reveal the nature of the near impasse that confronted the English in the
administration of criminal justice by the early nineteenth century.
From the perspective I have chosen, the movement for reform of
sanctions appears to have involved, inter alia, a widespread rejection of
traditional assumptions about the virtues of jury-based intervention and,
indeed, about the entire longstanding system of mitigation. Although the
precise reasons for this transformation in contt::mporary thought remain
elusive, the sea change it reflected seems, as I shall suggest in section II,
a most natural denouement to the centuries-long process I have been
describing. In section III, I discuss the themes of the book at length and
identify some important questions that my work raises but which I am as
yet unable to answer; I also allude to problems that fall within the subject
of this book but which I do not treat in any of the essays that I have
brought together. In the final section, I recapitulate my central arguments
in a more direct fashion.

I
The movement for reform of the law of sanctions gained momentum in
the early decades of the nineteenth century and bore fruit by the early
years of Victoria's reign. Between 1830 and 1840, Parliament removed the
capital sanction from many of the less serious offenses. Capital punishment was retained for those offenses for which, as it happened, juries had
from earliest times been relatively willing to convict offenders; it was no
longer the nominal punishment for those offenses for which the jury had
long served as one of the principal institutions of mitigation. Reform of
sanctions thus brought to an end a long phase in the history of the English
criminal trialjury. Jury-based mitigation of sanctions would continue, but
at a greatly reduced level. In the popular mind, and in reality, the jury
would usually adhere to the letter of the law.
356
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The widely observed role of the jury as mitigator of the law of sanctions
figured prominently in several aspects of the early-nineteenth-century
movement for law reform. This is the final stage in the English debate
over the trial jury that I shall discuss. My discussion will be brief, for the
movement for reform has been thoroughly chronicled, and my own
purposes are limited. 1 For the most part, my observations are retrospective, offered by way of conclusion.
The movement for reform of sanctions had its roots in the midseventeenth-century movement for law reform. 2 But it was the statutory
manipulation of benefit of clergy in the early eighteenth century that
represented the first important step in the direction of reform. We have
seen that the resulting practical penology of the period both built upon
longstanding mitigation practice and accommodated the notion that the
threat of death was a necessary deterrenP Capital punishment would be
imposed in only a handful of cases, but those cases would be identified as
the residue of a winnowing process. The offender would be kept in doubt
as to his fate for as long as it was deemed necessary and appropriate.
Reform was shaped-and limited-by the perceived need for an element
of terror in eighteenth-century penology.
Contemporaries sometimes explained the need to maintain the death
sanction as the price for not maintaining a large and professional police
force. 4 Resistance to abandoning the legacy of a makeshift local and
amateur constabulary prevailed not only among the county-based justices
of the peace and their allies but also among the urban working class. Fears
that a national police force would spawn both political centralization and
oppression by the employer class intensified toward the end of the
eighteenth century. 5 Proponents of a police system succeeded in 1792 in
1. For a comprehensive statement of the reform movement see Beattie, Crime and the
Courts, chs. 12-13. Beattie's masterful "Conclusion" (ch. 13) stresses the long-term
preparation for the early nineteenth-century reforms and the speed with which reform was
finally effected. I treat the developments involved sketchily and only in relation to the issue
of the trial jury. See also Radzinowicz, History of English Criminal Law, vol. I; W. R.
Cornish, "Criminal Justice and Punishment," in Cornish eta!., eds., Crime and Law in
Nineteenth Century Britain (Irish University Press, 1978), pp. 7-65; and Douglas Hay's
astute summary essay, "Crime and Justice in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century England," in Norval Morris and Michael Tonry, eds., Crime and Justice: An Annual Review
of Research, vol. 2 (Chicago, 1980), pp. 45-84.
2. See above, Chapter 5, section V.
3. See above, Chapter 7.
4. Langbein, "Albion's Fatal Flaws," pp. 115-16; David Philips, '"A New Engine of
Power and Authority': The Institutionalization of Law-Enforcement in England
1780-1830," in Gatrell eta!., eds., Crime and the Law, pp. 155-89. See also Beattie, Crime
and the Courts, ch. 2.
5. Philips, '"A New Engine of Power and Authority,"' pp. 171-74.
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passing an act for a stipendiary magistracy,6 but not until 1829 did they
secure legislation establishing the basis for a truly professional force.7 In
the intervening years the movements for reform of sanctions and for
establishment of a professional police system dovetailed. The proponents
of each reform fought against the common rationalization of the prevailing
scheme of criminal administration: a police system would invite tyranny;
in its absence, order depended upon the threat of the gallows; the decision
regarding the gallows ought to be intrinsic to the prosecution of each
individual offender.
In theory, the selection of offenders for capital punishment on a
case-by-case basis need not have involved the criminal trial jury more
than for the initial determination of whether the suspect was guilty. Once
the jury had found the defendant guilty the matter of sentencing could
have been left to the bench and the Crown. We have seen that most
eighteenth-century criminal law reformers, as well as apologists for the
prevailing system of criminal law, favored centering the entire mitigation
process (to the extent that it was to exist) in the Crown. We have also
seen, however, that most reformers viewed such a resolution of existing
problems as unrealistic. They recognized that, in practice, the jury would
not always find the defendant guilty and leave his fate to higher authorities. For the most part, reformers agreed that until the law of sanctions
had been altered, juries would inevitably (and justifiably) play a substantial role.s
The system was even more complicated than most commentators
indicated. In many cases the jury did in fact leave the decision on
sentencing to the bench and Crown. But that was within the context of a
system in which the jury possessed a great deal of power, should it wish
to use it, and in which the jury's deference to the bench and the bench's
deference to the jury were mutual. Moreover, in many cases involving
jury-based mitigation the jury took its lead from the bench; again, the
jury's willingness to do so must be understood in light of the fact that
when the jury wanted to go its own way, it had the power to do so.
Commentators may not have well understood the dynamics of the system,
but their essential insight was correct: so long as the law of sanctions
remained harsh, an entirely official system of mitigation of that law could
not easily come into being.
Law reformers in the early nineteenth century accepted the jury's role
within the existing system as a given. Like the eighteenth-century
reformers, their principal objective was certainty of the law. Thus they
6. Stat. 32 Geo. 3, c. 53.
7. Stat. 10 Geo. 4, c. 44.
8. See above, Chapter 7, section III.
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argued for reform of the law of sanctions so that mitigation would not
often be required. They did not, however, fall back on the argument that
mitigation might continue so long as it was solely in the hands of the
Crown. Romilly, in his famous speech in Parliament in 1810, framed the
issue in terms that others were to follow. 9 The jury, Romilly argued, had
been placed in the impossible position of having to choose in each case
between imposing a sanction that it believed to be far too cruel in the hope
that the Crown would mitigate it and committing an act ofperjury. 10 Not
only did such perjury undermine the system of deterrence, but it also bred
disrespect for the law. The reformers chose not to see the jury as part of
a quasi-legitimate sentencing process, nor to view the oath as imposing
responsibility to do justice in accordance with the terms in which juries
had traditionally acted. Thus by the early nineteenth century the jury's
longstanding tradition of merciful application of the law had come to be
described as a kind of jury lawlessness. Far from blaming the jury for
undertaking this lawless role, however, reformers sympathized with them
in their plight, and portrayed themselves as friends of the jury who would
save it from the "dilemma" that it faced daily. 11
In his 1810 speech Romilly developed a theme that he had introduced
decades before. Romilly had originally accepted Paley's description of the
system of criminal law, asserting, in his reply to Madan, that Parliament
had not intended that the law be enforced literally . 12 He had both
accepted the notion that Parliament intended the law to be enforced
selectively and, true to the principles of the new penology, attacked such
a system. By 1810 Romilly had come to believe that, even if Parliament
had not intended that the law be enforced literally, there were no clear
principles behind the process of selection. On the basis of statistical
research, he concluded that patterns of enforcement were always changing and were determined by the mood and inclinations of jury, judge, and
Crown. 13 Romilly now argued, moreover, that the system led in practice
to decisions by the judge that ought to have been made, if at all, by the
jury. He observed that in many cases where the jury convicted the
9. Sir Samuel Romilly, Observations on the Criminal Law of England (London, 1810)
(this tract contains the substance of Romilly's speech in Parliament).
10. Ibid., pp. 22-23.
11. See below, n. 22 and accompanying text.
12. See above, Chapter 7, text at n. 139.
13. Romilly, Observations on the Criminal Law, pp. 16 et seq. At one point Romilly
stated: "In this uncertain administration of justice, not only different judges act upon
different principles, but the same judge, under the same circumstances, acts differently at
different times" (p. 19). Several years earlier, Romilly had concluded that many capital
felonies were the result of changes in the value of money, a severity that resulted from "no
intention of the legislature, but altogether from accidental circumstances." Romilly,
Memoirs, 2:230 (letter toM. Dumont, Aug. 25, 1807).
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defendant, the bench subsequently reprieved him so that a pardon might
be sought from the Crown. In these cases, Romilly argued, the bench
based its decision upon facts which it itself had found. 14 Here again
Romilly opened up a line of argument that others were to pursue. In the
years that followed, the prevailing system of criminal administration was
portrayed as totally unpredictable. 15 According to critics, the jury was left
to guess what the bench might do in a given case, while the bench made
its own assumptions about the grounds of the jury's decision. The result
of the prevailing system of criminal justice, it was asserted, was that it
actually produced crime. 16 In drawing this conclusion, reformers were
perhaps fooled by the fact that there were more prosecutions in the early
nineteenth century than in the recent past, an increase that probably
reflected better enforcement rather than more crime.
Romilly'sfollowers characterized the position of the jury in even more
ironic terms. Sir William Grant, Master of the Rolls, argued that the jury
was forced to adopt a kind of discretion that the jury was never intended
to have. 17 Although this was true if one looks to the earliest period of the
criminal trial jury, it hardly did justice to the long history of official
acquiescence in jury mitigation of the law. Grant went on to criticize the
exercise of discretion in a conventional manner. The law of sanctions, he
argued, forced jurors to violate their consciences. 18 He played on the
famous phrase, "pious peijury": like many of Blackstone's successors,
Grant took the term "perjury" very seriously. He suggested that juries
did not trust others to use discretion and so took it upon themselves;
indeed, he noted, judges encouraged juries to do so. Grant seems not to
have supposed that this kind of judicial steering of juries produced a fairly
predictable scheme of resolutions. Rather he saw it only as contributing to
the jury's dilemma.I9
The dilemma of the criminal trial jury was often alluded to by early
nineteenth-century law reformers in their argument for reform of the law
14. Ibid., pp. 26-27.
15. See e.g. Lord Brougham's review of Romilly's published speech in The Edinburgh
Review, vol. 19 (Edinburgh, 1811), pp. 396-97; John William Polidori, "On the Punishment
of Death," in The Pamphleteer, vol. 8, no. 15 (London, 1816), p. 294.
16. E.g. A Brief Address to the People of England on the Criminal Law (London, 1827),
p. 10.
17. Sir William Grant: speech in Parliament, 1811. Hansard, ed., Parliamentary History,
vol. 19, App., cols. lxvi-lxvii.
18. Ibid., p. 13.
19. Idem: "Ought laws to be so framed that there must be a continual struggle in the
minds of your jurymen? ... [Jurors] can not be unmindful of the lenity of the judges; but
notwithstanding this, they are unwilling to risk anything: they will not trust to another the
use of a discretion which they have the power and disposition to exercise themselves." See
also Romilly, Memoirs, 2:230 (letter to Dumont, Aug. 25, 1807).
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of sanctions. In 1819, and again in the 1830s and 1840s, parliamentary
committees produced reports on the criminal law which portrayed prosecutors and jurors in the most sympathetic fashion. They had been left, it
was asserted, to implement a system that was essentially unworkable,
unfair, and counterproductive. 2o Parliamentary deliberations may have
been influenced by the testimony of victims of crime, especially artisans
and other men of small commerce, who had come to see the role of the
jury in the same way that reformers saw it. Prospective victims petitioned
Parliament for reform of the law of sanctions, asking that the death
sentence be removed from offenses against their property so that offenders would be more likely to suffer some substantial punishment and
the law would be more likely to deter criminal behavior.2 1 Grand jurors
and trial jurors also joined the clamor for reform. They too petitioned
Parliament, urging reform that would save jurors from the dilemma that it
now seemed nearly everyone agreed was their awful fate.2 2
The movements for reform of the police system and for reform of the
law of sanctions coincided with the movement for reform of prisons. 23
Transportation to the American colonies had ended abruptly with the
movement for independence, and for a time the English had experimented
with incarceration of convicts in the famous "hulks" on the Thames. 24
Transportation to New South Wales began in the late eighteenth century,
but by then the movement for incarceration and rehabilitation of convicts
in English penitentiaries was already well under way. Some of the
literature of this movement, the roots of which reach back into the
seventeenth century, featured descriptions of life in English prisons
where, it was claimed, conditions were brutal and virtually calculated to
produce a large and hardened criminal class.zs
One of the themes of the prison reform literature dealt with the effect on
the criminal class of the prevailing system of sanctions. Prisoners were
portrayed as fully aware that participants at every stage in the criminal
process sought to prevent imposition of the harsh sanctions provided for
by law. In 1831, Edward Wakefield, who had spent time in Newgate,
20. See e.g. "Report from the Select Committee on Criminal Laws," July 8, 1819, in
Parliamentary Papers, (585), vol. 8 (1819), pp. 3 et seq.; "Second Report from His
Majesty's Commissioners on Criminal Law,'' June 9, 1836, in Parliamentary Papers, vol. 36
(1836), pp. 183 et seq.
21. See e.g. "The Petition of the Master Calico Printers in the Vicinity of London" (Feb.
27, 1811), reprinted in Radzinowicz, History of English Criminal Law, 1: App. 4, p. 727.
22. See "The London Jurors' Petition" (Sept. 6, 1831), reprinted in ibid., pp. 731-32.
23. The literature on the subject of prison reform is vast. For excellent recent accounts
see Michael Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution,
1750-1850 (London, 1978); Beattie, Crime and the Courts, chs. 10-12.
24. Ignatieff, Just Measure of Pain, pp. 80-81.
25. See e.g. Hanway, Distributive Justice and Mercy, pp. 28 et seq.
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described a world in which there was remarkably little fear of the law.z6
Suspects knew, Wakefield claimed, how to play on the sympathies of
prosecutors; it was common knowledge, apparently, that a prosecutor
who wanted neither to put a suspect's life in jeopardy nor to forfeit his
own recognizance could be convinced to go through "the form of [his]
part in the prosecution, taking care to shape [his] evidence in favor of the
accused. " 27 Suspects also knew, Wakefield alleged, that judges and jurors
constantly nullify the law, by saving from capital convictions, one
whom they believe to be capitally guilty. This occurs so frequently, and
is so fully brought to the knowledge of the public, in the reports of trials
at every Old Bailey sessions, and at every country assize, that I am
unwilling to dwell on it at any length. 28
Wakefield described mock trials held by the prisoners in Newgate in
which the prisoners took the parts of judge, jury, and witnesses, and the
prisoner at the bar: "On these occasions the prisoners show a remarkable
knowledge of the temper of judges and juries, being in the habit of
acquitting many prisoners whom they knew to be guilty.' ' 29
The parliamentary committees on reform of the criminal law had a
virtual field day with this kind of material. At the very moment that the
nation was establishing a professional police force, it was-or so it
seemed-continuing to indulge a system of prosecution, trial, and sentencing that bred disrespect for the law and the notion among the
criminals themselves that, having been made the subject of mitigation,
they could continue to breach the law with impunity. Doubtless the select
committees that issued reports in 1819 and in 1836 interviewed persons
who said what the committee members wanted to hear: the evidence that
the committees compiled was remarkably one-sided. The testimony of
suspects and convicts was nevertheless of some real importance. To the
assertion that juries were faced with an awful dilemma was added the
charge that juries were mocked by the very persons whose lives they
spared. Apparently, capital sanctions failed to produce the terror they had
been intended to produce, and the administration of the criminal law was
undermining any real possibility of true rehabilitation. Far from inculcating religious values, the system was making a mockery of them. The jury
was not, of course, the only participant in this ill-begotten system of
criminal justice. But it was a participant whose behavior was difficult to
modify. A developing police force could be depended upon to take over
26. Edward Gibbon Wakefield, Facts Relating to the Punishment of Death in the
Metropolis (London, 1831).
27. Ibid., p. 58.
28. Ibid., p. 61.
29. Ibid., p. 62.
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the role of defaulting or half-hearted prosecutors, and the bench and other
officers of the Crown might respond to Parliament's concerns. But the
jury could be reached only through reform of the law of sanctions itself.
Not all members of Parliament were in agreement that there ought to be
reform. There were those who interpreted statistics showing more numerous convictions for property crimes after the first, limited reduction of
capital sanctions as indicating an increase in the number of those crimes
rather than as a greater willingness on the part of jurors to comply with
the letter of the law once the death penalty was no longer an issue. In the
end, however, such doubters were unable to resist the tide of reform. By
1840 Parliament had added large-scale reform of the law of sanctions to
reform of policing and incarceration. 30
Reform of the law of sanctions had an immediate impact on jury
behavior in many trials for felony. Parliament had largely removed the
need for massive and daily jury-based intervention on behalf of criminal
defendants. This development coincided also with the gradual transformation of the trial itself from a kind of morality play in which the
defendant spoke on his behalf in full sight of the jury to a more impersonal
and more highly structured trial in which the defendant was represented
by counsel and where rules of admissibility governed the presentation of
the evidence to the jury. A new world of criminal justice was being
ushered in; the old one had surely drawn to a close when, in the light of
widely held views, it seemed plausible to say that, after all, the jury had
never been intended to be a discretionary body.

II
Jury-based intervention did not end in the middle of the nineteenth
century. It remains a pervasive and vital aspect of the (so-called)
fact-finding process even in lesser felonies, where life is not at stake. In
that setting, however, it has not always been noticed. Perhaps jurors
themselves are, typically, unaware of the degree to which discretion
creeps into the fact-finding process. It was the sanction of death that made
jury law-finding in routine cases an important and recognized aspect of
English culture. Jury mitigation of the law soon passed from public
consciousness, save for episodic reappearances in what society has taken
to be special circumstances. Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
historians made relatively little of the fact that a tradition of jury
intervention in common-run felonies had for centuries been central to the
administration of the criminal law. Until recently, historians have por30. For a listing of capital statutes as of 1839 see Radzinowicz, History of English
Criminal Law, 1:733-34.
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trayed jury law-finding mainly as a matter of resistance to authorities in
political cases, and they have viewed those cases in isolation from the
general run of jury trials. They have viewed jury nullification the way they
have viewed monarchical depositions: as sudden outbursts, undertaken in
extreme circumstances, and seemingly lacking a basis in daily practices
and attitudes.
It seems fitting that the foundation for the abolition of open and massive
jury intervention was laid in the course of the debate over reform of the
English police system. In earliest times the jury had played an evidencegathering role, making up for the Crown's lack of policing and prosecutorial capacity. Subsequently that role was played by justices of the peace,
constables, and the other minor officials that composed England's
protopolice force. The limits of that meager force were widely recognized. Although authorities came to possess the capacity to gather
evidence in cases that were scheduled for trial, they remained largely
reactive, lacking the strength and numbers to prevent criminal activity.
Partly for that reason, capital sanctions were maintained. The maintenance of those sanctions in turn made continuation of jury intervention
inevitable. The development of the prosecution was a gradual process.
Only very slowly did authorities achieve the capacity to control the jury,
and even when they had done so there were reasons for allowing the jury
to share the power of mitigation. The transformation of criminal procedure in the early modern period thus eventuated in a system of trial
wherein juries that no longer controlled the production of evidence
nevertheless frequently and openly rendered verdicts against the evidence produced in court. The struggle for control of the law was by that
time very complex. The jury was coming to be a quasi-arm of the bench
even as it remained an extension of society. At one level, procedural
developments touching the jury reflected the fact that the criminal process
was becoming increasingly formal; at another level, the jury remained a
mediating institution that served multiple interests.
It is difficult to determine precisely how this two-sided relationship
between authority and the jury began. I have characterized the jury as
possessing the greatest degree of power during the medieval period. But
it must be remembered that in those times the Crown and bench were
relatively weak, so that the advantage they stood to gain from an alliance
with men of substance in the local community was correspondingly great.
Moreover, even if before the sixteenth century the bench could not have
prevented jurors from behaving as they did, authorities may nonetheless
have benefited from that behavior and felt little inclination to prevent it.
I have suggested that, in the main, legislative and judicial devices for
controlling the jury were not created in order to deal with jury-based
intervention that took the relatively benign form of merciful verdicts in
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run-of-the-mill cases. Authorities did not seek to end that aspect of the
jury's role; rather they sought to manage it, to set clear limits to its
operation, and to create the means whereby they could monitor verdicts
for what they considered true abuses.
By the eighteenth century authorities had gained so much control over
the practice of jury-based mitigation that it had become an integral aspect
of the official sentencing procedure. In form, of course, the jury continued
to determine only the question of guilt or innocence, and it was in part the
fiction so frequently involved in this aspect of its role that was bringing
jury-based intervention into disrepute. By then, too, it had become clear
just how powerful the jury could be. Its place in the constitution had been
marked out in the constitutional and political crises of the seventeenth
century and again in the late eighteenth century during the debate over the
law of seditious libel. The constitutional role of the jury combined with
the long-standing ethic of jury-based intervention in routine cases to
produce a formidable political and legal ideology. Yet at a deeper level, an
increasingly widespread concern for clarity, certainty, and predictability
of the law-a concern shared by both proponents and opponents of
reform-was feeding into the stream of opposition to jury-based discretion.
Reform of the libel law took the wind out of the sails of the movement
for the right of the jury to find law (though not out of the tradition of
resistance to unpopular political prosecutions, as the acquittals of, inter
alia, Hardy, Tooke, Thelwall, and Hone demonstrate). Although the
claim to that right was reasserted during the next decade, by and large
conferral of the power to render a general verdict altered the nature of
discourse concerning the jury. Jury discretion in seditious libel could now
be concealed within the fact-finding process, as it had long been concealed in treason. Arguments might arise over the definition of the law,
but they would be resolved by legislative decree or judicial elaboration of
existing standards. True jury nullification (as distinct from discretionary,
merciful verdicts) would continue episodically. But so long as such
verdicts remained concealed or, if open, ad hoc and unaccompanied by a
general claim to a right to find law, they could be-and down to our own
day have been-accepted as anomalies and as one of the costs of the jury
system. Ultimately, the reform of the law of sanctions had a similar
impact on the tradition of merciful verdicts in routine felonies: by the later
nineteenth century, jury discretion had largely been hidden from view.
Moreover, the period of intense reform activity and criticism on all sides
of the jury's supposed "dilemma" had conditioned much of society to
think in terms of the jury's responsibility to adhere to the rule of law.
It is impossible to ascribe the demise of discretionary fact-finding (or
law-finding) to a single cause. Reform of the law of sanctions was, of
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course, crucial, but that reform came about only after the assumptions
that underlay the preexisting system were somehow no longer tenable.
We have seen that the reform of the police system played a significant,
albeit indirect and catalytic role, as did the movement for reform of
English prisons. The emphases in the new penology on humanity and on
the certainty of the law were also significant: what began as a claim that
certainty was required for reasons of deterrence ended as a claim that
certainty was necessary for fairness to the defendant. Rationality regarding penology was closely related to rationality regarding the nature of the
trial itself. The sequencing of the trial in the early eighteenth century may
have resulted from developments in the law of evidence, including the
rules regarding the burden of going forward and the burden of proof, But
the law of evidence developed more rapidly in the nineteenth century
when Englishmen were no longer satisfied with a cumbersome system of
posttrial reprieve and royal pardon on grounds of an unsafe verdict. It is
possible that the law of evidence developed only after changes had been
effected in policing, in sanctions, and in the structure of jury trial, but
jurisprudence probably led as much as it followed. One might speculate
that the increasing recourse to counsel by defendants was crucial for the
development of the law of evidence, a development that probably
predated the acceptance of other reform demands. In the end, however,
although we can roughly date the close of the centuries-long phase of jury
trial history that we have traced, we can as yet do little more. We await
an informed analysis of the manner in which the end of that phase came
about; the much-needed history of the rise of the modern trial has yet to
be written.

III
The movement for reform of the law of sanctions prepared the way for
the modern view regarding the role of the criminal trial jury. The
traditional view eroded suddenly, reflecting its fragility and inducing us to
forget how long it had endured and how deeply it had been embedded in
the English culture. We would do well, therefore, to end our study of the
interplay of institutions, ideas, and behavior with a lengthy retrospective.
I should state at the outset that I have sought in these chapters not only
to answer some difficult questions but also to raise others for which I have
found no satisfactory answer. I shall in the course of my summation
review some of the unresolved problems that I have identified. This
review will, I hope, make clear the limits of the present work, and thereby
help to set a research agenda for those who share my particular interest
and approach to the social and intellectual history of the criminal law and
the criminal trial jury.
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I have discussed the origin and early development of the criminal trial
jury against the background of what I have called the Angevin transformation in the criminal law. That transformation-the gradual absorption into
royal jurisdiction of virtually all felonies-prepared the way for a nearuniversal capital sanction. Why did the Crown embark on such a harsh
sanctions policy? To what extent did authorities expect compliance?
From one point of view, the capital sanction merely represented a return
to an older and more primitive approach to the criminal law. The
Anglo-Saxon system of relatively moderate punishment (i.e., monetary
composition) had developed as a result of the Crown's interest, and
perhaps that of society generally, in stemming the more ancient practice
of the feud. We must not forget that for those few most serious offenses
over which the Crown even in Anglo-Saxon times exercised exclusive
jurisdiction, punishment was typically capital. One might conjecture that
so long as the Crown had a monopoly on punishment, that punishment
would be very severe.
On yet another view, the Angevins and their successors sought to make
the strongest possible statement against criminal activity, but believed
that enforcement ought to take account of both the circumstances in
which offenses had been committed and the reputation of the offender.
Roger Groot has shown that, at least in practice, the presentment jury
undertook a good deal of selection among offenders. The presentment
jury first named all those who were accused and then named those whom
they truly suspected. The evidence does not allow for the conclusion that
the presenters exercised discretion and stated that they did not suspect
some persons whom they in fact suspected but chose mercifully (or on
any other grounds) to exonerate. I have suggested, however, that we
should not be surprised to discover that the presentment jury did operate
on this basis. As I have tried to show, the trial jury did play such a role
and played it in an expansive fashion. One must consider the adoption of
the trial jury (and even the adoption of the harsh law of sanctions) in light
of earlier experience with jury-like institutions. It is possible that, by the
1220s, the Crown assumed that trial juries would behave just about as
they did. Certainly it is possible that the tension between authorities and
· juries that I have depicted in the medieval period reflected no more than
disagreement about the degree of discretion that ought to be exercised.
Those who view the eighteenth-century system of criminal administration as one in which authorities made active and calculated use of
selective enforcement might see in the twelfth-century transformation of
the criminal law an early form of this approach to governance. Such an
argument, it seems to me, would be difficult-though perhaps not
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impossible-to sustain. Except in homicide, royal pardons were fairly
unusual before the end of the thirteenth century; most selective enforcement was in the hands of the jury before that time. It is possible to argue
that the jury was itself an extension of the Crown, at least in the earliest
period, when the trial jury was often merely a subset of the presenting
jury. On this view the Crown struck an alliance with the most established
free men of the local communities, placing in their hands the power of life
and death over the populace on the countryside. By the end of the
thirteenth century (the argument might run) the Crown was attempting to
play a more prominent role in the granting of mercy: hence the increasing
flow of royal pardons of grace. It would stretch the point too far to say
that royal complaints about jury-based nonenforcement of the law were
really aimed at shoring up the royal purchase on the power to dispense
merciful judgments. There remains, nonetheless, fertile ground for investigation. Surely the Crown engendered deference through its use of the
pardon, whether or not one views royal policy as involving conscious
manipulation of the law in order to engender it.
My own view, as the essays in Part I of this volume suggest, is that the
Crown's participation in the process of selective enforcement came abotJt
largely by way of accident, and that that policy was only one of many
contradictory policies authorities pursued. It is difficult to explain the rise
of universal capital sanctions in terms of a desire to achieve the deference
of society through merciful nonenforcement of the law. We still know too
little about penological theory in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries,
especially about Continental practices and their influence within English
ruling circles. There is need for research on the development of capital
sanctions, on Continental influences, and on their melding with the
administration of the criminal law in England.
I have suggested that authorities were well aware that juries manipulated the evidence in order to give effect to their views regarding just
deserts and that the Crown and bench were unable to prevent juries from
playing this role. But I have also suggested that authorities were not
particularly ill-disposed toward this form of jury behavior. Other problems must have seemed more important, and there may not have been a
great deal of distance between lay and official views regarding the
appropriate sanction in most of the routine cases in which jurors exercised discretion. It is even possible that from fairly early on the Crown
actively encouraged juries to play the role that I have described. Although
judicial encouragement of jury mitigation of sanctions does not become
visible to us until the sixteenth century, there is no reason to believe that
this tradition began so late. The development of the prosecution and of
means to control the jury made judicial participation in merciful verdicts
in "appropriate cases" more affordable, but the Crown and bench had
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probably long before not only acquiesced in social standards but upon
occasion encouraged them. It is true that one would expect to find some
indication of this attitude in Bracton, Placita Carone, or in other law
books of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. But the fact that one
does not is hardly conclusive. To say the least, the last word has not been
written on the role of medieval institutions in the granting of mercy. It is
no longer so fashionable as it once was to focus on the machinery of the
criminal law or on theories of kingship and justice in the Middle Ages.
Attention has shifted to the sociology of crime, surely an important
subject. Somehow bridges must be created among all these fields. The
bridge I have attempted to create through an analysis of the judges'
shaping of the law of homicide is no more than a beginning.

2

Crucial to the developments I have traced is the origin of the investigative activities of the justices of the peace and the place of those activities
in the transformation of criminal procedure in the late fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries. Although the developments involved were not undertaken in a conscious attempt to reduce trial jury discretion, they contributed indirectly to that end. Thus it was in this period that authorities
largely brought the trial jury under their control. I have argued that the
form of control that emerged allowed for a substantial degree of jury
discretion. Although judges frequently steered juries not only to convict
but also to acquit or to render a partial verdict, they did so in a way that
preserved to some extent the reality and to a large extent the psychology
of trial jury independence. This last proposition is, of course, the most
difficult to prove. The leading authority on criminal procedure and jury
trial in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries believes that juries
exercised very little independence even in the assessment of questions of
fact. In James Cockburn's view, juries knew what result the bench
thought appropriate and gave their verdicts accordingly, so that, in effect,
what appears to be jury independence was in reality fairly automatic jury
ratification of judicially mandated mitigation. I have outlined the difficulties involved in this reading of the evidence relating to criminal assizes.
Beyond the realm of this study, there is also evidence, effectively
marshaled by Cynthia Herrup, that in the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries juries exercised very substantial discretion at
quarter sessions, particularly in relatively minor cases, either on their
own or by leave (but not solely on the order) of the bench. Although we
must be cautious about generalizing from jury behavior where life was not
at stake to jury behavior in capital offenses, it is difficult to imagine that
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society did not develop expectations about jury practice on the basis of
the very common use of the jury in relatively minor cases.
I have dwelled at length on changes in substantive law and the law of
sanctions that I believe reflected attempts to accommodate long-standing
social attitudes. Although these changes reduced the need for jury
discretion, they recognized the implicit or "silent" power of the TudorStuart jury; i.e., as the law (and especially its judicial application) was
brought into closer conformity with deep-seated and long-manifested
social attitudes about just deserts, and so long as the bench recognized the
limits that those attitudes established, the new instruments of control
could develop and be applied with relatively little tension. These changes
in legal rules and sanctions recognized also the realities of pretrial stages
where the community as well as royal officials played a role in sorting out
potential defendants. Research (now underway) that embraces the administration of the criminal law at all levels, and that analyzes that administration in terms of prevailing social and religious attitudes toward crime
and criminals, will, I believe, support my view of a complex and
two-sided judge-jury relationship. I suspect, however, that it will also lay
bare, in a way I have not, the influence of local politics and the contest
among central and local authorities for control over jury selection and
over jury resolution of many kinds of cases. Jury independence from
royal officials may often have reflected jury dependence upon local ones.
It remains likely that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
criminal assize juries behaved largely as they did in the following century.
That is, juries were frequently influenced by the bench, and usually
resolved cases in a way the bench approved of, but in many cases were
left by the bench to determine the matter on their own. And even where
the bench revealed its view of how a case ought to be resolved, it left the
jury in a position whereby it might resolve the case as though it were
resolving it for itself. Juries both followed the bench-i.e., took their view
oi the case largely from the bench-and believed they were making their
own assessment both as to fact and as to the appropriate sentence. From
the perspective of the jury, the judge's view was simply one very
important consideration that ought to be taken into account. That, at
least, is the way many contemporaries viewed the process in the
eighteenth century, when the tools for steering the jury were just as
strong, if not stro1ger. It is unlikely that in the earlier period jurors (and
the denizens of England's local communities who observed them) thought
juries played a less significant role.
Mid-seventeenth-century writings on the jury are an important source
of evidence about contemporary perceptions of the institution and its
behavior. As we have seen, this evidence, too, is ambiguous. Some
evidence for the existence of the most basic form of jury independence
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resides in the tracts attacking the jury as composed of know-nothings and
asserting that there were not enough qualified persons to serve. Had
jurors simply ratified explicit judicial mandates, the deficiencies of jurors
would have been less obvious and seemed less important. But this does
not prove that jurors went beyond the finding of fact; it may prove no
more than that some contemporaries doubted jurors' capacity to make
accurate factual assessments independently.
The Interregnum tracts that argued for greater jury power pose even
more difficult problems. These radical jury tracts clearly reflect the view
that, at least in political cases, the bench steered juries far too strongly.
But what of trials in more routine felonies? For the most part, the tracts
place the true law-finding jury deep in the historical past; it cannot be
found-one infers from the tracts-at the contemporary assize or quartersession proceedings. But the tract writers equated true law-finding with a
degree and form of jury power that we are certain did not exist in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The tracts simply do not speak
directly to the question of whether juries in routine cases exercised some
more modest degree of discretion.
It is by no means clear why radical jury proponents were inattentive to
the jury practices I have traced. Were they unfamiliar with the handling of
criminal cases at assizes and quarter-sessions? Or should we conclude
that juries did not exercise even the modest kind of discretion in routine
cases that I have labored to show that they did exercise? My tentative
view is that these writers probably were aware of contemporary practices
but that, from their perspective, those practices were barely worth
discussion. For what authorities saw as nearly too much jury autonomy,
radical jury writers viewed as far too little. How had this come about?
I have suggested that the early modern bench steered juries, that jury
discretion was to a large degree undertaken with judicial leave or
encouragement, and that the local community largely accepted this
judicial role. For the most part, the community believed it was doing
justice as much on its own terms as was appropriate. Those relatively few
political dissidents who strenuously opposed the common-law bench-as
the radical jury writers certainly did-perhaps viewed the modest degree
of jury-based discretion that characterized routine felony trials as a mere
remnant of what they supposed was a once fully manifested, God-given
duty. In their view, that duty had become a peripheral, judicially
manipulated power; no longer was it the very essence of the trial jury's
right. The tract writers thus reflected the existence of an ongoing tradition
in a curious way. Contemporary jury discretion gave them a clue to the
jury's "true" role even while it appeared to them to have been nearly
destroyed by the bench.
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It is also significant that mid-seventeenth-century jury proponents
sometimes failed to distinguish between civil and criminal trial juries.
Like the Wilkites of the following century, the Levellers were concerned
with private law as much-if not more-than with criminal law. Both
groups sought a simpler, more accessible system of law to govern their
acquisition, transfer, and protection of property. But the Levellers sought
more than a reduction of both the mysterious forms of the common law
and the discretionary powers of the common-law bench; they looked to
the local community to judge cases, whether crimes, civil trespasses, or
disputes over property rights or contracts. Lilburne's invocation of
Littleton is of interest not only because the Leveller misread his chief
source for the proposition that the jury possessed the right to find law.
The jury that Lilburne (wrongly) claimed Littleton endowed with lawfinding power was a civil jury. Jurors in private-law disputes no doubt
continued to exercise discretion in their fact-finding role, and this
probably shaped their behavior when the same persons sat in criminal
cases. But because of the formal separation oflaw and fact in civil cases,
the civil jury had long before surrendered much of the power still retained
by the criminal trial jury. How this separation had come about is beyond
the scope of the present study. The influence of civil-jury practice upon
criminal-trial-jury behavior, and the attitudes of contemporaries toward
the civil jury, are, however, matters that do touch my own concerns,
though I have left them for others to pursue. Lilburne, it seems to me,
reflected an outmoded school of thought in his reference to the civiljury's
law-finding power. By his day, the claim of the criminal trial jury's
"right" to find the law mercifully, or to nullify judicial pronouncements
upon the law, was based largely upon the fact that it was the Crown that
brought (or stood behind) the prosecution. It was a tradition that gained
its force from the threat of capital punishment, its justification from the
defendant's "choice" to put himself upon the country, and its eventual
spread to noncapital, high misdemeanors from the fact that the alleged
"victim"-political authority-was, in one of its manifestations, the
bench that presided over the trial and charged the jury to do justice.
The background to Bushel's Case reveals, we have seen, the tension
between judge and jury that sometimes accompanied the tradition of
generally accepted de facto jury independence. In several homicide cases
Chief Justice Kelyng challenged a kind of jury behavior that, from all one
can determine, was not atypical. Although it is possible that the jurors
whose verdicts he coerced had in fact been guilty of corruption, Kelyng's
critics did not assume that was the case. Their response suggests that jury
fact-finding was sancrosanct even when it appeared on the facts that the
jurors had indulged in a substantial degree of discretionary decision
making. Vaughan's opinion can best be understood against a background
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of criminal proceedings in which judge and jury typically were in
agreement not only on the facts but also on the merits of merciful
discretion. The jury's right to an untrammeled general verdict could be
vindicated precisely because there were few cases where judge and jury
were likely to clash. I have suggested that the most important idea in
Vaughan's opinion was not his statement that the jurors might have
knowledge of their own but rather that the jury might see things in their
own way. It is not clear what Vaughan meant by the term "conscience,"
but surely whether or not he was sincere Vaughan was pointing to some
element in contemporary social thought. Vaughan's opinion suggests
once more that the notion that the jury had an ultimate right to go its own
way in its assessment of fact was not foreign to the period.
But Vaughan's opinion raises as many questions as it answers. Why did
Vaughan not allude to the most relevant aspect of the background to
Bushel's Case? Why was he silent about the line of cases involving
Quakers in which juries had, from the standpoint of authorities, threatened the public order by making a mockery of the law and bringing
courtroom proceedings to a virtual standstill? And why did not. Vaughan
lay down a rule (as he might have) that placed some limits upon the jury's
power to frustrate both the bench and the law? Vaughan's draft opinion
leaves the impression that he had at first intended to set some limits to
jury deviation from the facts adduced in court. Subsequently he altered
his opinion, providing what must have seemed to contemporaries a lame
excuse: a jury, after it had been questioned by a judge, might somehow
have changed its mind (in the direction of innocence) in the intervening
time. Vaughan might have ruled that a jury that rendered a verdict totally
in the face of the evidence presented in court (as it seemed to the bench)
but could not explain why it had done so had gone beyond legal limits. For
reasons that are difficult to uncover, Vaughan seems ultimately to have
responded almost viscerally to a deep-seated notion concerning the
sanctity of the juror's conscience. It is probably true that Vaughan and his
judicial brethren could afford to do so since there were relatively few
cases in which jury discretion born of "conscience" might lead to real
conflict with the bench. But that is only to affirm rather than to deny the
existence of the concept of verdict according to conscience.

3
Thanks to recent research, we now know a great deal about crime and
criminal prosecution in the eighteenth century. John Langbein has shown,
for instance, how cut and dried the trial process could be. Because,
however, that process was employed for "selection" of offenders for one
or another level of punishment (as Langbein and John Beattie have
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demonstrated), the trial inevitably took on several related but not always
consistent social meanings. It is not surprising, for instance, that to many
contemporaries the trial appeared to be open-ended and even arbitrary.
Nor is it surprising that contemporaries disagreed about whether the
judge or the jury was in control. There are, moreover, matters about
which we cannot as yet be certain. How, e.g., did most of the populace
view the trial? Did they identify the criminal trial jury as an extension of
society or as an arm of authority? Did they regard jury verdicts as
arbitrary, or did they possess a settled understanding of the kinds of
offenders and offenses that were singled out for the various levels of
available sanctions? Did they perceive the jury as a bulwark of liberty, or
did they see jurors as pliant and venal (as some literary sources depicted
them), as simply actors in a grand farce?
I have suggested that we must be cautious about assimilating jury trial
to those institutions and procedures by which eighteenth-century authorities manipulated the affections of society at large. Although I am not
certain that any institution or procedure ought to be viewed mainly in that
way, some of them were handled in a manner that greatly strengthened
the hand of authorities. However we characterize the intent of Crown and
bench in these instances, we must distinguish the jury from other
institutions on the basis of the effect its use had both on governance and
on the relationship among the political and social orders of the eighteenth
century. It is of course true that the criminal trial jury offered an
important opportunity for cooptation of the middling and lower ranks of
lay society. Authorities' use of the jury-and the apparent esteem in
which the jury was held by the contemporary establishment-doubtless
contributed to the stability of their rule. Through the jury, England's
rulers extended the "beneficence" of the law to virtually all social orders.
Judicial endorsement of jury verdicts was bound to enhance the position
of authorities, whose mandates were implemented by an institution that
many people probably viewed as reflecting the standards of society at
large.
It is also true, however, that the jury's usefulness to authority depended upon the reality of the jury's independence both historically and
in terms of contemporary decision making. The relationship between
authorities and the institution of the jury was symbiotic. Authorities took
their standards at least in part from juries; through the jury, authorities
achieved more substantial enforcement of those standards than they
might otherwise have achieved. Might one, then, postulate the existence
of a ''ruling class'' that comprised the orders that served as judges, jurors,
and prosecutors (many of whom were too poor to serve as jurors but
sufficiently well-endowed to be the chief prey of thieves)? On such a view,
upper, middling, and lower-middling orders created an alliance in order to
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govern, according to their own shared standards, the lowest ordersperhaps fully a third-of society. To a significant degree, this is an
appropriate characterization of what actually occurred. But jurors commonly took their own standards from a variety of sources, and it seems
likely that they saw the world through the eyes of frightened defendants
even as they saw it through those of their own more insulated social
betters with whom they presumptuously identified and whom they often
sought to please. Jurors mediated by bringing rulers and ruled closer
together. The standards that they accepted were for both practical and
truly substantive reasons that much more acceptable to those above and
below them. The power exercised by eighteenth-century authorities was
very great, but the substance of the justice they provided, merciful as well
as merciless, through their (unavoidable) use of juries reflected the
interests of much of society. To put it slightly differently: authorities'
power to determine the content of this substantive justice-to establish
the terms upon which substantive rules would be applied-was severely
limited, and no institution reflected this limitation more dramatically than
the criminal trial jury.
This limitation was reflected not only in institutional realities and in
widespread social expectations regarding the administration of justice; it
was reflected also in influential contemporary discourses on the English
constitution and on the lessons of history. Although truly radical Interregnum thought was never assimilated by later jury proponents, the
nullification theory espoused by Lilburne (as of 1653), Penn, Hawles, and
those who opposed the later Stuarts' manipulation of grand and petty
juries achieved more than surface respectability. Having rested their
legitimacy in part upon their defense of the historical constitution, the
Whig government could not unilaterally determine the meaning of the
post-1688 settlement. Eighteenth-century authorities might claim that,
although the jury was still in use, it was no longer required as a bulwark
against tyranny, but that claim was open to rebuttal by the political
opposition. As I have argued, the longstanding ethic of jury discretion and
the more episodic tradition of true jury nullification fused both in practice
and in theory; they are not entirely separate even in the pages of so strong
an ally of the prevailing political order as Blackstone.
4

I have devoted little space to the motives that underlay the mitigation
of the law. This is of course an enormous subject, for motives varied from
time to time and place to place. They varied, too, depending upon the
background, character, age, and gender of the defendant (or the victim);
upon the persons responsible in given cases for mitigating the law; and
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upon the stage of the prosecution at which those persons undertook to do
so. By and large, I have treated the subject only very generally. I have
focused instead on the way the English thought about the practice of
jury-based mitigation, and I have left to the many scholars now at work on
the history of criminal law the tasks of analyzing and characterizing
geographical, temporal, and other variations in the behavior of juries
(including the important differences between the treatment of men and
women) and of assessing that behavior in the light of the history of the
many other stages in the enforcement of the criminal law. A truly
comprehensive history of jury-based mitigation of the formal law awaits
the results of these forthcoming studies. I should conclude this section,
however, with some brief observations on the matter of motives-that is,
the attitudes that led society to mitigate the law-and on the relationship
between that important subject and my own study of the criminal trial
jury.
Students of Tudor and early Stuart England have pointed to the fit
between, on the one hand, a system of criminal justice that announced
legal imperatives in definitive terms but provided abundant opportunities
for bestowing mercy and, on the other, a religious ethic that portrayed all
men as sinners, as subject to temptation and transgression, but proffered
opportunities for redemption to all but the worst of the fallen. Legal and
religious systems of maintaining order and saving souls, they have
asserted, in reality constituted a single system. Not only did society at
large see the matter in this fashion, but authorities also explained it in
these terms. Professor Herrup has developed this argument with particular force, characterizing Elizabethan and Jacobean enforcement of the
criminal law as part of a religion-based process of rehabilitation, or moral
regeneration. This seems to me, in fact, a plausible way of understanding
the practical application oflegal rules across the entire period, 1200-1800.
My own study of the history of the criminal trial jury points to some
contours of the evolution of this worldview that, in some dimension, is
with us still. The tendency to assimilate the law to prevailing religious
notions is undoubtedly age-old. Religious and secular norms were not
viewed as separate in the Middle Ages. Post-Reformation Puritanism
intensified belief in the omnipresence of sin and the capacity for moral
regeneration, but it did not mark a new departure in the identification of
serious criminal offenses with breaches of divine command. The royal
pardon had always carried with it-or was supposed to carry with it-the
imprimatur of Godly Mercy; the refusal to forgive an offender, and the
ritual of execution, were imbued with the notion that the offender was in
the eyes of God beyond earthly redemption.
It may be that from the outset of the common-law period it was
assumed that a variety of institutions, the jury included, would apply the
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law in a merciful fashion. We simply do not know how far authorities
countenanced such behavior. At the very least, if authorities did believe
that prosecutors, grand jurors, and trial jurors should conform to the
formal rules of law, they also believed that the Crown should apply those
rules in accordance with the standards of divine justice. I have suggested
that society's reluctance to adhere to formal rules was far greater than
authorities had at the outset assumed it would be. Indeed, society's
disposition was apparently more merciful than that of the Crown, for
early on the Crown left itself relatively few opportunities to intercede to
prevent executions. Social (including religious) attitudes that were themselves in part-but only in part-engendered by secular and religious
authorities combined with the relative lack of royal institutions of
mitigation to produce a powerful degree of community intercession.
We have seen that authorities reacted to widespread social intercession
in a variety of ways. In some of its manifestations that reaction must be
viewed as an attempt to monopolize and to limit the exercise of mitigation. To the extent that they were unable to do so, and especially with
regard to those instances where they viewed the extension of mercy as
both inevitable and just, authorities came to understand the system of
criminal administration in terms that both accommodated the divine
aspect of secular justice and accorded with the realities of practice. This
is, then, how I would interpret the perspective of authorities by the Tudor
period. Authorities had by that period made sense for themselves and for
others of the practices over which they were coming to exert greater,
though still far from total control. Their assimilation (to a substantial
degree) of society's definition of the role and purpose of legal institutions
had already taken place and so constituted one of the limiting factors that
prevented them from willing, or attempting, a more complete form of
control. Within the context of prevailing legal and religious norms, norms
to which authorities gave significant degrees of definition and shape,
authorities sought both to control and to share the power of mitigation.
They were influenced in their views regarding both the appropriateness of
mitigation and the institutions that ought to bestow it by the kinds of cases
with which they were confronted and by the realities of the still-early
stage in the evolution toward relatively greater royal control that the
system of criminal administration had reached.
The evolution toward royal control (I have suggested) is difficult to
trace precisely because control came to involve manipulation of lay
institutions, including the jury, even while the power of pronouncing the
resolution of cases was left in lay hands. Thus it is difficult for us-as
indeed it was for contemporaries-to determine whether the late
seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century criminal trial jury was a
relatively independent mitigator or a relatively dependent one. Authori-
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ties and society at large probably viewed the institution differently in this
regard; it is possible that when authorities and jury proponents clashed it
was as much because of social assumptions about what juries did, and
were supposed to do, as because of what, at least in most cases, juries in
fact did.
By the dawn of the modern era the understanding of the purpose of the
institution of the jury may have altered in yet another significant way.
New ways of thinking about human behavior had slowly emerged, mainly
changing, but also weakening, the grip of religion upon society's understanding of the operation of the criminal law. As before, the law served to
control and to rehabilitate, but the concept of rehabilitation was being
transformed by the increasing emphasis upon the social origins of criminal
behavior. Jurors sometimes took such notions into account in their
decisions about the fate of offenders. For their part, authorities interpreted the jury's role as co-mitigator in terms of jurors' inclination to
"use" the law to sort out the blameworthy at least partly in terms of the
constraints under which offenders had acted and the likelihood that the
new sanctions of transportation and hard labor would reform them. This
more secular perspective on the causes of criminality and the prospects
for reform was intimately joined with the more traditional religious
conception of sin and redemption. Few contemporaries thought about
them as truly separate interpretations of human behavior. But the
implications of the new perspective should not be minimized, for that
view contained a threat to the most crucial assumption that underlay the
system of criminal law.
By the eighteenth century, if not long before, some contemporaries had
come to hold two potentially contradictory views concerning human
behavior: offenders were the product of social circumstances; offenders
acted freely and should be held criminally responsible for their acts. The
prevailing system of administration of the criminal law highlighted this
contradiction. The maintenance of the death penalty alongside an open
search for reasons not to apply it focused attention on, among other
things, the degree of constraint under which a given offender had acted.
Authorities, and apparently much of English society, accepted the fact
that such constraints were very powerful. The pardon process itself, and
certainly the reasons for which many pardons were granted, testified to
this understanding of the nature of much human behavior.
Critics of the prevailing system made their own use of the same insight:
the death penalty was unjust in many cases because the criminal was a
mere product of his background-his upbringing, associates, and needs.
At the same time, it was assumed that there was a realm within which
people acted freely. Few writers attempted to draw a line between the act
for which one was responsible and the act for which one was not. It was
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as though most critics assumed that, with reform of the law of sanctions,
the problem of constraint would melt away. They seem to have shared an
almost universal view that the disparity between the nature of the offense
and the level of the proposed punishment determined the relevance of
evidence bearing on the defendant's freedom to have done otherwise than
he did. But this was neither a new phenomenon nor one that died with the
reforms of the nineteenth century. Perhaps we will come closer to
understanding this aspect of eighteenth-century English mentality when
we consider the way in which the same contradiction prevails in our own
assumptions and language regarding criminal justice.
It is conventional to say that we believe that nearly all offendersindeed nearly all persons-are mainly free, and thus mainly responsible
for their acts, save for the few "insane" who, we agree, bear no
responsibility at all. Some, we believe, are more free than others, and it
is the degree of freedom or nonfreedom that we, like those before us, take
into account. The sanction of death is reserved, on this view, for those
whose acts are, as it seems to us, both extremely serious and at least
substantially free. That is a modern view, but it is useful to keep it in mind
as one studies the history of criminal law from medieval to modern times.

IV
The foregoing essays explore various aspects of the history of verdict
"according to conscience," stressing the relationships among them.
These relationships are often difficult to establish, for the various motives
they reflect were not always separate in the minds of jurors, officials, or
contemporary observors.
I have given considerable attention to the idea of the jury as a bulwark
against tyranny, an idea that, from the seventeenth century until recently,
has loomed large in historical scholarship. But I have attempted to
demonstrate that this traditional view does not capture what was behaviorally the most significant aspect of the jury's place in medieval and early
modern English culture. Pride of place must be reserved for the jury's role
as a mitigator of capital sanctions in felony trials. This aspect of jury
history, which bears a complicated relationship to the political role of the
jury, is itself a multifaceted phenomenon.
We can best understand jury mitigation by focusing on jurors' attitudes
regarding the appropriateness of punishment for specific defendants who
had acted in particular ways. The most prevalent attitude was, in its most
general form, a belief that the defendant did not deserve as harsh a
punishment as the law provided. Such a belief is, of course, consistent
with any number of specific attitudes toward the defendant or his
behavior. For example, the defendant's peers may view his act as lawful,
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or they may view it as unlawful but not so serious as to merit the
prescribed sanction. The latter, by far the more common view, may
reflect either the view that the defendant has suffered enough or the view
that, although the defendant has not suffered enough, the prescribed
sanction would make him suffer too much. Either stance may spring from
the common feeling that defendants deserve mercy if they repent of their
behavior and/or if their behavior was in some significant degree the
product of forces beyond their control.
In studying the effects of these aspects of jury behavior, I have
developed several main themes. First, I have sought to show that the
jury's role as mitigator was a by-product of institutional arrangements
that were themselves (albeit indirectly) the result of the tensions between
legal rules and social norms occasioned by the Angevin revolution. To a
certain extent, the political implications of those tensions would in any
case have made it difficult for authorities to develop an administration of
the criminal law that was managed entirely by officials and so contributed
to the need for a jury-like institution. But the existing weaknesses in
English bureaucratic and policing capacities perhaps counted even more
heavily: simply put, lay cooperation was required at every stage in the
legal process. Once the institution of the jury came into being, both
jury-based intervention and a struggle to limit its reach were virtually
inevitable.
Second, the history of legal doctrine was itself affected by the interaction of legal and social tensions with the institutional arrangements
embedded in the administration of the criminal law. The law of homicide
and the rules of forfeiture and of statutory benefit of clergy reflected
responses to social realities. Tensions were muted not by head-on
collisions between judge and jury but by the manipulation of categories,
by the creation of alternative punishments, and by the powerful ethos
inherent in the ritual and substance of the royal pardon. The evolution of
the substantive criminal law cannot be understood apart from social
processes; yet the relationship between the doctrine of the criminal law
and other social processes was so complicated that we may never be able
to sort out fully the strands of that relationship.
Third, the ideology of jury mitigation (the more modest law-finding
tradition) was relatively stable even though the specific motives that
underlay mitigation were ever-changing. The community's attitudes
toward criminal offenders were in part a product of transient notions
regarding appropriate behavior, but they were also a product of more
enduring relationships between individuals and society. Those attitudes
were, moreover, in part a product of the very fact of jury participation.
Institutional realities created or reinforced social norms and expectations.
Man was not simply to be judged but, apparently, to be judged by his
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fellowmen. He might be the subject of divine mercy, but divine mercy
was to be granted not only through God's vicar, the king, but also through
all of God's subjects, the community as represented by the jury. Secular
and religious authorities might help define the concept of mercy in cases
in which juries participated, but so, too, did both episodic movements and
longstanding traditions within the community at large. Verdicts that were
at one level routine, even cynical, repudiations of the capital law and that
registered instead approval of a harsh, lesser sanction were conceptualized (or at least rationalized) by participants and by both lay and learned
observers in terms of the prevailing understanding of merciful verdicts
according to conscience.
Fourth, the more radical tradition of the jury as judges of law as well as
fact underwent important changes between the time of Lilburne' s first
trial and passage of Fox's Libel Act. It was a tradition born of, and
influenced by, English constitutional and political conflict. The criminal
trial jury came to represent the community in the face of (allegedly)
tyrannical or otherwise illegitimate authority, and as concepts of political
legitimacy changed, so too did the radical conception of the jury's
law-finding role: from the true and sole judges to monitors of a legitimate
but potentially abusive bench. Appeals to history played an especially
important role in this tradition: the Levellers invoked an equalitarian
Anglo-Saxon past; Rawles drew upon the ''persecutions'' of Lilburne and
Penn; many Hanoverian critics of seditious libel doctrine took their stand
upon the nullifyingjuries of the Restoration. The relationship between the
radical tradition and the jury's role as mitigator in more routine cases was
complex. We are still far from understanding the influence of jury-based
mitigation on Leveller thought. Vaughan's defense of uncoerced factfinding was open to misappropriation by political dissidents who probably
cared little about the fate of common-run thieves. Even among those who
shared eighteenth-century reformers' opposition to what appeared to be
an ad hoc system of justice, the daily role of the jury in helping to resolve
routine cases could be turned to advantage. As the two traditions drew
closer together, at least in some corners of contemporary political
rhetoric, the more radical view was restated in terms that invoked the
purposes and values implicit in the more commonplace and officially
assimilated view-making control of the latter all the more significant to
all concerned.
Fifth, the struggle to define the terms on which mercy was to be
granted, or to define the limits of appropriate jury behavior in commonrun cases, was integral to the entire administration of the criminal law.
Authorities might manipulate some stages of that administration with
what seems like almost a free hand. If we focus on the shaping of
indictments by officials, on their handling of royal pardons or mitigatory
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legislation, on the judge's role when passing sentence, or on the words
and demeanor of royal officials at executions, we are likely to stress the
degree to which the criminal law-and especially selective enforcement of
that law-was an instrument of royal power. If we focus on the jury, the
matter is more ambiguous. Although juries might be packed, harangued,
threatened, and even, before 1670, coerced, there were always practical
limits to the control authorities might exert. Moreover, acquiescence in
jury intervention in some kinds of cases weakened attempts to control
them in others. In the institution of the jury, one sees most clearly the
dialectical aspect of the administration of the criminal law. Official
attitudes, not only as they expressed themselves in judge-jury relations,
but also as they were revealed in legislation, in judicial development of
the law, and in the entire field of royal administration of both mercy and
unforgivingness, reflected an assimilation of community attitudes. This
fact does not vitiate the power of the concepts of class conflict and
domination. It does suggest an approach-by no means a novel one-to
the application of those concepts, one that might help us to understand a
particular complex of forces at work in the English past. At least with
respect to the use of the criminal trial jury, the phenomenon of domination might best be understood in terms of the widespread, communitybased attitudes that officialdom assimilated, in part reshaped, l:lnd then
imposed as though they were largely of its own creation.
Sixth, the English system of criminal administration that I have
described involved substantial costs, only some of which were recognized
by contemporaries. It involved a form of jury behavior that distorted and
perhaps delayed development of the criminal law. By providing an
opportunity for jurors to select from among those whom the law had
doomed those whom the community would save, and those whom it
would not, it gave vent to, and legitimated, not only merciful attitudes but
also (we can be certain) the meanest sort of prejudices. As a result of the
system, some judicial attempts to prevent juries from exercising mercy in
common-run felonies were perhaps wrongly thought to reflect a taste for
the gallows rather than principled opposition to jury law-finding and the
belief that all mitigation ought to be left to Crown and bench. Though the
problem of uncertainty of the law was ultimately recognized (and then
perhaps even exaggerated by contemporaries), for long the perceived
advantages of the approach to penology that the system accidentally
produced delayed legal reform. Indeed, it delayed reform until jury trial
had come to be viewed (in some quarters) as an open farce, risking the
result that all jury discretion might come to be viewed as unlawful or
unwise.
Finally, the roots of mitigation are embedded not only in religious
norms, intracommunity relationships, legal mandates, and political reali-
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ties; they are embedded also in the particular and enduring human
response, in given cases, to excuse persons who have acted as those who
sit in judgment of them might have acted, or with respect to whom
(though the reason may not be clear) anger has subsided. The truly evil
who deserve to die do so because-as it seems to jurors and other
judges-the wrongs they have done are "unforgivable," which is to say,
beyond earthly redemption. However, the perception of what is unforgivable is colored by personal and status relationships to the accused and the
degree to which those who judge him are able to get beneath his skin, or,
if they stand back, how much they come to understand his apparently
criminal act as the product of forces over which he had little, if any,
control.
It is difficult to trace the impact that notions of constraints on human
behavior had on both official and lay participation in the administration of
the criminal law. By the late eighteenth century, however, the trial had
evolved to a large degree into a sentencing process in which the element
of social determinism undoubtedly played a significant, if sub rosa, role.
At the same time, determination of guilt or innocence had become so
confused with the issue of the appropriate sentence that the entire
proceeding was subjected to scorching criticism. The reform of the law of
sanctions in the nineteenth century lessened the pressure on juries to find
a basis for partial or entire exculpation in evidence suggesting that the
defendant's behavior was to a significant degree beyond his control.
Thus, the reforms, undertaken in order to produce certainty and, thereby,
to deter criminal behavior, had the additional virtue of safeguarding the
notion (ought one say: fiction?) that wrongdoers typically act with
sufficient free will as to justify their conviction. As I plan to demonstrate
in future studies on the jury, the concept of will, and the criminal law, one
of the most significant characteristics of modern Anglo-American jurisprudence has been its tendency to separate the two determinations that
the centuries-long evolution of English criminal administration had forced
together. First the post-1850jury would determine whether the defendant
was guilty, in the sense of having "voluntarily" committed an unlawful
act; then the defendant would be sentenced, often (by virtue of later
reforms) in the light of a presentencing report in which he appeared as the
plaything of social forces. This institutional solution to the ambivalence
about the nature of human behavior that has increasingly afflicted modern
culture has, for better or worse, served the purposes not only of those
who rule us but of all of us as we rule each other and ourselves.
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208-15, 210 n.35, 382; bill regarding
legality of, 219-21; binding over by
judge, 141 n.l51, 206 n.l9; fining by
judge, 209 n.31, 210, 210 n.33, 211,
213, 213 n.52, 219, 219 n.SO, 220, 225,
231-32; judicial browbeating, 327-28
n.50; legality of, 208-15, 210 n.33,
236-49; legality of, debated in the
Commons, 219; Penn's views on, 232;
Rudyard's views on, 232, 234-36;
Starling's views on, 233-34, 234 n.l41;
threatening by judge, 214, 249 n.l92;
views of "Reasons" on, 246-48. See
also Bushel's Case; Judge; Kelyng;
Tyrrell
Coercion of jurors (grand): fining by judge,
218; threatening by judge, 214 n.57
Combat. See Trial by battle
Commission of 1380, 58 n.115, 74
Committal statute. See Statutes
Common law, 163, 175, 185, 186, 196, 223,
226, 229, 247, 335; Leveller understanding of, 164 n.32 (see also Levellers)
Common lawyers, 163
Common Pleas, Court of, 236, 236 n.l50,
239, 241, 244
Commonwealth, 183
Commonwealth bench, ISO
Community: and community-based system
of law, ISO; concept of murder, 53;
concept of self-defense, Chapter 2 passim; and criminal defendants, 4; dependence of royal authority upon,
68-69; and judicial recommendations
for mitigation of law, 283 n.51; Leveller view of, 185-86, 186 n.I07; local,
and Lilbume's views regarding law,
192; perspective on the criminal trial,
374; perspective on role of criminal
trial jury, 267-68, 370-71; sympathy
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toward suspects, 48; view of the criminal-law, 149 n.178
Community, attitude of, in Middle Ages,
regarding: defense of kin, 43; liability,
351 n.142; liability in Anglo-Saxon period, 50; retaliation, 38; slayers, 58;
slaying adulterer, 42; slaying in course
of open fight, 38; slaying housebreakers, 41; thieves and theft, 61-64
Commutation of sentence, 5, 145. See also
Pardon; Transportation
Compensation (to victim): and Leveller
reform demand, 161 n.24. See also
Composition
Composition, 5, 6, 9, 10, 50, 51, 58, 97
Compurgation, 5
Concord. See Settlement
Confession, 81, 131-32 n.lOO, 132 n.l02,
137
Conquest. See Norman Conquest
Conscience: of jurors, 188,231, 238,244,
246, 246 n.182, 251 nn. 201-2, 251-52,
252 n.203, 255, 257, 201, 273, 298,
308, 327 n.49, 337 n.93, 348, 373, 381;
Leveller appeals to, 193-94, 197;
Leveller invocation of, 184-86; and
Leveller view of law, 167, 185-86;
Quaker appeals to, 204, 208
Conspiracy (false indictment), 25 n.93
Constable, 112, 222, 364
Constitution, English, 375; role of criminal
trial in, 335; role of criminal trial jury
in, 331-33, 336
. Construction (of statutes). See Judge: interpretation of law
Contemporary observers. See Criminal
trial: observers of
Continent, 368; criminal justice on the, 289
Continental reform theory, 297
Contract, 372
Conventicles, 202, 203
Conventicles Act. See Statutes
Conviction rates. See Homicide; Theft
Coroner, 34 nn.16 and 18, 77, 80 n.44, 89
n.78, 91 n.91, 171; enrollments of, 45
n.66, 58; rolls of, 14, 33, 35-36; treatment of accidental homicide, 86 n.62,
93 n.96
Coroner's inquest, 17, 36 n.25, 52, 58-59,
61, Chapter 2 passim, 88 n.72, 210
n.33; alteration of facts by trial jury,

397

38 n.28; assessment of defendant's
reputation, 58: how verdicts were
reached, 37
Council, 113, 131, 277
Counsel, 16, 135 nn.127-28, 136 n.l31,
270, 270-71 n.2, 339, 363, 366; denial
of, 135-36; for Quakers, 211; right to,
172, 173, 175, 194, 199 n.170
County: trials in, 179, 181, 186 n.108, 188
County court, 7, 17, 21
Court, Royal, 250
Courts. See Anglo-Saxon; Chancery; Common Pleas; County; Exchequer; Hundred; King's Bench; Star Chamber
Courts baron, 181
Courtsleet, 181
Crime: increase of, 305, 313; perception of
seriousness of, in fourteenth century,
73 n.23. See also Arson; Burglary;
Causes of crime; Homicide; Larceny;
Murder; Robbery; Theft; Treason
Criminal law. See Crime; Law
Criminal trial, nature of: in eighteenth century, Chapter 7 passim; in Middle
Ages, 14-20; observers' commentaries
on, in eighteenth century, 285-88, 286
nn.57-58 and 60, 287 n.62; in sixteenth
century, 129-43. See also Criminal
trial jury; Judge; Verdict; Witnesses
Criminal trial jury:
acting in tandem with judge, 284, 284-85
n.54
alteration of facts, Chapter 2 passim, 77,
96
application of law, 260-61, 346-49
attempts to secure jury friendly to authority, 132-33
behavior in medieval period (summary),
98-100
Blackstone's view of, 294-96, 296 n.94
bulwark against tyranny, 333, 334, 379
coercion by judge. See Coercion of jurors
competence of jurors debated, 161, 161
n.26, 182, 182 n.102, 187-88, 325-31,
335, 339-43
composition of, 13,21-22, 52 n.92, 114,
132 n.106, 133, 133-34 n.111, 271,271
n.4, 351 n.l42
consent to trial by, 12 n.36, 15, 15 n.45,
20 n.63
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contemporaries' perception of, in eighteenth century, 310-17
contemporaries' views on role of, in seditious libel, Chapter 8 passim
corruption of, 19, 22, 26, 27, 28, 63, 65,
76, 102, 105, 114 n.24, 140
costs of system of merciful discretion,
382
Dagge's view of, 300-301
debate in Parliament concerning seditious libel. See Parliament: debate
concerning seditious libel law
deliberations, 18, 139, 139 n.42, 150-52,
272, 272 nn.7 and 10, 287-88
discretionary role, 13-14, 20, 98, 184,
212, 218, 260-61 n.231, 353, 363-64,
365-66
duty of, regarding truth, 138
early forms of, 14
Eden's view of, 298-99
effect on development of the law, 72, 76,
77-79, 82, 84, 85--86, 89 n.80, 93-94,
100 n.l05, 129
embellishment of verdicts, 36--37
encomiums to, 334-35
exercise of merciful discretion, 26, 63,
126, 198, 239, 280, 307, 312-13, 369-70
fear of reprisal, 26, 28, 29
Fielding's criticism of, 292
finality of verdict, 20 n.63, 147. See also
Bushel's Case
foreman, role of, 272
Hawles' view of duty of, 255-58
impact of tradition of discretion on administration of criminal law in eighteenth century, 344-46, 350-51, 352-53,
365
impaneling of second jury, 67-68 n.6
inexperience of jurors, 150-52 n.l79
Interregnum movement for law reform,
160-62, 186, 187, 187 n.109. See also
Hale Commission
judge-jury relationship. See Judge: judgejury relationship
judges of law as well as fact, 153, 159,
173, 174-75, 195, 206, 224, 228,
229-30, 235, Chapter 8 passim, 381
jury's perspective on right to employ
discretion, 150-52 n.l79
knowledge of attitudes of common people, 341-43

law-finding theory, 168, 173-75, 184,
191, 196, 197-98, 207,248-49,252-58,
260-64, 299, 331 n.64, 333-34, 335,
381, Chapter 8 passim. See also Criminal trial jury: judges of law as well as
fact
law-finding traditions, fusing of, 349,
351-52, 375, 381
Leveller perspective on, Chapter 5 passim
merciful tendencies of, mocked by prisoners, 361-62
mitigation by, criticism of, in eighteenth
century, 288-310 (text and notes passim), 358-59
mitigation of law, motives for, 29 n.2,
58, 282 nn. 47-48, 280--84, 379-80
names of defendants and charges supplied to, 134
nullification of law by, xviii-xx, 26, 27,
62-63, 228, 239. See also Criminal
trial jury: discretionary role; judges of
law as well as fact; law-finding theory
nullifying role, origins of, 364
orality, importance of, 137
origins of, 4, 11, 11 n.30, 13 n.39; as asserted in eighteenth century, 331-32
origins of tradition of merciful discretion, 376--77, 380
out-of-court-information, in eighteenth
century, 283-84 n.52, 287, 287 n.64.
See also Criminal trial jury:
self-informing
packing of, 251, 270
partisan behavior, 28, 29
Penn's appeal to, 224, 225-26, 228,
229-30
qualifications for service, 22, 26, 114,
132, 132 n.104, 188, 189, 251
recommendation to judge to seek pardon, 282 n.48
relation to presentment jury, 8 n.20, 14,
16--17, 19, 21-22
religion and merciful discretion, 375-79,
381
responses to judicial questioning, 67-68,
67 n.5, 67-68 n.6, 68 n.7, 81-82 n.49
right to trial by, 115, 116, 144, 149, 229,
258, 260, 261, 347
Rudyard's views on role of, 230-31, 232
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scope of fact-finding power discussed,
254-55, 262
self-informing, 16-18, 17-18 n.55, 18
n.56, 27, 105-6, 114, 216 n.69
self-informing, decline of, 108-9, 119
standard of proof for guilt. See
Evidence: standard of proof
Star Chamber proceedings, 113-14; responses to examination by, 142,
141-42 n.152, 142 nn.53-56, 143 n.57
statutes read to, 256
summary of arguments concerning role
of, 367-83
undervaluation of stolen property, 107,
127, 275, 276, 276 n.28, 280, 292, 295,
298
unsubstantiated testimony, 33
Vaughan's view of role of, 241-43
veracity of verdicts in Middle Ages,
Chapter 2 passim
views of role of, in Bushel's Case,
236-49 Crown, 295-96; claim to be
able to interpret law, 163; as fount of
justice, 71; pardon policy and revenues of, 95; and pardon process,
72-73, 72-73 n.21; pleas of, 5-6, 50,
367; restraints on power to pardon
(see Pardon; Statutes); theory of royal
mercy, 86, 376-77 (see also Mercy;
Wit e)
Custom, 178, 335
Damages, 174
Decentralization: of legal system, 161. See
also Levellers
Declaration of Indulgence, 262, 320
Defendant. See Crime; Criminal Trial;
Criminal Trial Jury; Judge; Pardon;
Reputation
Defense of home, 41
Defense of kin, 43, 43 n.58
Deference to authorities, and mitigation of
law, 283-84 n.53, 290 n.72, 311, 313,
368, 374-75, 381-82
Delegation of legal authority, and Leveller
theory, 183, 184, 186 n.107, 197-98
Deliberation. See Criminal trial jury: deliberations
Deodand, 88, 88 n.69, 89 n.78
De odio et alia, writ of, 11, 13 n.39
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Depositions, 109 n.4, Ill n.l2, 137, 137
n.l37, 272 n.9
Deterrence, 95 n.99, 102, 289, 295, 297,
299, 303, 307, 366
Diggers, 190 n.122
Discretion: exercised by presentment jury,
8, 9. See also Criminal trial jury: discretionary role; law-finding theory;
Mercy
Disturbance of peace, 222, 225, 226-27
n.114, 227
Domination, 382
Due process, 196, 228, 235, 352
Enforcement. See Selective enforcement
English Civil War. See Civil War, English
Enlightenment, 268
Enrollments, 68 n.8, 73 n.23, 87, 97 n.lOI,
129; accuracy of, 49 n.78, 68; details
of testimony, 47-48. See also Chapters 2 and 3 passim; Coroner: rolls of
Equality, 191-92 n.132
Error, writ of, 239
Evidence, 7-8 n.l8, 16, 16 n.48, 17, 18,
26-27, 28, 37 n.27, 150-52 n.179, 224,
229, 230, 241-44, 251, 251 n.201, 252,
253-54 n.210, 270-71 n.2, 271, 271 n.6,
272, 278, 281, 282; law of, 267, 274,
336; standard of proof, 25-26, 26 n.94,
273-75, 273 n.13, 280-81, 286 n.58,
347 n.129
Exaction, 16
Examination, pretrial, 119, 137, 139, 275.
See also Depositions
Exchequer, 210; barons of, 236 n.150;
Court of, 210, 211
Exclusion crisis, 250-51
Excusable homicide. See Homicide
Execution, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 19, 79, 80, 101,
144, 306-7 n.132; percentage of convicts actually subjected to, 144-45
n.162; rate, for capital offense, 279-80;
after summary process, 80, 80 n.44,
81-82 n.49, 82 n.50
Eyre, 11 n.30, 12-15, 16 n.48, 17, 17-18
· n.55, 18-19 n.59, 20, 20 n.64, 22,
22-23 n.79, 23, 25 n.93, 32 n.10, 47, 52
n.92, 68 n.8, 180
Fact, questions of. See Bushel's Case;
Criminal trial jury: law-finding theory;
Seditious libel: law of
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False imprisonment, 236 n.po
Famine, 24, 69
Felons, manifest, 30, 35, 79-80 n.40, 80
n.42, 83; power of justices of the
peace to try, 24
Felony. See Crime
Feud, 50, 51, 80, 80 nn.42-43, 367
Feudal tenures, !55
Fifth Monarchy, 157
Fines, 9, 14, 15, 25, 51, 5!-52 n.88, 53, 66,
89 n.78, 114 n.24, 180, 225. See also
Wite; Coercion of jurors: fining by
judge
Firearms, 93, 123-24
First finder, 37
Flight (from justice), 30, 80 nn.41-42,
81-82 n.49, 89 n.78, 90-91 n.87
Forfeiture, 15, 30, 77, 86, 88-89 n.75,
90-91, 90-91 n.87, 91 n.88, 92 n.92,
93, 95, 95 n.99, 99, 100, 100 n.J05,
122, 123, 380
Forgery, 22-23 n.79
Fox's Libel Act. See Statutes
Frankpledge, 7 n.15, 15
Freeholders, 52 n.92
Free press, 341, 350
Free speech, 341, 350, 353
Free will, 296, 301, 302, 302 n.118, 316,
378-79, 383
Fundamental constitution, 189
Fundamental liberties, 183, 268, 307
Games, accidental deaths in course of, 90
Gangs, 69, 73 n.23, 76, 127
Gaol. See Prison
Gaol delivery, 16, 20, 20 n.64, 21 n.70,
21-22, 22-23 n.79, 23, 34; conviction
rates at, 32 n.JO; false accusation at,
25 n.93; rolls, 60, 90-91 n.87
General verdict. See Verdict: general
Glorious Revolution, 262, 320, 321
God, 3, 14, 19, 27, 88 n.69, 164, 166, 167,
169, 171, 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 186
n.107, 191, 204, 206 n.19, 208, 215,
225, 227, 246 n.182, 252, 305, 349,
376, 381
Goths, 331
Grand assize: jury of, 11
Grandjury, 66,97-98, 113, 115, 131, 171
n.59, 214, 250, 258, 258 n.225, 259,
261, 274-75, 275 nn.20 and 22, 280,

312, 361, 377; relationship to presentment jury, 8 n.20; and transition from
presentment to indictment, 112. See
also Presentment jury
Guildhall, 170
Habeas corpus, writ of, 168, 210, 237, 237
n.151, 240, 241
Haberdashers' Hall, Committee of, 192
Hale Commission, 156-57, 157 n.12, 160
n.22, 186, 187 n.109
Hamond v. Hamond, 236 n.150
Hamsoken, 54, 82 n.52, 85 n.61. See also
Housebreaking
Hanging. See Execution
High Commission, Court of, 155
High Court of Justice, 156
High misdemeanor. See Misdemeanor:
high
Highwaymen, 60
Historical evidence, 180
History: Leveller views of, 184, 189, 198
(see also Norman Yoke); Penn's use
of, 227 n.J16; role of, in seditious libel
debate, 331-33; Starling's views on
Penn's use of, 228
Home Circuit, 150-52 n.l79
Home Office, 277
Homicide, 5, 6, 9, 10, 17, 26, 33, 108, 243,
256, 269, 368, 369, 372; through accident, 12, 16, 17, 24 n.88, 30, 51, 70
n.l4, 71, 79; through accident, rules
of, 86-93, 105, 123-24; analogy of
jury's role in, to seditious libel, 324,
326, 329, 342-46; capital and clergyable, line between, 126; chastisement,
in course of, 214, 217; comparative
treatment of, through self-defense and
accident, 89 n.80, 90-91; conviction
rates for, 22, 22-23 n.79, 34, 61-ti2,
106-7, 122; false accusation of, 25
n.93; fining by Kelyng in cases of,
214, 216-220; gradation of, 106-7;
through insanity, 24 n.88, 30, 70 n.J4;
jurors fined for verdict in cases of, 209
n.3l;justifiable, 30, 41, 79-86, 81
n.48, 86 n.62, 92, 122-23; law of, 30,
119-20, 120 n.58, 253-54 n.54, 380;
law of, and relationship to jury, in
early modem period, 124-25 n.80;
malice implied in, 254;
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murder-manslaughter distinction, 30,
125, 126 n.82, 143, 216, 216 n.70, 217;
presentment for, 8; reporting requirement, 10 n.27; in self-defense, 12, 16,
17, 22-23 n.79, 24 n.88, Chapter 2 passim, 70 n.14, 71, 77, 78-79, 81-86,
122-23, 123 n.72, 214, 216--18, 256,
344; in self-defense, rules of, 35,
37-38, 71 n.17, 82 n.52; slaying self in
attempt to slay another, 90--91, 91
n.89, 92 n.92, 123; societal distinction
between simple homicide and murder,
32; unemendable, 50. See also Manslaughter; Murder
Hot blood, 56, 122
Housebreaker, 30, 77-78 n.34
Housebreaking, 55, 60, 82 n.50, 83, 84
House of Commons. See Parliament
House of Lords. See Parliament
Hue and cry, 17, 32-33, 36 n.25, 79-80
n.40, 81--82 n.49
Hulks, 361
Human nature: and merciful sentiments,
303, 375-83 passim
Hundred, 6, 8 n.19, 17, 178, 186 n.108,
188, 189; bailiff of, 21, 52 n.92
Hundred jury. See Presentment jury
Imprisonment, 3-4; false, 236 n.150. See
also Causes of crime; Prison
Indictment, 134, 135, 222, 223, 224, 225,
227, 228, 231, 257, 261, 287 n.61; relationship to presentment, 25; relationship to trial verdicts, Chapter 2 passim. See also Grand jury; Presentment; Presentment jury
Infanticide, 269
Information, 210, 261
Infortunium, 86, 87
Innocence, presumption of, 274
Inns of Court, 119, 119 n.54
Inquest: special, 15 n.45; early form of
trial jury, 9 n.25, 12; on writ de odio
et atia, 11-12
Insanity. See Homicide: through insanity;
Pardon
Insanity, criminal, 379
Intent, criminal, 253, 253-54 n.210; felonious, 120; jury assessment of, 126, 150,
323 n.l6, 342-44, 347, 348-49; in sedi-
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tious libel, 319-20, 320 n.7, 322-24,
342-43 n. 118; in treason, 128
Interregnum: movement for law reform in,
Chapter 5 passim, 293, 294, 371. See
also Levellers
Involuntary manslaughter, 124 n.78
Jail. See Prison
Jesuits, 250
Judge:
administration of system of mitigation,
277-78
attitudes toward criminal trial jury, 115,
115 n.29
charge to jury, 139, 139 n.141, 205,210,
273, 276, 278 n.36, 281--82
as "cipher," 169 n.54, 169-70, 173 n.67,
229
coercion of jurors. See Coercion of jurors
comments on evidence at trial, 138, 272,
272 n.9, 273, 278, 278 n.36, 279, 285,
313-14
compassion, 99 n.1 04
conviction against the evidence, remedying, 145, 145 n.163, 280--81 n.43
as counsel for defendant, 172
development o[legal rules, 78-79, 94,
97, 111, 124, 369
encouragement of jury to mitigate, 149,
150--52 n.179, 278, 280--81, 285
inability to monitor jury truthfulness, 28
interpretation of law, 260, 276
judge-jury relationship, 18 n.58, 48, 49,
110-11, 119, 124-25, 129-30, 138-40,
146, 147, 148-49, 150-52 n.179,
168-69, 188, 241--42, 253-54, 254--55,
271, 278-79, 282, 284, 284--85 n.54,
351 n.142, 370, 380; in seditious libel
cases, Chapter 8 passim. See also
Criminal trial: observers of, in eighteenth century
local magnates and gentry serving as, 21
n.70
mitigation of law by, 150--52 n.179, 277,
280--81 n.43, 306
monitoring bailment by justices of the
peace, 109-10
Penn's views on role of, 229
perspective on jury behavior, 35, 66--67,
76, 77, 85-86, 93, 96, 98-99, 110
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n.l05, 115, 115 n.29, 126, 128, 150-52
n.179, 307
questioning of jury, 67-68, 67 n.5, 68
n.8, 81 n.48, 140
reasons for recommending mitigation of
law, 282 n.49, 283-84, 283 n.51,
283-84 n.53
right to punish jurors (before 1660), 140,
141 nn.150-51
role in criminal trials, 16, 18, 18 n.58,
270-71
suspicion regarding alleged accidental
slayers, 91-92
suspicion regarding alleged property defenders, 84
suspicion regarding alleged
self-defenders, 49, 79
Vaughan's view regarding role of,
240-42
Wilkite criticism of, 334
See also Commonwealth bench·
Westminster bench Judgment': verdict
nothwithstanding, 277
Junius trials, 324
Jurisdiction, private: and criminal law, 24
n.86
Juror. See Criminal trial jury
Jury. See Civil trial jury; Criminal trial
jury; Grand jury; Presentment jury;
Special jury
Jury bill. See Parliament: Commons committee on jury bill; Lords' consideration of jury bill
Jury packing. See Criminal trial jury: packing of
Justices: local, 7 n.l7, 179
Justices of assize, Chapter 4 passim;
270-88 passim
Justices in eyre, 3, 6, 7, 7 n.17, 14, 47,
178-80, 182
Justices of gaol delivery, Chapters 2 and 3
passim
Justices of oyer and terminer, 21, 130, 210
Justices of the peace, 21 n.70, 24, 34 nn.16
and 18, 58 n.115, 61, 66, 69, 74, 364,
369; and bail statute, 109-10; origins
of investigatorial role of, 111-13
Justices of trailbaston, 178
Keeper of the peace, 21 n.70, 24, 112, 112
n.l9, 179

Kin, 51, 58, 80 n.42, 86 n.62; defense of,
. 77-78, 77-78 n.34; prosecutions by, 5
Kmg. See Crown; Royal authority
King's Bench, Court of, 130, 141 n.150,
168, 178-81, 206 n.19, 209, 210, 211,
212,237,237 n.51, 241, 272 n.9, 277,
323
Kingship, 163; theories of, 369
King's peace, 6 n.13, 80 n.42
Knights, 15-16 n.47, 52 n.92
Labor, imprisonment at hard, 191
Laggamanni, 332
Land registration, 157
Larceny, 5, 6, 10, 60; grand, 127-28 n.86,
279; grand, conviction rate for 107·
petty, 11, 20 n.63, 107, 127-28,n.86:
275, 279
Last resort. See Homicide: in self-defense
'
rules of
Latin, 49, 162 n.28
Law: certainty of, 309; changes in, and
effect on judge's perspective on trial
jury behavior, 370; changes in, and
effect on trial jury practice, 370;
charge of obstruction of, 114; decentralization, 178-80, 185-86, 187; fundamental, 183, 191, 197, 224; law and
fact joined, 260-61 n.231; law and fact
distinguished, 169, 169 n.49, 173-75,
184, Chapter 8 passim; Leveller view
of nature of, 184-86; principles of development of, 93-94; "true," and
Quakers, 207-8; whether knowable
339-40. See also Anglo-Saxon; Co~
munity; Crime; Criminal trial jury;
Homicide; Judge; Private law; Seditious libel
Law French, 165
Law reform: Angevin, 6, 6 n.13; of
Edward I, 23, 24, 86-87 n.64;
eighteenth-century movement for,
288-310, 354-55, 378-79; Interregnum
movements for, 155-57, 160, 176, 180,
186-92; nineteenth century movement
for, 356-63. See also Hale Commission; Levellers
Lechery, 78 n.36
Leech's Case, 210, 210 n.35, 233, 233
n.140, 244-45, n.177
Leets. See Courts leet
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Legislation, 70-71; capital sanctions, 311;
of Edward I, 23; exclusion of offenses
from benefit of clergy, 117-18, 118
n.49, 127 n.84, 275, 275 n.24, 280;
qualifications for jury service, 114,
132. See also Statutes
Levellers, 153-59, 160, 162, 187, 332,
371-72, 381; criticism of system of
criminal law, 162, 162 n.28; natural
rights theory, 164 n.32-33; opposition
to discretion of authorities, 167 n.42;
phases of debate over the jury,
159-60; and Scripture, 164, n.33; understanding of history, 153 n.3, 164
nn.32-33, 165-66; view of the bench,
184; view of history of judiciary, 165
n.36; view of the medieval jury,
165-66, 198. See also Law reform:
Interregnum movements for
Leveller tracts. See Index of Persons and
Places, passim
Liberties, 7
Literacy test: benefit of clergy, 118, 118
n.50. See also Benefit of clergy
Local politics, 370
Lockeian, 332
Magistrate, and exercise of discretion, 275
n.23
Magistrate, Godly, 186, 190
Magna Carta, 13 n.39, 165, 178, 179, 180,
181, 183, 189, 196, 219-20 n.81, 222 n.
94, 229, 232, 257
Malice, 12, 53, 54, 71, 93, 125, 219, 219
n.80, 253-54 n.210, 254; aforethought,
54, 55, 56, 74. See also De odio et
atia
Manifest felons. See Felons, manifest
Manslaughter, 52, 107, 118, 118 n.49, 122,
124, 214; as distinct from murder (sixteenth century and after), 106-7; involuntary, 124 n.78. See also Homicide
Mayor of London, Lord. See Starling, Sir
Samuel
Mens rea, 56, 57, 339-40
Mercy, 5, 10 n.26, 86, 86 n.62, 99, 106,
195, 198, 207, 245, 293-94, 307, 311,
336, 382; characteristic of English law,
347-48; exercised by presenting jury,
13 n.38; and royal pardon, 24 n.88,
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376-77. See also Criminal trial jury:
discretionary role; Judge: encouragement of jury to mitigate
Military service and pardon policy, 31, 70,
72-73 n.21, 101, 146
Misadventure. See Homicide: through accident; Infortunium
Misdemeanor, 24, 241; high, 225, 372
Mitigation: debate over who should exercise power of, 288-310; inevitability
of, under general capital sanction,
308-10; system of, in eighteenth century, 274, 280-88. See also Benefit of
clergy; Criminal trial jury; Judge; Pardon; Pregnancy, claim of; Reprieve;
Royal authority; Transportation
Moral certainty. See Evidence: standard of
proof
Moral regeneration, 376
Murder, 5, 8 n.l9, 10, 35-36, 36 n.25, 45,
50 n.80, 53-58, 53 n.95, 58 n.115,
73-74 n.24, 214, 234, 253-54 n.210; in
Anglo-Saxon law, 50, 53; definition of,
in fourteenth century, 74-75, 74 n.25;
definition of, in late fifteenth century,
117 n.46; as distinct from manslaughter (sixteenth century and after),
106-7; indictment for, 33, 34, 34 n.18;
and pardon statute (1390), 33; societal
distinction between murder and simple
homicide, 32, 53-59
Murdrum, 51, 53, 55, 74 n.25, 100 n.105
Mutilation, 9, 10
Natural justice, 295, 296
Natural rights, 186 n.107
Necessity: and criminal behavior, 293; as
legal defense, 296, 297 n.96; theory of,
in theft, 128, 128 n.87
Negligence, 86, 87, 88 n.72, 89, 89 n.78,
91, 124
Neighbor, and theory of merciful jurors,
195
Newgate, 60 n.l27, 213 n.52, 222, 229,
236, 362
New Model Army, 155-56
Norman Conquest, 4, 50, 163, 187, 189-90
n.121
Norman legal procedures, 164 n.32
Norman Yoke, 162, 163, 165, 173, 189. See
also Levellers
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Novel disseisin, 174, 175
Nullification, jury. See Criminal trial jury
Oath, 7, 7 n.17, 8, 13, 19, 20 n.63, 27,
66-67, 80 n.42, 82, 114, 189, 275 n.23,
307, 327 n.49, 359
Officials, local, 17
Old Bailey, 194, 208, 213, 222, 226, 362
Old Testament, 186, 195
Ordeal. See Trial by ordeal
Ordinances of !311, 70 n.14
Outlawry, 16 n.48
Outlaws, 30, 80, 80 nn.41-42
Oyer and terminer, 24; commissions of,
21, 113; trials on commissions of, 21
n.70. See also Justices of oyer and
terminer
Pardon, 10 n.27, 12, 19, Chapter 2 passim,
145, 289, 295 n.90, 304, 306, 311, 336,
348, 366, 368, 380, 381; charters of,
86; granted on condition (transportation), 279-80; for homicide, rules regarding, 30-31; and increase of crime,
24-25 n.89; judge's request to Crown
for pardon, 139-40, 277 n.34; of
course (de cursu), 24 n.88, 30-31, 61
n.l31, 70, 72-73, 75, Chapter 3 passim, 100 n.105, 117; of course, for defense of kin, 77-78 n.34; of course,
and development of law, 93; of
course, and pardon policy, 72-73 n.21;
of course, rules applicable to, 83, 84;
of grace (de gratia), 24-25, 24 n.88,
30-31' 46-47, 70-71, 73-74, 85, 99,
116-17, 120, 280, 386; of grace, attempts to restrain royal granting of,
25, 70-76; of grace, and development
of law, 119 n.54, 121 n.63; of grace,
protests against, 33; of grace, and statute of 1390, 33-24, 75; reasons for
granting, 145 n.163, 283, 283 n.50,
301, 378; royal policy toward, and effect on jury, 59; statutory grants of,
117 n.40, 121 n.63; terms of, 86 n.62.
See also Military service; Statutes
Pardonable homicide. See Homicide:
through accident; through insanity; in
self-defense
Parliament, 63, 72-76, 155, 156-57, 163,
164, 167, 167 n.43, 168, 169, 170, 171,

172 n.63, 180, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196,
197, 204, 212-21 (text and notes passim), 236 n. 150, 241, 242 n.169 243
250, 313, 322, 324, 326, 328 nn.SI-5Z,
332, 349, 353, 356, 358, 359, 361, 363;
attempts to limit pardons, 70 n.14,
73-74, 73-74 n.24, 75-76; attention to
crime, 25; bail and committal statutes,
110-11 (see also Statutes); committee
for reform of criminal law, 362-63;
Commons committee on jury bill
(1667), 221 nn.86 and 87, 238; concern
with jury corruption, 26, 114 n.24;
concern with serious crime, 73 n.23,
73-74, 73-74 n.24; debate concerning
seditious libel law, 324, 330, 330 n.62,
331, 331 n.64, 349, 352, 352 n.147 (see
also Statutes: Fox's Libel Act);
Lords' consideration of jury bill
(1667), 221 n.87; and pardon process,
71-73, 72 n.20, 73 n.22; proceedings
regarding Kelyng, 212-21, 232, 237,
246, 248, 345; and qualification for
jury service, 114, 132. See also Statutes
Parliament, and gradation of punishment.
See Benefit of Clergy; Legislation;
Statutes
Partial verdict. See Verdict: partial
Peine forte et dure, 15
Penn and Mead's Case, 208, 243, 256. See
also Trial: of William Penn and William Mead
Penology, 190, 267, 268, 276, 368; English
approach to, in eighteenth century,
289; English reform movement (eighteenth century), special characteristics
of, 290-91. See also Law Reform
Peijury: by jurors, 114 n.24, 140, 242,
359-63. See also Criminal trial jury:
corruption of
Petition of Right, 189, 257
Petitions: to Parliament, protesting royal
pardon policy, 73-74 n.24; for commutation or pardon, 283, 283 n.51
Petty assize, II, 20 n.63
Petty larceny. See Larceny, petty
Petty treason. See Treason, petty
Philosophical necessity, 301-2, 301 n.l16,
302 n.118. See also Dawes, Manasseh
Pilfering, 292
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Pious peijury, 295, 298, 335, 360
Piracy, 118 n.49
Plague, 24, 69
Plea bargains, 118 n.50, 131-32 n.lOO, 132,
148, 150-52 n.l79
Plea rolls. See Enrollments
Plead, refusal to, 194. See also Peine forte
et dure
Pleas of the Crown. See Crown: pleas of
Poachers, 270
Poisoning, 50 n.80
Police, 357-58; professional force, 362;
system, reform of, 364
Policing, 380
Political offense. See Treason; Seditious
libel
Political prosecutions, 270
Popish Plot, 250-51, 250 n.193, 252
Pregnancy, claim of, 118 n.50, 186
Premeditation, 45, 53-56, 121-22
Presentment, 6 n.l4, 7, 7 n.17, 9, 10, 13
n.39, 14, 17, 18-19 n.59, 21, 24, 25, 25
n.91, 26, 51, 51 n.87, 51-52 n. 88, 52,
98
Presentment jury, 3-4, 7, 7 n.17, 8, 8
nn.19-20, 9, 10, II, 11 n.30, 12 n.35,
15, 16 n.48; and discretion, 10-11, 10
n.26, 12, 13-14, 14 n.41, 98, 367; and
fine for concealment of felony, 9; how
informed, 16-17; relation to trial jury,
13-14, 15-16. See also Grand jury
Press, free, 341, 350
Presumption of innocence, 274
Printing: unlicensed, 253 n.209, 258
Prison, 7 n.l5, 34, 52; breach of, 22-23
n.79; at hard labor, 191; and Lilburne,
197 n.163
Prison reform, 160, 191 n.129, 296, 300,
301 n.112, 309 n.52, 361, 366. See also
Law reform; Penology
Private law, 11, 18, 20 n.63, 188, 189, 327,
372; complaints about, 187
Probability. See Evidence: standard of
proof
Proof, method of, 7-8 n.l8. See also
Compurgation; Criminal trial jury;
Trial by ordeal; Trial by battle
Property, 158, 187, 190 n.122, 227, 275,
372; defense of, 79, 84
Proportionality, 289
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Prosecution, 5, 7; development of royal
practices regarding, 108-9; malicious,
25 n.91
Prosecutor, private, 135, 270, 271, 275, 377
Protectorate, 157
Protestants, 250
Provocation, 219, 219 n.80, 253-54 n.210;
See also Homicide: in self-defense,
rules of; Manslaughter; Murder
Punishment: certainty of, 309, 383
Punishment of jurors. See Bushel's Case;
Coercion of jurors
Puritan Revolution. See Civil War, English
Puritanism, 186; and penology, 283 n.50
Quakers, 160, 198-99, 199 n.170, 200-201,
202-8, 209, 210-12, 215, 220, 221, 226,
228, 229, 230, 235, 239, 248, 249
n.192, 254, 256, 257, 373; prosecutions
of, 209-12, 213, 215-16, 217, 220. See
also Trial: of Quakers
Quarter sessions, 24, Ill, 369, 371. See
also Justices of the Peace
Questions of fact. See Criminal trial jury:
law-finding theory
Questions of law. See Criminal trial jury:
law-finding theory
Rape, 26, 15-16 n.47, 269
Reason and common law, 163, 171, 172
n.63
Reasonable doubt, beyond a. See
Evidence: standard of proof
Recorder of London, 213. See also Howe!,
Sir John
Reformation, English, 128, 185
Rehabilitation, 191 n.129, 293, 361, 378
Religion, and system of selective enforcement of criminal law, 376-78
Religious orders, 7 n.15
Reprieve, 139, 145-46, 145 n.163, 239, 366.
See also Judge
Reputation, 7 n.l5, 8, 10, 17, 20 n.63, 26,
58, 62, 73-74 n.24, 217, 245, 283, 283
n.52, 287, 343, 367. See also Criminal
trial jury: mitigation of law, motives
for
Respectability, 283-84 n.53
Restitution, 191 n.l29
Restoration, Stuart, 157, 253, 263-64, 274,
275, 381
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Restoration bench, 252 n.203
Retreat, rule of, in law of self-defense, 38.
See also Homicide: Self-defense, rules
of
Retrial, 277
Rex v. Care, 253 n.208
Rex v. Franklin, 321, 322, 341
Rex v. Green [et al.], 251 n.20l
Rex v. Harris, 253 n.208
Rex v. Hood, 219
Rex v. Langhorn, 251 n.202
Rex v. Owen, 324
Rex v. Selby, 210, 210 n.35
Rex v. Stockdale, 329 n.56
Rights, natural, 186 n.l07
Riot, 224 n.l04, 226
Riot Act, 308 n.l39
Robbers, 8 n.l9, 10, 73-74 n.24, 80 n.44,
81-82 n.49, 82-86, 94, 95 n.98; rules of
law regarding, 30
Robbery, 60, 75, 79, 81 n.48, 82, 84, 118
n.49; conviction rates for homicide
and, 62 n.l34
Roman law, 247
Royal authority:
concern with serious crime, 63, 69, 70,
102
concern with state trials, 129, 132, 133
control over law, special form of, in
eighteenth century, 314-15 n.156
and criminal law, 7 n.16
divine right, 163
enforcement of law, 7
extension of mercy, 70-71 , 73, 99,
376--78
failure to introduce gradations in law,
96, 99-100, 101-2
jurisdiction of, 9, l 0, 51
limits of power of, 4, 27, 68-69, 147, 352
n.l4l, 350-51, 352 n.l44, 375, 377,382
mitigation of Jaw, 267
opposition to corruption, 28, 68
original assumptions about role of criminal trial jury, 13, 367, 377
and perspective on behavior of criminal
trial jury, 26, 27,98-99, 105, 137, 140,
147-48, 149, 368-69, 378
and reach of legal rules, 80-81
relationship to tradition of criminal trial
jury discretion, 374-75
remedies, 9

use of criminal trial jury in administration of Jaw, 98, 364-65
use of system of selective enforcement,
101-2, 267, 310-15, 374, 381-82
See also Crown; Judge
Royal Court, 250
Royal prerogative, 24 n.88, 30, 163
Rump Parliament, 156--57, 192
Rye House Plot, 250-51
St. Asaph's Case, 328, 330, 338, 353 n.l48
Salisbury's Case, 121-22, 121 n.62
Sanctions, Jaw of: scope of capital, 275-76;
movements for reform of, 160, 187,
190, 356-63, 378-79, 383 (see also
Law reform; Penology). See also Execution; Imprisonment; Mutilation;
Transportation
Sanctuary, 80, 80 n.42, 116 n.38
Satisfied conscience. See Evidence: standard of proof
Saxon, 331
Scandalum magnatum, 253 n.208
Science, 247, 252 n.203, 274
Scientific, 252 n.203; assessment, 274; theory, 273
Scripture, 159, 164, 164 n.33, 182-83
n.103, 186, 190, 191-92, 191 n.130,
191-92 n.132, 204, 207, 246, 335, 339;
Leveller identification of, with law,
185, 186
Seditious activity, 222; of Quakers,
alleged, 203, 203 n.lO, 206
Seditious libel, 243, 249, 254, 257, 262, 262
n.232, 263, 269, 316, Chapter 8 passim; debate over Jaw of, Chapter 8
passim; Jaw of, 252, 253 nn.208-9,
253-54 n.210, 255, 319-20, 321 n.11,
342 n.117, 350 n.l38, 381; Mansfield's
views on, 32 n.10; reform of law of,
365; stages of the eighteenth-century
debate concerning, 321-31; tracts concerning, Chapter 8 passim (see also
Index of Person and Places)
Selective enforcement: criticism of,
359-63; contemporaries' mistaken assumptions about, 382; endorsement of,
303-4; opposition to, in eighteenth
century, 290; system of, in eighteenth
century, 314-15 n.l56, 289-90, 374;
use of, by royal authorities, 310-15,
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310-11 n.148. See also Criminal trial
jury; Judge; Royal authority
Self-defense. See Homicide: in
self-defense; Pardon
Sentences, in cases ending in partial verdicts, 279
Sentencing, judicial behavior at moment
of, 306-7
Servant: defense of master, 40, 78 n.36;
slaying of master, 57-58
Settlement, out of court, 9, 9 nn.24-25, 11
n.30, 58
Seven Bishops' Case, 263, 320, 321 n.11,
326, 328
Sheriff, 6, 7 nn.15 and 17, 16, 21, 52 n.92,
61, 66, 178; tourn of, 181
Ship Money, Case of, 241
Simple homicide, 46, Chapters 2 and 5 passim. See also Homicide
Social conditions. See Causes of crime
Society for Supporters of the Bill of
Rights, 334
Special inquisitions, 22-23 n.79, 47-48. See
also Inquest
Special jury, 321 n.11, 322
Special verdict. See Verdict, special
Standard of proof. See Evidence: standard
of proof
Star Chamber, Court of, 106, 113-14, 132,
155, 241, 245, 253, 253 n.209, 319; examination oftrialjury by, 137, 140-43,
140-41 n.l49, 141-43 nn.l52-57,
150-52 n.179
State trials, 106, 120, 130, 132-33, 137,
138, 140
Statutes:
52 Hen. 3, c.26 (1267): Marlborough, 100
n.105
6 Edw. l, c.9 (1278): Gloucester, 100
n.105
13 Edw. l, c.1 (1285): Winchester, 23
n.82
28 Edw. l, (1300): Articuli Super Cartas,
178, 279
2 Edw. 3, c.2 (1328): Northampton, 70
n.14
10 Edw. 3, c.2 (1336): limiting pardons,
70 n.14, 73-74 n.24
14 Edw. 3, stat. l, c.4 (1340): abolishing
Murdrum fine, 74 n.25
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14 Edw. 3, stat. 1, c.15 (1340): limiting
pardons, 73-74 n.24
25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c.3 (1352): challenge
of jurors, 22 n.75
13 Rich. 2, stat. 2, c. I (1390): limiting
pardons, 33, 56, 58 n.115, 71, 75, 75
nn.29-30, 85
2 Hen. 5, stat. 2, c.3 (1414): juror qualifications, 114 n.25
11 Hen. 7, c.3 (1495): dispensing with
grandjury, 115
23 Hen. 8, c.13 (1531): juror qualifications, 114 n.25
24 Hen. 8, c.15 (1532): slaying of felons,
30
26 Hen. 8, c.4 (1534): Welsh Marches,
114 n.24
1, 2 Phil. and Mary, c.13 (1554-55): bail,
109-10, 113
2, 3 Phil. and Mary, c.10 (1555): committal, 109-11, 113, 131
4, 5 Phil. and Mary, c.7 (1557-58): tales,
114 n.27
14 Eliz., c.9 (1572): tales, 114 n.27
14 Chas. 2, c.1 (1662): Quaker Act, 202
16 Chas. 2, c.4 (1664): Conventicles Act,
202-8, 216, 216 n.69, 222, 224 n.104,
226, 227, 242, 254, 256
4 Geo. 1, c.ll (1718): transportation, 276
n.29, 276-77 n.30
3 Geo. 2, c.25 (1730): juror qualifications, 271 n.4
32 Geo. 3, c.53 (1792): act for stipendiary magistracy, 358
32 Geo. 3, c.60 (1792): Fox's Libel Act,
252, 320, 320 n.7, 321, 330, 330 n.62,
331, n.64, 349-50, 350 n.138, 352, 354,
354-55 n.l52
10 Geo. 4, c.44 (1829): police system,
358
Strangers, 59, 81-82 n.49
Stuart bench, 251, 262-63
Stuart monarchy, 153, 167, 320-21, 375
Suicide, 92 n.92
Suspects, 8 n.20, 10, 11, 13, 13 nn.37-38,
14, 15, 16 n.48, 17, 22, 23, 32, 51-52
n.88, 60

Tales de circumstantibus, 114, 132, 133,
322 n.l45
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Target shooting, 88, 88 n.72, 88-89 n.76,
89-90, 94, 123-24
Terror and criminal law, 274, 277, 277
n.32, 292, 308, 308 n.139, 311, 311
n.150, 357, 362
Testimony, 66, 119, 253-54 n.210, 270,
272, 274, 281, 286; at coroner's inquest, 17; before presentment jury,
18-19 n.59
Theft, 9, 10 n.27, 21 n.70, 26, 59-60, 60
n.127, 61, 62, 73 n.23, 85 n.61, 106-7,
120, 126-27, 190, 191,269,344-45,
363; acquittal rates, 59; conviction
rates, 22, 22-23 n.79, 61-62, 279-80;
false accusation of, 25 n.93; jury's refusal to convict for, 26; law of, 128
n.88; presentment for, 8
Thieves, 8 n.19, 70 n.14, 73-74 n.24, 75, 80
nn.42 and 44, 82 n.52, 84, 94, 101,
182, 182-83 n.103, 190, 374; caught in
the act, 79; hand-having, 79-80 n.40,
80 n.44, 82
Throckmorton's Case, 141 n.151
Tower of London, 169, 176
Trailbaston, 21, 24, 25 n.93
Traitors, 10
Transportation, 127-28 n.86, 146, 276, 276
n.29, 276-77 n.30, 277, 279, 280, 284,
293-94, 313, 316, 361
Treason, 5, 62, 106, 128-29, 130, 131, 131
nn.98-99, 134, 135, 156, 170, 171, 199
n.170, 234, 249, 250, 253, 257, 259,
274, 365; law of, 119, 128 n.89
Treason, petty, 57-58, 118
Treatises, medieval: 369; perspective of,
on law of homicide, 71-72, 71 n.17, 82
n.50
Trespass, 21, 21 n.70; civil, 174, 372; criminal, 60, 64, 112 n.19, 225, 234; and
private prosecution, 60-61
Trial: of John Lilburne (1649), 170-76, 181,
183-84, 198; of John Lilburne (1653),
192-97, 198, 204; of William Penn and
William Mead, 208, 222-25, 228-29,
231, 232, 337; of John Penruddock,
199 n.170; of Quakers, 203,203 n.10,
206 n.18, 213; of Thomas Rudyard et
a!., 230; of Seven Bishops, 321; of Sir
Nicholas Throckmorton, 177 n.84; of
Sir George Wakeman, 251
Trial, new, 242 n.169

Trial by battle, 5, 11, 12 n.36
Trial by jury. See Criminal trial jury: consent to trial by; right to trial by
Trial by ordeal, 3, 4, 5, 7, 7-8 n.18, 8, 8
n.20, 10, 10 n.26, 11, 12, 13, 13
nn.37-38, 14, 19, 25, 51, 52 n.89, 97
Trial rolls, 17-18 n.55
Truth, not a defense in seditious libel, 319,
337
Tudor monarchy: and changes in criminal
law and procedure, Chapter 4 passim;
and perspective on administration of
criminal law, 377
Tumult, 227 n.115
Undervaluation. See Criminal trial jury:
undervaluation of stolen property
Unlawful assembly, 222, 226-27 n.l14, 227
Verdict: God's judgment, 14; inscrutability
of, 27; non-unanimous, 18; general,
174, 175, 267, 325, 352, 354, 355; partial, 150-52 n.l79, 209, 279, 280, 281,
286, 295 (see also Criminal trial jury:
discretionary role; Judge: encouragement of jury to mitigate); special, 19,
209, 217, 230, 260-61 n.231, 338; unanimous, 18. See also Bushel's Case;
Criminal trial jury: finality of verdict
Victoria, queen of England, 356
Viii, 8 n.19

Wagstaffe's Case, 210-11, 210 n.36, 212,
213, 213 n.52, 215, 233, 236-39, 244,
244-45 n.177, 246, 246 n.183, 248
War, 24
Wards and Liberties, Court of, 155
Wergeld, 31, 50, 51, 58
Western Circuit, 212, 217
Westminster bench, 182, 217, 278
Wharton's Case, 238, 244, 244-45 n.177
Whigs, 250, 263
Whipping, 127-28 n.86, 150-52 n.179,
276-77 n.30, 277
Wife: and defense of, 78 n.36; and slaying
of husband, 57-58
Wilkites, 291, 324, 326, 334, 335, 341, 348
n.133
Wite, 5, 50, 51
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Witnesses, 16, 16 n.48, 18-19 n.59, 37,
135, 136, 136 n.135, 204, 205, 222-23,
242,243,253-54 n.210, 271, 281, 312
Women, 376; and benefit of clergy, 118
n.50; and claim of pregnancy. See also
Pregnancy, claim of
Workhouse, 293, 293 n.79
Writ: de procedendo ad judicium, 182; of
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attachment, 182; of compulsion to execute, 182; of "life and limb" 13 n.39.
See also De odio et atia
Yearbooks, 15-16 n.47, 72 n.20, 73 n.22,
90--91, 92 n.92
Zenger's Case, 252, 322, 323

